Mrs. Rose InenemohUnuigbe -VS- Union Bank of Nigeria Plc- National Industrial Court of Nigeria

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT LAGOS

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE R. H. GWANDU

DATE: 18^th December, 2025 SUIT NO.: NICN/LA/308/2016

BETWEEN

MRS ROSE INENEMOH UNUIGBE……………..CLAIMANT

AND

UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC………………..DEFENDANT

LEGAL REPRESENTATION.

Chief Paul Omoijiade with Stephanie Ukonga-Ojeikere for the Claimant

Omotayo Omotoye for the Defendant

JUDGMENT

The Claimant commenced this suit via a general form of complaint filed on the 11^th May, 2016 which was further Amended on 13^th June, 2017 and sought the following reliefs.

A DECLARATION that the purported termination of employment of the Claimant is unlawful and wrongful as the said termination was done without regard to the contract of employment and the Collective Agreement.
A DECLARATION that the purported termination was without reason and not in line with the International Best Practice in International Relation as enshrined in the ILO convention Article 158 and recommendation 166.
A DECLARATION that the non-payment of severance benefits based on 150% total emolument to the Claimant when same was paid to her colleague is unlawful and discriminatory.
A DECLARATION that the termination of her employment “For services no longer required” amounts to redundancy.
A DECLARATION that the Defendant bank is in arrears of the Claimant`s gratuity in the sum of ?14, 404, 251 less ?5, 998, 380.00 already paid to the Claimant;
A DECLARATION that the deductions of unearned Housing ?39,963.29 (Thirty Nine Thousand Nine Hundred and Sixty Three Naira Twenty Nine Kobo) and Loans ?99, 555.22 (Ninety Nine Thousand Five Hundred and Fifty Five Naira Twenty Two Kobo) made to the gratuity paid by the defendant to the Claimant is unlawful, null and void
A DECLARATION that the withholding of the Claimant`s 150% exit package of her basic, housing, transport and lunch allowance of ?3, 500, 997.00 (Three Million Five Hundred and Ninety Seven Naira) in line with the Agreement between the Defendant, Association of Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions (ASSBIFI) and the National Union of Banks Insurance and Financial Institution Employees (NUBIFIE) dated 10% September, 2013 is wrongful, unlawful, and discriminatory;
A DECLARATION that the Defendant bank is in arrears of the Claimant`s 150% exit package of ?3, 500, 997.00 (Three Million Five Hundred Thousand Nine Hundred and Ninety Seven Naira) due to her in line with the MOA dated 10^th September , 2013;
AN ORDER of this Honorable Court compelling the Defendant Bank to reinstate the Claimant to her employment which was terminated without due process/procedure laid down in the Defendant Bank`s Hand Book and Collective Agreement.
AN ORDER for the refund of deductions of unearned Housing ?39, 963. 29 (Thirty Nine Thousand and Sixty Three Naira Twenty Nine Kobo) and Loans ? 99, 555.22 (Ninety Nine Thousand and Fifty Five Naira Twenty Two Kobo) made to the gratuity paid by the defendant to the Claimant.
AN ORDER for the payment of interest at 15% per annum (compounded annually) on payments under (j), (n) and (o) from 4/9/2015 till date of liquidation;
AN ORDER that the Defendant Bank being in arrears of the Claimant`s 150% exit package, pay to the Claimant the sum of ?3, 500, 997.00 (Three Million Five Hundred Thousand Nine Hundred and Ninety Seven Naira) being 150% of her basic, housing, transport and lunch which was never paid to her in line with Agreement with the Defendant, and Association of Senior Staff of Banks Insurance and Financial Institution Employees (NUBIFIE) dated 10% September, 2013.
In the alternative to (d) AN ORDER of this Honorable Court that the Defendant pay the Claimant redundancy benefits in line with Article 5 of the Collective Agreement.
In the alternative to (h) AN ORDER of this Honorable Court directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant one month salary in Lieu of Notice and payment of severance benefits in line with the Agreement of the Defendant and the Unions on 30^th September, 2014.
AN ORDER for the payment of Gratuity arrears of ?14, 404, 251 less ?5, 998, 380.00 already paid to the Claimant;
AN ORDER that the Defendant Bank Pay the sum of ?45, 300.000 (Forty Five Million Three Hundred Thousand Naira) as Damages/compensation calculated on the basis of the remaining twelve (12) years the Claimant would have been in the employment of Defendant for the wrongful and unlawful termination of the Claimant`s employment.

In response to the Claimant’s Amended Statement of Facts, the Defendant filed a Statement of Defence dated 8^th August 2016 and on 2^nd August 2017, the Claimant filed a Further Amended Statement of Facts and thereafter, filed an Additional Witness Statement on Oath 29^th October 2018.

The Defendant filed a Further Amended Statement of Defence. Pursuant to the Defendant Further Amended Statement of Defence, the Claimant filed an Additional Witness Statement on Oath on 29/10/21.

BRIEF STATEMENT OF FACTS

The case of the Claimant is that the termination of her employment was wrongful as same was done without regard to her contact of employment and the collective Agreement, ILO Convention 158 and ILO Recommendation 166, that she was never paid the one month salary in lieu of notice, nor paid 150% severance pay pursuant to the Agreement dated 10^th September, 2013 between the Defendant, Association of Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions (ASSBIFI) and National Union of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions employees (NUBIFIE). Furthermore, the Defendant deducted already earned income from her gratuity entitlement and based the computation of the gratuity entitlement on basic, salary, housing, lunch and transport instead of basic salary and all allowances.

The Defendants case is that it terminated the Claimant employment in accordance with the Contract of Service signed between the Claimant and the Defendant. The Defendant states that in accordance with Clause 7 of the Contract of Service, either party can determine the employment by providing one (1) month calendar notice in writing or the Defendant pays to the Claimant one (1) month salary in lieu of notice.

The Defendant said it deducted the sum of N39,963.29 and N99,555.22 from the Claimant account as unearned housing allowance and loan borrowed by the Claimant while in the service of the Defendant. The Defendant states that it paid the Claimant gratuity in full in accordance with the Defendant Trust Deed of Variation, 2004.

The Defendant states that the Claimant was paid her arrears of basic salary and allowance in full, and the Claimant is not entitled to any arrears whatsoever.

Trial commenced on 3^rd July 2019 and the Claimant opened her case and was examined-in-chief. The Claimant adopted three (3) Witness Statement on Oath dated 11^th May 2016, 12^th August 2016 and 29^th October 2018. On 18^th November 2019, the Claimant was cross-examined, and no re-examination was done.

The Defendant opened its case on 19^th February 2025, the Defendant sole witness, Mr. Francis Idiaghe adopted his Witness Written Statement on Oath filed 6^th July 2021 and tendered some documents. The Defendant’s witness was cross-examined and thereafter re-examined by the Claimant’s counsel.

Trial was concluded and the matter was adjourned for adoption of Final Written Addresses.

DEFENDANTS’ ARGUMENT.

The Defendants final address was filed on the 28^th April 2025, Counsel raised the following issues for determination by this Honourable Court-

Whether the termination of the Claimant’s employment by the Defendant is right in law?
Whether the Claimant has been able to prove her entitlement to one (1) month salary in lieu of notice and N237,150.38 less payment for arrears of her basic salary and allowance?
Whether the Claimant’s termination amount to redundancy, which entitles the Claimant to redundancy benefit?
Whether the Defendant was right to have deducted its outstanding loan from the Claimant’s gratuity?
Whether the Claimant is entitled to the sum of N8,405,871.60 as shortfall in payment of her gratuity?

Arguing issue one, Counsel submitted that the Claimant states that she was never issued any query before her employment was terminated by the Defendant, and thus, the Defendant violated the relevant provision of the collective agreement which was incorporated into her contract of employment, that she was not paid one (1) month salary in lieu of notice as contained in her Contract of Service which she signed with the Defendant, also that in her letter of termination dated 31/7/2015, the Defendant terminated her employment for service no longer required, which is unknown to her Contract of Service and Collective Agreement, and thus, makes her termination unlawful and wrongful.

That in the case of THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF THE CATHOLIC ARCHDIOSCESE OF ABUJA & ANOR v. BARTHOLOMEW AGBOCHONU (2020) LPELR-51191(CA) Per IDRIS JCA (P. 29, paras. A-G), it has been established and decided that a contract of service is the bedrock upon which an aggrieved employee must found his case where he complains about wrongful termination of his employment, and as such, he succeeds or fails upon the terms thereof.

Again, that in the case of UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC v. EMMANUEL ADEREWAJU SOARES (2012) LPELR-8018(CA) Per OKORO ,JCA (Pp. 15-18, paras. A-D), it has been established that it is the contract of service that governs the relationship between and employer and his employee, and not the collective agreement, the court has further held that a collective agreement will not govern the relationship between an employer and an employee, unless such collective agreement is incorporated into the contract of service.

The Court also held that a collective agreement cannot stand alone but must be incorporated into the contract of service for an employee to rely on it.

Counsel submitted that the Contract of service signed between the Claimant and the Defendant, has no collective agreement whatsoever incorporated in it, and as such, the Claimant cannot rely on the collective agreement as a means to determine whether her termination was wrongful or not. Moreso, the Claimant letter of employment dated 28/11/89 does not incorporate any collective agreement. Clause 7 of the contract of service signed between the Defendant and the Claimant, provides that for the Defendant to determine the Claimant’s employment, the Defendant can give to the Claimant one (1) month notice in writing, or salary in lieu of the one (1) month notice. The Defendant by its pleading and evidence has been able to establish that the Claimant was paid one (1) one month salary in lieu of notice, that it is prima facie that the reason why the Defendant terminated the Claimant’s employment was because her service was no longer required as contained on the face of her letter of termination dated 31/7/2015. See SAMUEL IYIOLA OGUNDIPE v. NIGERIA TELECOMMUNICATIONS LIMITED & ORS (2015) LPELR-24920(CA) Per NDUKWE-ANYANWU, JCA (Pp. 20-21, paras. E-F) and that by this legal authority, the Defendant can terminate the Claimant employment for any reason whatsoever, whether good or bad, provided the termination is in accordance with the terms of their contract.

Counsel submitted that by Clause 7 of the contract of service, the Defendant does not need to provide any reason before it could terminate or determine the Claimant’s employment, provided there is one (1) calendar month notice in writing or salary in lieu of notice.

Arguing issue two, Counsel submitted that the Claimant avers that after her employment was terminated on 31/7/2015, the Defendant did not and has not credited her account with one (1) month salary in lieu of notice, of which the Claimant tendered her statements of account from 1/7/2015 to 8/1/2016, that the Defendant in its response stated that the Defendant paid the Claimant one (1) month salary in lieu of notice in accordance with Clause 7 of her Contract of Service and letter of termination dated 31/7/2015.

The Claimant also states in paragraph 41 of her Witness Statement on Oath filed 29/10/21, that she was paid the arrears of her basic salary and allowance totaling N2,214,144.89 less N237,150.38 to arrive at a net figure of N1,976,994.51, of which the Claimant relied on her pay slip for the month of 7/23/2015 and it it is trite that any clam for loss of earning is a claim in special damages and must be fully particularized, see BENIN RUBBER PRODUCERS CO-OPERATIVE MARKETING UNION LIMITED v. S. O. OJO & ANOR (1997) LPELR-772(SC) Per IGUH ,JSC (P. 32, paras. A-B) where the Court held that any claims for loss of earning is a claim for special damages, which the Claimant must give full particulars of her rate of earnings in her pleading to enable the court calculate as best and as accurate as it can, the actual amount the Claimant loss.

Counsel submitted that by the Defendant’s letter of termination to the Claimant dated 31/7/2015, the Defendant stated in the said letter that the Claimant salary in lieu of notice has been (past tense) credited into her account. Suffice to say that the Defendant never wrote in the said letter of termination that the Claimant salary in lieu of notice will be (future tense) credited into the Claimant account. The Claimant stated that on 23/7/2015, the Defendant paid arrears of her basic salary and allowance totally N2,214,144.89 less N237,150.38 to arrive at a net figure of N1,976,994.51, the Defendant submits that it paid the above sum before the Claimant employment was terminated on 31/7/15.

The Defendant submits that the arrears of basic salary and allowance paid by the Defendant to the Claimant on 31/7/15, includes her one (1) month salary in lieu of notice.

Counsel submitted that if the Claimant was to justify her claim for one (1) month salary in lieu of notice and shortfall in arrears of basic salary and allowance, she must or ought to have given full particulars of the monies paid on 23/7/15, in order for her to establish that the monies paid on the said date does not include her one (1) month salary in lieu of notice and shortfall of her arrears of basic salary and allowance, that if the Claimant had given full particular of the money paid on 23/7/2015, the Claimant would have raised a benefit of doubt that the money paid by the Defendant on the aforesaid date, does not include the one (1) month salary in lieu of notice, shortfall in arrears of basic salary and allowance. see OTERI HOLDINGS LIMITED v. HERITAGE BANKING COMPANY LIMITED (2020) LPELR-50802(CA) Per TOBI ,JCA (Pp. 65-66, paras. F-B), BARR. SAMUEL ULEGEDE v. TYONA MBAPUUN (2021) LPELR-54205(CA) Per NIMPAR ,JCA (Pp. 47-48, paras. E-A).

Arguing issue three, Counsel submitted that in the case of UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC v. EMMANUEL ADEREWAJU SOARES(supra), the court held that the contract of service is the bedrock upon which an employee must found his case if he alleges that his employment is wrongfully terminated, the Claimant founded her case of redundancy on the collective agreement reached between the Nigeria Employers Association of Banks, Insurance and Allied Institutions (NEABIAI) and the Association of Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions (ASSBIFI), and as such, the said collective agreement relied upon by the Claimant was not incorporated into the contract of service signed between the Claimant and the Defendant or her contract of employment. The Claimant pleaded and gave evidence that she was not issued any query before her employment was terminated, and as such, her termination should be declared redundant with redundancy benefits.

Counsel submitted that the Claimants reliance on the collective agreement reached between the Nigeria Employers Association of Banks, Insurance and Allied Institutions (NEABIAI) and the Association of Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions (ASSBIFI) as a means to determine whether her termination should be declared redundant goes to no issue, as the said collective agreement was not incorporated into her contact of service, and as such, the Claimants claim for redundancy benefits must fail in its entirety.

Arguing issue four, Counsel submitted that the Claimant states in her Witness Statement on Oath filed on 29/1/18, that the Defendant deducted the sum of N99,555.22 from her gratuity without providing a proven statements of account to that effect, in the trial of 19/2/25, the Claimant testified while being cross-examined by the Defendant counsel that she was given a loan. The Claimant never testified that she had repaid the said loan during her cross-examination and/or re-examination, that it is trite that an admission of fact does not need further proof. The admission by the Claimant that she was given a loan by the Defendant, without further oral evidence that the said loan had been repaid in full, gives no doubt that the Claimant had repaid the said loan, see ZE DAVID OWORA EBEKE & ANOR v. OWORA EGWU & ORS (2020) LPELR-51472(CA) Per UMAR ,JCA (P. 13, paras. E-F).

Arguing issue five, Counsel submitted that the Claimant states that the Defendant short paid her in term of gratuity, by paying less to what she is entitled to. The Claimant states that by the Trust Deed of Variation 1996, the Claimant is entitled to 270% of her total emolument as gratuity. In response, the Defendant states that what govern the Claimant gratuity pay is the Trust Deed of Variation, 2004, of which the defendant complied with by paying the Claimant in accordance with the Deed. The Defendant also states that by the email dated 29/9/14 and 14/5/14 the Defendant informed the Claimant and all its employees the discountenance of gratuity pay.

Counsel submited that the applicable Deed of Variation relevant as at the time the Claimant exited the service of the Defendant, was the Deed of Variation 2004, that Clause 13 of the Deed of Variation 1996, provides that: The bank may from to time (with the consent of the Trustees) alter or amend any of the provision of this Trust or the rules or insert new provisions or rules therein.

Provided that no alteration shall be made:

Which will cause the main purpose of the fund to cease to be that of the provisio of pension and gratuities on retirement at a specified age for employees and former employees of the banks;
Which will result in the return of any portion of the funds to the bank;
The joint tax board shall approve of all proposed amendments to the trust deed or to the rules.

That suffice it to say that the first Trust Deed of Variation was made far back as 1972. The Trust Deed of Variation 1972 was amended in 1973, later amended in 1979, and further amended in 1996 before the extant Trust Deed of Variation 2004, that these amendments are all contained in the recital part of both the Deed of Variation Trust Deed of 1996 and 2004, that pursuant to the power vested in the Defendant in Clause 13 of the Trust Deed of Variation 1996, the Defendant created the Deed of Variation 2004.

Counsel submitted that by the power vested in the Defendant to amend the Trust Deed from time to time, the Defendant is restrained from altering such provision in the Deed where such will affect the pension and gratuity of retired employees of the bank and not terminated employees.

That in the instant case, the Claimant is not a retired employee, rather, her employment was terminated for service no longer required. By Clause 11 of the said Deed of Variation with the ‘’UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC, PENSION AND GRATUITY SCHEME-RULES’’, the normal retirement age of an employee of the bank shall be 60 years, it is no doubt that there are plethora number of cases that has distinguished the mode by which an employee may exit from an employment. See MR. ENIWOMAKE RICHARD OVIVIE & ORS. DELTA STEEL COMPNAY LIMITED (2023) LPELR-60460(SC), that having complied with the power vested in the Defendant in Clause 13 of the Trust Deed of Variation 1996, to amend the Trust Deed from time to time, without affecting the interest of the retired employees of the bank, the Trust Deed of Variation 2004 is applicable in calculating Claimant’s gratuity.

CLAIMANTS’ ARGUMENT.

The Claimants final address was filed on the 16^th June, 2025 and Claimants Counsel raised the following issues for determination-

Whether the termination of the Claimant for services no longer required accord with her contract of employment and International best practices?
Whether the termination of the Claimant amount to redundancy?
Whether the Claimant is entitled to the following other reliefs in the suit:

Payment of the shortfall in the Claimant’s gratuity entitlement in the sum of ?8,405,871.60 as per paragraph 37 of the further Amended Statement of facts.
Payment of the Claimant`s 150% exit benefit of ?3,500, 997.00 pursuant to the Agreement between NUBIFIE, ASSIBIFI and the Defendant dated 10^th September, 2013.
Refund of deducted already earned income:
Payment of interest on deductions and withheld Gratuity
Payment of the Claimant`s one month in lieu of Notice.
Payment of damages in the sum of ?45,300,000.00

Arguing issues one and three(v), Counsel submitted that the termination of the Claimant`s employment for services no longer required was not in accord with her contract of employment and Article 7 of ILO Convention 1982 on Termination of Employment (convention 158) and paragraph 8 ILO Termination of Employment Recommendation, 1982 (Recommendation 166), that paragraphs 46 and 47 of the Claimants further Amended statement of facts were never controverted by the Defendant who in paragraph 46 of her Further Amended statement of Defense averred that the Claimant’s appointment was not terminated based on any wrong doing, there was no basis to issue a query or giving warning letter to the Claimant though she was told not to report in the office and following her acquittal, the Claimant on 2nd June 2015 wrote the Defendant that she will be resuming on 8^th June 2015, the Defendant subsequently handed the Claimant a letter of suspension which was backdated to 25^th March, 2014, the Claimant was never paid the one month salary in Lieu of Notice as can be seen in her statements of account dated1st January 2013 to 29^th June 2015 (Exhibit RIU 15 Pg 1-11). The argument of the Defendant in paragraph 4.27 that it paid the one Month in Lieu of Notice before the Claimant`s employment was terminated on 3^rd July 2015 is not supported by evidence.

Also, that the argument of the Defendant that there was no violation of the ILO Convention is not sustainable, the Claimant`s contract of employment Exhibit Idiaghe 1, page 1-5. In paragraph 7 provides: “Notwithstanding anything herein contained either the Bank or the official may determine this agreement at any time giving to the other one calendar months’ notice in writing in that behalf but the Bank shall have the right to pay to the official one month`s salary in Lieu of such notice.”

Counsel submitted that the Claimant was arraigned before his Honor A.A Adefulire-Oghoere of the Lagos State Magistrate Court on 31^st March, 2014 on a three-count charge of conspiracy. She was discharged and acquitted on 15^th April 2015. During this period of trial, she was not given any formal letter of suspension. However, upon the recall of the Claimant from suspension, she was paid the balance of her withheld income pursuant to Article 4 (iii) (c) of the collective Agreement-EXH RIU 17a –c pg 1-59.

The Claimant in paragraph 44 of her further Amended statement of facts filed on 13^th June, 2017 averred that the termination of her contract of employment for services no longer required is unknown to her contract of employment and the collective Agreement. The Defendant did not totally controvert the Claimant’s averment in paragraph 42 of its Further Amended Statement of defense.

A cursory look at the contract of service – EXH Idiaghe 1 pg 1-5 article pages of the collective Agreement EXH. Idiaghe 4 page 1-16, EXH. Idiaghe 4 page 1- 16, EXH RIU17 pg. 1-59 and the handbook did not provide for termination for services no longer required, the requirement of clause 7 of the contract of service which require one month notice or payment in lieu of Notice was never compiled with by the Defendant. The Defendant in paragraph 4.20 of her final 26 Address submitted that the Claimant was paid one month salary in lieu of Notice pursuant to clause 7 of the contact of service.

The Defendant’s submission in paragraph 4.26 and 4.27 of her Final Address that she paid the Claimant arrears of her basic salary and allowances totaling ?2,214,144.89 less ?237,150.38 to arrive at a figure of ?1,976,994.51 on 23/7/2015 cannot support her claim to the payment of Claimant`s one month salary in Lieu of Notice. The Pay slip for 23/7/15 put the basic salary of the Claimant at ?81,791.67 in the month of July 2015. The sum of ?613,437.45 on the pay slip was the arrears of basic salaries withheld while the Claimant was on suspension. The pay slip for 23/4/2015 indicate basic salary of ?40, 895.83 – see EXH R1U3 pages 1-11. The pay slip indicate that the Defendant paid the Claimant her salaries on the 23^rd of every month, that it is therefore incredible to accept that the basic salary paid on 23/7/2015 will support the employment terminated on 31/7/15.

On the Collective agreement, Counsel submitted that the Claimant in paragraph 4.05 of her Final Written Address submitted that the contract of service is the bedrock of any case where the issue of wrongful termination of employment calls for determination and referred to the cases of THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF THE CATHOLIC ARCHDIOCESE OF ABUJA & ANOR V. BARTHOLOMEW AGBOCHONU (2020) LPELR – 51191(CA) PER IDRIS, JCA (P.29, PARAS A-G), but it is trite law that where several documents make up a contract they must be read together. See ETUK .V. HERITAGE BANK PLC. (2018) LPELR – 45777 (CA).

The Defendant in paragraph 4.07 to 4.14 of the Final Address argued that for a collective Agreement to be binding on the Defendant must be incorporated into the Claimant`s contract of employment and referred to the case of NIGERIA PLC V. EMMANUEL ADEREWANJU SOARES (2012) LPELR – 8018(CA), the submission of the Defendant no longer represent current position of the legal status of collective Agreements as the case of SOARES (supra) was decided before the coming into existence of the 3^rd Alteration Act, that the case of NATIONAL UNION OF HOTEL AND PERSONAL SERVICE WORKERS (NUHPSW) V. OUTSOURCING SERVICES LIMITED (2023) LPELR – 60683 (CA) PAGE 23 is the new position of Law and the Learned trial Judge recognized and took the liberty of it when it held thus:

“The Defendant has argued that a collective agreement is not justiciable. Section 254c (i) (ii) of the 1999 constitution, as amended has conferred this Court with exclusive jurisdiction “relating to the determination of any question as to the interpretation/application of any collective agreement”.

The power of interpretation and application of collective agreement approximates the power to declare as to the nature of rights, privileges and obligations existing under the collective agreement. By virtue of constitutional power of interpretation and application, a collective agreement is justified and enforceable in the said Provision, the jurisdiction frontiers of the lower Court, the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, was expanded to inter alia, hear and determine questions bordering on “collective Agreement” as in the instant case. It is important to note that this power granted the lower Court is “to the exclusion of any other Court”, that the power of interpretation and application of collective agreement approximates the power to declare as to the nature of rights, privileges and obligation existing under the collective agreement. By Virtue of constitutional power of interpretation and application, a collective agreement is justiciable and enforceable”. In the argument canvassed on behalf of the Respondent, in this regard, counsel must-have been oblivious of this sweeping constitutional power with which the National Industrial Court of Nigeria is clothed, to the exclusion of any other Court, to hear and determine the nature of the instant question. The constitutional dispensation moved the jurisdiction of the lower Court past the realm of mere interpretation, to include enforcement, id est, the determination of the question as to the “interpretation of any collective agreement”.

See section 7 sub section (i) (c) (i) of the National Industrial Court act, 2006. It needs to be unequivocally stated that the above statutory provision and the majority of the decisions, on which the Respondent placed its reliance, where pre-alteration position of the law, when the provision of section 7 of the NICN act, 2006 held away. The advent of the 3^rd Alteration Act, of the 1999 constitution, could be validly linked to a game changer when the wither to enforceable agreement becomes justifiable. But prior to the Alteration Act, the doctrine of privity robbed collective agreement of its agreement of its enforceability, except and until such times when terms of the agreement are incorporated into individual members” contract of employment”.

Further that the argument in paragraph 4.11 of the final Address that the Claimant`s letter employment did not show that the collective Agreement was incorporated into her contract of employment have been overtaken by the Court of Appeal decision in NUHPSW.V. Outsourcing Services LTD. (supra), that the Defendant`s Handbook – EXH RIU2 Pg 1-57 Volume 4 page 1 under SUB-HEAD “General” provides:

“in all matters affecting staff, attention must be paid into my current Union Agreement to which the Bank is a party. Such Agreement are binding upon the Bank, and are to be observed in the spirit as well as the letter” 21 volume 4 of the handbook under SUB-Head- “Contact of service” provides: “ Every member of staff must sign a contract of service Agreement and is bound by the conditions thereof in addition to the provisions of the relevant collective Agreement. A copy of the signed contract should be placed in the employee`s file”.

The Claimant was a member of ASSBIFI and tendered her pay slip which indicates payment of her Unions due to the Association, payment of union due is an incidence of union Membership. See the National Industrial Court of Nigeria Judgment (unreported) in valentine Ikechukwu Chiazor V. Union Bank of Nigeria PLC Suit No. NICN/LA/122/2014 the judgment of which was delivered on 12/7/2016 by his Lordship Hon. Justice Kanyip held that payment of Union dues is an incidence of union membership, see also ILO collective Agreement Recommendation, 1951 (No. 91).

Counsel submitted that the importance of the provision, in NUHPSW .V. Outsourcing services LTD(2003) LPELR – 60683B (CA) page 27 is that the National Industrial Court in considering the measure or quantum of damages is to do so in accordance with “good or international best practices in labor or industrial relations, which shall be a question of fact. It will be stating the obvious to say that prior to the Third Alteration, when employment and labor matters were handled by the High Court, there was no obligation to apply and follow good or international best practices. It is an innovative provision which seems to be directed at enthroning an entirely new employment and labour jurisdiction …”

Counsel submitted that the defendant in paragraph 4.12 of the written Address submitted that clause 7 of the contract of employment – Provides for payment of one month salary in Lieu of Notice and in paragraph 4.13 submitted that the Claimant was paid one month in Lieu of Notice. The submission of the Defendant that the Claimant was paid one month in Lieu of Notice is not supported by evidence.

Also that the Defendant in paragraph 4.15 of her Written Address referred to the case of SAMUEL LYIOLA OGUNDIPE V. NIGERIA TELECOMMUNICATIONS LIMITED AND ORS (2015) LPELR – 24920 (CA) and further argued in paragraph 4.16 and 4.17 that she was at liberty to terminate the employment of the Claimant for any reason whatsoever, whether good or bad, provided the termination is in accordance with the terms of their contract, in the instant case, the Claimant was never paid one month salary in Lieu of Notice. The attempt by the Defendant to hide under the salary and arrears paid to the Claimant after her recall as shown in the Claimant`s pay slip for 23^rd July 2015 – EXH. R1U3 pg 1-11 is unfortunate and not sustainable.

The Defendant`s argument in paragraph 4.17 of the Written Address that she does not need to give any reason for the termination of the Claimant is no longer in accord with international best practice particularly article 4 and Article 5 of ILO Termination of Employment convention, 1982 (No. 158).

That although the ILO Convention 158 and Recommendation 166 have not been ratified by Nigeria, the Court is empowered under section 254c (i) (f) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to have regard to international best practices in Industrial Relations. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in the case of NUHPSW V. OUTSOURCING SERVICES LTD (supra) and SOUARA ENERGY RESOURCES LTD V. OYEBOLA (supra).

Counsel therefore prayed this Court to hold that the termination of the Claimant`s employment without reason and without payment in lieu of the one month Notice violated her contract of employment, ILO Convention 158. The Defendant`s argument in paragraph 4.18 to 4.32 of her Final Address and reference to the case of BENIN RUBBER PRODUCERS CO-OPERATIVE MARKETING UNION LIMITED V. S.O. OJO AND ANOR (1997) LPELR – 772 (SC), OTERI HOLDINGS LIMITED V. HERITAGE BANKING COMPANY LIMITED (2020) LPELR – 50802 (CA) and BAR. SAMUEL ULEGEDE V. TYONA MBAPUUN (2021) LPELR -54205 (CA) that the Claimant has not provided particulars of the nonpayment of her one month salary in Lieu of Notice is not sustainable and calculated to mislead this Honorable Court. The Claimant pleaded her statement of account EXHIBIT RIU 15 PG1-22 from 1/1/13 to 29/6/15 and her pay slips from April 2014 to July 2015 EXH. RIU3pg1-11. There is no evidence of the payment of one month salary in Lieu of Notice. See paragraph 32 and 42 of the Claimants Further Amended Statement of facts which the Defendant did not controvert in her Further Amended Statement of Defense. It is trite law that facts admitted require no further proof.

Arguing issue two, Counsel submitted that the termination of the Claimant amount to redundancy, see paragraph 51 and 52 of the Claimants Further Amended Statement of Facts, the Defendant in paragraph 49 and 50 of the Further Amended Statement of Defense aver that the Claimant was terminated for services no longer required and not on ground of redundancy, the defense of the Defendant is very feeble and not sustainable. The Defendant in paragraph 4.35 to 4.38 of her Final Address cited the case of the Union Bank of Nigeria PLC V. Emmanuel Aderewaju Soares (Supra) and submitted that the collective Agreement sought to be relied upon was not incorporated into the Claimant`s contract of employment, the Claimant was a member of ASSBIFI and paid her dues as shown in the pay slips already in evidence. She is therefore entitled to the benefit of Union Membership. Moreover, the Defendant’s Handbook – Exhibit RIU2 pg 1-57 volume 4 pg 1 -57@ page 1 incorporated the Collective Agreement into the Claimant contract of employment.

Also, that the argument by the Defendant that she did not declare redundancy is not sustainable, the Agreement between NUBIFIE, ASSBIFI and the Defendant dated 10^th September, 2013 is clearly a declaration of redundancy. See Exhibit – Idiaghe 2 pae 1-2, Article 5 of the Collective Agreement Exhibit RIU17a-c pg1-59 and Section 20 (i) (a) (b) (c) (2) (3) of the labor Act provides: The ingredient for the determination of redundancy as expressed in section 20 of the Labor Act are reinforced in the Agreement of 10^th September, 2013.

The instant case is in all forms with that of Agunbiade & Ors V. First Bank of Nigeria LTD- Suit No. NICN/LA/ the Judgment of which was delivered on 12^th March, 2024, the Agreement of the 10^th September, 2013 benefits are lower than the redundancy payments provided in the collective Agreement Article 5(d) which provides that any employee declared redundant shall be entitled to monetary compensation on the following basis.

Banking Group:

More than 15 years of service:

16 weeks total emolument for each completed year of service.

6.07. We therefore pray his Lordship to hold that the termination of the Claimant`s employment amount to redundancy and should be paid redundancy benefits as particularized in paragraph 52 of the Further Amended Statement of Facts. See Article 5 paragraph (d) (i) of the collective Agreement – EXH. Idiaghe 4 page 1-16.

Arguing issue 3(i), Counsel submitted that the Claimant is entitled to payment of the shortfall in her gratuity entitlement, that the Defendant is in arrears in the payment of the Claimant gratuity. That the Claimant in paragraph 37 of her Further Amended Statement of Facts particularized her entitlement to gratuity, the Claimant`s terminal benefits were wrongfully computed in breach of page 15, paragraph 18 of the Gratuity Rules of the Trust Deed, 1996 and the Defense of the Defendant is evasive and a clear admission of the Claimants` Claim, see Aminu V. Afribank PLC & Anor (2010) 18 N.L.L.R. page 37-38 paragraph D-H.

Counsel submitted that the Claimant is entitled to the shortfall in her gratuity entitlement, the law is trite that an employee is entitled to all his benefits, see Chiazor V. Union Bank of Nigeria PLC SUIT No. NICN/LA/122/2014 the judgment of which was given on July 12, 2016 page 2. Per Hon. Justice B.B Kanyip PHD.

That the Defendant in paragraph 4.50 of her Final Address argued that the Director of the Defendant Bank pursuant to paragraph 13 of the Trust Deed, 1996 have the powers to alter the Trust Deed 1996, the Defendant in paragraph 32 of her Written Amended Statement of Defense states that the confidential circular No18/97 restricted total emolument to basic salary, housing, transport and lunch, circular No. 18/97 is entitled “INCENTIVE PACKAGE FOR EARLY RETIREMENT” has nothing to do with interpretation of the Trust Deed, 1996 which came into effect on 1994. See page 4 of the Exhibit Idiaghe 2 pages 3-5 page 4 of the Circular No. 18/97 and the question that readily calls for asking is, “Can Circular No. 18/97 that expired on 31th January, 1998 form the basis for the interpretation of the provisions of the Trust Deed; 1996 which is still extant? The answer will certainly be in the negative, see also the Trust Deed 1996-page 9 paragraph 20 under sub-head- Total Emolument.

Counsel submitted that the Defendant`s circular No. 18/97 in paragraph “c” of the circular misrepresented the provisions of the Trust Deed on what constitute total emolument in the computation of gratuity, the Defendant`s circular No. 18/97 expired on 31^st January, 1988 consequently and this Honourable Court is to hold that the Defendant`s circular No 18/97 which expired on 31^st January, 1998 is spent and has no legal effect in the gratuity entitlement of the Claimant.

Counsel submitted that the question of what constitute total emolument under clause 20 of the 1996 Trust Deed have been answered by this Court in the following cases: Miss. Ormane Lily Uyor V. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc. Suit No. NICN/LA/582/2017 the Judgment of which was delivered on 12^th January, 2021 by his Lordship Hon Justice P.A. Bassi and this court is to hold that total emolument as used in section 20 of the 1996 Trust deem is made up to the Claimant`s basic salaries and allowances. In Port and Cargo Handlings services company Limited, Sifax Nigeria LTD and 2 others V. MIGFO Nigeria LTD and Demca Services Limited (2012) LPELR- 97215 (SC) the Supreme Court held that the word “INCLUDES” when used in a statue or written enactment can enlarge the scope of the subject it qualifies.

The Deed of variation of Trust Deed 1996 under pages 14-17 provides for gratuity payment under paragraph 18, page 15.

The words total emolument used in the Gratuity Rules 1996 are very clear and loud, the Claimant is thus entitled to payment of gratuity, pursuant to paragraph 18, page 15 of the Gratuity Rules and not under the general provisions under clause 20 of the 1996 Trust Deed.

The apex Court in GABRIEL OLATUNDE V. OBAFEMI AWOLOWO UNIVERSITY & ANOR (1998) LPELR – 2575 (SC) (1998) 5 NWLR (PT., 549 178) also held that where the language, terms, intent or words of any part or section of a written contract, document or enactment are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their ordinary and actual meaning as such terms or words used best declare the intention of the parties unless the provision will lead to absurdity or be in conflict with some other provisions thereof. Per Iguh J.S.C (P.22 paras. B.D), see also Emmanuel Olamide Larmie V. Data Processing Maintenance &Services LTD (2005) LPELR -1756 (SC), Union Bank of Nigeria Plc. V. Alhaji Adams Ajabwe & Anor (2011) LPELR – 8239 (SC).

Counsel submitted that the Defendant in para. 4.45 to 4.59 argued that the 2004 is the applicable Trust Deed, however the Defendant as per EXHIBIT RIU31pg1-8 effected payment of gratuities based on the percentages prescribed on the annexure to the 1996 Trust Deed as follows:

S/N	NAME	DATE OF EXIT	% GRATUITY
1	Ebidah Joy	29/11/2013	148
2	Enodolo Mulanyi R.E	29/11/2013	248
3	Ezeanowai A.I	29/11/2013	296
4	Ileaboya A.O.	29/11/2013	272
5	Nwokolo Augustine	29/11/2013	287
6	Osaze R.O.	29/11/2013	249

EXH. RIU31pg 1-8 was never challenged and are thus deemed admitted. The above gratuities payments and the percentages applied are only supported by the 1996 Trust Deed-EXHIBIT RIU28pg1-10. The above percentages applied are not supported by the purported 2004 Trust Deed – EXH. Idiaghe 5 p61-16.

Counsel submitted that based on his testimony, the DWI is not a witness of truth and his evidence before this Court should be discountenanced, that he told this Court that he paid the Claimant pursuant to the 2004 Trust Deed. There is no provision for payment of gratuity in the 2004 Trust Deed. The only document with provides for gratuity payment is the 1996 Trust Deed, see C.E. Okeke & Ors V. UBN Plc. Suit. No NICN/LA/160/2017 the judgment of which was delivered on 30^th June 2020 by his Lordship Hon. Justice P. Bassi who held that the 1996 Trust Deed was more credible (page 17 and 18 paras. C and A).

Arguing issue 3(ii), Counsel submitted that the Claimant in paragraph 38 and 39 of her Further Amended Statement of Facts particularized her claim to the 150% exit benefit, the Defence of the Defendant in paragraph 27 of her further Amended Statement of Defence was evasive and amount to admission, that the Defendant did not controvert paragraph 38 of the Claimant’s further Amended Statement of Facts and is therefore deemed admitted. The argument of the Defendant is not sustainable when verged against the decision of this Honourable Court in the case of Mr. Olusegun Jonah V. Union Bank of Nigeria PLC. Suit No. NICN/LA/806/2016 the judgment delivered on 6^th February, 2020 by hon. Justice R.H Gwandu at page 14 paragraph B, ILO Collective Agreement Recommendation, 1951 (No. 91) Article 3(1) provides that collective agreements should bind the signatories thereto and those on whose behalf the agreement is concluded. Employees and workers bound by a collective agreement should not be able to include in contracts of employment stipulated contrary to those contained in the collective agreement.

Arguing issue 3(iii), Counsel submitted that the deduction by the Defendant of the Claimant’s already earned income is not in accord with his Contract of Employment, the staff Handbook and ILO Convention 95, Section 254 C1 (h) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Third Alteration) Act, 2010 is endowed with the powers to have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in Nigeria civil cases and interpretation of International Labour Standards in an examination of Conventions of the International Labour organization has for a long time frowned at any act of unilateral deduction of workers` wages. Thus, the protection of wages Convention, 1949 No. 95 specifically provides in Article 8 that:“Deduction from wages shall be permitted only under conditions and to the extent prescribed by national laws or regulations or fixed by collective agreement or arbitration award.

Workers shall be informed in the manner deemed most appropriate by the competent authority of the conditions under which and the extent to which such deduction may be made”

The above Article of the Protection of wages Convention 1949 (No 95) has since been incorporated into our domestic legislation. Thus section 5(1) Labour Act Cap L1, Laws of Federation of Nigeria, 2004 unequivocally provides that: “Except where it is expressly permitted by this Act or any other law, no employer shall make any deduction or make any agreement to deduct from the wages to be paid by the employer to the worker for or in respect of any fines, see Eva Henrietta Akhere V. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc. Suit No. NICN/LA/142/2014 the judgment of which was delivered on July 6, 2017 his Lordship Hon. Justice J.D. Peters at page 13 para D and page 14 para A.

Counsel argued that earned benefits cannot be recouped or deducted from the terminal benefits of an employee and this was the position of her Lordship Hon. Justice O.O Oyewunmi in Egbe V. Union Bank PLC. And Union Homes Savings and Loan Plc. (2015) 58 N.L.L.R (PT 200) pages 302 – 303 paras G-D.

See also Miss Vivian Chinedu Okwudiafor V. Diamond Bank Plc. Suit No. NICN/LA/364/2015 the Judgment which was delivered on July 12, 2018 his Lordship Hon. Justice J.D. Peters at page 13 para. C and Page 14 para A.

The Claimant in paragraph 40 of the Amended Statement of facts particularized her Claim on refund of already earned income.

The Defense sole witness, under cross examination was asked whether he has any policy of the Defendant in support of the deductions. He replied that there was no such policy before the Court.

Arguing issue 3(iv), Counsel submitted that the Claimant is entitled to pre-judgment interest on the withheld gratuity and already earned income deducted. See the cases of Babajide Oguntowso V. Ecobank Nigeria Plc. Suit No. NICN/LA/478/2012 the judgment of which was delivered on 19^th June, 2017 by his Lordship Hon. Justice O.A. Obaseki- Osaghae and John Holt Plc. V. Martin Nwabuwa Appeal No. CA/L/875/2017 the judgment of which was delivered on 17^th July, 2020 per Ugochukwu Anthony Ogakwu JCA @ page 17 and 18 held that the NICN has the power to award Pre judgment interest, in the case of John Holt Plc. V. Martin Nwabuwa (unreported) Appeal No. CA/857/2017 the Appeal Court, Lagos Division in a judgment delivered on 17^th 2020 held per Ugochukwu Anthony Ogakwu, JCA at page 17 paragraph C-D and page 18 paragraph A-B held that only the National Industrial Court Civil Procedure Rules to award pre-judgment interest.

Arguing issue 3(v), Counsel submitted that the Position of the law is that damages may be awarded to assuage such loss which flows from the Defendant`s act. It need not be specifically pleaded. It is said to arise from inference of law and need not be proved by evidence. It suffices if it is generally averred Karibi - Whyte JSC in YALAJU – AMAYE V. ASSOCIATED REGISTERED ENGINEERING CONTRACTORS LIMITED & ORS. (1990) LPELR- SC. 198/1986 espoused the law further when his Lordship added that general damages are presumed by the law to be the direct and probable consequences of the act complained of and that unlike special damages, it is incapable of substantially exact calculation. See also BRITISH AIRWAYS V. ATOYEBI (2014) LPELR SC 332/2010.

The Defendant in paragraph 60 of the Further Amended statement of Defense averred that the Claimant is not entitled to reliefs in this suit which includes damages. The Defendant particularly did not effect payment of the Claimant`s gratuity in full and deducted already earned benefits from the gratuity paid. The Defendant did not also effect payment of the Claimant`s one month in Lieu of Notice. The Claimant was also denied Redundancy Payment.

The Court of Appeal in the case of SAHARA ENERGY RESOURCE LIMITED V. MRS OLAWUNMI OYEBOLA (2020) LPELR – 51806(CA) the judgment of which was delivered on 3^rd December, 2020 held that the NICN pursuant to section 254C (I) of the 1999 constitution (As Amended) and section 7(6) of the National Industrial Court, 2006 can award damages in the exercise of his powers under section 19 (d) of the National Industrial Court Act over and above that allowed under common law.

Arguing issue 3(ii), Counsel submitted that the Claimant in paragraph 38 and 39 of her Further Amended Statement of Facts particularized her claim to the 150% exit benefit and the Defence of the Defendant in paragraph 27 of her further Amended Statement of Defence was evasive and amount to admission, that the Defendant did not controvert paragraph 38 of the Claimant’s further Amended Statement of Facts and is therefore deemed admitted. The argument of the Defendant is not sustainable when verged against the decision of this Honourable Court in the case of Mr. Olusegun Jonah V. Union Bank of Nigeria PLC. Suit No. NICN/LA/806/2016 the judgment delivered on 6^th February, 2020 by hon. Justice R.H Gwandu Wherein the Court at page 14 paragraph B, ILO Collective Agreement Recommendation, 1951 (No. 91) Article 3(1) provides that collective agreements should bind the signatories thereto and those on whose behalf the agreement is concluded. Employees and workers bound by a collective agreement should not be able to include in contracts of employment stipulated contrary to those contained in the collective agreement.

DEFENDANTS REPLY ON POINT OF LAW

In response to issue 1 canvassed by the Claimant that the termination of her employment for service no longer required does not accord with her Contract of Employment, Articles 3, 4, 7 and 8 of the International Labour Organization (ILO) Termination of Employment Convention 1982 (ILO Convention 158) and Paragraph 8 of the ILO Termination of Employment Recommendation 1982 (recommendation 166), Collective Agreement, Defendant’s Handbook, the case of Ikechukwu Chiazor v. Union Bank of Nigeria Plc. in Suit No. NICN/LA/122/2014 and the case of National Union of Hotel and Personal Service Workers (NUHPSW) v. Outsourcing Servis Limited (2023) LPELR – 60683 (CA). The Defendant submits that all the above cited judicial authorities, laws and documents relied upon by the Claimant are inconsistent with the decision of the Supreme Court delivered in 2024, which clearly pronounced that an employer is not obliged to give/state any reason for firing an employee, but once an employer gives a reason for terminating or dismissing an employee, the burden lies on the employer to justify the said reason, see SKYE BANK PLC V. ADEGUN (2024) LPELP – 62219 (SC), Per Ogunwuniju (Pp. 31-32, paras E-B) and going by the above decision of the Supreme Court, the termination of the Claimant’s employment for service no longer required is valid.

The burden would lay on the Defendant to prove by sufficient fact and evidence, if the Defendant had stated a reason in the Claimant’s letter of termination why it terminated the Claimant’s employment for service was no longer required. However, this is not the case of the Defendant, as the Defendant only terminated the Claimant’s employment for service no longer required in accordance with Clause 8 of the Claimant’s Contract of Service, which the same is in tandem with the decisions of the Supreme Court as decided above.

Further that in para 5.34 of the Claimant’s Final Written Address, the Claimant argued that the non-payment of her one-month salary in lieu of notice was brought to the attention of the court via her statement of account and pay-slip which were pleaded, Counsel argued that it is the principle of law that parties to a suit must not dump documents (in the instant case: statements of account and pay-slip) on the court, as parties are obliged to speak on every document pleaded and tendered from the bar, see ASSENE (NIG) LTD V. MIVERO PHARMA LTD ANOR (2021) LPELR – 56247 (CA) Per Banjoko JCA (Pp. 38-39, paras A-C), the Defendant submits that if the Claimant had orally testified on the Statement of Account and Payslip (gave a breakdown of the lump sum during examination-in-chief) in respect of the lump sum of N1,976,99.51 paid by the Defendant into her account on 23/7/2025, the Claimant would have enabled the Defendant to ask the appropriate question(s) during cross-examination. The Claimant cannot and should not expect the court to speculate or begin to examine the statement of account/payslip which is in evidence on what amount constitute the one-month salary in lieu of notice, basic salary and allowance, when the said documents have not been examined in open court and exposed to test in open court.

Furthermore, by the letter of termination dated 31/7/2015, the Defendant informed the Claimant that it ‘’had’’ credited the Claimant’s account with one-month salary in lieu of notice, that by such assertion, the burden of proof shifted from the Defendant to the Claimant to prove by her Statement of Account/payslip, that the sum of N1,976,99.51 paid by the Defendant into the Claimant’s account on 23/7/2015, do not include the one-month salary in lieu of notice.

In further support of the Defendant’s case, the Defendant states that the lump sum of N1,976,99.51 paid on 23/7/2015 by the Defendant into the Claimant’s account, was tagged, ‘’STAFF SALARY FOR JULY 2015’’. A perusal of the Claimant’s statement of account will shows that the salaries paid by the Defendant to the Claimant (aside from salaries paid during the Claimant’s suspension), shows the sum of N137,886.64 to N138,106.97 between 2014 and 2015 when the Claimant employment was terminated. So, the Defendant submits that for the Claimant to have earned far above her monthly salary in July, 2015, place a burden on the Claimant to testify/give a breakdown of how the lump sum constitutes only the arrears of her basic salary and allowance to the exclusion of the one-month salary in lieu of notice.

Furthermore, the Court of Appeal has pronounced that failure of the Claimant to have established such facts during examination, cannot be cured through Claimant’s Final Written Address.

In response to issue 2 on whether the Claimant’s termination amount to redundancy. The Defendant submits that if the court would agree and abide itself with the decision of the Supreme Court in Skye Bank Plc v. Adegun (SC) 2024 (SUPRA), ‘’that an employer has the right to fire or terminate the employment of an employee without stating or giving any reason’’, then the termination of the Claimant’s employment for service no longer required without any reason, validates the Defendant’s action, and same does not render the Claimant’s termination redundant, see also NIGERIA SECURITY PRINTING AND MINTING PLC v. OLANIKE AFUSAT OLALEYE (2020) LPELR-50409(CA)were Per GARBA, JCA (Pp. 15-27, paras. E-A) by which decision of the Court of Appeal, the court has pronounced that once an employer terminates the employment of an employee for service no longer required, such statement (termination of employment for service no longer required) speaks for itself.

Also, that the Court further held that no matter how unlawful, wrongful a termination may be, the quantum of damages available to an employee is the salary in lieu of notice as contained in the contract of service.

The Defendant submit that if the Claimant’s termination is converted to redundancy, the Claimant would be entitled to redundancy benefit, and same will contradict the decision of the Court of Appeal.

Counsel submitted that it is constitutional and by plethora number of cases, that in the hierarchy of Courts, the decisions of a higher court (no matter how wrongly it was decided), is binding and not persuasive on lower courts. Moreso, the case of AGUNBIADE JOSEPH OLUDAYO & 187 OTHERS V. FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA LTD in Suit No. NICN/LA/357/2018, relied upon by the Claimant is inconsistent with the Claimants case, to the extent that the Honourable Justice Ikechi Gerald Nweneka reached his judgment/decision on two ratio decidendi, before concluding that the Claimants’ termination for service no longer required amount to redundancy, namely:

That the manner in which the termination was carried out (Exhibit 9, which reads as, ’FIRSTBANK has in accordance with the collective agreement binding the parties, communicated to ASSBIFI of its intention to embark on staff reengineering); and (conjunctive)
The number of employees involved point irresistibly to the redundancy.

Counsel submitted that the Claimant failed to plead and tender documentary evidence on the number of employees terminated for service no longer required alongside with her in year 2015. Rather, the Claimant pleaded letters of withdrawal of service of ex-employees of the Defendant, whose service were withdrawn in 2013, 201 and 2016. Moreso, the only letter of exit the Claimant relied on in 2015, was the letter of withdrawal of service of a colleague whose description of exit does not contain letter of termination.

The Defendant submitted that the failure of the Claimant to have pleaded, tendered and testified on of the number of employees whose employment were terminated for service no longer required alongside with her in year 2015, further renders her claim for redundancy a nullity. Therefore, the Claimant’s claim for redundancy benefit fails in its entirety as contained in issue 3(ii)(v) of the Claimant’s Final Written Address.

COURT’S DECISION.

I have read the processes filed, the submissions of Counsel as well as heard the testimony of witnesses of parties in this suit, from the issues raised by Counsel in their respective final addresses, I have distilled the following issues for determination by this Honourable Court-

Whether the termination of the Claimant for services no longer required accord with her contract of employment and International best practices,
Whether the Claimant’s termination amounts to redundancy, which entitles the Claimant to redundancy benefit,
Whether the Claimant has been able to prove the reliefs sought against the Defendant

On the first issue, whether the termination of the Claimant for services no longer required accord with her contract of employment and International best practices, the Claimant relied on Article 7 of the ILO Termination of Employment Convention 1982 and Paragraph 8 ILO Termination recommendation 1982 which provide thus-

Article 7 of the ILO Termination of employment Convention, 1982 (ILO Convention 158):

“The employment of a worker shall not be terminated for reasons related to the worker`s conduct or performance before he is provided an opportunity to defend himself against the allegations made, unless the employer cannot reasonably be expected to provide the opportunity”.

and paragraph 8 ILO Termination of Employment recommendation, 1982 (Recommendation 166) provides:

“The employment of a worker should not be terminated for unsatisfactory performance unless the employer has given the worker appropriate instructions and written warning and the worker continues to perform his duties unsatisfactorily after a reasonable period of time for improvement has elapsed. The said ILO Convention 158 and Recommendation 166 are hereby pleaded and shall be relied upon at the trial of this suit.

The Claimant states in her statement of facts that the Defendant accused her of fraud, reported her to the Police, which arrested and detained her and was subsequently arraigned before the Igbosere Magistrate Court which found her not guilty of the offence and acquitted her.

She said she reported back to the office and gave her notice to resume via a letter dated 2^nd June 2015 after which she was given a suspension letter backdated to 25^th March 2014 which she signed on the 9^th June 2015 and her employment was thereafter terminated by the Defendant for ‘services no longer required’.

The Defendant relies on clause 7 of the contract of service which states that “Notwithstanding anything herein contained either the Bank or the official may determine this agreement at any time giving to the other one calendar months’ notice in writing in that behalf but the Bank shall have the right to pay to the official one month`s salary in Lieu of such notice.”, and argues that based on this provision, the Defendant does not need any reason before it could terminate the services of its employees.

In DAMISA V. U.B.A. (2025) 19 NWLR (PT. 2021) 409(P. 431, PARAS. A-B; E-F), the supreme Court held that “a master reserves the right to dismiss an employee at any time. However, the dismissal must be as specified in the letter of employment, the contract of employment, or whichever document that regulates the employment relationship. An employer is entitled to terminate an employee’s employment for no reason at all. Where a reason is given however, same must be justified.”

While the Court affirmed the age long common Law practice which entitled the employer to hire and fire and employee at will and for no reason at all, I will not be relying on same in this case as presently constituted, the Claimant in this present case has however activated the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court which enables it to interpret and apply international best practices where it deems fit, in this case, see Order 14A of the National Industrial Court Civil Procedure Rules, the Claimant has pleaded and relied on Article 7 of the ILO Termination of Employment Convention 1982.

The Defendant has made no arguments against the application of said international treaties, I therefore take it that the Defendant admits this Honourable Court by the Jurisdiction vested it by Section 254C (1) (f) and (h) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and section 7(6) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria Act 2006, which enjoined the National Industrial Court to have due regard to fair labour practices and to good or international best practices in labour, employment and industrial relations when exercising its exclusive jurisdiction over labour and employment matters, can hear and rely on internation practices in its decisions.

Moreso, this Honourable Court cannot ignore the circumstances which led to the arrest, suspension and termination of the Claimants employment.

Exhibit RIU 11 is an invitation to appear a staff disciplinary committee dated 12^th May 2015, exhibit RIU 12c is a memo of suspension dated 25^th March 2014 which was received by the Claimant 9^th June 2015, exhibit RIU 13 is the memo recalling the Claimant from suspension dated 7^th July 2017 and exhibit RIU 14 is a letter of termination dated 31^st July, 2015.

From the timeline, it can be seen the Claimant was never handed a letter of suspension before she was placed on suspension, this is already a violation of the terms of employment of the Claimant, again exhibit RIU 9a-g is a judgment of the Magistrate Court Igbosere delivered on the 15^th April 2015, before the Claimant was handed a letter of suspension and called to a disciplinary hearing on the same matter she was discharged and acquitted for, I dare say even the Defendant must see how the timeline of events and subsequent termination of the Claimants employment would look to a bystander who looks at the facts before this Court.

While the Employer by common Law can terminate the employment of its employee, the employer must by ILO conventions and treaties give a reason for terminating the services of its employee by the new dispensation, this Honourable Court being first a Court of equity must to preserve the security of employment look at the equitability of terminations in cases brought before it, apply common Law where it seems fit and Equity where it is warranted, the application of the ILO conventions and treaties are equitable applications which better regulate the employment space in Nigeria and protect the job securities of Nigerians also.

At the point the Defendant accused the Claimant, reported her to the Police, charged and arraigned her before a competent Court, it removed the right to terminate her upon resumption without reason, as from the pointview of the Court it looks and feels like retribution against the Claimant, especially after she was found not guilty by the Court for no reason at all, this is in violation of Article 7 of the ILO Termination of Employment Convention 1982 and also coupled with the fact that the Defendant has not shown the Court it followed strict compliance with the terms of employment, the Defendant in relying on clause 7 of the contract of employment, did not show the Court it paid the Claimant one month’s salary in lieu of termination as mandated by the said clause it relies on. Counsels’ argument cannot take the place of evidence, arguing that the Claimant was paid and showing the Court where or how the Claimant was paid are two different things, this Court will not speculate on behalf of the Defendant.

I hereby hold that the termination of the Claimant for services no longer required is in violation of the terms of employment between the Defendant and the Claimant and also Article 7 of the ILO Termination of Employment Convention 1982.

On the second issue, whether the Claimant’s termination amounts to redundancy, which entitles the Claimant to redundancy benefit, the Claimant relied on exhibit Idiaghe 2 pages 1-2 which is a collective agreement between NUBIFIE and ASSBIFI and the Defendant dated September 2013, the Defendant has argued that the collective agreement was not incorporated into the Claimants contract of service and as such her assertions go to no issue, I say this is a weak argument, the Claimant has shown by cogent evidence( her pay slips) that she was a member of the ASSBIFI, the Defendant did not argue that the collective agreement is not inoperative but that it is inapplicable on account of its not being incorporated in the Claimants terms of employment.

The Defendant`s Handbook – EXH RIU2 Pg 1-57 Volume 4 page 1 under SUB-HEAD “General” provides:

“In all matters affecting staff, attention must be paid to any current Union Agreement to which the Bank is a party. Such Agreement are binding upon the Bank, and are to be observed in the spirit as well as the letter”

At page 21 under SUB-Head- “Contact of service”, it provides: “Every member of staff must sign a contract of service Agreement and is bound by the conditions thereof in addition to the provisions of the relevant collective Agreement. A copy of the signed contract should be placed in the employee`s file”.

This by the Defendants Handbook ratifies any collective agreement which is in force and incorporates same into the terms of employment between it and its staff.

It is however the Claimants case to prove redundancy as he who alleges must prove same, see ANIBABA V. DANA AIRLINES LTD. (2025) 9 NWLR (PT. 1994) 377(P. 423, PARAS. D-G).

The Court in OVIVIE V. DELTA STEEL CO. LTD. (2023) 14 NWLR (PT. 1904) 203(P. (E) 239, PARAS. E-G) SC held that –‘redundancy procedures in Nigeria are governed by the following: (a) The Nigerian Labour Act. (b) The decisions of the courts; that is, case law. The employment contracts of the affected (c) employees and employment handbook. The provisions of any collective bargaining agreement between an employer and the (d) representatives of a trade union. Applicable international best practices.’.

The Claimant in this suit has sought to rely on the Labour Act and the collective agreement, however the Court in NIGERIAN SOCIETY OF ENGINEERS V. OZAH(2015) 6 NWLR (PT. 1454) 76 (P. 96, PARAS. B-C) CA had distinguished redundancy as ‘the termination of appointment of an employee is in a bracket of its own far removed from the incident of an employee leaving service because of redundancy. Termination of appointment implies complete severance of an employer/employee relationship by dispensing with the services of an employee with his post extant, while redundancy implies that the post occupied by the employee is no longer necessary and/or useless to the employer.’

The Supreme Court affirmed this decision when it held in OVIVIE V. DELTA STEEL CO. LTD.(supra) (P.240, paras. D-H) that ‘redundancy in service is a mode of removing an employee from service when his post is declared redundant by his employer. Redundancy is a form of involuntary permanent removal from office. It is therefore not a voluntary retirement, nor is it a dismissal from service. It is also not a voluntary or forced resignation, nor is it a termination of appointment. Rather, it is a unique procedure whereby the employee is lawfully relieved of his appointment. Thus, the conditions applicable to redundancy are quite different from those applicable to retirement or other conventional modes of relieving an employee from service such as termination, resignation, or dismissal.’

The Claimant in this suit has alleged wrongful termination and proved same, it will therefore be contradictory if the Court finds for redundancy where the Appellate Court have held that redundancy is a special form of relieving an employee of his employment and it is distinct from dismissal or termination, moreso the Claimant must prove the elements of redundancy which she has failed to do, reliance on only the collective agreement will not suffice as it is and the Court cannot speculate as to the incidence of redundancy either.

I hereby hold that the Claimant has failed to prove her termination amounts to redundancy.

On whether the Claimant has been able to prove the reliefs sought against the Defendant, the Claimants first relief against the Defendant is for a declaration that the purported termination of employment of the Claimant is unlawful and wrongful as the said termination was done without regard to the contract of employment and the Collective Agreement, this relief is granted as prayed for reasons given above.

On the relief for a declaration that the purported termination was without reason and not in line with the International Best Practice in International Relation as enshrined in the ILO convention Article 158 and recommendation 166, this relief is also succeeds and is granted accordingly.

On the Claimants relief for a declaration that the non-payment of severance benefits based on 150% total emolument to the Claimant when same was paid to her colleague is unlawful and discriminatory, the Claimant did not prove redundancy under the collective agreement, thus this relief fails and is refused.

The Claimants relief for a declaration that the termination of her employment “For services no longer required” amounts to redundancy is also refused.

The Claimants relief for a declaration that the Defendant bank is in arrears of the Claimant`s gratuity in the sum of ?14, 404, 251 less ?5, 998, 380.00 already paid to the Claimant, the Claimant adduced evidence that the 1996 Trust Deed is what is in use by the Defendants and not the 2004 Pension Trust Deed, she has tendered evidence which shows the Defendant paid gratuities based on the 1996 Trust Deed after it claimed the 2004 Deed had come into effect, the inconsistencies surrounding the Defendants 2004 Deed has led the Court to doubt its veracity and the Defendant has not shown the Court otherwise, its defence on this is weak and does not address the issues raised by the Claimant in her statements of fact succinctly, based on this, I will rely on the 1996 Trust Deed as the operational document in this case and this means the Claimant was underpaid her gratuity on terms used in paying others in the rime frame of her termination, this relief is hereby granted as prayed.

On the Claimants relief for a declaration that the deductions of unearned Housing ?39,963.29 (Thirty Nine Thousand Nine Hundred and Sixty Three Naira Twenty Nine Kobo) and Loans ?99, 555.22 (Ninety Nine Thousand Five Hundred and Fifty Five Naira Twenty Two Kobo) made to the gratuity paid by the defendant to the Claimant is unlawful, null and void, the Claimant has admitted that she took a loan from the Defendant, it was communicated to her in the breakdown of her indebtedness and benefits, however the Defendant has not shown this Honourable Court when the loan was taken, how much was taken and paid and the structure of what is paid or left, it cannot justify this deduction by cogent evidence.

Also, the deduction of unearned housing allowance cannot be justified, the Claimants suspension made it mandatory that she reports to the office, payments made to the Claimants accounts are automatically earned as far as this Honourable Court is concerned and the right procedure on deduction of wages outlined by Section 5 of the Labour Act.

This relief succeeds and is hereby granted accordingly.

On the Claimants reliefs for a declaration that the withholding of the Claimant`s 150% exit package of her basic, housing, transport and lunch allowance of ?3, 500, 997.00 (Three Million Five Hundred and Ninety Seven Naira) in line with the Agreement between the Defendant, Association of Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and Financial Institutions (ASSBIFI) and the National Union of Banks Insurance and Financial Institution Employees (NUBIFIE) dated 10^th September, 2013 is wrongful, unlawful, and discriminatory and a declaration that the Defendant bank is in arrears of the Claimant`s 150% exit package of ?3, 500, 997.00 (Three Million Five Hundred Thousand Nine Hundred and Ninety Seven Naira) due to her in line with the MOA dated 10^th September , 2013 the Claimant has not proved these reliefs and they are hereby refused.

On the Claimants relief for an Order of this Honorable Court compelling the Defendant Bank to reinstate the Claimant to her employment which was terminated without due process/procedure laid down in the Defendant Bank`s Hand Book and Collective Agreement, this Honourable Court cannot foist a willing employee on an unwilling employer, especially where the employment was not statutory flavored, see DAMISA V. U.B.A(supra) (Pp. 425, para. G; 431, paras. B-E).

On the Claimants relief for an Order for the refund of deductions of unearned Housing ?39, 963. 29 (Thirty Nine Thousand and Sixty Three Naira Twenty Nine Kobo) and Loans ? 99, 555.22 (Ninety Nine Thousand and Fifty Five Naira Twenty Two Kobo) made to the gratuity paid by the defendant to the Claimant, this relief succeeds and is granted as prayed.

On the Claimants relief for an Order for the payment of interest at 15% per annum (compounded annually) on payments under (j), (n) and (o) from 4/9/2015 till date of liquidation, this relief is refused.

On the Claimants relief for an Order that the Defendant Bank being in arrears of the Claimant`s 150% exit package, pay to the Claimant the sum of ?3, 500, 997.00 (Three Million Five Hundred Thousand Nine Hundred and Ninety Seven Naira) being 150% of her basic, housing, transport and lunch which was never paid to her in line with Agreement with the Defendant, and Association of Senior Staff of Banks Insurance and Financial Institution Employees (NUBIFIE) dated 10% September, 2013, this relief fails and is refused.

On the alternative relief to an order of this Honorable Court that the Defendant pay the Claimant redundancy benefits in line with Article 5 of the Collective Agreement, this relief fails and is refused.

On the alternative relief for an order of this Honorable Court directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant one month salary in Lieu of Notice and payment of severance benefits in line with the Agreement of the Defendant and the Unions on 30^th September, 2014, the defendant is Ordered to pay the Claimant one Month’s salary in lieu of Notice only.

On the Claimants relief for an Order for the payment of Gratuity arrears of ?14, 404, 251 less ?5, 998, 380.00 already paid to the Claimant, this relief succeeds and is granted.

On the Claimants relief for an order that the Defendant Bank Pay the sum of ?45, 300.000 (Forty-Five Million Three Hundred Thousand Naira) as Damages/compensation calculated on the basis of the remaining twelve (12) years the Claimant would have been in the employment of Defendant for the wrongful and unlawful termination of the Claimant`s employment, this relief fails and is refused accordingly.

This is the judgment of this Honourable Court and it is entered accordingly.

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Hon. Justice R.H Gwandu

Judge

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