IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE PORT HARCOURT JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT OWERRI

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP, HON. JUSTICE N.C.S. OGBUANYA

 

DATE: OCTOBER 21 2025                                 SUIT NO: NICN/YEN/125/2016

 

BETWEEN:

MR. COLLINS HARRISON GODSPOWER                                             - CLAIMANT

AND

FIRSTBANK OF NIGERIA LTD                                               - DEFENDANT

 

REPRESENTATION

G.C Ihunwo, Esq - for the Claimant;

A.N Ozornwafor, Esq- for the Defendant

 

JUDGMENT

1.             The Claimant, a former banker and staff of the Defendant bank, instituted this Suit vide a General Form of Complainant with accompanying frontloaded processes dated and issued on 30th June, 2016, to challenge the Defendant’s act of maliciously including and publishing his name among its staff whose employment was terminated on ground of fraud and sending same to Central Bank of Nigeria, which act amounts to unfair labour practice, as it has smeared his banking career and ruined his employability in the banking industry in Nigeria. By an Amended Statement of Facts pursuant to the Court’s Order of 22nd July, 2022, the Claimant claims the following reliefs:

1.                 An Order of One Hundred Million Naira (N100,000,000.00) as general damages for the wrongful publication of the Claimant’s name by the Defendant to the Central Bank of Nigeria on the list of Fraudulent persons.

2.                 A Declaration that the labelling of the Claimant as being fraudulent after the Defendant exonerated him of the said allegation is malicious and amounts to an Unfair Labour Practice.

3.                 An Order of this Honourable Court granting the Claimant the sum of Ten Million Naira as damages for the trauma arising from the wrongful termination of the Claimant’s employment by the Defendant

 

 

2.             The Defendant reacted with Amended Statement of Defence dated and filed on 14th February, 2020. The Claimant had earlier also filed a Reply to the Defendant’s Statement of Defence, dated and filed on 23rd October 2018. The matter was subsequently set down for trial.

3.             At the trial proceedings, the Claimant testified for himself as sole Claimant’s Witness (CW), adopted his Written Statements on Oath of 11th September, 2018 and Further Statement on oath of 23rd October, 2018 and tendered 14 sets of documents set out as Nos. 1-12 on Claimant’s list of Documents dated 30th June, 2016 and Nos 1 and 2 on the list of documents dated 23rd October, 2018. The said documents were admitted into evidence and marked Exhs. C1- C9; C10SR – C12SR and C13 – C14. The exhs. C10SR. ; C11SR and C12SR were admitted Subject to Ruling (SR) as objections were raised against their admissibility. The exhibits are as follows: Exh. C1 – Claimant’s WAEC Certificate dated June, 1994, Statement of Result from Rivers State College of Arts, Statement of Result from Ahmadu Bello University Zaira dated 23rd August, 2003 and NYSC Certificate; Exh. C2 – Claimant’s letter of offer of employment from the Defendant dated 12th June, 2006; Exh. C3 -Claimant’s letter of Confirmation of Appointment from the Defendant dated 31st July, 2007; Exh. C4 – Claimant’s letter of promotion dated 17th May, 2013; Exh. C5 – Defendant’s Memo dated 22nd August, 2013 suspending the Claimant; Exh. C6 - Defendant’s Memo dated 6th November, 2013; Exh. C7 - Claimant’s letter of termination of employment dated 24th April, 2014; Exh. C8 – Document emanating for the Defendant showing pictures and details of persons stated to be involved in fraud; Exh. C9 – CTC of letters from CBN dated 16th July, 2014, and 5th February, 2014; Exh. C10SR – Employee Handbook of the Defendant; Exh. C11SR – Undated letter from Claimant’s Counsel and the response of the Defendant to the said letter, dated 23rd December, 2015; Exh. C12 SR – Printed Copy of emails sent by the Claimant  to Union Bank Resourcing dated 11th March, 2016; Exh. C13 – Memo of the Defendant dated 3rd April, 2008; Exh. C14 - Letter dated 8th May, 2008 addressed to the Defendant by Solicitors to Miss. Ifubaraboye Semenitari Sandra. The CW was Cross-examined by the Defendant’s counsel, and there being no Re-examination by his counsel, CW concluded and prayed the Court to grant the Claimant’s reliefs.

4.             On the part of the Defendant, one Mr. Onyobo Uchay (the Human Resource Business Manager of the Defendant Company) testified for the Defendant as the sole Defendant’s Witness (DW). He adopted his Written Statement on Oath of 14th February, 2020 and tendered in evidence 5 sets of documents which are set out as Nos 1 - 5 in the Defendant’s list of documents dated 14th February, 2020. The said documents were admitted in evidence and marked as Exhibits D1 - D5. They are: Exh. D1 – Defendant’s memo dated 25th March, 2009; Exh. D2 – Memo of the Defendant dated 6th November, 2013; Exh. D3 -CTC of letter from CBN dated 16th July, 2004; Exh. D4 – Letter of termination of the Claimant’s employment; Exh. D5 – CTC of judgment of the Rivers State High Court in Suit No. PHC/795/2016 between the Claimant and the Defendant. The DW was Cross-examined by the Claimant’s counsel, and there being no Re-examination by his counsel, DW concluded and prayed the Court to decline dismiss the suit. ’s reliefs.

CASE OF THE PARTIES

5.             Going by the pleadings, testimonies and evidence of the Claimant, his case is that he was employed as a Banking Assistant by the Defendant bank on 12th June, 2006 (exh.C2), and his employment confirmed on 31st July, 2007 (exh.C3), and he rose through the ranks to the post of Banking Officer. That he was sometime in August 2013 suspended from duty on the allegation of receiving fake dollar notes into the bank’s vault, but was exculpated after investigation of the matter in accordance with the stipulation of the Employee Handbook of the Defendant. And that his employment was subsequently terminated without any pending disciplinary issue and he was not given any prior notice of termination  or reason other than that his ‘services was no longer required’.

6.             It is also the Claimant’s case that after the abrupt termination of his employment, the Defendant further made an offensive publication designating  him as a fraudulent person as he was included in the list of those staff whose employment was terminated on account of fraudulent activities at work. And worst still, the Claimant had sent the said publication to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), with the result that he was has been unable to be employed by any other banking institution, as he noticed during his last attempt to secure another job with another Bank- Union Ban of Nigeria. It is the contention of the Claimant that  the Defendant’s acts of terminating his employment for no reason and yet made malicious publication smears the Claimant’s career and  stalls  his chances of being employed in banking/financial sector, which has been traumatic and amounts to unfair labour practice, of which requires legal remedy to assuage. 

7.             Coming from the side of the Defendant,  the case of the Defendant  tailed with that of the Claimant on the employment history, but differs markedly on the claimant’s allegation of acts of unfair labour practice and wrongful termination of the employment as the Defendant insisted that it did nothing wrong in making the publication and sending the Claimant’s name to the CBN as an employee who lost his job on ground of fraud, given that the Claimant was involved in the fake dollar issue, of which there is no evidence of how he was exculpated.

 

8.             The Defendant maintained that the Management of the Defendant bank was still considering the issue of the allegation of fraud against the Claimant at the time of his recall to work and after a final decision was taken, the Claimant’s employment was terminated. It is also the case of the Defendant that it made no false publication against the Claimant and did not smear the Claimant’s image and career. That the Defendant merely notified the CBN of the termination of the employment of the Claimant and mentioned the ground upon which his employment was terminated, pursuant to the CBN directives. That also, that the Claimant had instituted a suit on libel at the Rivers State High Court against the Defendant, of which Judgment was delivered in favour of the Defendant.  And that the Claimant has been previously involved in cash suppression of which he was indicted and issued a warning letter. It is also the Defendant’s case that the termination of the Claimant’s employment was done in accordance with the terms of employment contract and prevailing labour practice.

COUNSEL’S SUBMISSION

9.             Learned Defendant’s counsel, Adaora Nwankwo-Ozornwafor, Esq,  in her Final Written Address (settled with Ajibo E.O. Ndubuisi, Esq and Sam O. Ebelogu, Esq) dated 6th June 2022 and filed on 7th June, 2022, formulated and canvassed arguments on two issues for determination, as follows: (1) Whether the termination of Claimant’s employment is an unfair labour practice, unlawful, null and void?; (2) Whether from the totality of evidence adduced before the Honourable Court, Claimant has proved his case and entitled to the reliefs sought?

10.        Two issues for determination were raised and arguments canvassed on the side of the Claimant by learned counsel for the Claimant, Lesley N.B. Wike, Esq (mow Hon. Justice Lesley N.B. Wike, of the FCT High Court), in her Final Written Address dated 1st December, 2022 and filed on 9th May, 2023. The said two issues are : (1) whether the suspension of the Claimant on the allegation of fraud, investigation and exoneration of the Claimant of the said allegation, the subsequent publication of the Claimant’s name on the Defendant’s portal, the notification of all staff of the said publication, the termination of the employment of the Claimant by the Defendant, and the submission and publication of the Claimant’s name to the Central Bank of Nigeria by the Defendant on the allegation of fraud the Claimant was hitherto exonerated of, is not malicious, injurious to the Claimant’s name and amounts to unfair labour practice?; (2)Whether this Honourable Court can grant compensatory damages in favour of the Claimant on issues 1 and 2.

 

11.        However, the then Claimant’s learned counsel however @ page 9, paragraph 8.00 of her Final Written Address raised and argued as issue 2: Whether from the totality of evidence adduced before the Honourable Court, Claimant has proved his case and is entitled to the reliefs sought? Learned counsel for the Defendant further filed a Reply on Points of Law in response to the Final Written Address of the Claimant. The undated Reply on Points of Law was filed on 17th August, 2023.

12.        At the resumed proceedings of 23rd July 2025, both Final Written Addresses were adopted by the respective learned counsel, (G.C Ihunwo taking over from the former Claimant’s counsel who has become a Judge). Counsel also adumbrated on same, and urged the court to uphold their submissions as canvassed in their respective divide for the parties they represented. The Judgment was thereafter reserved. In the course of this Judgment, full consideration would be accorded counsel’s respective submissions on the issues so raised and canvassed in their respective Final Written Address and oral adumbration.

COURT’S DECISION

13.        I actively participated in the engaging proceedings; read the pleadings and processes along with the submissions canvassed in the Final Written Addresses filed and exchanged by respective counsel, inclusive of  arguments on the admissibility and jurisdictional objections, as well as oral adumbration in advancing the case of the parties they represent. I also keenly watched the witnesses testify and had noted their demeanors, and also carefully evaluated the evidence tendered as exhibits in the proceedings.

 

14.        It is noteworthy that the two previous counsel for the Claimant in this matter later elevated to the Bench as Hon.Judges;  O. Gbassam Esq, (then Principal State Counsel, Rivers State Ministry of Justice), now Hon,Judge of the Rivers State High Court, and later L.N.D Wike (then State Counsel, Rivers State Ministry of Justice), now Hon,Judge of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja), who upon judicial appointment handed over  the casefile to G,C Ihunwo (Snr.State Counsel, Rivers State Ministry of Justice), who concluded the matter. Congratulation my Lords! It is also noteworthy that the matter traversed the various Judicial Divisions of the Court at Yenagoa, Owerri, Porthacourt and back to Owerri, and among three Hon.Judges of the Court- His Lordships T.J Agbadu-fishim J; H.S Danjidda J, and now concluded before this Court.

 

 

 

15.        I would first proceed with clearing the threshold issue concerning admissibility of documents numbered Nos. 10 , 11 and 12, which were sought to be tendered  by the CW, but which admissibility was objected to, by the learned Defendant’s counsel, and, in a brief Bench Ruling, were admitted ‘Subject to Ruling’ and marked as Exh.C10SR; Exh.C11SR and   Exh. C12SR. Also, the Defendant’s learned counsel had, purporting to respond to an unverified directive (not borne out of the record of the Court) but said to be a directive from the Court wherein the Court was said to have raised issue suo motu and called on counsel to address same, filed Additional Written Address, raising jurisdictional issues querying– Whether the Honourable Court has jurisdiction to entertain claims for defamation arising out of employer/employee relationship?

 

The Ruling on Admissibility and Jurisdictional Objections:

 

16.        At the trial proceedings, learned counsel for the Defendant raised objections on admissibility of three out of fourteen documents tendered as exhibits by the Claimant’s Witness, on ground of lack of pleading and non-compliance with rules on admissibility of electronic evidence in S.84 of the Evidence Act. Learned Defendant’s counsel had argued that relevancy is not the only basis for admissibility, contending that the documents did not meet the requirements of admissibility, in that they were not pleaded or served on the Defendant or complied with the S.84 of Evidence Act. Responding, learned Claimant’s counsel had pointed that those documents were well pleaded in the Amended Statement of Facts, and there is no evidence of non-compliance with service as they were frontloaded and did not breach S.84 of Evidence Act.

 

17.        Having checked the Amended process and the said documents tendered, I find no intrinsic defect that would warrant inadmissibility of such documents relevant to the facts in issue, as their background facts were pleaded to anchor admissibility of such documents, and there is no evidence of non-compliance with S.84 Evidence Act. Even if there are intrinsic defects, given that those documents were relevant to the facts in issue in this matter, the interest of justice would have triggered invocation of S.12 of the National Industrial Court Act (NICA) 2006, to depart from the rigid provisions of the Evidence Act. On that note, the admissibility objection affecting those three documents is hereby overruled. Accordingly, the three documents are fully admissible and re-numbered, to be referred to as Exhs. C10-C12. I so hold and direct.

 

 

 

18.        On the Jurisdictional Objection, learned Defendant’s counsel had submitted that the National Industrial Court lacks jurisdiction to entrain matter bordering on defamation being a tort-based claim, Counsel had hoarsely argued that: “it is the Defendant’s contention that the Claimant’s suit as constituted against          the Defendant is founded upon an alleged tort of defamation and it is not within the jurisdiction of this Court”. Counsel had cited and relied on two 2016 reported decisions of the Court of Appeal: Dr. Emmanuel Sebastian Akpan v. University of Calabar (2016) LPELR-41242 (CA) and Dr. Maurice Tabang Bisong v. University of Calabar (2016) LPELR-41246 (CA), applied also in another 2020 Court of Appeal decision in Eco Bank v. Winifred Osu (Unreported Suit No. CA/L/963/2016, Judgment delivered on 24th February 2020).

 

19.        Interestingly, the learned Defendant’s counsel who cited and relied on the Court of Appeal decisions did not cite other later decisions of the Court of Appeal that did not follow those decisions on tort-based claims arising from workplace: MHUWN v. Ehigiegba (2018) LPELR-444972(CA); Nwagbo & Ors. v. National Intelligence Agency (2018)LPLER-4620(CA); Nassarawa State Specialist Hospital Management Board & Ors. v. Mohammed (2018) LPELR-44551(CA); Omang v.NSA (2021)10 NWLR (Pt.1781)55; also applied in Okoro v. Ecobank Nig Ltd (Unreported Suit No. CA/C/07/2016, Judgment delivered on July 16 2021), which directly upheld the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court on workplace defamation.

 

20.        These later authorities represent the expansive school of thought based on the purposeful interpretation of the Constitutional mandate of the National Industrial Court-to holistically adjudicate matters arising from or connected with any or all of the three jurisdictional segments of its subject-matter jurisdiction set out in the S.254C (1) of the extant Constitution (As Amended), which are: employment, labour relations and workplace issues. The tortious claim, such as workplace defamation, is just like other contractual claims arising from employment, and constitute the civil matters arising from employment, labour relations and workplace as envisaged by the extant Constitution. The concept of workplace defamation, an aspect of labour relations and workplace causes, being a civil matter, certainly fall within the jurisdictional ambit of the National Industrial Court. Incidentally, the extant Constitution in S.254C(1) vesting jurisdiction on the National Industrial Court did not exclude tortious claims arising from employment, labour relation or workplace (workplace defamation), and nothing in S.254C (1) suggests so, given that tort is an integral part of civil matters!

21.        I take liberty to reproduce the provisions of the S.254C (1) (a) of the Constitution (As Amended), which are empathic as it concerns the subject matter of the dispute herein. It reads:

254C-(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters-

(a)        relating to or connected with any labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations and matters arising workplace, the conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith;” (underlined emphasis mine).

 

22.        Even if, admittedly, that there exist conflicting authorities on this issue which blurs discerning precedent to follow by the lower Court, the tide not only fall on the later decisions, but a quick resort would also be  to adopt the ‘judicial option of choice of befitting decision’ available in such circumstance of unresolved conflicting authorities. In Ngun v. Mobil Producing Unlimited [2013] LELR-20197(CA) 31-32, C-D, the Court of Appeal which relied on the Supreme Court’s case of Osakwe v. F.C.E (Technical) Asaba, held thus: “where there is no discernable ratio decindedi common to the decisions of a superior court and this court has handed down conflicting decisions, the lower Court or a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction is free to choose between the decisions which appears to it to be correct”. The choice is certainly exercised on the side of the line of authorities which adopt purposeful interpretation to enhance the constitutional mandate of this Court, as can be seen copiously expressed in the contextual phraseology adopted in the enabling legislation and which discloses the true intentions of the law maker to have a holistic adjudicatory forum of a Court set up for all matters of or arising from labour, employment or workplace and connected or related matters- the National Industrial Court. In Aiewero v. A.G Federation [2015]15 NWLR (Pt.1482)353, the Court @P.382, paras. D-E, cautioned thus:

Where an interpretation of statute will result in defeating the object of the statute, the court will not lend its weight to such interpretation. The language of the statute must not be stretched to defeat the aim of the statute.

 

23.        In UTC v. Pamotei [1989]2NWLR (Pt.103)244@303, para.A-B, the legendary jurist, Oputa JSC, remarked thus: “it is now a settled principle of construction of statutes that the legislature does not use any words in vain’. Thus, the repetitive use of the words ‘connected with’, ‘related to’, ‘arising from’ or connected therewith’, variously in S.254C of the extant Constitution is deliberate and for emphasis on the jurisdictional scope of this Court on matters involving issues of employment, labour and workplace.

24.        It is actually from the backdrop of the phrasal concept of ‘arising from, related to, connected with labour/employment/workplace’ used variously in the provisions of S.254C (1)-(5) of the extant Constitution that this Court derives its amplified jurisdiction to entertain other core civil claims bordering on contract and tort, such as tenancy, libel, negligence, policy issues, fundamental human rights, and even criminal jurisdiction. Going forward, I dare say that this provision has over time become a one stop-shop for gauging the amplification of the new jurisdictional mandate of this Court in its one-subject matter adjudicatory-stock, which is: employment, workplace, labour-related, connected and/or arising matters!  A distinguished legal scholar and senior counsel, Prof. Offornze Amucheazi SAN, shared similar thoughts, when he stated thus: “The idea behind this provision …is to remove any limitation on the categories of claims/reliefs the court can entertain arising from workplace or employment issues”.(See: “Liberalizing the National Industrial Court’s Approach in Intermediate Claims to Provide Comprehensive Redress For Labour Claims: Lessons from Foreign Jurisdiction”, Guest Lecture at the Workshop on Industrial Relations and the Law for Judicial Officers of the National Industrial of Nigeria, Organized by Jursistrust Centre for Socio Legal Research and Documentation, held at Ibom Golf Hotel Uyo, Akwa Ibom State, on 19th January 2021). 

 

25.        The Court of Appeal took similar view in NUT Niger State v. COSST Niger State [2012] 10 NWLR (Pt.1307)89, when it held that S.254C of the 1999 Constitution (As Amended) by the Third Alteration Act, expanded the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court by vesting it with exclusive jurisdiction over all labour and employment related matters. Similarly, in Omang v. NSA [2021] 10NWLR (Pt.1788)55, the Court of Appeal held that the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court extends to matters having nexus, inextricably linked or reasonably connected to subject matters over which jurisdiction is conferred in Section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (As Amended).

 

26.        Learned Defendant’s counsel in her jurisdictional challenge posturing cited and relied on Oli v. INEC [2023]14 NWLR (Pt.1903)86, to the effect that to ascertain whether the subject matter of a suit falls within the jurisdiction of the Court, a Court is guided by the claim in the originating process, the questions posed for determination and the reliefs sought. That is, it is the claim before the Court that has to be looked at to ascertain whether it comes within the jurisdiction conferred on the Court. Applying the principle, learned Defendant’s counsel had submitted that “the reliefs sought against the Defendant reveal claims actionable in tort and on which this Honourable Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over but the High Court of Rivers State”.  

 

27.        A follow up question is- Is the subject matter of this Suit amenable to the jurisdiction of the (Rivers) State High Court instead of the National Industrial Court, as learned Defendant’s counsel would want this Court to endorse? Put differently- Is learned Defendant’s counsel entirely correct in her submission applying the principle of using the case theory and reliefs to determine the jurisdiction of the Court in the instant suit? I do not think so, going by the   nature of the case theory and reliefs sought for by the Claimant in the instant suit vis-à-vis the scope of the jurisdictional mandate constitutionally preserved for the National Industrial Court.

 

28.        Even a cursory look at the subject matter of the suit, gleaning from case of the parties and reliefs sought, would indicate that the parties are in employment relationship which culminated in termination of the employment and the Claimant complains and seeks remedy over certain conducts of the Defendant arising from the workplace and connected with the employment,  such as the alleged “wrongful publication of the Claimant’s name by the Defendant to the Central Bank of Nigeria on the list of Fraudulent persons”; that the “labelling of the Claimant as being fraudulent after the Defendant exonerated him of the said allegation is malicious and amounts to an Unfair Labour Practice”, and asks for “damages for the trauma arising from the wrongful termination of the Claimant’s employment by the Defendant”.

 

29.        With this succinct undisputed case theory and reliefs sought in this matter, the pertinent arising question is- Which Court, if not  the National Industrial Court, that is  the appropriate Court vested with jurisdiction  to adjudicate the dispute, in the light of the provisions of Section 254C(1) of the extant Constitution? It is clear that the extant Constitution in the S.254C(1)(a), granted this Court an exclusive jurisdiction, over such civil causes or matters ‘relating to or connected with any labour, employment…and matters arising from workplace, the conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith’. The key indicator is that such cause/matter arise from, relating to, or is connected with employment, labour or workplace! See: Shell Petroleum Development Co of Nig Ltd v. Hallelujah Bukuma Fishermen Multi-Purpose Cooperative Society Ltd [2002]4NWLR (Pt.758)505@517, para.E, where the Court of Appeal referred to the definition given by the Supreme Court while interpreting  the provisions of  a legislation  of the  word ‘connected’ thus: “The verb ‘connected ‘ is defined in Black ‘s Law Dictionary , 6th ed., as ‘joined; united by junction, by an intervening substance or medium, by  dependence or relation, or by order in a series”.

 

30.        From the record, I find that the subject matter of the dispute bordering on workplace defamation and manner of termination of employment raising issue of unfair labour practice in this suit involves issues of employment relationship as it arose from workplace, not being from the street or other non-work-controlled environment/ matter. ‘Workplace Defamation’, a type of  defamation that can only arise in work environment and related to routine course of work borders on labour relation at work place, which is essentially different and distinct from general Defamation, just as the Tenancy resulting from accommodation-tied-to-employment, such as Official Quarters, differs markedly from general Tenancy. It is still National Industrial Court that is vested with jurisdiction over such type of Tenancy. It is same with Workplace Defamation, more so as both contract and tort-based claims are integral components of civil causes mentioned in S.254C (1)of the extant Constitution. I so hold.

 

31.        On the whole, I hold a humble but tenaciously considered view that given the expanded and espoused jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court under the current legal regime in Nigeria, all matters involving and connected with employment, workplace or labour relations, inclusive of workplace defamation being civil matter arising from workplace calling for adjudication in the instant suit, is not only cognizable for adjudication at the National Industrial Court, but also falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court, by virtue of its Constitutional mandate vested on the Court under S.254C (1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended by the 3rd Alteration Act 2010, effective 4th March 2011). To that end, the learned Defendant’s jurisdictional objection on this ground hereby fails, and is accordingly dismissed. I so hold.

 

32.        Another jurisdictional objection raised by the learned Defendant’s counsel, in her said Additional Written Address, borders on plea of ‘Res Judicata’, contending that the same subject matter of defamation has been adjudicated at the High Court of Rivers State and was dismissed, placing reliance on Exh.D5, which is Judgment of the Rivers State High Court on the matter. Counsel hulled in authorities of Abiola & Sons B. Co Ltd v. 7Up Bottling Co Ltd [2012]15NWLR (Pt.1322)184; SPDC v. X.M Fed Ltd (2008) ALL FWLR (Pt.408)1938 on the effect of plea of Res Judicata, to the effect that such matter cannot be re-litigated and the decision of the High Court is final and cannot be revisited by this Court, being a Court of coordinate jurisdiction.

 

 

 

33.        I take it that this line of objection is borne out of misconception of the subject matter of this suit in contrast from the one litigated in the High Court, which Judgment is marked as Exh.D5. Let me point out also, that this Court has not in any way reviewed the said judgment of the Rivers State High Court even as it is an Exhibit (exh.D5), other than to check the subject matter and what it decided and how it relates to, or affects the instant suit, so as to confirm if the principle of ‘Res Judicata’ can be legitimately invoked, as canvassed by the learned Defendant’s counsel.

 

34.        From the record, I  find that much as the subject matter of both suits involves the same parties, its cause of action is not conceptually the same, as this one is basically anchored on the workplace issue of employer-conduct and issue of unfair labour practice resulting in workplace defamation that is tied to career and employability in the banking sector, given the impact of the publication classifying the Claimant as having left employment on basis of fraud and his name sent to the Central Bank of Nigeria, the chief regulator of the banking industry in Nigeria. These issues were not in the front burner or the same reliefs sought for in the said High Court matter in exh.D5.

 

35.        In her jurisdictional objection posturing anchored on the principle of ‘res judicata’, the learned Defendant’s counsel even forgot the interface of the ‘res judicata principle’ on the adjudicatory principle of multiple suits that:   one subject matter can give rise to different causes of action, of which an aggrieved party is entitled to litigate any aspect of the cause of action in the appropriate Court. I find nothing convincing from the submissions of learned Defendant’s counsel indicating that the employment issues in this instant suit, have been litigated and resolved in the suit adjudicated at the Rivers State High Court, so as to invoke the doctrine of Res Judicata against the instant suit being adjudicated in the appropriate Court for such subject matter. This suit is therefore, not a re-litigation of the matter in exh.D5.

 

36.        It is trite that a Court, like the National Industrial Court herein, with jurisdiction over an aspect of subject matter in issue, (such as the main issue of alleged acts of unfair labour practice in the instant suit), cannot be excluded from the matter it has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate, merely because another aspect of the subject matter was taken to a different Court to adjudicate. On that note, this segment of the jurisdictional challenge also fails, and is accordingly dismissed. I so hold.   

 

37.        Having considered and determined all pending preliminary issues awaiting Ruling, it is time to deal with the substantive dispute presented in the suit.

 

DECSION ON SUBSTANTIVE DISPUTE

 

38.        The substantive dispute revolves around harmonized sole issue identified for determination- (1). Whether given the facts and evidence led, the Claimant proved his case to be entitled to the Reliefs sought? By the Amended Statement of Facts dated 18th July 2022, pursuant to the Court’s Order of 18th July 2022, the Claimant sought for three (3) Reliefs- one Declaratory and two Substantive Reliefs- but placing the declaratory relief in the middle (no.2). As Declaratory relief provides base for Substantive relief, it is usually considered first/earlier than the Substantive.  On that note, the Relief (2) on Declaratory Relief would be considered first. 

 

39.        The Relief (2) asks for: “A Declaration that the labelling of the Claimant as being fraudulent after the Defendant exonerated him of the said allegation is malicious and amounts to an Unfair Labour Practice.” Being a declaratory relief, the Claimant is obliged to prove same irrespective of weakness or no defence from the Defendant, as the law is that it is incumbent on a party seeking declaratory relief to satisfy the Court by evidence and not merely by admission of the Defendant in the pleadings. See: Dim v. Enemuo [2009]10NWLR (Pt.1149) SC 353@380-381. Para.F-D. From the record, I find that the Claimant laid evidence of his  employment history (exhs.C2-C4), and how he was queried and suspended over allegation of Dollar transaction but was recalled to resume duty (exhs.C5 and C6), which disciplinary procedure was in accordance with Employee Handbook March 2007 (exh.C10), and surprisingly his employment was terminated for ‘services no longer required’(exh.C7), and worst still, his name and photograph published in the Notice Board among the list of Staff who exited the Bank on grounds of fraud (exh.C8) and his name subsequently forward to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) pursuant to the CBN Circular to All Banks (exh.C9), with the result that the Claimant could not secure another job in the banking industry as shown in his unsuccessful employment interview with Union Bank (exh.C12), which brought to an abrupt end his banking career, and he is a professional Accountant (exh.C1), with much banking experience.  

 

 

 

 

40.        Claimant had contended that such wrongful and malicious act by the Defendant is reckless and unjustified as it has created adverse effect on his career and rendered him jobless and such amounts to unfair labour practice.  The Claimant’s main contention is that after he was suspended from duty and later recalled to resume duty in accordance with the provisions of the Employee Handbook, that recall means he has been exonerated and that would put an end to any further action on that disciplinary issue. It is also the Claimant’s contention that, while his employment termination letter was silent on that disciplinary issue, the Defendant still went ahead to publish his name and photograph at the Portal accessible to Staff as Notice Board and sent his name to the CBN to be blacklisted for employment as an employee whose employment was terminated/dismissed on grounds of fraud, and since then he has been jobless, having been blacklisted by the CBN as he observed during his unsuccessful employment interview with another Bank- Union Bank of Nigeria.  

 

41.        The Defendant did not deny this publication and sequence of actions, particularly that the said publication was made after the Claimant’s employment was terminated which did not place reliance on any fraudulent activity by Claimant, yet went ahead to publish the  Claimant’s name and photograph in its portal and to the CBN as a notice.

The Defendant had set up defence of qualified privilege, and justification of truth, contending that the Claimant was suspended after it became aware that EFCC came to the Branch for investigation following the Claimant’s involvement in the case of purchase and depositing of fake dollars in its vault at Ahoada Branch, and that the Claimant was never exculpated or discharged of any complicity even on his recall from suspension. And that the report to the CBN was in keeping with the directive, and that the Claimant had other incidence in the past, but which the Claimant also denied and tendered exh.C13 and C14 to show how it ended in his favour, and that his employment was not terminated referencing any such incident including the one of the dollar purchase and deposit in the bank vault, for which he was suspended pending investigation, but recalled without any pronouncement of being indicted.

 

42.        The Defendant and its learned counsel had maintained and argued that there is nothing before the court to show that the Claimant was exonerated even in the face of exh.C6 (Recall letter), by which the Claimant was recalled from the suspension initiated by exh.C5 (suspension letter) over the said fake dollar purchase and deposit incident, which disciplinary process is in line with exh.C10 (Employee Handbook).

43.        The stance taken by the Defendant and its learned counsel prompts the quire- If the Defendant actually indicted the Claimant why did it not exercise its disciplinary power to dismiss the Claimant for such act of gross misconduct warranting Summary Dismissal as in Clause 8.10 (c) of the Employee Handbook (exh. C10), which states: “Notwithstanding the above provisions, any employee who is guilty of gross misconduct shall be liable to summary dismissal”. The Defendant rather suspended and recalled the Claimant for such act of gross misconduct, and later terminated the employment without linking it to the incident, making the incident an after-thought, as there is no basis to still use the incident as basis for the publication so made against the Defendant’s career reputation, which has adversely affected his banking career. The essence and legal significance of disciplinary measure of ‘suspension pending investigation’ as exercised by the  Defendant is to provide better investigation process that is uninhibited by the presence of the defaulting employee, and since suspension is not a recognized mode of exit pathway in employment relationship, as it does not severe the cord of the employment relationship, it is expected that upon full investigation, the outcome would be to either indict or free the suspended staff, and where no indictment is pronounced, the defaulting employee is deemed to be free and the employer would be estopped from revisiting the incident, particularly at a time the employment has been terminated, which was not even carried out as punishment for infraction arising from the investigation report.

 

44.        It is well within the disciplinary ambit of an employer over its employee to condone infraction, and an employer is not permitted to resort to the already condoned infraction as even ground for termination of the employment, not to talk of an alleged infraction not used as a basis for termination of the employment, to be used as a basis for making report to regulatory authority, with the consequential damage to the career reputation of the ex-employee.

 

45.        Flowing from the foregoing discourse, I take the view that both the ‘doctrine of estoppel’ and ‘doctrine of condonation/implied waiver’ would come to the aid of the Claimant, given the factual circumstance of the instant suit, both doctrines of which were restated and applied in the recent Supreme Court case of Skye Bank v. Adigun [2024]15 NWLR (Pt.1960) SC1 (Adigun’Case). On the doctrine of estoppel, the Supreme Court, per Ogunwumiju JSC @ p.38, para.A-B, held thus: “The doctrine of estoppel stipulates that a party cannot be allowed to mislead another person into believing in a state of affairs and turn around to say to say to that person’s disadvantage that the state of affairs which he represented does not exist at all”. See also: Aliero v. Saidu {2023]16 NWLR (Pt.1909)95.

46.        On the doctrine of condonation/implied waiver’, His Lordship @p.38, paras. B-E held thus:  “Apart from the issue of estoppel, I am of the view that the doctrine of condonation and implied waiver will come to play in this case. By the doctrine of implied waiver and condonation, the appellant is deemed to have overlooked the misdeed of the respondent by giving him a caution instead of a harsher disciplinary measure”.  It is of note that the Supreme Court in the Adigun’Case still arrived at that decision and applied the doctrine of estoppel and condonation /implied waiver in favour of the ex-employee in the circumstance where there was even an outcome of disciplinary process that resulted in indictment deserving of punishment of dismissal, but which lesser punishment of caution was administered on the erring employee. In the instant suit, there is even no evidence of indictment of the Claimant employee, other than that he was suspended pending investigation and later recalled to resume duty, without any pronouncement that he was indicted by the outcome of the investigation. Also, the Claimant’s employment was not even terminated on the basis of such infraction as a communication, even by conduct, of the outcome of the investigation.

 

47.        The Defendant would rather, make offensive publication against the Defendant’s career reputation, classifying him among employees whose employment was terminated or who were dismissed from service on ground of involvement in fraud, and went ahead to send his biodata to the CBN, who, acting on the said information supplied by the Defendant, blacklisted the Claimant from further gainful employment in the banking industry. As it stands, I find no evidence on record to warrant invocation of the defense of justification or privilege, as canvassed by the Defendant and its learned counsel. I so hold.

 

48.        Workplace Defamation arises where, as in the instant case, the employee’s career has been exposed to extinction in the line of industry of his career path due to offensive publication against such an employee at work place. The publication is complete once done in accessible places to any other person other than to the employee whom it was meant to be communicated to. Thus, given the peculiarity of workplace defamation as targeting to dent the employee’s career and job-reputation, usually    communicated in internal publication at workplace, any offensive career-damaging publication made available to other staff in any medium, such as portal or notice board or staff WhatsApp group and to regulatory body, such as CBN in the instant case, is publishing to a third party for purposes of satisfying the essential element of publication to third party. I so hold.

 

49.        On the other element of false and malicious publication, what makes this publication false and offensive is the evidenced fact that it was done after the Claimant has been recalled to duty after investigation. The outcome of the investigation for which the Claimant was suspended was not indicated and nothing would make a rational mind to think that that issue has not been closed even as the termination of the employment was not anchored on it, rather on the infamous ‘your services is no longer required’.

 

50.        There is no doubt that the publications, particularly the one sent to the CBN  in furtherance of regulatory compliance in the Circular to All Banks (exh.C9) totally damaged the Claimant’s career as he has become unemployable, having been blacklisted as falling in the database of bank employees who were dismissed or whose employment terminated on ground of fraud. The falsity and adverse impact of such publication makes it malicious and reprehensible amounting to act of unfair labour practice.  This uncontroverted evidence by the Claimant’s testimony is a pointer to acts of unfair labour practice, which this Court frowns at and curtails in modern workplace practice.

 

51.        The concept of unfair labour practice and best practice in labour relations in workplace practice, are recognized cause of action under the emerging labour law jurisprudence which this Court has been constitutionally imbued to adjudicate and enforce, courtesy of the provisions of S.254C (1) (f) and (h) of the the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (3rd Alteration 2010), effective 4th March 2011. The emerging concept of unfair labour practice seeks to moderate workplace practices in line with best practice in labour relations on the side of both employer and employee. It is an aspect of ‘decent work agenda’ of the International Labour Organization (ILO), which encourages heathy work place environment devoid of harassment and oppressive conducts at workplace. The Workplace Defamation as disclosed in the instant suit is wrongful and essentially falls within the realm of acts of unfair labour practice. I so hold.

 

52.        In the circumstance, the Relief (2) succeeds, to the extent that it is hereby declared that the labelling of the Claimant as being fraudulent after the Defendant exonerated him of the said allegation is malicious and amounts to an Unfair Labour Practice. I so hold and declare.

 

 

 

 

 

53.        The Reliefs (1) and (3) are to be taken together, as they ask for general damages for the wrongful act of workplace defamation amounting to unfair labour practice and damages for the trauma arising from the wrongful termination of the Claimant’s employment by the Defendant. The Relief (1) prays for: “An Order of One Hundred Million Naira (N100, 000,000.00) as general damages for the wrongful publication of the Claimant’s name by the Defendant to the Central Bank of Nigeria on the list of fraudulent persons”. And the Relief (3) seeks for: “An Order of this Honourable Court granting the Claimant the sum of Ten Million Naira as damages for the trauma arising from the wrongful termination of the Claimant’s employment by the Defendant”.

 

54.        The Claimant had anchored these reliefs on the aftermath of the Defendant’s termination of his employment (exh.C7), which though was without any link with the incidence of the dollar transaction and deposit in the bank’s vault for which he was placed on suspension from duty pending investigation (exh.C5), but was exonerated having not been pronounced guilty upon his recall from the suspension (exh.C6). Nevertheless, the Defendant went on to  publish his name and biodata in its accessible portal as notice board (exh.C8), and also sent to the CBN, the regulator of the banking industry, in purported compliance with the CBN’s Circular to All Banks concerning maintaining “a data bank on staff of financial institutions dismissed or terminated on grounds of fraud and forgeries…”(exh.C9), with consequential backlisting of the Claimant from further employment in the banking sector, which became obvious during his unsuccessful employment interview with another Bank, the Union Bank of Nigeria(exh.C12). 

 

55.        From the sequence of incidents and evidence led on material facts in issue, I find from the record that it goes thus: the Claimant was alleged to have been involved in transaction and deposit of fake dollar in the Defendant’s bank vault of which he was placed on suspension pending investigation, but was later recalled to resume duty. The Defendant did not disclose the outcome of the investigation but just recalled the Claimant but subsequently terminated his employment. This termination is not linked to the incident of the dollar transaction or any other disciplinary issue, it is just for reason of ‘services no longer required’. The Claimant exited the employment relationship at that point and was paid off in line with the terms of employment for employee exiting without dismissal.

 

 

 

56.        Thereafter, the unexpected happened- the Defendant published the Claimant’s name and photograph in its portal accessible to all staff, serving as a notice board, in a classified notice indicating that the Claimant’s employment was terminated as result of fraud. The said information was also, admittedly, sent by the Defendant to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the regulator of the Banking Industry, who had in a Circular to All Banks, requested compulsory submission of biodata of staff either dismissed or who employment was terminated on ground of fraud or forgeries, to get rid of such staff, in line the provisions of S.44(4) of the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA)(As Amended), which states that: “Any person whose appointment with a bank has been terminated or who has been dismissed for reasons of fraud, dishonesty or convicted for an offence involving dishonesty or fraud shall not be employed by any bank in Nigeria”.   

 

57.        For elucidated discourse, I have taken liberty to paste copies of the relevant exhibits relating to the suspension (exh. C5); recall (exh.C6) ; termination (exh.C7) and publication of Claimant’s name (exh.C8), in their sequence of occurrence in relation to the issue under contention:

 

Suspension Letter (exh.C5):

Recall Letter (exh.C6):

 

 

 

 

Termination Letter (exh.C7)

 

 

 

 

 

Publication of Claimant’s Name (exh.C8)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

58.        From the record, I find that the crux of the Defendant’s defence of justification and privilege was hinged on its obligation to report employees who were disengaged because of involvement in fraud or acts of dishonesty, in compliance with the CBN directive in exh.C9, which begs the question- Can the plea of justification and privilege avail the Defendant? The Defendant had purported to have acted pursuant to this provision of the regulatory law (BOFIA), by sending the Claimant’s biodata to the CBN, and he was indeed, blacklisted as his subsequent attempt to regain employment in the banking industry became for him, a nightmare, and fruitless, as he experienced with the last attempt with Union bank where he was said to have done well in the interview but he was never contacted again (exh.C12). At a point it sounded as a bewitchment of the Claimant, as ordinarily, a person who left previous employment by way of termination does not get so affected (blacklisted), as the concept of ‘termination’ does not carry with it infamy of misconduct, unlike the concept of ‘dismissal’ that comes with career-damage requiring career-cleansing by the Court.   

 

59.        An arising pertinent question is- Did the Defendant truly act pursuant to this provision given that the termination of the Claimant’s employment was not linked to any fraud or dishonesty, such incident not indicated in the termination letter? Why the concealment of such incident if that is to be linked with the CBN Circular requiring sending information of culprits to the CBN? Compliance with this provision would entail indicating in the termination letter such reason, so as to be anchored under the provision of the regulatory law, and obviate elements of surprise and associated trauma and psychological disorientation, when such information is discovered in the course of searching for another job , without knowing that such career-damaging information has been sent to the CBN, which makes such an ex-employee a prohibited candidate of subsequent employment in the Nigerian banking Industry, going by the provisions of S.44(4) of the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA)(As Amended), quoted in the said CBN’s Circular to All Banks (exh.C9).

 

60.        Again, could the Defendant truly rely on the incident even after it suspended the Claimant pending investigation but did not disclose the outcome of the investigation but simply recalled the Claimant to resume duty? This arising question has been extensively addressed while considering the Relief (2) in the course of this Judgment. Suffice it to say that the Defendant having investigated the incident during the supposed suspension of the Claimant with punitive measure of payment of half salary to the Claimant during the period of the suspension pending investigation (exh.C6), done in line with the prescription of the Employee Handbook (exh.C10), emphatically exonerated the Claimant upon his recall from duty which completed the exercise of disciplinary measure of ‘suspension pending investigation’, which was also done in line with the Employee Handbook (exh.C10), from where that disciplinary process was anchored. going by the tenor of  the Suspension letter exh.C5).  

 

61.        And having recalled the Claimant without informing him of any indictment, sufficiently foreclosed the Defendant from further relying on the said incident to classify the Claimant as being part of those staff who lost their jobs on account of fraud or acts of dishonesty as envisaged by the directive of the CBN  as expressed in the  said Circular. Worst still, while terminating the Claimant’s employment nothing of such incident was disclosed as basis for the termination, prompting the question – Why was it not so disclosed in the termination letter, and would the Defendant be allowed to read into the termination letter a reason it did not contain as basis for the termination of the Claimant’s employment and warranting sending his name to the CBN in compliance with the directive in the CBN’s Circular to All Banks?

 

62.        I hold the considered view that Banks and Other Financial Institutions under  the supervision of the CBN and obliged to comply with the reporting of  fraudulent employees pursuant to the provisions of the of S.44(4) of the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA)(As Amended), ought to be very circumspect, diligent and transparent in ensuring that the erring employees are subjected to proper disciplinary hearing and any indictment expressly stated in a report as act of fraud or dishonesty, and duly communicated and disclosed in the disengagement letter, whether by termination or dismissal, knowing fully well of the consequence of such inclusion of employees in the CBN database of blacklisted ex-bank employees; being a permanent bar to re-employment in the banking and financial sector.

 

63.        This expected best practice in labour relations cannot be said to have been imbibed and deployed by the way and manner of the Defendant’s handling of the incident in the Claimant’s case. It seems that the Defendant was tricky and somewhat carried away and obsessed with the infamous cliché:’ “Your services is no longer required”, which is not one of the indicated reasons of fraud or dishonest act that would necessitate compliance with the provision of the S.44 (4) of BOFIA. I so hold.

 

 

 

 

64.        The Claimant’s grouse and gamut of evidence led and submissions of learned Claimant’s counsel is not necessarily the mere act of termination of the Claimant’s employment on the reason of ‘your services no longer required’, but more of the Defendant’s overreaching acts of publishing the Claimant’s name and photograph in its accessible portal and sending his name to CBN for sanction, without him being indicted or the reason disclosed in his termination letter-What then is legal basis for such acts?  To my mind, the Defendant having not legally justified such wrongful acts done to the Claimant with consequential damaging effect on his banking career, amounting to acts of unfair labour practice, as already declared in the Relief(2), is the kernel of the Claimant’s substantive Reliefs (1) and (3).

 

65.        It is the Claimant’s contention that the Defendant upon terminating his employment on basis of ‘services no longer required’ and having severed the employment relationship, maliciously went on to smear his career reputation and made a mess of his cherished accounting career as it made a false and offensive publication to the CBN to blacklist him from further employment in the banking sector of the economy.

 

66.        It is of note that the Defendant’s learned counsel had argued that the Claimant did not prove libel (workplace defamation) by using the general elements  of ordinary libelous claims cognizable at the High Court, and not condescending on peculiar elements dealing with the nature of occurrence of workplace defamation as consignable at the Industrial Court, of which the Claimant had led evidence on and made sufficient averments to establish, particularly, that the publication was damaging to his career and prevented him from re-gaining employment in his chosen career line in the banking industry , which is a direct fallout of the unjustified sending of his name to the CBN under the category of staff that were disengaged on ground of fraud or dishonest act.  

 

67.        On the whole, I find the Defendant liable for the oppressive and wrongful acts of unfair labour practice against the Claimant.  In Leonard Oyinbo v. Guinness Nig. Plc (Suit No. NICN/LA/639/2012, Judgment delivered Sept.20 2019, per Ogbuanya.J), it was held thus: “I hasten to add that an employer who persists to practice unfair labour practice at workplace risks liability for compensation of victimized employee”. I adopt this view herein. This compensation is by way of award of relief of general damages. It is trite that general damages are awardable per se upon breach, and is compensatory in nature in monetary form, as assessed by the court in exercise of its equitable jurisdiction to compensate the injured party by the act of the breach of contract or injury inflicted.

 

68.        The rational for award of damages in litigated matter of this kind, has been further elucidated in Shukka v. Abubakar [2012] 4 NWLR (Pt.1291) CA497, when the court stated: “The basic object of award of damages is to compensate the plaintiff for the damage or injury or loss he had suffered as a result of the action of the defendants, premised on the guiding principle of restitution in interregnum- that is, putting the plaintiff in a position in which he would have been, if he had not suffered the wrong for which he is being compensated”. In N.A.C.B Ltd v. Achagwa [2010]11 NWLR (Pt.1205) CA 339 @369. Paras. C-D, the court clarified how general damages are determined thus: “One of the characteristics of general damages is that it is fixed by the opinion of the court, such as the law will presume to be the direct natural or probable consequence of the act complained of”. See also: Odumosu v. A.C.B Ltd (1976)11SC55; Samouris v. Maja [1996]7NWLR (Pt.460)336; Union Bank of Nigeria v. Alhaji Adams Ajabule & Anor (2011) LPELR- 8239(SC).

 

69.         In consequence, the Reliefs (1) and (3) succeed, to the extent that the sum of N50,000,000.00 (fifty million naira) is hereby awarded against the Defendant in favour of the Claimant as compensation by way of general damages for the act of unfair labour practice of terminating the Claimant’s employment for ‘services no longer required’ but turned around to publish his name and bio data among ex-employees disengaged for involvement in fraud and dishonest acts, after it had exonerated him but wrongly sent his name to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) which blacklisted him in line with S.44(4) of the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA) (As Amended), and prevented him from re-gaining employment in the banking industry in Nigeria, thereby tarnishing his cherished career and rendered him jobless and traumatized. As a consequential Order, the said Wrongful publications are hereby set aside. Accordingly, the Defendant is hereby restrained from further giving effect to its said wrongful career-damaging publications against the Claimant. I so hold and Order.

 

70.        I am not also unmindful that this suit is an old suit of 2016, filed in Yenagoa and later returned to Owerri and Port Harcourt and transferred to this Court, and has been diligently prosecuted by the Claimant to this point of Judgment. In the circumstance, in line with Or.55 Rs.1, 4 & 5 of the extant Rules of this Court, the sum of N2,000,000 (Two million naira) Cost is hereby awarded against the Defendant in favour of the Claimant. The sums of money awarded and payable in this Judgment shall be paid to the Claimant by the Defendants, within two (2) months of this Judgment, failing which it attracts 10% interest rate per annum until fully liquidated. I so hold and order.

71.        For clarity and avoidance of doubt, and on the basis of the reasons advanced in the body of the Judgment, the terms of this Judgment are as follows:

1.     The Admissibility and Jurisdictional Objections raised in the Suit lack merit and are hereby dismissed;

 

2.     Relief (2) succeeds, to the extent that it is hereby declared that the labelling of the Claimant as being fraudulent after the Defendant exonerated him of the said allegation is malicious and amounts to an Unfair Labour Practice;

 

3.     The Reliefs (1) and (3) succeed, to the extent that the sum of N50,000,000.00 (fifty million naira) is hereby awarded against the Defendant in favour of the Claimant as compensation by way of general damages for the act of unfair labour practice of terminating the Claimant’s employment for ‘services no longer required’ but turned around to publish his name and bio data among ex-employees disengaged for involvement in fraud and dishonest acts, after it had exonerated him but wrongly sent his name to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) which blacklisted him in line with S.44(4) of the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA) (As Amended), and prevented him from re-gaining employment in the banking industry in Nigeria, thereby tarnishing his cherished career and rendered him jobless and traumatized. As a consequential Order, the Defendant is hereby restrained from further giving effect to its said wrongful career-damaging publications against the Claimant;

 

4.     As a consequential Order, the said wrongful publications are hereby set aside. Accordingly, the Defendant is hereby restrained from further giving effect to its said wrongful career-damaging publications against the Claimant;

 

5.     In line with Or.55 Rs.1, 4 & 5 of the extant Rules of this Court, the sum of N2,000,000 (Two million naira) Cost is hereby awarded against the Defendant in favour of the Claimant;

 

6.     The sums of money awarded and payable in this Judgment shall be paid to the Claimant by the Defendants, within two (2) months of this Judgment, failing which it attracts 10% interest rate per annum until fully liquidated.

 

72.        Judgment is entered accordingly.

 

 

HON. JUSTICE N.C.S OGBUANYA

PRESIDING JUDGE

21/10/25