JOSHUA CHETO -VS- DALEMA MINI MART LIMITED& 2 ORS- National Industrial Court of Nigeria

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE KADUNA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT KADUNA

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE BASHAR A. ALKALI

DATE: THURSDAY 11^TH DECEMBER, 2025

SUIT NO: NICN/KD/06/2025

BETWEEN:

JOSHUA CHETO…………………………………………………..CLAIMANT

AND

1. DALEMA MINI MART LIMITED

2. NORMA SHIRLEY JIBRILU DEFENDANTS

3. NASIRU JIBRILU

REPRESENTATION

Abdullahi Bello Esq for the Claimant

A. A. Salisu Esq with S. I. Abdulaziz Esq for the Defendants

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

The Claimant filed a Complaint pursuant to Order 3 Rule 2 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedures) Rules 2017 on the 24^th of January 2025, whereat the Claimant claims against the Defendants the following reliefs:

a. A DECLARATION that by making a direct assertion of fraud, breach of trust and theft of the sum of N50,000,000.00 against the Claimant in its petition dated 22^nd May 2023 to the EFCC without a reasonable basis, the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants had set the law in motion against the Claimant leading to his unwarranted arrest and detention from the 14^th of June 2023 to the 5^th of July 2023 and thus are liable for false imprisonment of the Claimant.

b. A DECLARATION that by making a direct assertion of fraud, breach of trust and theft of the sum of N50,000,000.00 against the Claimant in its petition to the EFCC leading to the arrest of the Claimant from his work place and in the presence of his colleagues and customers and causing the detention of his car, thereby discrediting the Claimant in his trade and lowering him in the estimation of members of the society are liable for defamation of the Claimant's Character.

c. A DECLARATION that by further publishing the assertion of crime of fraud and theft against the Claimant to the Managing Director of Alibert Products Limited, Maged Taan and Jacob Cheto thereby discrediting the Claimant in his trade, the 3^rd Defendant is liable for slander.

d. Special damages in the sum of N100,000.00 as unpaid salary for the month of June 2023 (that is; for the days he worked from 1st to 14th of June 2023 when he was arrested and for the remaining days in June 2023 he spent in the custody of the EFCC following the Petition).

e. Recovery of the sum of N405,215.5 from the 1^st Defendant to the Claimant being his unpaid commission on the sale of furniture.

f. N5, 000, 000.00 as general damages against the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants jointly and severally for false arrest and imprisonment of the Claimant from 14^th of June to 5^th of July 2023.

g. N5,000,000.00 as general damages against the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants jointly and severally for tort of defamation.

h. N1, 000, 000.00 as general damages against the 3^rd Defendant for slander.

i. N500,000.00 general damages for detention of the Claimant's car from 6^th of July 2023 till 6^th of July 2023 against the 1st Defendant.

j. Cost of this action.

The Claimant predicated his claims on the Statement of Fact and Witness’ Statement on Oath filed on the 24^th of January 2025, and Reply and Further Witness’ Statement on Oath filed on the 4^th of March 2025. The Defendants filed a Statement of Defence and a Witness’ Deposition on Oath on the 18^th of February 2025.

At the plenary trial on the 28^th of April 2025 where the Claimant opened his case. Jacob Cheto, who testified for the Claimant hereinafter referred to as CW1, identified his Depositions made on Oath filed on the 24^th of January 2025, and adopted the same as his evidence in support of the case of the Claimant.

The Claimant, who testified for himself hereinafter referred to as CW2, identified his Depositions made on Oath filed on the 24^th of January 2025, and 4^th of March 2025, and adopted the same as his evidence in support of his case. The Claimant tendered the underlisted documents, and they are marked accordingly as follows:

1. Complaint from Delema Mini Mart Limited dated the 22^nd of May 2023 addressed to EFCC– marked Exhibit CW001.

2. Written Statement made by one Norma Shirley Jibrilu – marked Exhibit CW002.

3. Alibert – Delema Received Invoice Daily Sale Report – marked Exhibit CW003.

On the 27^thof May 2025, the Defendants opened their defence, Clement A. Ajinwa, hereinafter referred to as DW1, testified for the Defendants. DW1 identified his Statement on Oath filed the 18^th of February 2025 and adopted the same as his evidence in support of the defence of the Defendants.

After the close of the hearing of the suit, on the 23^rd of July 2025, the matter came up for the adoption of the Final Written Addresses filed by Counsel. Counsel for the Defendants, A. A. Salisu, Esq. identified his Final Written Address filed on the 10^th of June 2025 and Reply on Point of Law filed on the 3^rd of July 2025 and adopted the same as his legal submission in aid of the case of the Defendants while urging this Court to dismiss the claim of the Claimant.

Counsel for the Claimant was not in court for the business of the day, the Court therefore adopted pursuant to Order 45 Rule 7 of the Rules of this Court the Final Written Address filed on the 30^th of June 2025 by Abdullahi Bello, Esq. on behalf of the Claimant.

CASE OF THE CLAIMANT

The facts of the case of the Claimant are that before the Claimant's employment with the 1^st Defendant, he worked for Alibert Products Nigeria Limited as an accountant and administration officer from 2019 to 2022 at its Kano Showroom, Kano State before it got burnt. Sometime in March, 2022, the Claimant was introduced to the 3^rd Defendant by Majeed Ta'an, the Managing Director of his erstwhile employer, Alibert Products Limited, to assist in setting up a furniture showroom for the 1^st Defendant Company at its Kaduna office. The 3^rd Defendant offered the Claimant employment with the 1^st Defendant as a Showroom Manager with monthly remuneration of

N100,000.00 and 0.5% commission on each sale of furniture in the showroom where the Claimant manages.

All through the times the Claimant worked with Alibert Products Nigeria Limited and before his issues with the 1^st Defendant in June 2024, the Claimant had a good working relationship with both Companies. The Claimant commenced service with the 1^st Defendant sometime in March 2022 and was being paid his monthly salary as agreed until May 2023. From the 14^th of June 2023, the Claimant's employment with the 1^st Defendant was interrupted when officers of the EFCC approached him at his place of work in the 1^st Defendant's office and arrested him. The Operatives of the EFCC came into the premises in large numbers, sealing the premises. As two of them were stationed at the entrance of the premises, then four operatives came up to the Claimant's and placed him under arrest in the presence of his colleagues, staff and customers who had come to patronise the company.

The operatives later brought the Claimant down to his car and searched it, and then seized his car keys, laptop, wallet and two mobile phones. Thereafter, the EFCC officers transported the Claimant to the EFCC Kaduna Zonal Office where he was detained in their cell. During the Claimant's stay in the custody of the EFCC, he was informed orally of the written petition submitted by the 2^nd Defendant on behalf of the 1^st Defendant Company against him and one Halima Ali, who was an assistant manager with the 1^st Defendant, accusing the Claimant of fraud, stating that he had conspired with the said Halima to fraudulently divert proceeds of furniture sales in the sum of N50,000,000.00 into an Access Bank Account opened by the Claimant and Halima.

The Claimant denied the allegation as false and maintained in his written statement given to the EFCC officers that he never opened any bank account in the name of Dalema nor diverted any sum meant for the 1^st Defendant. The Claimant maintained that, monies meant for the 1^st Defendant in the course of marketing activities in the 1^st Defendant Company paid through him were remitted into the account of the 1^st Defendant. On the 19^th of June 2023, while the Claimant was still in the custody of EFCC, its Zonal Commander called the attention of the Claimant and insisted that the Claimant had diverted funds belonging to the 1^st Defendant and that the Claimant must give written statements explaining transactions in his accounts, otherwise he will not be released on bail.

During the Claimant's stay in the custody of the EFCC from the 14^th of June 2023 to the 5^th of July 2023, he was interrogated severally by the investigating officers of the EFCC, particularly one Shu'aibu Umar Modibbo, at none of those times did the officers confront the Claimant with any such account said to have been opened or operated by the Claimant, nor was any such suspicious funds found in the Claimant's account statements of his various banks produced and shown to him. On the 21^st of June 2023, the said Modibbo, while interrogating the Claimant in the presence of his brother, Jacob Cheto, who had visited the Claimant from Abuja, told the Claimant that he had discovered that no such account was actually opened.

In a Fundamental Right Action filed by the Claimant against the EFCC, Access Bank and Zenith Bank, Suit No: KDH/KAD/959/2023, the Claimant reported the fact that no such account was found by the EFCC in his affidavit in support of the Motion filed in the action, in its response, by way of a Counter Affidavit, the said Modibbo did not state any contrary fact. All through the time the Claimant was under the employ of the 1^st Defendant, he never operated any account purporting to be in the name of the 1^st Defendant and of which he is a beneficiary. Although the Claimant was given a form purporting to grant him administrative bail dated 14^th June 2023, the Claimant was yet refused an opportunity to make calls until the 16^th of June 2023 when he was allowed to make a phone call to his brother, Jacob Cheto, and so could not find a way to meet his bail conditions. By the 19^th of June 2023, although the Claimant and his surety had executed a recognisance form for the Claimant's bail, he was not released until of July 2023, as the EFCC officers were still, in the interim, grilling the Claimant into admitting that he defrauded the 1^st Defendant of N50,000,000.00.

When the Claimant was being released from custody, the EFCC's Investigating Officers released his car keys to him, which was seized at the point of his arrest. On the 14^th of June 2023 when the Claimant was taken away from the 1^st Defendant's premises, his Honda Car, 2005 Model was left parked at the premises, while his car keys and other belonging were seized. After his release, on the 6^th of July 2023, the Claimant returned to the 1^st Defendant's premises to retrieve his car, but was prevented by a Manager of the 1^st Defendant, one Mallam Aliyu. The said Mallam Aliyu told the Claimant that the 3^rd Defendant had instructed that the Claimant should not be allowed to take his car from the premises. Three days later, the Claimant received a call from a member of staff of the 1^st Defendant, one Mr. Clement Abah, inviting the Claimant to the 1^st Defendant's premises to retrieve his car. When the Claimant returned to drive out his car, he met all the tires deflated, and so had to get a tire technician to inflate the tires. The Claimant also discovered that his battery was weak and was no longer functioning well, he hence had to replace the battery with a new one costing him N45,000.00.

During the Claimant's ordeal with the EFCC, his Accounts with Access Bank and Zenith Bank were also placed on Post No-Debit, necessitating the Claimant, among other grounds, to file the Suit No: KDH/KAD/959/2023 to get back his properties seized, get his accounts released from restrictions and remedies for wrongs occasioned by the circumstances of his arrest. The claimant's phones and Laptop that were seized by the EFCC for investigation were later returned to him sometime in February 2024 during the pendency of the Fundamental Right Action filed by the Claimant against the EFCC, Access Bank and Zenith Bank before the High Court of Kaduna State, in Suit No: KDH/KAD/959/2023. On the 16^th of October 2024, the judgment in the Suit was delivered in favour of the Claimant, upholding his constitutional rights.

Since the 22^nd of May 2023, when the petition was acknowledged by the EFCC, the Claimant has not been charged with any offence in relation to the petition. All through his interactions with the EFCC, the Claimant was refused a copy of the petition written on behalf of the 1^st Defendant against him. The Claimant was only able to get a copy of the Petition dated the 22^nd of May 2023 along with the 2^nd Defendant's Written Statement dated 23rd of May 2023, when the EFCC filed a response in the above action, attaching a copy of the Petition and the Statement to its Counter Affidavit filed 6^th of October 2023. The 2^nd Defendant specifically suggested to the EFCC that the Claimant had opened other Accounts in the name of the 1^st Defendant to channel proceeds of furniture and specifically suggested the sum of N50, 000,000.00 as monies diverted. In the Written Statement to the EFCC, the 2^nd Defendant mentioned Account Number 1722377663 with Access Bank as the Account provided to customers by the Claimant, which account the 2^nd Defendant mentioned does not belong to the 1^st Defendant. The said Account number 1722377663 is registered with the POS device of the 1^st Defendant. After the Claimant's legal issues with the EFCC seem to have been in better watch with his lawyers, Jacob Cheto returned to Abuja where he works and resides.

Jacob resumed his work at Alibert Products Limited, an associate Company with the 1^st Defendant Company, where he happened to meet the 3^rd Defendant who came to visit the Managing Director of Alibert. Jacob approached the 3^rd Defendant and gently asked what was going on with the Claimant. The 3^rd Defendant exclaimed, calling the Claimant a thief, a criminal and that the Claimant will spend his time in jail and that the Claimant stole N50,000,000 from the Defendants and promising that the Claimant will rot in jail. Sometime between July and September 2023, Jacob's boss, the Managing Director of Alibert Products Limited, Maged Taan, called Jacob to his office and insinuated that Jacob is aware of what the 3^rd Defendant is accusing the Claimant of. The said Maged also suggested to Jacob that since they are twins, it is no how the Claimant will be committing the crime alleged and Jacob will not know about it. Even as Jacob denied knowing about the allegations, the said Maged continued to call Jacob on several occasions, questioning him about the allegation against the Claimant to the knowledge of some of his colleagues in the office, including Jacob's wife.

This query continued in the Alibert's office leading to rumour of Jacob's expulsion from his employment. Several staff of Alibert had also met Jacob to express their concerns about the issues the Claimant was facing and how it may affect his Job. As feared, on the 1^st of September, 2023, Jacob was issued a termination letter from his employers, Alibert.

After the salary of the month of May 2023, the Claimant was not paid salary anymore, not even for the days he worked from 1^st to 14th of June 2023 when he was arrested, nor for the 21 days he spent in the custody of the EFCC following the Petition. From March 2022 when the Claimant was employed with the 1^st Defendant, the Claimant was paid 0.5% Commission of the proceeds of Furniture sales. The Claimant was, however, not paid the 0.5% Commission on sales for May and June 2022 and April and May 2023. The Claimant is therefore entitled to a total of N405,215.5 of unpaid commission. As a Showroom/Sales Manager of the 1^st defendant, the Claimant was responsible for recording and keeping records of sales in the Company's Daily Sales Book. The Claimant also prepares and keeps personal records of the sales in his personal computer, indicating the figures of the sale for May and June 2022 and April and May 2023. The Claimant's Assistant, Halima Ali, also made entries in the Record Book.

DEFENCE OF THE DEFENDANTS

The Defendants stated that the employment of the Claimant was a secondment from Alibert Products (Nigeria) Limited to sell its products at the 1^st Defendant's premises. The Claimant was not the Defendants' direct employee nor did the Defendants own the products sold. The crux of the Defendants' complaint at the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission was the discovery that the Claimant received monies into his personal accounts from customers without the knowledge or approval of the Defendants. The Claimant stocked the showroom with furniture that belonged to him personally and was not on the inventory of Alibert Products (Nigeria) Limited and sold the same using the 1^st Defendant's premises for his personal gain thereby breaching the trust reposed in him by the Defendants. The Defendant never at any time instructed any person to deny the Claimant access to his vehicle. The 3^rd Defendant never called the Claimant a thief, criminal or that he would spend his time in jail or rot in jail as the 3^rd Defendant is neither a court or a law enforcement agency capable of handing out sentences or incarcerating any person. The Defendants are not aware of what the bases are for arriving at the spurious figures quoted by the Claimant, especially in Paragraph 51, who never made any demand for payment.

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

Counsel for the Claimant nominated three issues for the determination of this suit, to wit:

1. Whether or not a failure to comply with Order 3, Rule 12 (1) (d-f) of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 does not amount to an irregularity.

2. Whether the Claimant has been able to establish the basis for the claim of his unpaid remuneration to entitle him to the recovery thereof.

3. Whether the Claimant has established the torts of false imprisonment, defamation, and detinue against the Defendants to entitle him to the award of general damages claimed.

Counsel for the Defendants also nominated three issues for the determination of this suit, to wit:

1. Whether the Claimant has fulfilled the Conditions necessary to arouse the jurisdiction of the Honourable Court.

2. Whether an employee on secondment may maintain an action against his station of secondment.

3. Whether from the facts and circumstances of this suit, the claimant is entitled to the reliefs claimed.

Having carefully gone through the subject matters of this suit, which are basicly based on the tort, and the legal submissions of the parties, I will therefore consolidate the issues nominated by the parties and re-couch them as follows:

1. Whether the National Industrial Court of Nigeria has jurisdiction over tortious claims arising out of the employment relationship between the Claimant and the Defendants

2. Whether there is an employment relationship between the Claimant and the Defendants which can make the Defendants liable in tort.

3. Whether the Claimant has proved his case against the Defendants to entitle him to the reliefs sought.

LEGAL SUBMISSION OF THE CLAIMANT

Counsel for the Claimant submitted that in his quest to prove his claim to the unpaid salary and 0.5% commission against the Defendants, the Claimant stated, in his Statement on oath, in paragraphs 5, 6, 8 & 40, the offer that the 3^rd Defendant (who is a Director of the 1^st Defendant) made to him, for N100,000.00 monthly salary and 0.5% monthly commission in consideration for his service to the 1^st Defendant as a showroom manager. He stated that he commenced work with the 1^st Defendant and was being paid his salaries as agreed and also his 0.5% commission since from March 2022 of his employment. The Claimant has by the paragraphs presented a contractual agreement (employment) between him and the Defendants with terms of his employment, which the Defendants have been complying with until June 2023 when he was arrested by the EFCC at the behest of the Defendants. The paragraphs present a clear fact of offer of employment from a Director of the 1^st Defendant and acceptance by conduct from the Claimant with consideration from both parties.

The Defendants on the other hand, through their sole witness, DW1, responded by stating in paragraphs 5, 12 & 13 of Dw1's Witness Statement dated 18^th February, 2025 that, the claimant was a secondment and not a direct employee of the Defendants; that they do not owe the Claimant salary or commission and he is not entitled to same. Under cross examination, DW1 conceded that he came to know the Claimant for the first time when the Claimant resumed duties in Kaduna. Obviously DW1 was not a witness to the offer of employment made by the Defendants to the Claimant. His evidence as to the terms of employment of the Claimant is not reliable.

The Defendants did not controvert or state to the contrary the existence of the terms of his employment entered between the parties, they did not deny the fact that the Claimant was being paid the amounts stated in terms of salaries and commissions. While the DW1 stated that the Defendants do not owe the Claimant any salary or commission, DW1 did not however, suggest that the Defendants had paid the Claimant his salaries and commissions that the Claimant has stated he was not paid, by paragraphs 39 - 41 of CW2's Witness Statement. Invariably, the Defendants did not controvert these states of facts in their Statement of Defence. By Order 32, rule 3 of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017; mere denial of debt is not a sufficient defence against the Claimant's claims.

Submitted paragraphs 5, 6, 8 & 40 of the Claimant's Witness Statement and paragraphs 4, 6, 8, 9, 49 & 50 of the Claimant's Statement of Facts clearly demonstrate the existence of an employment contract between the Claimant and the 1^st Defendant with remuneration to proceed directly from the 1^st Defendant to the Claimant and not any other person. To further contradict the position that the Defendants are attempting to push, with the indirect employment or secondment notion, in Exhibit CW01, written by the 2^nd Defendant, in lines 2 to 3 in the 1^st paragraph, the 2^nd defendant referred to the Claimant as her employee. In Exhibit CW02, the 2^nd Defendant who made the Statement to the EFCC, referred to the Claimant two times as her employee. In fact 2^nd defendant said she 'employed the two of them Halima and Joshua. This can be seen in lines 11 to 14 of Exhibit CW02. Both Exhibits CW01 & CW02 were frontloaded and served on the Defendants, they did not make any statement in denial of their authenticity in their Defense, they also did not object to their admissibility during trial. In fact none of the Defendants were called to testify on the issue, hence there was no point for the Claimant to further prove fact which is not in controversy. The attempt by the Defendant to twist the nature of the Claimant's Employment is clearly incredible.

Courts have held umpteenth time that parties are bound by the contract they freely entered. In Enemchukwu v. Okoye (2017) 6 NWLR (Pt.1560)37 at p. 56, paras. C-D, the Court of Appeal held that; when contracts are voluntarily entered into by parties, they become binding on them based on the terms they have set out for themselves.

The claims of the Claimant in relation to his remuneration under paragraphs 56 (d & e) being in the nature of special damages, the Claimant as CW2 having stated the basis of entitlement to N100,000.00 monthly salary and 0.5% Commission on sale of furniture in paragraph6,8 and 40 of his Statement on oath, which were not controverted, went further to state in paragraph 39 the period the Defendants failed to pay his salary in the month of June, which is a total of 36 days, that is, over a month's salary. He clearly stated that he had worked for 14 days and then spent 21 days in prison as a result of the petition by the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants, which days he could not earn any wage but could have if not for the actions of the Defendants.

The Claimant in paragraph 41 of his Statement on Oath, also stated in a tabular form, the months in which he was not paid commission, the total sales made of furniture for each of those months and a calculation of the 0.5% commission owed to him in each of those months, totalling N405,215.5. CW2 tendered in evidence, Exhibit CW03- which is, the Alibert-Dalema Received Invoice and Daily Sales Report. CW2 demonstrated to this Honourable Court how he came about the sum claimed as commission during trial. Exhibit CW03, was served on the Defendants, the Defendants were also given notice to produce their Daily Sales Book of the 1^st Defendant which would reflect the content of Exhibit CW03, but the Defendants did not and did not also controvert its contents, making the CW03 admissible as secondary evidence. From all of the above, the Claimant have provided particulars of the specific claim of his remunerations and specially pleaded them.

Further submitted that the claim, as the name suggest, is founded on unlawful and unjustifiable restraint of a person's right and liberty to move about freely. It consists of acts of arrest and detention or imprisonment of a plaintiff without lawful justification by any person or by law enforcement agencies on complaints or information received in the course of their duties. The Claimant herein, pleaded and gave evidence in his Statement on oath dated 24^th of January, 2025, as CW2, of his arrest by the EFCC from his workplace, in the premises of the 1^st Defendant and his detention in the cell of the EFCC from the 14^th of June 2023 till the 5^th of July 2023. Spending 21 days in custody. Even as he had met his bail conditions by the 19^th of June 2023, he was yet kept for interrogation and his incarceration was brought about by the petition written against him by the 2^nd Defendant, acting for the 1^st Defendant, as per Exhibit CW01, wherein allegations of crime was reported against the Claimant. The point to be made first is, whether the arrest and subsequent detention of the Claimant was lawful and justified.

From the statement of CW2, in paragraphs 9-13 of his Statement on oath of 24/01/2025, and the Defence of the Defendants, he was arrested, searched and taken into custody in a surprising circumstance, which appears that no prior investigation of the allegation against the Claimant was carried out. The Defendants did not even attempt to present in evidence or plead any findings made by the EFCC or even by themselves before making a report, to demonstrate that there was a reasonable suspicion that the Claimant committed the crime alleged. In fact the Claimant was only informed of the reason for his arrest after spending a night in detention. It can also be understood from the deposition, that no Order of court was obtained to have permitted his incarceration for the number of days.

The Claimant also related to this Honourable Court the action he subsequently had to file, Suit No: KDH/KAD/959/2023 to enforce his Fundamental Rights. He also made the fact that he has not been charged to court for the allegation made against him since June 2023 when he was arrested for it. The Defendant did not even present to this court any report of the investigation suggesting that the Claimant likely committed the offence. Without arguing in debt, clearly is in contravention of the Constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria and unlawful. See section 35 (1)(c) of the Constitution. No justification has been established for the petition made. By Exhibit CW01 made by the Defendant to the EFCC against the Claimant, it is clear that the Defendants were active in setting the law in motion leading to the unlawful arrest and detention of the Claimant.7.10. In Onyedinma v. Nnite (1997)3 NWLR (Pt. 493)333 at p.346, paras. A-D, and Zenith International Bank Ltd v. Alobu (2017) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1554)135 at p.149, paras. C-E.

Claimant further submitted that the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants petitioned the EFCC by their letter, Exhibit CW01, wherein they made a direct assertion of crimes stated, in relation to N50, 000,000.00 of the 1^st Defendant funds against him, thus, publishing a defamatory statement against him. This hence demonstrate an action in libel for which courts have held that for that cause of action to be founded, the statement must be defamatory of the claimant, it must be false and must have been published by the defendant to some other person other than the claimant who is defamed. See Onyejike v. Anyasor (1992) 1 NWLR (Pt.218)437. It is trite law that in an action for libel, it is actionable per se, damages need not be proved as same is presumed. In the first place, a determination would have to be made whether the contents of CW01 is defamatory, in NEPA v. Inameti (2002)11 NWLR (Pt.778) 397, pp. 421, paras. F-G; 432, paras. E-F, the Court of Appeal held that; a defamatory statement is one which has the tendency to injure the reputation of the person to whom it refers, which tends to lower him in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally and in particular to cause him to be regarded with feelings of hatred, contempt, ridicule, fear, disdain or disesteem. Also in Akomolafe v. Nigerian Exchange Insurance Co. Ltd (2000)13NWLR (Pt. 683) 181 at p.188, para.C, the Court of Appeal held that; a statement is prima facie defamatory if the words in their natural and primary sense, that is, in their plain and popular meaning, are defamatory.

From the content of Exhibit CW01, and also pleaded by the Claimant, the 2^nd Defendant, under the letter head design of the 1^st Defendant company, made allegation of suspicious fraud, breach of trust and theft against the Claimant. The 2^nd Defendant went further to make direct and positive accusations against the Claimant, where she suggested that the claimant and the other person 'opened other accounts in the name of Dalema/Dalema Mini Mart to channel the proceeds of furniture sales amounting to about Fifty Million Naira (N50,000,000). The statement by the 2^nd Defendant clearly suggests conclusive and definite commission of crimes against the Claimant, such that, any person to whom the statement is published would believe that; (1)such Bank Account exist; (2) the sum of Fifty Million Naira is missing from the coffers of the 1st Defendant.

On the claim of detinue for the detention of the Claimant's car against the 1^st Defendant. By CW2's evidence in paragraphs 23 to 29 of his 1^st Statement on oath, the EFCC having released the car key of the Claimant's car to him, the 1st Defendant through its agents, that is, Mallam Aliyu and the 3rd Defendant, has no justification to refrain the Claimant from taking his car from the premises of the 1^st Defendant. It is in evidence that the Claimant went to the office of the Defendants and attempted to drive out his car, but was restrained by a manager of the 1^st Defendant, Mallam Aliyu, who claimed to have acted on the instructions of the 3rd Defendant. The defendants are therefore by their actions liable for the detention of the Claimant's car from the very day he attempted to retrieve it till he was subsequently called on the 9^th of July 2023 by DW1 permitting him to take his car. In defence of this part of the Claimant's Claim, the Defendant, through DW1, stated in paragraph 9 that they never at any time directed any person to deny the Claimant access to his vehicle. But under cross examination, DW1 stated that, soon after the Claimant's release, the Claimant came to their premises and that he is not aware of the Claimant's interaction with any of the employee of the ist Defendant.DW1 conceded that he cannot authoritatively give account of some of the interactions the directors of the 1st Defendant may have with other managers. From the piece of evidence elicited under cross examination, DW1's is not a witness for the day the Claimant visited the 1st Defendant's premises to attempt to retrieve his car. DW1's evidence that, no person was ever given directive is also not credible.

LEGAL SUBMISSION OF THE DEFENDANTS

Counsel for the Defendants submitted that this suit in its entirety is premature. The Claimant has failed to comply with the conditions stipulated in the provisions of Order 3 Rules 12 (1) d of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 pertaining to payment or non-payment of a purported monetary claim or salary or allowance which form the crux of this claim. The failure of the Claimant to comply with paragraphs d-f of the above rule renders the suit incompetent. The court of appeal in the case of WEMA BANK V. OWOSHO (2018) LPELR 43857 (CA) at pages 17-22 paragraphs E-A for a valid and competent legal action to be initiated and maintained by the appellant before a court of law for the recovery of the debt indicated on the Exhibit, a formal demand for the payment of the debt form the Appellant to the respondent has to be made within the period of time stipulated by the Limitation Law of Lagos State for actions to recover such debts between the Appellant and its customer, the respondent. That the crux of the Claimant's claim is a liquidated money demand for which the Jurisdiction of this court cannot be ignited without fulfilling the statutory preconditions contained in paragraphs d-f of Order 3 Rule 12(1) of the Rules of this Honourable Court. This Honourable Court is therefore urged to strike out this suit.

Further submitted that the Defendants in this suit have maintained that the Claimant was never its direct employee but rather a person on secondment from his employer Alibert Products (Nigeria) limited. The Claimant has not denied or controverted this averment of fact. The law is trite that any deposition which is not challenged or controverted is deemed admitted. This means that the Claimant has admitted that he does not have any contract of employment capable of enforcement against the Defendants. As a secondment by its nature does not terminate the employee's contract of employment. It continues to subsist during the period of employment. Cited U.B.A PLC & ANOR V. DUNMOYE (2017) LPELR 50106(CA)(Pp. 12-13 paras. D).

The Claimant not being an employee of the Defendants cannot therefore institute a suit against any of the defendants for employment related matters. As in doing so, the Claimant would run foul of the provisions of Section 254(C)1 (a)-(k) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (As Amended) where this Honourable Court derives its powers from. Indeed, the section does not envisage mere secondment as a ground for which an action may be brought before it not against the head employer but against the temporary work place.

Further submitted that the Claimant of necessity needs to satisfy the Court on the balance of probabilities that he is entitled to the same. The Claimant throughout the course of conducting his case has failed woefully to lead any credible evidence to persuade this court and tilt the imaginary scale of the balance of probabilities in his favour. Proof positive of this is the Claimant's pleadings where he made reference to and frontloaded documents to be relied upon at the trial such as a Certified True Copy of the Affidavit in Support of Motion sworn by Joshua Cheto in suit No. KDH/KAD/959/2023, Certified True Copy of the Counter Affidavit in suit No. KDH/KAD/959/2023 sworn by Shuaibu Umar Modibbo and Access Bank Account Statement of the Claimant. Yet, he failed to tender these documents in evidence to support his claim. The logical inference that the Honourable Court may make from such a deliberate omission is that had the Claimant produced these pieces of evidence, they would have proved unfavourable to him. This conclusion finds firm footing in Section 167 (d) of the Evidence Act, 2011 (As Amended).

The Claimant claims in paragraphs d-i of his claims for special and general damages. This is without leading any credible evidence to warrant the grant of these spurious claims. No single shred of evidence was led before the honourable court to demonstrate that the Claimant was entitled to any amount as salary. The razor thin testimony intended to prop up the claim for unpaid commission was anchored upon Exhibit CW03 which would not stand the test of admissibility under Section 84 of the Evidence Act, 2011 (as amended) and should therefore be expunged from the record. Even if it were for the sake of justice to be considered, under cross-examination the Claimant could not explain the bases for which the figures bandied in that document were arrived at. The claimant after stating that he was the manager for that section and was responsible for all the stock could not under cross-examination explain to the court what items of furniture were sold to generate those figures. The law is trite that he who asserts must prove. Section 131 (1) & (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011 (as amended). Also cited the case of DASUKI V. FRN & ORS. (2018) LPELR- 43897 (SC). Throughout the course of trial, the Claimant adduced no shred of evidence to justify the grant of his claims before this Court the weakness of the defence.

The Allegations of false imprisonment, slander and defamation are mere smoke screens to mask the paucity of the claims of the Claimant before the Honourable court. The fictitious deposition of PW1, which is intended to lend credence to the allegation of defamation and slander, particularly his assertion that he approached the 3^rd Defendant to find out why the Claimant was arrested, which then precipitated a purported slanderous and defamatory tirade by the 3^rd Defendant, has been proven to this Honourable court to be false. Under cross-examination, the witness admitted that he was fully aware of all the complaints against the claimant before he approached the 3^rd Defendant. It therefore follows that he could not have thereafter purported to seek out the same information from the 3^rd Defendant. The only logical inference this Honourable court may make is that the witness has contradicted his testimony in a fundamental way to make him an unreliable witness before the court. The law is trite that where there are material contradictions in the evidence of a witness which go to the root of a case, they should not be taken lightly.

COURT’S DECISION

I have carefully analysed all the processes filed by both Parties, the exhibits adduced and the exhibits tendered, on issue one, a close look at the suit will undoubtedly reveal that the claims of the Claimant against the Defendants are mainly tortious: defamation, false imprisonment and detinue. These are the claims which arose in the course of employment. The decisions of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria and the Court of Appeal regarding the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria in tortious claims have been inconsistent, thereby leading to a jurisdictional crisis. The parties are not aware of this crisis or deliberately ignore it, but the Court cannot ignore it as it is fundamental to the exercise of the adjudicatory power of the Court. It is for this reason that the Court makes it an issue to be resolved. It is the Court that raised it suo motu. I am not oblivion of the position of law which requires that where a Court raise an issue suo motu, the Court shall beckon the parties to address the Court on the issue raised. The Court of Appeal in the case of ORJI V. AMARA (2016) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1531) 21 sternly warns that no court of law has the jurisdiction to raise an issue and resolve it suo motu without hearing the parties. In the Nigerian adversary system of adjudication, courts should be reluctant or loath to raise issues suo motu. This is because litigation is not theirs but that of the parties. If a court raises an issue suo motu, it has removed itself from its exalted position to flirt with the parties and, in the course, gets itself soiled in the litigation. Although a court has the jurisdiction to raise an issue suo motu, it does not have the jurisdiction to resolve the issue suo motu. The court must allow the parties to react to the issue by way of address. On no account should a court of law raise an issue suo motu and resolve it suo motu. A court is not a Father Christmas and its jurisdiction is limited to the issues presented to it. The court cannot generally make pronouncements that affect the parties before it without allowing the parties to address it thereon.

Notwithstanding the profound warning of the appellate courts in a plethora of judicial authorities which enjoin the courts to be hesitant to raise issues suo motu and resolve it suo motu, authorities plenteous which state the instances where the Court can raise issues suo motu and resolve it suo motu without hearing from the parties. The Supreme Court in the case of AKINGBULUGBE V. NIROWI (2023) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1895) 339 where the Supreme Court held that:

It has become accepted that a court can raise an issue suo motu and decide same without calling for the address of parties in the following instances:

a. When the issue relates to the court’s own jurisdiction;

b. When both parties are not aware or ignored a statute which may have a bearing on the case. This is because every court is expected to take judicial notice of statutes by virtue of section 122(2)(a) and of the Evidence Act, 2011;

c. When on the face of the record, serious questions of the fairness of the proceedings are evident.

See also ANGADI V. P.D.P. & ORS (2018)15 NWLR (PT. 1641) 1; PERSONS, NAMES UNKNOWN V. SAHRIS INT’L LTD (2019) 13 NWLR (PT. 1689) 203; and OMONIYIV. ALABI (2015) 6 NWLR (PT. 1456) 572.

In the case of OGAR & ORS V. IGBE & ORS (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt.1678) 534 articulated as follows:

There is this misconception that in ALL cases where the court, at any stage, finds that an action is manifestly incompetent either as regards competence, jurisdiction or by operation of a statute it cannot on its own initiative or suo motu put an end to it without hearing the parties. English Courts, holding on to the principle that lithe (sic) consent of the parties cannot give a court jurisdiction which it does not otherwise possess, II (sic) have held that a court is not only entitled, but bound, to put an end to proceedings if at any stage and by any means it becomes manifest that they are incompetent; and that it can do so on its own initiative, even though the parties have consented to such void action ...

In Effiom v. Cross River State Independent Electoral Commission, Tabai, JSC, relying on Tukurv. Government of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517 and tacitly accepting this principle, states that in some special circumstances the court can raise an issue of law or jurisdiction suo motu and without hearing the parties, decide on it. He however qualifies it; holding that the principle that the court ought not to raise an issue suo motu and decide upon it without giving the parties an opportunity to be heard on it applies mainly to issues of fact. In any case, the appellant who complains that the court below raised an issue suo motu and decided upon it without giving the parties an opportunity to be heard on it, must go further to show that the failure to hear him on the point occasioned some miscarriage of justice.

(underlined mine for emphasis)

From the above exposition of law, it is without a sheer doubt that the Court can judiciously and judicially raise the issue of law suo motu and determine it suo motu without hearing from the parties. As a corollary to this conclusion of law, the discourse on the substantive jurisdiction of the Court is a matter of law which the court is competent to raise and resolve without hearing from the parties. I so hold.

The Supreme Court in C.G.C. (NIG.) LTD. V. ISA (2023) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1888) 129 p. 153 paras B – D gave condiments for the determination of the jurisdiction of a court where it was held that:

A court is competent to adjudicate over a matter if all of the following conditions are fulfilled:

a. It is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualification of the members of the bench and no member is disqualified for one reason or another;

b. The subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction; and

c. The case comes before the court initiated by due process of law and upon fulfilment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction.

On whether the National Industrial Court of Nigeria is competent to assume jurisdiction over the tortious claim. This Court in Suit no: NICN/EN/35/2021 between ENGR. CHIBUZOR ALBERT AGULANA V DR. FABIAN OKONKWO (unreported) decision of which was delivered on the 7^th of April 2024 by His Lordship, Honourable Justice O. O. Arowosegbe, where my Lord gave a sumptuous exposition on the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court over tortious claims arising from employment relations and how the decisions of this Court and of course, the Court of Appeal have been causing uncertainty in stare decisis. For a proper understanding of the judicial view embedded in the said judgment, I will hereby reproduce the ratio of the judgment as follows:

The latest authority cited by the learned objector’s counsel on the issue of NIC’s lack of substantive jurisdiction over “workplace defamation” is: Ecobank Nig. Ltd & Ors v. Osu, which was decided February 24, 2020. The latest authority cited by the learned claimant’s counsel was MHWUN v. Ehigiegba, which was handed down in 2018. And incidentally, Ecobank Nig. Ltd v. Osu did not take cognisance of MHWUN v. Ehigiegba but cited Akpan v. Unical [supra] with approval, which was also cited by the learned objector’s counsel with approval and, incidentally, MHWUN v. Ehigiegba was latter than Akpan’s case. Akpan’s case was the very first Court of Appeal’s authority holding that the NIC lacked jurisdiction on workplace defamation and, it was decided May 13, 2016. It upheld the NIC’s decision declining jurisdiction over workplace defamation on the ground that, defamation was a standalone cause of action and as such, could not be ancillary to employment. It could be seen that the NIC itself kick-started the controversy. And within 2016 till the moment, the NIC itself has not agreed within itself on this issue as it continues to dish out conflicting decisions on the issue.

From the above, with the utmost respect, it is clear that there is no discernible ratio decidendi in the conflicting decisions from both the NIC and Court of Appeal on this issue. Naturally, I made further researches to see if the issue had been rested in any further Court of Appeal’s decision, the Court of Appeal being the apex Court to the NIC. What my researches unearthed was even more confounding. Rather than being settled, these further authorities heightened the confusion. I came across a long array of authorities from the Court of Appeal for and against, with most of them, with the utmost respect, not taking cognisance of the Court of Appeal’s previous decisions that said yes to NIC’s jurisdiction over workplace defamation. It is needless to say that the NIC itself did not fair better as it too, neither took cognisance of the latest Court of Appeal’s authorities on the issue or its own previous authorities. With grave respect, there appears now to be two schools of thought from the judicature on whether the NIC has civil jurisdiction over workplace defamation and torts generally.

The first school is the restrictive school of thought while the second is the expansive school of thought. From what I could garner from my researches, the following 8 decisions of the Court of Appeal represent the restrictive school of thought:

1. Akpan v. Unical (2016) LPELR-41242 (CA) delivered May 13, 2016;

2. Ecobank Nig. Ltd v. Osu (2020): Unreported CA/L/963/2016 – delivered February 24, 2020;

3. Adeniyi Olushola & Anor v. Adolphus Yakubu (2021) LPELR-56015 (CA);

4. Adeniyi Olushola & Anor v. Billa Saliu (2021) LPELR-56027 (CA);

5. Adeniyi Olushola & Anor v. Giwa Friday (2021) LPELR-56019 (CA);

6. Olushola & Anor v. Andrew (2021) LPELR-56017 (CA);

7. UBA & Ors v. Oladejo (2021) LPELR-55320 (CA) and;

8. Ekobank Nig. Ltd & Ors v. Idris (2021) LPELR-52806.

The following 5 opposing decisions of the Court of Appeal represent the expansive school of thought:

1. MHWUN v. Ehigiegba (2018) LPELR-44972 (CA);

2. Nwagbo & Ors v. National Intelligence Agency [NIA] (2018) LPELR-4620 (CA);

3. Nasarawa State Specialist Hospital Management Board & Ors v. Mohammed (2018) LPELR-44551 (CA);

4. Omang v. Nsa (2021) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1781) 55 delivered May 19, 2020 and;

5. Okoro v. Ecobank Nig. Ltd (2021): CA/C/07/2016 – Delivered July 16, 2021.

What I have listed above are the authorities available to me at this point. I do not doubt that, there might be other unreported decisions from the Court of Appeal on this issue, which I was not fortunate to stumble upon. By dint of the doctrine of stare decisis, there cannot be different schools of thought when it comes to decisions of courts of law bound by judicial precedents, like the judicature in Nigeria. But the reality is that, occasionally this happens because, different panels and lawyers might not be aware of the opposing decisions from the same court on the same issues and thereby, the courts give differing decisions on the same issue. This scenario is what usually leads to difficulty in establishing firm ratio decidendi that constitutes stare decisis on a point of law. I found that none of the authorities from the restrictive school of thought mentioned Okoro v. Ecobank decided July 16, 2021 or Omang v. Nsa [No. 4 on the Expansive List] decided 2020, which reinforced MHWUN v. Ehigiegba [supra] on the nature of NIC’s expansive civil jurisdiction, though, not directly on workplace defamation while Okoro v. Ecobank was directly on workplace defamation.

So, Okoro v. Ecobank stands on its own, even though, the quartet of: Adeniyi Olushola & Anor v. Adolphus Yakubu [supra]; Adeniyi Olushola & Anor v. Billa Saliu [supra]; Adeniyi Olushola & Anor v. Giwa Friday [supra] and; Olushola & Anor v. Andrew [supra],were decided after it, they, having been decided in November 2021, while Okoro v. Ecobank was decided in July 2021, whereas, Okoro v. Ecobank noted, discussed and overruled Akpan v. Unical while MHWUN v. Ehigiegba also similarly noted and overruled Akpan v. Unical, which most of these restrictive authorities relied on.

But it appears that in Adeniyi Olushola v. Adolphus Yakubu one MAHWUN [not MHWUN] v. Ehigiegba was cited, but it was not noted at all in the Court of Appeal’s decision. It appears too that, the MAHWUN v. Ehigiegba cited therein is different, as it appeared that it held that the NIC lacked jurisdiction over workplace defamation, whereas, MHWUN v. Ehigiegba I know clearly held that the NIC has jurisdiction on workplace defamation. Note that one is MAHWUN while the other is MHWUN. Be that as it may, Adeniyi Olushola v. Yakubu did not cite Okoro v. Ecobank at all, which was decided in 2021 and clearly overruled Akpan v. Unical, on which the latter authorities were based. Ecobank v. Idris was delivered January 20, 2021 before Okoro v. Ecobank, which was rendered July 16, 2021. Even though, the Court of Appeal said the NIC has no jurisdiction on workplace defamation in Ecobank v. Idris, it did not discuss MHWUN v. Ehigiegba at all, though cited. Cases No. 3-6 from the restrictive school of thought were consolidated cases and so, were on the same issue of malicious prosecution, likewise case No. 7 thereof, and therefore, not directly on workplace defamation, but still on the question of the NIC’s jurisdiction on torts, workplace defamation being an aspect of tort.

However, MHWUN v. Ehigiagba and Okoro v. Ecobank were directly on workplace defamation. With this state of affairs, it means Okoro v. Ecobank that directly decided the question of NIC’s jurisdiction over workplace defamation, is the latest, having been decided July 2021 and, this decision was foreshadowed by MHWUN v. Ehigiegba; Nwagbo & Ors v. National Intelligence Agency and, Nasarawa State Specialist Hospital Management Board & Ors v. Mohammed , which were all decided in 2018 and they all held that NIC’s civil jurisdiction is not limited to only disputes between employers and employees but extends to any dispute at all that is related to labour and industrial relations and therefore, covers all matters touching on labour and employment, howsoever styled or termed. Nwagbo’s case was on claim for death benefits by the relations of a deceased employee and, the objection was that NIC’s jurisdiction was limited to only existing employment relationships i.e. employer-employee relationship, and did not extend to third party non-employee, but the Court of Appeal said no: “it extends to any dispute related to labour and industrial relations.”

It is therefore clear that there are truly two schools of thought at the Court of Appeal at the moment on the issue of NIC’s jurisdiction on workplace defamation and torts generally. It is needless to say that, the same thing is applicable in the NIC. In fact, the NIC itself has been more responsible for the problem when it was the first to decline jurisdiction, which the Court of Appeal upheld in Akapan’s case. Thus, at the initial stage different judges of the NIC independently in the cognate cases affirmed jurisdiction and declined jurisdiction simultaneously, while in the latest cases, it per force kowtowed to the individual judge’s known latest Court of Appeal’s decisions on point thus, the continuing conflicting decisions on point. A good example in this last category of NIC’s decisions on its jurisdiction on workplace defamation is Eric Ivivie Baror v. Polaris Bank Ltd [1] [Delivered 11-24-2022]. The NIC phrased its decision, based on the Court of Appeal’s latest known cognate decision, thus:

“Adeniyi Olushola & anor v. Adolphus Yakubu…held that the NICN does not have jurisdiction over malicious prosecution. This position was also reached by the Court of Appeal in Adeniyi Olushola & anor v. Billa Saliu…and Adeniyi Olushola & anor v. Giwa Friday…UBA & ors v. Oladejo…on its part held that the jurisdiction of NICN does not extend to ‘criminal matters and tort’ or to malicious prosecution, assault, detinue or any liability in tort’. In respect of ‘criminal matters’, this decision was given despite that section 254C(5) of the 1999 Constitution donates jurisdiction over criminal causes or matters of which jurisdiction is conferred on the NICN by section 254C or any other Act or law .

All these Court of Appeal decisions are later in time than the 2018 decision in MHWUN v. Dr. Alfred Ehigiegba…And so by law I am compelled to follow them. This means that I cannot exercise jurisdiction over the claims of the claimant in defamation in the instant suit.”

That has been the most recent contour of the decisions of the NIC known to me on workplace defamation in deference to the doctrine of stare decisis. I would have found myself bound to take the same position too but, for the three authorities from the Court of Appeal, which held that the NIC has expansive jurisdiction over all matters arising from labour and industrial relations, while the 2021 authority of Okoro v. Ecobank specifically held that, NIC has exclusive jurisdiction over workplace defamation thus, becoming the latest that is directly on point. As could be seen Eric Ivivie Baror v. Polaris Bank Ltd was not aware of these authorities, especially Okoro v. Ecobank decided in 2021 directly on the issue of workplace defamation thus, bringing about the impossibility of discerning a ratio decidendi common to the decisions of both the NIC and the Court of Appeal on the question of NIC’s jurisdiction on workplace defamation.

I need not cite any further NIC’s conflicting decisions on the issue, for they are embedded in the several of the Court of Appeal’s decisions already cited. Therefore, it is clear as daylight that there are presently no discernable ratio decidendi on the issue of workplace defamation from the decisions of both the NIC and the Court of Appeal. In this scenario, it is even difficult to decide which is the latest on point amongst the welter of conflicting decisions, since the most recent decisions were not directly on workplace defamation, which is the extant cause of action but on malicious prosecution, another branch of tort different from workplace defamation. But they all, with grave respect, made sweeping generalisations thus creating the ambiguity. The Court of Appeal in Ngun v. Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited (2013) LPELR-20197 (CA) 31-32, C-D , which relied on the Supreme Court’s Osakwe v. F.C.E. (Technical) Asaba , solved this problem by giving the leeway to courts:

“Where there is no discernable ratio decidendi common to the decisions of a superior court and this Court has handed down conflicting decisions, the lower Court or a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction is free to choose between the decisions which appear to it to be correct …”

It is now incumbent on me to rationalise which of the welter of conflicting decisions without clear ratio decidendi common to both sets of decisions from both courts: the NIC and the Court of Appeal, I chose. Even though, this is a choice granted by law under a scenario like this, as an exception to the doctrine of stare decisis but, it is certain that the law did not grant the discretion at the whims and caprices of the judge but presupposes that the judge’s choice would be backed by cogent reasons, which might assist the Court of Appeal or the appellate court to resolve this issue once and for all, if the matter goes on appeal, by reconciling all its numerous conflicting decisions and coming out with a clearly discernable ratio decidendi, that can serve as locus classicus on the recondite issue. This is so because a court’s exercise of discretion must be judicial and judicious. Let me now go into that.

The arguments for and against the NIC’s exclusive civil vires over workplace defamation are centred at one end, from the defendant/objector’s point of view on what the NIC’s jurisdiction used to be and what it ought to be and not, what it actually is under the Third Alteration Act, an entirely new statute, hence; the reluctance to do a literal construction of S. 254C-(1) of the Constitution. This is the thread that runs through the cases cited by the learned defendant-objector’s counsel. And with the utmost respect, this point of view seemed to be shared by all the eight listed authorities in the restrictive school of thought, even though, decided on the expansive shoulder of the Third Alteration Act. And the singularity in all these authorities towing the restrictive line is that, none unearthed the existence of any ambiguity and absurdity inherent in granting exclusive civil jurisdiction to the NIC over workplace defamation. With the gravest respect, they merely seemed to reason that the NIC ought not to have jurisdiction over workplace defamation based on what used to be or what ought to be. Unfortunately, it is only upon a resultant ambiguity leading to absurdity from literal interpretation that a court of law can lawfully depart from the literal rule of interpretation, which is the primary rule of interpretation.

The expansive jurisdiction school of thought posits that the NIC has expansive exclusive jurisdiction over workplace defamation and employed the literal rule to construe S. 254C-(1) of the Constitution and, came to the conclusion that the NIC has expansive exclusive civil jurisdiction, which covers workplace defamation, torts generally and all other matters arising from labour, employment and workplace, howsoever styled or termed and, matters incidental to them or connected with them under the auspices of the Third Alteration Act. The Notice of Preliminary Objection as argued in the supporting Written Address by the learned objector’s counsel was essentially centred on the Trade Dispute Act and did not, for once, cite S. 254C-(1) of the Constitution. That aspect of the arguments is immediately dismissed without the need for any further discussion because; it is an affront to the Constitution. The TDA did not confer jurisdiction on the NIC under its present constitutional configuration: it is S. 254C of the Constitution that does and, it gives the NIC jurisdiction over even the TDA under S. 254C-(1)(b). So, all the issues covered in the TDA have become a tiny aspect of the expansive civil jurisdiction now granted the NIC under S. 254C of the Constitution.

It is therefore incorrect approach to cite the TDA and NICA to limit the jurisdiction granted the NIC under the extant Constitution; as the NIC’s jurisdiction is now to be totally found inside the Constitution – NUEE & Anor v. BPE LPELR-SC.62/2004, 38-39, B-F; also (2010) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1194) 538 S.C. An ordinary Act of the NASS cannot restrict the jurisdictions of the superior courts constitutionally granted. But I found that, in the adumbration, especially on the additional authority cited, the learned objector’s counsel, for the first time, newly proffered arguments on S. 254C-(1) of the Constitution. I shall now consider these new arguments with the flimsy aspects of the arguments in the WA in support of the NPO, which unwittingly have some relevance to the questions raised by S. 254C-(1) of the Constitution.

In deciding whether the NIC has exclusive civil jurisdiction over workplace defamation, we shall be guided by the time-honoured doctrine of construction of new legislations to the effect that, new statutes must be interpreted with tabula rasa – Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v. Oyebola (2020) LPELR-51806 (CA) . That is, they must be construed with a mindset shunned of the knowledge of the previous position of law relative to the subject matter of the new legislations. In a nutshell, a new statute must be construed as if there was never a law on the subject matter it covers. The person construing the new legislation must have a mindset that the old law has been abrogated or amended. It means, the person construing new legislations, constitutions inclusive, must employ literal rule of interpretation first and foremost; and if this yields total abrogation of the old law, it must be enforced as the extant position of law on the subject and, not otherwise, except there is thrown up an ambiguity leading to absurdity – Skye Bank v. Iwu (2017) LPELR-42595 (SC) 26-32, B-F .

Therefore, it is not a correct approach to believe that all that the Third Alteration Act did was only to make the NIC a superior Court and therefore, by that, limit its jurisdiction to what it used to be under the TDA and NICA. That is exactly what the Court of Appeal warned against in Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v. Oyebola [supra]. Let us disabuse our minds of the previous state of the law and focus all our attention on the Third Alteration Act. We shall be able to see better and clearly what the new NIC’s civil jurisdiction entails. It would be seen that the basic anchor of the objector’s arguments in support of the NPO was based on the knowledge of what the law used to be with regard to the jurisdiction of the NIC and the inability to unlearn the prior knowledge. To be able to correctly interpret a new legislation, one must unlearn the previous state of the law and relearn the new state of the law as contained in the new statute. In that sense, literal interpretation is the first and foremost rule [basic rule] of interpretation of statutes, constitutions inclusive. For the sake of clarity S. 254C-(1)(a) of the Constitution, which is central to this controversy, provides thus, and I quote:

“Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters –

(a) relating to or connected with any labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations and matters arising from workplace, the conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employer, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith.”

Those are the provisions of Constitution that have been the bedrock of the decisions for and against the jurisdiction of the NIC over workplace defamation. They are therefore the immediate provisions that fall for consideration in determining the NIC’s non obstante jurisdiction over workplace defamation. Looking at these provisions, assuming one were not a lawyer, with a pre-knowledge of labour law, what interpretation would one give these provisions, with regard to the NIC’s jurisdiction over workplace defamation? Definitely, a layman would say that the NIC has absolute jurisdiction over workplace defamation. Is there ambiguity leading to absurdity in the wordings of S. 254C-(1)(a) of the Constitution, to warrant the invocation of any other rule of interpretation? There is neither ambiguity nor absurdity thrown up by the application of literal interpretation.

It is not being said that the NIC cannot understand the nuances of workplace defamation or that, the lawyers practising in the NIC would not understand the nuances simply for the fact that they practise in the NIC. In any case, the practice of law in Nigeria is general. Going by literal interpretation, does the NIC have jurisdiction over workplace defamation? The answer is yes. It is a matter that arises from work-context. That is what the layman would say and literal interpretation is about the true or ordinary meanings of words used in legislations as understood by laymen. It is only when its application leads to ambiguity and absurdity that courts resort to the other esoteric rules of interpretation that might be strange to those not trained in law to cure the ambiguity and absurdity.

Having found no ambiguity in the phraseology of S. 254C-(1)(a) of the Constitution and, no absurdity in the application of the literal rule to them then, the NIC has exclusive non obstante jurisdiction over workplace defamation and, it is in the best position to adjudicate such defamation because; it has the singular expertise to determine its impacts on the employment fortunes of the victim-employee or victim employer. Besides, there is a new concept in the modern jurisprudence of labour law around the world known as workplace defamation. It would appear that the real focus of the restrictive school of thought is about the omission of the drafters of the Third Alteration Act in not specifically naming defamation or torts as an item over which the NIC has jurisdiction: that is, not specifically using the jargon defamation or torts but, instead used general words that captures torts and much more. They felt, based on the prior knowledge of what the jurisdiction of the erstwhile NIC used to be and what it ought to be, the Constitution could not have intended such expansive jurisdiction on matters they felt were standalone or independent of labour relations.

How true is the assertion that, ‘workplace defamation’ is unrelated to labour and independent of it, we shall see anon. Suffice to say now, none of the authorities from the restrictive school of thought, has argued that, in the ordinary language of the provisions of S. 254C-(1)(a) of the Constitution, it could not cover workplace defamation and torts generally. They only argued that, based on the previous state of the law; it ought not, and therefore did not meet the intendment of the draftsmen of the Constitution. They abandoned literal interpretation and resorted to purposive cum mischief rule interpretation, which incidentally negated one of the real purposes of the Third Alteration Act, which was to grant the NIC expansive jurisdiction. In effect, both purposive and mischief rules were not correctly applied.

The poser is: is it really possible to start naming all aspects of the subjects that fall under labour and employment law like, saying the NIC has jurisdiction over teachers’ employment, army’s employment, workplace defamation, workplace assaults and battery, workplace detinue, ad infinitum? It is definitely not feasible. The second question is: from the wordings of S. 254C of the Constitution, is it clear that, in layman’s view, they capture defamation and general torts? The answer is straight yes. After all, the provisions did not also mention ‘termination’ and ‘dismissal’ or ‘disciplinary actions’, which are the commonest causes of actions in industrial relations and it has not been argued that, NIC has no jurisdiction over them because they were not specifically listed. And this is simply because, they are the traditional forts of industrial relations litigations. The restrictive approach, which the learned objector’s counsel is urging on the Court, boils down, for the umpteenth time, to reluctance to let go the previous state of the law.

The phrase: “matters arising from workplace” in S. 254C-(1)(a) of the Constitution is clear enough and definitely captures all torts and much more, arising from the workplace as a result of industrial relations, more especially so that, there is a labour concept known as “workplace defamation”. The fact that there is the concept known as workplace defamation introduced into the lexicon of employment and labour relations axiomatically suggests that, it is a labour relations court [industrial Court], if one exists in the jurisdiction and, it is a superior court of record with the requisite powers, that must have jurisdiction over workplace defamation, a well-known concept in industrial relations, except we want to deliberately give a meaning inconsistent with the wording.

The concept of workplace defamation has assumed almost like notoriety to the concepts of termination and dismissal in industrial relations such that, it would be disservice to industrial relations to ignore it in Nigeria. It is therefore the NIC, a workplace court, which logically and constitutionally has jurisdiction over workplace defamation. It could not have been otherwise. Being otherwise would be absurd. This is the pattern in some other climes that have full-fledged labour/industrial courts with superior court status and the requisite powers like the NIC in Nigeria. When similar controversy arose in Kenya, the Kenyan Court of Appeal held in relation to the jurisdiction of the Kenyan Industrial Court over workplace defamation in Medical Research Institute v. Davy Kiprotich Koech (2018) eKLR that:

“Section 11(1) of the Labour Institutions Act 2007 established the Industrial Court…

In addition section 87(1) of that Act [the Employment Act 2007] specified that; [sic]

‘Subject to the provisions of this Act whenever –

(a) …

(b) any question, difference or dispute arises as to the rights or liabilities of either party; or

(c) touching any misconduct, neglect or ill treatment of either party or any injury to the person or property of either party, under any contract of service, the aggrieved party may complain to the labour officer or lodge a complaint or suit in the Industrial Court.’

Thereafter, following the promulgation, the Constitution 2010 established the specialized courts, that is, the employment and labour court and the environmental court…

And pursuant to Article 162(2) of the Constitution, Parliament enacted the Industrial Institutions Act and the Employment Act, 2007, and replaced the Industrial Court as established under that Act with the Employment and Labour Relations Court (ELRC).

In so far as the ELRC’s jurisdiction was concerned, section 4(1) of the Industrial Court Act 2011 stipulated that:

(1) ‘In pursuance of Article 162(2)(a) of the Constitution, there is established the Industrial Court for the purpose of settling employment and industrial relations disputes and the furtherance, securing and maintenance of good employment and labour relations in Kenya [sic

(2) The court shall be a superior court of record with the status of High Court.

(3) The court shall have and shall exercise jurisdiction throughout Kenya.’

Section 12(1) went further to specify that; [sic]

‘The court shall have exclusive original and appellate jurisdiction to hear and determine all disputes, referred to it in accordance with Article 162(2) of the constitution [sic] and the provisions of this Act or any other law which extends jurisdiction to the court relating to employment and labour relations including all the other matters specified in the Act’

It is clear from this chronology of the enactments, that the position prevailing prior to the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution, was that the Industrial Court had exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters concerning employment disputes or that were employment related …

Yet the respondent sought to file the suit in the High Court, instead of the Industrial Court. But that said, there was an additional dimension to the suit which involved a claim for defamation that required to be taken into consideration. It is this aspect of the dispute that the learned judge concluded was a matter that only the High Court could determine, as this was an issue that went beyond the Industrial Court’s remit…

A claim for defamation is a claim in tort or causing injury to an individual, and the remedy or relief will usually be in general damages. Before the establishment of the Industrial Court, this was a matter which would have wholly been determined by the High Court. But whether the Industrial Court, was sufficiently empowered to hear a claim for defamation was dependent on the extent of the Industrial Court’s jurisdiction as specified by the two Acts.

As seen above, sections 47 and 87(1) of the Employment Act 2007 were explicit that the court had jurisdiction to deal with any question, difference, or dispute as to the rights and liabilities of an employer or employee, as well as on matters touching on misconduct, neglect, ill treatment, or any injury to the person or property of either party or infringement of statutory rights. Considering that the respondent’s claim was that his employer was alleged to have injured his person by way of defamation , we find that the court had the requisite mandate with which to determine the dispute between the parties .

But the matter does not end there. In view of our findings above, did the court have the necessary powers to grant the reliefs sought? Our answer to this would be in the affirmative. We say this because section 12(4) of the Labour Institutions Act, 2007 stipulated that: [sic]

‘In the discharge of its functions under this Act, the Industrial Court shall have the powers to grant injunctive relief, prohibition declaratory order [sic], award of damages, specific performance or reinstatement of an employee’.

Essentially, the above provisions endowed the court with sufficient powers to hear, determine and grant appropriate reliefs such as damages, injunctions, and specific performance, inter alia, to matters that were of an employment nature .”

It could be seen from the quotation that, just like S. 254C of the Nigerian Constitution did, the jurisdiction of the Kenyan Industrial Court, was granted in general expansive and incorporative terms without the specific mention of defamation or torts and, it was interpreted by the Kenyan Court of Appeal to cover workplace defamation. The Kenyan Court of Appeal took into consideration whether there would be any absurdity in the Kenyan Industrial Court being unable to grant the appropriate reliefs and came to the conclusion that, the court had all the necessary powers and therefore, fully competent to adjudicate workplace defamation and therefore, had the exclusive civil jurisdiction. The NIC has all the powers of a High Court, and much more, by virtue of SS. 6(1), (3), (5)(cc) & (6) and 254D-(1)&(2) of the Constitution in conjunction with SS. 12-19 of the National Industrial Court Act [NICA]. So, there is no inability in the NIC to effectively adjudicate and grant any reliefs appropriate to workplace defamation. In effect, no absurdity could arise from its adjudicating work-context defamation. It could be seen that the Kenyan Court of Appeal employed the literal rule of interpretation and gave it to the Kenyan Industrial Court when it was sure that, there was no absurdity resultant from the application of literal rule.

It could also be seen that the Kenyan legislations under consideration did not at any point specifically mention defamation or torts, but used general words to capture workplace defamation like S. 254C of the Nigerian Constitution. The Kenyan Court of Appeal specifically relied on the provisions that give the parties to employment contracts rights to sue for any injury to their persons or properties, so far the injury arose from employment and industrial relations, to arrive at the conclusion that the Kenyan Industrial Court was seised of jurisdiction over workplace defamation. The “injury” phraseology is similarly covered under S. 254C-(1)(a) of the Nigerian Constitution, when the Constitution says that, the NIC shall have exclusive civil jurisdiction in any “matters arising from workplace, the conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith.”

The word ‘safety’ at Google is defined as: “the condition of being protected or unlikely to cause danger, risk, or injury.” The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English [6 ^th Ed.] p. 1604 says, ‘safety’ means: “Not in danger: when someone or something is safe from danger or harm.” The law of defamation secures persons’ from unjustified harms or injuries to their good names; and ‘right to good name’, is a thing, though incorporeal. The word “safety” therefore encompasses, security from both physical and mental injuries and therefore, covers the rights to security from physical and proprietary injuries mentioned in the Kenyan statutes by which the Kenyan Court of Appeal arrived at the conclusion that the Kenyan Industrial Court has exclusive civil jurisdiction on workplace defamation. It could be seen that this is very much similar to the Nigerian method and any room for arguments is removed from the Nigerian method when it goes further to say that all: “matters arising from the workplace” shall be cognizable before the NIC.

And we should not forget that the NIC’s jurisdiction over workplace defamation is directly conferred by the Constitution unlike the Kenyan Industrial Court’s jurisdiction over workplace defamation that is conferred by ordinary statutes, and not directly by its Constitution, though made pursuant to the Kenyan Constitution , yet the Kenyan Court of Appeal gave it to the Kenyan Industrial Court : how much more the NIC whose jurisdiction is fully structured into the Constitution non obstante? The advantage of the Nigerian method is that, being constitutional provisions, they enjoy wider applications [more expansive applications] than it would have been under ordinary statute and, escape any reproach from conflict with other statutory provisions and, other provisions of the Constitution because of the severally repeated non obstante clauses of S. 254C of the Constitution. A constitutional provision must be given broad interpretation unless the context otherwise suggests – Skye Bank Plc v. Iwu (2017) LPELR-42595 (SC) 160-163, F-E . And there is no contrary suggestion in the provisions of S. 254C in particular and the other provisions of the Constitution in general. And besides, the phrases “connected with”, “arising from”, “relating to” or “incidental to” and “including” that surfeited S. 254C of the Constitution demonstrated an unequivocal intent to cover all matters that arise from labour, employment and industrial relations, whether they are litigated independently or in addition to any other labour relations matters. In the language of law: being words of inclusive expansiveness, they covered the fields – INEC v. Musa (2003) LPELR-24927 (SC) 36-37, D-C; 35-36, B-A . Litigating a matter is entirely the preserve of the litigants and not that of the courts. A claimant therefore chooses the cause of action he wants to litigate and is at liberty to abandon any. That is why a court normally does not grant unclaimed relief. This derives from the law that a court has no jurisdiction to dictate what infringement of a person’s right s/he should challenge. The person has the right to select which violation of his right s/he wishes to pursue and which reliefs s/he wishes to claim. A person might be dismissed and defamed in the same dismissal letter and, s/he choses to pursue the defamation alone without challenging the dismissal or without asking for reinstatement, which is the situation in the instant case. That s/he does so is not the concern of the defendant or the court to ground an objection that the supposedly lone independent workplace defamation action could not be sustained because; it was not joined with another labour matter.

The important thing, for the NIC, like any other court, is whether the matter being pursued arose from work-context or industrial relations, which gives it its exclusive civil jurisdiction, while the duty of the defendant is to offer his or her defence to the suit and not to dictate to the claimant to file multiple causes of action and reliefs against it. It is therefore patently wrong and insupportable by the provisions of S. 254C of the Constitution that the claimant herein cannot bring a standalone action on workplace defamation without joining the issue of his dismissal. The phraseology of S. 254C of the Constitution does not support that view. S. 254C-(1) simply says the NIC has exclusive civil jurisdiction over “matters arising from workplace” after talking about matters that arise from employment and industrial relations. So, the construction of “matters arising from workplace” cannot be limited to matters arising from industrial relations. Had it been that was the intendment of the constitution drafters, they would have left the phrase out. Since it is there, it must have its full meaning – Skye Bank Plc v. Iwu [supra] 160-163, F-E .

I will cite the second example at the international scene where another country with a labour court with similar jurisdiction and powers to the NIC cedes exclusive civil jurisdiction over workplace defamation to its labour court. That is the State of Israel. In an article titled: “Substantial Damages to an Employee for Unlawful Termination and Defamation”, Galia Shahar reported the Tel Aviv Labor Court thus:

“The Tel Aviv Labor Court recently awarded ILS 250,000 in damages to a longtime employee due to unlawful termination and defamation …

The court found that the employer could have ordered the employee’s examination by a doctor on the employer’s behalf, thus disproving or proving its concerns. However, in the absence of a medical opinion, the employer had no right to draw medical conclusions about the employee.

The court also noted that the employer did not provide any evidence justifying the employee’s dismissal, except for absenteeism due to her medical condition.

Regarding the employer’s appeal to the health fund, the Tel Aviv Labor Court found that this act might substantially harm the employee’s good name . Its reasoning was as follows: the appeal to the health fund was not supported by anything medically relevant, the employer’s presentation of the employee was biased and even false, and the employer’s conduct harmed the employee’s good name before the letter’s recipients and even the doctors who provided the employee’s sick notes.

The substantial amount of damages granted to the employee reflects the court’s displeasure with the employer’s conduct in this specific termination process.”

With this further example from Israel, it is abundantly clear that the NIC is not the lone labour court with exclusive civil jurisdiction over workplace defamation. And we should not forget that the NIC has constitutional and jurisdictional obligations to apply international best practices in the adjudication and resolution of labour and employment disputes under S. 254C-(1)(f) of the Constitution and therefore, bound to follow the examples of the international best practices shown above in interpreting the provisions of S. 254C-(1)(a) to assume jurisdiction over workplace defamation. This is part of the jurisdictional questions involved in the interpretation and applications of the provisions of S. 254C-(1)(a) of the Constitution that has hardly been paid attention to in all the authorities I have come across on this issue. Going by the international best practices in this area of the law, as enjoined by S. 254C-(1)(f) of the Constitution in conjunction with S. 254C-(1)(a) of the Constitution, the law emerges that the NIC unassailably has non obstante jurisdiction over workplace defamation.

The distinction between “matters arising from workplace” and the phrase “matters connected with labour or employment” is important and marks the expansive intention of the legislature to cover all civil causes and issues howsoever named or styled that occur in the workplace. “Matters arising from workplace” places emphasis on the facts that the causes of action need not be typical labour causes traditionally known before now but the fact that they arose from the workplace or occurred at the workplace gives the NIC exclusive civil jurisdiction over them. Had it been that it was not the intendment to give NIC exclusive civil jurisdiction over whatsoever types of issues that arose from work-context, the legislature would not have strained itself to use the phrase after it had used the phrases “relating to or connected with any labour, trade unions, industrial relations”, as legislatures do not employ words in vain and for that reason, effects must be given to the clear unambiguous words and phrases used in a statute literally, especially when they do not invite ambiguity and absurdity – Cocacola v. Akinsanya [supra] 121, D-G, 123, A-C, 141, D-F, 149-150, E-A, 157-158, A-H, 159, F-G, 160, E-H; Ekejiuba v. INEC & Anor (2016) LPELR-40926 (CA) 14-17, C and, Ojibara & Ors v. The Governor of Kwara State & Anor (2004) LPELR-13002 (CA) 62, D-E , where the Court of Appeal stated the position thus:

“…I must bear in mind two established principles of interpretation 1) The legislature does not use words in vain. Therefore, 2) every word must, as far as possible, be given its natural and plain meaning.”

I found that attention has not been specifically paid at all to the meaning and effect of the phrase “matters arising from workplace” in the construction of the provisions of S. 254C-(1)(a) of the Constitution conferring the NIC’s civil jurisdiction. Much attention has been focused on “connected with”, “relating to” and “incidental thereto” phrases with total abandonment of the phrase “matters arising from workplace”. This is perhaps part of the problem in the construction of the provisions leading to the attempt to deny the NIC civil jurisdiction on workplace defamation duly conferred on it by the Constitution. The phrase “ matters arising from workplace” is different from all the other phrases and duly confers the NIC with exclusive civil jurisdiction on any independent cause of action arising from the workplace, so far it arises in the course of labour relations in the workplace and would therefore cover the filing of an independent action on workplace defamation, as a single cause of action not joined to any other cause of action; as is the case extant. The phrase “arising from workplace” obviously also covers actions between employees without the joinder of their employer, as there is nothing suggesting otherwise in the phraseology.

The arising from workplace phrase is therefore clearly meant to encompass causes of actions that are not traditionally connected with labour or employment but arose within work-context. The phrase, jointly with the other phrases or construed in the context of the other phrases, is the real marker of the NIC’s expansive jurisdiction and, it definitely takes care of standalone matters like the instant case, so far they arose from the workplace and in the course of industrial relations and could not be settled without reference to the industrial relations fulcrum of the supposedly independent cause of action. If the standalone theory is sacrosanct, how come that workplace injury, which is also a tort, could be litigated alone at the NIC without the joinder of any other cause of action? This shows that the standalone theory has nothing to do with the filing of a case but with the factual ramifications of the causes of action of which the claimant is at liberty to choose which he would prosecute.

The nature of the present configurations of the NIC’s civil jurisdiction, I found that it is not generally understood on why the NIC has jurisdiction over workplace defamation. Where a defamation arose in the course of disciplinary actions or procedures, and it is sued upon as an independent action, it would be thoroughly impossible to fathom how it could be logically justified that it is not connected with labour because; it was filed as an independent cause of action and being heard alone in that manner or, that it is divorced from the industrial relations fulcrum of its existence simply because, it was sued upon as a standalone cause of action. And I want to observe that, there is no law that says defamation is at all times a standalone subject that could not be ancillary to another subject. The standalone doctrine, with grave respect, is a judicial coinage that has no legal and logical basis. That defamation could be ancillary to another subject or another cause of action or embedded in another subject is the reason why there is the concept of workplace defamation, as a legalese in employment jurisprudence, which clearly implies that such defamation has its umbilical cord tied to the apron of workplace disputes. This is the modern jurisprudence of labour relations around the world and the judicature in Nigeria is bound to embrace it by virtue of S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution.

It means the law recognises that there are peculiarities in defamation arising from workplace or connected with workplace and by virtue of S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution, as midwifed by the Third Alteration Act, and Nigeria, through the NIC and the Court of Appeal, is bound to kowtow to this cutting edge innovation as the international best practice in this area of the law. With the above explanation, it is clear that no other court in Nigeria has the authority to adjudicate workplace defamation suits, except the NIC, so far the causes of action arose from the workplace. This conclusion is strengthened when it is realised that, S. 254C begins by directly naming the jurisdictional sections of all the superior courts of first instance in Nigeria [SS. 251, 257, and 272 of the Constitution] and directly subjugates them to the NIC’s civil jurisdiction. It is not a matter of jurisdiction grabbing but the only method available to avoid controversies like this, where there is more than one court with exclusive jurisdictions. The legal implication of this is that, wherever it is hazarded that there is ambiguity or conflict about the jurisdictional competences of the NIC and any other superior court of first instance in Nigeria, the NIC automatically has the exclusive civil jurisdiction, as the Constitution forbids the struggle for jurisdiction between the NIC and any other court in the country, as such, no ambiguity could be resolved in favour of any other court of first instance against the NIC. And there is no ambiguity in this instance.

In this wise, with all due respect, it appears unsupportable in law and logic to say the NIC has no civil jurisdiction over torts generally. It has exclusive jurisdiction over all workplace torts generally, including workplace malicious prosecution, workplace assaults, bullying and harassments, which are clearly “matters arising from workplace, the conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith” over which S. 254C-(1)(a) of the Constitution ably conferred the NIC with exclusive civil jurisdiction. The language is clear enough beyond arguments. And any doubt is removed if one considers the combined provisions of S. 254C-(1)(b) & (f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution. Section 254C-(1)(b) gives NIC exclusive civil jurisdiction over the interpretation and applications of all labour statutes and for this reason, statutes like the Factories Act [FA], Employees Compensation Act [ECA], Trade Unions Act [TUA], Labour Act [LA] etc. all come within the exclusive civil jurisdiction of the NIC and, they all verge on issues touching on safety of workers/employees against workplace injuries/torts and against breach of duty of care leading to factory accidents, injuries and the like. They cover negligence, failure to provide safety gadgets leading to accidents and the resultant injuries etc. and, all these fall under the canopy of tort.

If the NIC has exclusive civil jurisdiction over all these statutorily created protections against torts: why would it lack jurisdiction over common law workplace torts; especially as the language of S. 254C-(1)(a), as quoted earlier, clearly suggests that it has? Going by the example of S. 87(1)(c) of the Kenyan Employment Act 2007, which provides for rights to safety of employers and employees against injuries to their persons and properties, which the Kenyan Court of Appeal interpreted to mean the Kenyan Industrial Court has exclusive civil jurisdiction over workplace defamation, it would not be far fetched to deduce that, the Kenyan Industrial Courttoo, has jurisdiction over all other types of workplace torts: assaults, harassments, injuries resulting from workplace accidents etc. And the phraseology of S. 254C-(1)(a) of the Constitution, especially the phrase “matters arising from workplace” is clearer than that of the S. 87(1)(c) of the Kenyan Employment Act that the NIC has expansive jurisdiction beyond strict labour and employment disputes. S. 12(1) of the ECA shows clearly that employees have a choice either to claim under the ECA or under the common law.

It would be absurd to expect that when the employee claims under common law, he has to go to the High Court over the same issue he compulsorily has to prosecute in the NIC by virtue of S. 55(4) of the ECA, if he chose to pursue his right under the ECA. In any case, the Constitution does not give the victim-employee the right to even make a choice, as S. 254C-(1)(a) of the Constitution clearly ceded exclusive civil jurisdiction to the NIC when it stated that, the NIC has exclusive civil jurisdiction on: “matters arising from workplace, the conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith” and matters connected with or related to any labour or industrial relations. The words used therein clearly covered all types of torts that can happen at the workplace: assaults, malicious prosecution, battery, harassments, economic torts, detinue etc. It should also be noted that workplace torts are an area of labour law that the ILO has special interests in, with clearly fashioned out cutting edge treaties – ILO C155 – Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 1981 ; and ILO C190 – Violence and Harassment Convention, 2019. ILO C155 covers all sorts of tortious injuries, physical and mental injuries that could arise as a result of unsafe workplace or work-environment[5], while ILO C190 covers all sorts of tortious assaults and harassments that one could think of, including: workplace malicious prosecution and defamation.

I do not think it could be respectably argued that malicious prosecution is not a form of harassment [judicial], while workplace defamation come well within the definition of harassment under ILO C190[6], which regards a single occurrence of an offensive act or conduct as satisfying the definition of harassment [7] instead of the usual repeated occurrences commonly regarded as harassment. After all, nobody doubts that malicious prosecution is a classical form of abuse of judicial process to the irritation and annoyance of the victims for purposes of harassment to tire out the victims. And if this happens in the workplace or in the course of work, I wonder how it could be safely argued that the NIC has no civil jurisdiction thereon. Nigeria has ratified both conventions and, by virtue of S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution, only the NIC can apply them to torts. They constitute statutory interventions in work-context torts. Ceding jurisdiction on workplace defamation and other torts to the High Court , which is constitutionally barred from applying these international labour law instruments means, workers/employees in Nigeria would be denied the opportunities of enjoying the benefits of these international labour law instruments at the High Court while adjudicating torts, since it has no jurisdiction to apply them.

This is another cogent reason that shows that the expansive school of thought is, after all, right and, fittingly appreciated the philosophy behind the grant of expansive civil jurisdiction to the modern NIC over all workplace issues. It did not occur to the learned objector’s counsel that substantial part of issues arising from wrongful discharge [terminations/dismissals], which has been the traditional fort of employment law, actually falls under tort. This is what the authors, Find Law Attorney Writers [8], say about the law of wrongful discharge in Nevada:

“Wrongful discharge can arise under three circumstances: violation of statute (i.e. discrimination), breach of contract, or a tort action involving bad faith or tortuous discharge…A tort action can be brought for bad faith discharge, when a contractual relationship exists or for tortuous discharge, in the absence of contractual relationship…

In order for an employer to be liable for the intentional tort (assault or battery) of an employee, that tort must occur within the scope of employment …”

With the above, I do not think it can be seriously argued that the NIC lacks jurisdiction on tort of wrongful termination/dismissal because it is independent. Bad faith discharge covers defamatory discharge whereby a worker is defamed in the discharge letter. Traditionally, actions in tort have always been brought on interference with the performance of contracts generally, inclusive of tort of wrongful interference with the performance of contracts of employment. Inducing breach of contract of employment might involve a third party to the contract or a co-employee. And all these are purely employment matters. We can now see why the jurisdiction of NIC is not limited merely to cases of employees versus employers but goes beyond to include disputes between two employees and, even third parties versus employers or, third parties versus employees in cases of companies’ employee-agents and, all those things that are connected with them. This is what the Court of Appeal in MHWUN v. Ehigiegba [supra] correctly recognised when it held that:

“It is important to note that section 254C(1)(a) of the Nigerian Constitution, 1999 confers an expansive jurisdiction on the Court to adjudicate on any matter arising from the workplace…The idea behind this…is to remove any limitations or obstacles on the categories of claims or reliefs which the Court can entertain arising from the workplace or employment issues…It is now settled principle of interpretation of statutes that the law maker does not use any words in vain …”

Similarly, in Nwagbo & Ors v. NIA [supra] the Court of Appeal held that: “It is clear from the provisions of Section 254C of the Constitution that the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court is not limited to disputes between employer and employee only; it extends to any dispute related to labour and industrial relations.” It is for this reason that the NIC assumed jurisdiction over a case of economic duress that arose in work-context – Osazuwa v. International Tobacco Company & Anor[10] . The NIC also assumed jurisdiction on workplace detinue that arose in the course of employment relations and at the workplace in El-Aminu Yakubu v. Bontus Oil and Gas Nigeria Ltd & Ors[11]. Therefore, the NIC undoubtedly has unobtrusive jurisdiction on all forms of torts, including workplace defamation, assaults, malicious prosecution, detinue[12], workplace injuries, economic loss/duress [13] etc. so far they arose out of the workplace or arose in work-context.

It is for the reasons of: “matters arising from workplace”; “relating to or connected with” any industrial relations and, “incidental thereto or connected therewith” too, that the NIC has jurisdiction to entertain suits filed by relations or next-of-kin of deceased employees/workers to claim the deceased-employee’s terminal benefits and other accrued entitlements, even though, the action is not directly between the employer and the deceased-employee, the two original parties to the employment relationship and, for which Order 10 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria Civil [Procedure] Rules, 2017 [NIC Rules] is germane. It is equally for these reasons that the family/next-of-kin of a deceased-employee could lawfully sue the employer, even though, not a party to the contract, for damages resulting from tort of industrial accident leading to the death of an employee.

You will all agree with me that industrial accidents and assaults for which the ILO has made specific conventions [ILO C155 & C190], and which only the NIC has jurisdiction to apply and, which some labour statutes in Nigeria, as already shown before now, have also made provisions on, are all torts, equally with special requirements in pleadings and proof, just like workplace defamation. To the extent that we concede jurisdiction to the NIC on these, there is no basis, apart from the fact that ILO conventions also cover workplace defamation, to contest the NIC’s exclusive jurisdiction on workplace defamation. So, the arguments that because, defamation has special requirements in pleading and proof, the NIC cannot entertain it, are therefore shown to be manifestly faulty. If cases of industrial accident-injuries, which are undoubtedly torts; are being adjudicated in the NIC with their special requirements in pleadings and proof, why would the NIC be precluded from entertaining workplace defamation with its special requirements? There appears to be no justifiable reason. Is it being said that lawyers would not know what to plead and prove because, the cases were filed in the NIC or that, the labour court itself would not understand these requirements, which it understood in regard to the workplace injuries, which are also torts? The answer is axiomatic.

Just as some lawyers constantly fail to expertly plead and prove defamation in the High Court and some succeed in doing the right things, the same thing will also happen at the NIC. When they do the right thing, the cases are won, if the facts merit winning and, when they failed to do the right thing, the cases are lost irrespective of the facts, not because they were filed in the NIC but because, that is the way of the law in all courts, the NIC and the High Court inclusive. To further cement the law that the NIC has exclusive jurisdiction over workplace defamation, the fact that special work-context nuances have been brought about in this area of labour law as the international best practices is germane. I will get to this now.

A careful note of my clarifications so far would reveal that four of the five dimensional natures of the NIC’s civil jurisdiction have been carefully examined and articulated above. They are: 1. The “relating to or connected with” phrasal connotation. 2. The “matters arising from workplace” phrasal dimension. 3. The “including” doctrine of its jurisdiction. 4. The “matters incidental thereto or connected therewith” phrasal dimension. 5. The unfair labour practices and international best practices dimension of its jurisdiction introduced by S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution. The initial four aspects of NIC’s civil jurisdiction were ushered in by S. 254C-(1)(a) of the Constitution; and we have fully examined them. We shall now examine the unfair labour practices and international best practices dimension of its jurisdiction.

This aspect, I found, has been completely ignored in all the literatures reviewed; as none of the judgments of the Court of Appeal, both for and against NIC’s jurisdiction on workplace defamation, looked at the question from this prism and, neither have the arguments of the lawyers in these previous cases addressed it from this angle too nor, even the judgments of the NIC itself before now touched this aspect of its jurisdiction with regard to its civil jurisdiction on workplace defamation, except in Marshal Ofeh Ijikeme Ikpor v. The Corps Marshal & Chief Executive, Federal Road Safety Corps & Anor where the NIC cursorily examined this question. I also found that, all the legal writers I have read have not addressed this point too. They all looked at the question of NIC’s civil jurisdiction over torts from the prism of the construction of S. 254C-(1)(a) of the Constitution alone, whereas, S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution is the most radical of all the dimensions of the NIC’s civil jurisdiction. These provisions showed irrefutably why the NIC’s jurisdiction is made expansive under the current jurisdictional configuration ushered in by the Third Alteration Act and, revealed the futility and absurdity of not allowing NIC to exercise the exclusive expansive civil jurisdiction so granted it. Let us now go into the meat.

Arising from the above, the NIC has the constitutional obligations to eradicate unfair labour practices from the world of work in Nigeria; and in doing this, it must apply international best practices derived from other jurisdictions and international sources, particularly as contained in the ILO instruments and other international labour law instruments to arrive at the best international practices and standards in the resolution of labour disputes. Since the NIC is conferred with the sacred constitutional non obstante obligation to apply international best practices; and there are already international best practices applicable to workplace defamation, how does the nation obey this obligation if the NIC is denied jurisdiction on workplace defamation? How does S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution fulfill itself? This makes bare the absurdity of denying the NIC exclusive civil jurisdiction duly conferred on it by the Constitution over workplace defamation and other torts.

It is in this wise that, the NIC is the only Court with jurisdiction on workplace defamation and other workplace torts because, it is the only Court that can enforce the international best practices in this area of the law and the ILO and other international labour law instruments, as I have shown before now. It is because of this complex nature of modern labour law that the civil jurisdiction of the NIC is couched in expansive and all-inclusive manner in order to enable it meet the constitutional mandate of a cosmopolitan labour court that the Constitution envisaged for it. It might not be generally known that one of the major reasons for the reestablishment of the modern NIC as a superior court of record is the need for Nigeria, as a member of the ILO, to escape the then perennial queries from the ILO for failing to enforce the ILO treaties it had ratified in the course of industrial relations.

It is for this that Nigeria reestablished the NIC to cater for the obligations arising from the ILO and other similar international labour organisations to which Nigeria is a member in order to be able to enforce these international labour instruments municipally in the world of work while adjudicating labour disputes. The learned author James Rika, in his incisive article: “The Proper Role and Jurisdiction of the Industrial Court”: was more forthright in the history behind the constitutional reestablishment of the Kenyan Industrial Court by revealing that the ILO and other social partners were directly instrumental to its reestablishment and for the sole purpose that, Kenya fulfills its obligations to the ILO and other international labour law organisations. He puts it like this:

“The Industrial Court, more than any other Court has a role applying, international law to domestic labour market. We are the Institution that the International Labour Organization look up to, to implement the International Labour Standards. The labour law reforms of 2007, which first suggested we could be a Superior Court, were driven by the ILO and the social partners. We have a role to promote and protect international labour standards. It would be in the interest of this Court, that the Judiciary does not lose touch with the ILO otherwise we make ourselves unable to understand the ILO agenda, and our role in its fulfillment.”

From the foregoing, we can now understand better the place of the ILO instruments and other international labour law instruments in the expansive jurisdiction of the NIC. The ILO queries majorly led to the reestablishment of the NIC as a superior court of record, and ever since the reestablishment, the compliance level of Nigeria has improved, but the nation is still facing teething problems because of the problems associated with delineating the frontiers of the NIC’s jurisdiction, as is presently the case, as some labour cases are still being filed in the wrong courts, thereby denying the nation the opportunity to fulfill its labour law obligations on such cases and the continuing resultant queries. Of recent, Nigeria received queries on her failures to enforce some maritime treaties it ratified, which included maritime labour instruments. This is because, some of these cases that were labour cases were wrongly filed in the FHC and, the FHC lacks jurisdiction on any type of labour relations, be it maritime labour claims and more particularly so, it lacks jurisdiction to enforce ratified but undomesticated treaties and international labour standards. With the above hindsight, we have to do a rethink of our perception of the modern expansive jurisdiction of the NIC. Wherever the issue of unfair labour practices are involved and they arose from the workplace or are related to industrial relations, the NIC is the Court with the exclusive civil jurisdiction over the matter because international best practices must be applied to remedy the unfair labour practices. And in the world of industrial relations, the special needs of workplace defamation has been recognised and catered for.

And it looks difficult to fathom how the publication of defamatory materials against an employee by the employer or co-employee on workplace issues can escape the radar of unfair labour practices. To defame an employee without defence is even worse than termination of employment simpliciter. This is because; it can effectively take away the possibility of securing another work. What else could be a more unfair labour practice than that? I do not think there is. Therefore, by virtue of S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution, the NIC has an unobtrusive jurisdiction to remedy proven cases of workplace defamation by the application of international best practices. And I so hold. Such is the specialty that the phrase, “workplace defamation”, has been coined for defamation that arose in the course of labour and employment relations; and the international best practices in this area of the law is that, special rules have been evolved for some peculiarities in the nature of workplace defamation. There is now the doctrine of “compelled self-publication/disclosure” whereby the rigour of proof of publication in defamation has been obviated in workplace defamation in the circumstances where it may be difficult or impossible for the injured person to prove publication. This is usually in relation to termination/dismissal/discharge.

In such cases, such libel is only communicated to the injured person through letter of discharge and, to the proper persons or authorities within the workplace that are officially supposed to be notified for the efficaciousness of the discharge letter and, not to unconnected staffers, regarded as third parties. Under normal libel in common law, it would have meant there is no publication because of the lack of the employer’s direct publication of the libelous discharge letter to a third party, since the communication to rightful authorities within the workplace is privileged, but the law implies publication in a situation where it is clear, the victim-employee would compulsorily have to disclose the defamatory discharge letter to third parties when seeking another employment and, has actually disclosed it and lost the potential job as a result. And here, we are faced with allegations of workplace libel contained in a dismissal letter thus, falling squarely within the radar of the doctrine of “compelled self-publication/disclosure”. Whether or not the prerequisites are met is to be seen at the appropriate place in the judgment but that the allegations fall under the possibility of compelled self-publication, there is no doubt.

Denying the NIC jurisdiction would mean that workers/employees in Nigeria are not allowed to enjoy the benefits of the international best practices in this area of the labour law, contrary to the mandate of S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution, which seeks to make modern Nigerian labour law cosmopolitan. For these reasons, wherever the issues of unfair labour practices and international best practices arise, the NIC has undoubted non obstante jurisdiction. For example, it is in this wise that erudite B.B. Kanyip, HPNICN, in assuming jurisdiction over “employee loan”, another recondite area of the civil jurisdiction of the NIC, which has equally been embroiled in similar controversies of irreconcilable decisions, like workplace defamation, observed in Asana v. FBN Ltd:

“…the goal of labour law is to ensure that no employer can be allowed to impose – and no worker can be allowed to accept – conditions of work which fall below what is understood to be a decent threshold in a given society at a given time.’ The defendant should not, indeed cannot, be allowed to impose on the claimant a fait accompli – entice the claimant with an employment loan at low rate, then turn around and constructively dismiss her and convert the low rate loan to one of higher rate. Head or tail, the employer benefits much against the interest of the claimant. This cannot be.”

Also in Aneke Arinze Leonard v. Ecobank Nig. Ltd, the NIC further expatiated the nature of NIC’s jurisdiction under the doctrines of unfair labour practices and international best practices when it assumed jurisdiction over employee loan. For further example, Article 1(2) of the ILO C181, which deals with triangular employments midwifed by private recruitment agencies says: “For the purpose of this Convention, the term workers includes jobseekers.” This showed immediately that the jurisdiction of the NIC transcends mere employer-employee relationships and verged on any issues connected with labour or industrial relations. The labour rights of prospective employees are recognised and protected thus, conferring NIC with jurisdiction on disputes between non-employee and employer. So, unlike under common law, in the modern jurisprudence of labour law, a non-employee could sue an employer of labour for the violations of some rights: i.e. discrimination, thereby evading the doctrine of privity. And this marks the nature of the NIC’s civil jurisdiction under the doctrine of unfair labour practices and international best practices midwifed by S. 254C-(1)(a), (f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution. This Convention also raises the question of sanctity of the doctrine of privity in relation to triangular employment relations and shows the anchor of the NIC’s jurisdiction to bypass the doctrine of privity in appropriate cases.

From the foregoing, it must now be abundantly clear as daylight that, the NIC’s civil jurisdiction is intentionally made expansive under the Third Alteration Act in order to cater for the country’s international labour law obligations and the application of the doctrines of unfair labour practices and international best practices as commanded by S. 254C-(1)(a), (f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution, contrary to the restrictive-school-of-thought’s insistence on NIC’s former narrow jurisdiction under the TDA and, to a large extent, under the NICA. I so hold. The TDA and the NICA did not have coterminous jurisdictional provisions with the Third Alteration Act and as such, both statutes, which are ordinary statutes, could not be invoked as aids to the interpretation of S. 254C, and at worst, as limiting the NIC’s expansive civil jurisdiction. Literal rule shows that the NIC now has expansive civil jurisdiction and since there is no ambiguity resulting in absurdity in the application of literal rule; the expansive civil jurisdiction must be left unscathed in accordance with its tenor. Even if the purposive rule or the mischief rule is applied correctly, it favours the conferment of expansive civil jurisdiction on the NIC, having seen the rationale for that.

It is necessary to introduce a caveat at this juncture that, the doctrine of compelled self-disclosure/publication is not applicable in cases of workplace defamation outside the narrow bounds of defamation contained in terminal letters. In all other cases, proof of publication remains as under the common law, but the question remains constant: whether workplace defamation has the potentiality to negatively impact the present and future employment prospects of the defamed employees? And if the answer is yes; workplace defamation is implicated and, only the NIC has the non obstante jurisdiction to adjudicate it. This question, the learned authors – Aluko & Oyebode – framed in another way, which they christened the “But For Test”: which posed the question: would the defamation have happened without employment relations or without the work-context? And they surmised that, if the answer is no: workplace defamation is implicated and the NIC has the exclusive civil jurisdiction over it. Rarely will any defamatory material arising from workplace be without serious consequences on the employment prospects of the victim-employee or victim-employer, more particularly so when the employers and employees have corporate images to protect. That is why even accusations of infidelity [tort] at the workplace must come to the NIC because, head or tail, it has serious implications on the victim’s work prospects.

To defame an employee with the potentiality of negatively impacting his employment prospects is definitely unfair labour practice that demands the best international practices around the world to remedy because, labour rights have been elevated to fundamental human rights, especially the right to work. So, by dint of S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution, which anchored the eradication of unfair labour practices and granted the NIC the non obstante jurisdiction over them, and gave it the twin obligatory jurisdiction to remedy unfair labour practices with international best practices, as reflected in ILO instruments and other international labour law instruments/practices, the NIC has exclusive jurisdiction over workplace defamation. I so hold. It was partly under unfair labour practices that the Israeli Labour Court assumed jurisdiction over workplace defamation for, it held that the employer was biased and being biased, is an instance of unfair labour practices.

Luckily, the Court of Appeal, in Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v. Oyebola (2020) LPELR-51806 (CA), has validated NIC’s non obstante jurisdiction under S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution, though, in relation to the types of radical reliefs, unknown to the common law, that the NIC could award. It is nonetheless significant that it has set in motion the ratio decidendi that, the NIC has exclusive jurisdiction to eradicate unfair labour practices and inculcate international best practices in the world of work in Nigeria in line with the ILO’s decent work mantra. And for this reason, the NIC is not tied to the apron of the common law and could therefore, do some unique things hitherto unknown to the previous Nigerian labour law; especially with the innovative provisions of SS. 12-19 of the NICA, which accentuated S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution. Consequently, I quote extenso how the NIC applied international best practices of “compelled self-publication” to workplace defamation in Marshal Ikpor’s case [supra]:

“I found that, there abound a lot of conflicting decisions on the issue of the jurisdiction of this Court on defamation in employment matters, unfortunately from this Court itself, and the Court of Appeal – see Bisong v. University of Calabar (2016) LPELR-41246 (CA) 37-38, E and MHWUN v. Ehigiegba (2018) LPELR-44972 (CA) 28-36, E-C and Ecobank Nig. Ltd & Ors v. Idris (2021) LPELR-52806 (CA) as examples… Such is the disturbing level of the conflicting decisions that, it elicited a full-length article from two lecturers of the premier University of Ibadan: Eyongndi and Onu in “The National Industrial Court Jurisdiction Over Tortious Liability Under Section 254C (1)(A) of the 1999 Constitution: Sieving Blood From Water” published at https://www.academia.edu [accessed July 23, 2022].

In this incisive article, the authors gave reasons for the unsettled state of the rationes decidendi in this important area of the law and proffered solutions. I observed that, while their suggested panacea might help, it only scratched the problem but did not curb it. There is therefore the need to unearth the root of the problem and get it uprooted from the source to put an end to the nagging problem. This is more disturbing because of the fact that, even this Court itself has shunned out conflicting decisions on this very issue. So, the problem is more, that of this Court itself than the Court of Appeal. And any solution must find the reason for the uncertainty in this aspect of the law by this Court itself. Part of the reason is that, defamation under common law has peculiar demands in pleadings and proof, before the common law courts; one of which is that, the victim-claimant must plead and proof [sic] publication, which most often, are not properly done and are most often too, not even possible in employment defamation.

The solution is to see how the world of works relations has reacted to this peculiarity in employment-relations defamation. I observed that, this is the real cause of the conflicting decisions and why, some defamatory actions that would succeed in other climes, normally failed in the NICN . The world of works relations has upped her expertise in this area of the law, by recognising exception to the requirement of proof of publication when it comes to employment-related defamation, especially in cases of termination – see Richard J. Larson, “ Defamation at the Workplace Employers Beware” in Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal: Vol. 5: Iss. 1, Article 2 at http://scholarcommons.law.hofstra.edu [accessed July 23, 2022]. The article gives a general survey of this new area of the law, particularly with regard to the changed world-view on the issue of proofs of publications in the world of employment relations’ defamations.

That is the in-thing in employment-relations defamation in the world of work today. Following the jurisdiction of this Court under S. 254C-(1)(a), (f) & (h) of the 1999 Constitution [as altered], the NICN is the Court with exclusive civil jurisdiction on employment related torts of defamation. This is because, it is the only Court constitutionally empowered to search for and apply international best practices in resolving labour and employment disputes and the only Court empowered too, to search for and apply international labour standards and treaties in the world of works.” – [P. 36-37]

It seems strange, illogical and contrary to the spirit of the Third Alteration Act and the ILO decent work agenda that an employee would be defamed in his workplace and the High Court, a non-specialist court, would have jurisdiction to try the matter when the technical name – workplace defamation – now exists as a significant sub-subject of labour law, clearly suggesting it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NIC, a workplace dispute court and, when it is clear too, the defamation is rooted in employment relations. Even if the High Court, a non-specialised general jurisdiction court, appreciates the need to apply these nuances; as it lacks the jurisdiction to eradicate unfair labour practices and apply international best practices, it cannot do anything in that regard, and its adjudication will be deprived of the constitutional mandates in S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) to the detriment of the intended beneficiaries thus, revealing an unintended negative consequence of the restrictive interpretation of the provisions of S. 254C of the Constitution. This shows clearly that the High Court lacks jurisdiction over workplace defamation.

It is also necessary to draw attention to the fact that the High Court also lacks jurisdiction to apply ratified but undomesticated international labour treaties by virtue of S. 12(1) of the Constitution to which it is still tied, while the NIC has been freed from this restriction by S. 254C-(2) of the Constitution. The NIC can also apply international labour standards by virtue of S. 254C-(1)(h) of the Constitution, which the High Court has no jurisdiction to do. Since these instruments cover virtually all aspects of the NIC’s expansive jurisdiction and are constantly applied in the adjudication of cases by the NIC, to cede jurisdiction to the High Court on any aspect of the expansive jurisdiction of the NIC is to negative S. 254C of the Constitution and deny the workforce of their benefits.

To tow (sic: toe) the line of the restrictive school of thought would therefore mean that the provisions of the Constitution are being interpreted to achieve the direct opposite of their tenor to defeat the intendment of the legislature. So, the literal rule is the correct rule, which is in line with the view of the expansive school of thought, to adopt in the construction of the provisions of S. 254C of the Constitution. And the law is that, once the Constitution speaks clearly and covers the field, all other laws must bow. The common law and statutory laws [the TDA & NICA] being cited against the NIC’s exclusive expansive civil jurisdiction on workplace defamation and general torts must therefore bow. It would be disobeying the Constitution and abdicating Nigeria’s obligations to the ILO and other international labour law organisation, to compel the NIC to abdicate jurisdiction over workplace torts in general and, workplace defamation in particular, to the High Court, a non-specialist court.

The doctrine of compelled self-publication/disclosure is the modern currency of workplace defamation and, having been seen to be objectively for the benefits of the stakeholders in industrial relations and to the advantage of industrial harmony and sustainable economic development, Nigeria is bound to buy into it in accordance with the dictates of S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitutioncombined with SS. 13, 14 & 15 of the NICA and, the jurisprudence of labour courts around the world to consider the wider economic interests of the society in adjudicating labour cases, which S. 10(3)(a)&(b) of the Trinidad and Tobago Labour Relations Act captures by providing that:

“Notwithstanding anything in this Act or any other rule of law to the contrary, the Court in the exercise of its powers shall –

(a) make such order or award in relation to a dispute before it as it considers fair and just, having regard to the interest of the persons immediately concerned and the community as a whole;

(b) act in accordance with equity, good conscience and substantial merit of the case before it, having regard to the principles and practices of good industrial relations .”

The old laws have gone with regard to the NIC’s jurisdiction and are now replaced with the new state of the art innovations, as ushered in by the Third Alteration Act. I so hold. The old law must be unlearned while the new law, as contained in the Third Alteration Act , particularly S. 254C, must be learned. That settles the 5 ^th dimension of the nature of the NIC’s exclusive expansive civil jurisdiction. It is therefore indubitably established that the NIC has non obstante civil jurisdiction over work-context torts in general and much more, in as much as the civil issue arose from the workplace, contrary to the restrictive school of thought. And I so hold.

May I state at this juncture that the world of work in Nigeria has even always recognised the special needs for workplace defamation even before the enactment of the Third Alteration Act and, the judiciary had risen to the occasion and innovated a special measure by inverting the requirements of proof in the popular doctrine that, where an employer gives reason for discharge, s/he is hooked with the reason, as s/he must justify it to the satisfaction of the court to sustain the discharge - SPDC v. Olarewaju [2008] LPELR – 3046 [SC], 19, E-G . It is only that the development was atrophied at that rudimentary stage without being fully developed to capture workplace defamation in its full breadth, as has happened in other advanced democracies.

The NIC in its pre- Third Alteration Act period had upped this doctrine beyond the rudimentary stage at which it atrophied under common law in Nigeria by insisting that wherever there is peremptory termination, even without mentioning a reason, it carries with it the implied stigma that the victim-employee did something heinously wrong to warrant such sudden termination and that; this is deemed to have negative effects on the employability prospects of the victim-employee and must be remedied. But this development did not reach the full advancement of compelled self-publication to negate the rigour of publication in deserved instances. Thus, in Industrial Cartons Ltd v. NUPAPPW (2006) 6 NLLR (Pt. 15) 258 , a case of wrongful termination of employment, the erstwhile NIC decided pre- Third Alteration Act that, one month salary in lieu of notice would not meet the justice of the case because of the peremptory manner by which the claimant’s appointment was terminated, which it held, had the effect of suggesting that the claimant did something wrong. That, it said, tarnished the victim-employee’s image. The then NIC awarded six months salaries for the ruffled reputation.

As far back as 1968, the ILO in “Judgment 121: Twentieth Ordinary Session of the Administrative Tribunal of the League of Nations, 1968”, involving Agarwala v. United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization [FAO] , held on workplace defamation:

“By the letters of 8 and 9 June 1966 the complainant was relieved of his duties and in effect forbidden to call at his office… Since his emoluments have been fully paid, he has suffered no material damage,but he has suffered moral damage.He is entitled to compensation for the distress caused by the abrupt way in which he was treated, tantamount in its form to summary dismissal, and for the injury done to his reputation and to his prospects of obtaining other employment . The Tribunal fixes this compensation at 6,000 dollars.”

This proves to the hilt that the ILO has, for at least, the past 56 years, fully recognised the tort of workplace defamation as an integral part of industrial relations. It is all about innovation and proactivity, which Nigeria must now imbibe by virtue of S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution. The Israeli Labour Court, as cited earlier on and, in another case, reported by Luth Levush, “Israel: National Labor Court Quintuples Compensation in Occupational Harassment Case”, had relied consistently on the doctrines of good faith and fair dealings to innovate rules to circumvent common law obtuseness and dealt with workplace harassment, even though, there is no specific statute that gave it jurisdiction to adjudicate and award remedies over workplace harassments. Workplace harassment is an aspect of torts. This shows that the Israeli Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction over all workplace torts. At common law, even though, workplace defamation was not originally recognised, the need to cater specifically for it was however later recognised at some point, as reported by the learned authors: John Bruce Lewis et al, in their erudite work: “Defamation and the Workplace: A Survey of the Law and Proposals for Reform”:

“With the coming of the Industrial Revolution during the eighteenth century, England changed from an agricultural society to one of wage labor. In his treatise The Law of Libel, published in 1812, Francis Holt wrote:

‘Every man has a right to the fruits of his industry, and by a fair reputation and character in his particular business, to the means of making his industry fruitful. At common law therefore an action lies for words which slander a man in his trade, or defame him in an honest calling.”

That is the origin of the common law workplace defamation. One thing that is clear from the literature, as quoted above, is that the law was specifically developed in response to industrial relations as a result of industrial revolution, to protect workers in their trade and professions from defamations that might have injurious effects on their means of livelihood. At this period, there were no specialised courts specifically created to cater for industrial relations cases in Britain and the USA . It is certain from the origins of the extension of defamation to trade and industry that; had such specialised superior court like the NIC existed with full jurisdiction and powers, it would have had the exclusive civil jurisdiction because, it would have been illogical and absurd to develop a law in response to industrial relations and not grant the industrial court the exclusive civil jurisdiction.

Now that we have the NIC in Nigeria, as a specialised superior court of first instance, created specifically for workplace and industrial relations disputes and, with all the powers of a High Court and much more, could it be logically argued that the High Court, a general jurisdiction court, would continue to exercise jurisdiction over workplace defamation that was specifically created in response to the workplace and industrial relations? The answer is no: for much more reasons than the history of the origins of workplace defamation, the NIC is granted exclusive fitting jurisdiction by S. 254C of the Constitution . With regard to this controversy, the Nigerian case is more perplexing because; the Constitution specifically says the NIC has exclusive civil jurisdiction over matters that arose from the workplace or from industrial relations and yet, there is still arguments on whether it has jurisdiction over workplace defamation!

First, the Constitution, as I have shown earlier on, sufficiently infuses the NIC with non obstante jurisdiction in this area of the law and secondly, that is the way the foreign jurisdictions with similar full-fledged industrial courts like the NIC, have treated the issue of workplace defamation: their labour/industrial courts have exclusive jurisdictions over it. Thirdly, the origins of workplace defamation showed irrefutably that the arguments that defamation is a standalone concept and for that reason, could not be litigated as ancillary to employment relation lacks foundation. From the origins of the concept of workplace defamation under common law, it had its umbilical cord tied to workplace relations, having arisen in connection with trade, profession and employment relations necessitated by the industrial revolution. It was not developed in the skies unconnected with anything but clearly developed in connection with industrial relations; and it has remained so till date. It is from this initial watershed under common law innovation that further developments led to the now full-fledged modern workplace defamation with more fine-tuned innovations to take care of the special nature of workplace defamation, yet under common law. I quote the learned authors John Bruce Lewis et al once again. Tracing the trajectory of development of the modern workplace defamation, the learned authors said:

“Many of the weaknesses in the application of defamation suits between employers and employees are the result of the historical development of American and English defamation law, in which the employment relationship played no part. There were few defamation actions arising out of the employment relationship until the nineteenth century . Defamation suits between employees and employers require three interrelated conditions: the legal recognition of right of workers to sue their employers; the legal recognition of an employee’s reputation as important enough to merit judicial protection; and an employment relationship and socio-economic environment creating the possibility of labor mobility. It was only after the employment environment met these three conditions in the middle of the eighteen century that courts in England began to entertain defamation cases arising from out of the workplace.

An employer is generally not liable for the republication of a defamatory statement made only to an employee because the employee is held responsible for any harm that results from his own statements. Some courts, however, have held that the employer is liable if there is reason to believe that the employee will, at some point, be compelled to repeat the defamatory statement.”

From the above, two things are made bare. Workplace defamation is entirely dependent on employment relationships and cannot be divorced from them. It was the response of common law defamation to employment relationships and its development was entirely tied to the workplace and employment relations. The second thing is that: the doctrines of qualified privilege and compelled self-publication are evident; which is what the more responsive climes have fully developed into the special class of workplace defamation . There are a lot of other innovations developed peculiarly for workplace defamation but the most significant is the doctrine of compelled self-publication. Having got to this juncture, I will now look at excerpts from the key decisions from the two schools of thought in Nigeria before rounding up on this aspect of the case. First, I take a look at some authorities from the restrictive school of thought. In Akpan v. Unical [supra], which was the first from the Court of Appeal in the restrictive school of thought:

“ The National Industrial Court is a Court of limited jurisdiction in terms of subject matter, as clearly spelt out in Section 254C of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, its jurisdiction is limited to matters closely related to labour and employment matters. The National Industrial Court cannot entertain any matter outside its constitutionally prescribed subject matter area. A claim cannot be considered ancillary to the main claim when it is completely removed from the subject matter of the main claim …A careful examination of the provisions of Section 254C of the 1999 Constitution, as amended will not reveal that its powers extend to entertaining a claim in tort, at all. A claim in tort cannot be considered as being ancillary to a claim for wrongful dismissal when brought before a Court which has its jurisdiction limited by statute…A claim for defamation stands on its own. The learned trial Judge therefore rightly declined jurisdiction over the Appellant’s claim for defamation.”

Note that, this Court of Appeal’s decision upheld the NIC’s declination of jurisdiction over workplace defamation. I will take one more example in the restrictive school of thought which is the latest directly on point. It is the case of Ecobank Nig. Ltd v. Idris [supra]:

“It is clear from the list of items specified at Section 254C(1) of the Constitution and indeed Section 254C(2) (3), over which the NIC had jurisdiction to entertain, cases or matters which border on defamation of character is not one of those items and it should not be so construed to confer jurisdiction on the National Industrial Court (NIC) merely because those defamatory remarks were made in the course of the Respondents [sic] employment with the 1 ^st Appellant and thus, the defamatory remarks and claims for damages thereto should not be entertained by the NIC…hence the National Industrial Court cannot assume jurisdiction under Section 254C(1)(a) over cases or matters founded on a claim for damages for defamation of character…”

It would be noticed that the first in the series of authorities in the restrictive school of thought, which is the anchor of all the subsequent authorities, and in the latest in line, their reasoning are the same. The second is an excerpt from the latest that is directly on point from the restrictive school of thought on the jurisdiction of NIC over workplace defamation. It would be found that the anchors of the two authorities are exactly the same. The indictment on the NIC’s jurisdiction is that, since the Constitution did not specifically use the jargon ‘ defamation’ or ‘ tort’ in S. 254C-(1)(a), the NIC had not jurisdiction over defamation, even though, it arises from work-context and as a result of employment relations, such defamation would yet be totally independent of the workplace and employment relations and, as such, could not still be said to be ancillary to employment relations and therefore, could not be entertained by the NIC because; the NIC’s jurisdiction is limited. Let me observe, with the greatest respect, in the meantime that there was nowhere in S. 254C that the Constitution expressly stated that the NIC’s jurisdiction was limited as deduced in the two authorities. Let us now look at excerpts from two of the leading Court of Appeal’s decisions from the opposing school: the expansive school of thought. I cite first MHWUN v. Ehigiegba [supra], which is the very first on this line:

“It is important to note that Section 254C(1)(a) of the Nigerian Constitution, 1999 confers an expansive jurisdiction on the Court to adjudicate on any matter arising from the workplace…The idea behind this provision is to remove any limitations or obstacles on the categories of claims or reliefs which the Court can entertain arising from workplace or employment issues. However, despite the seeming clarity in the extent of the jurisdiction…there are still a lot of uncertainties in respect of matters which are termed ancillary or connected to the subject matter over which the Court has exclusive jurisdiction. As a result of this position, even the Court…in a number of instances refused to entertain claims or reliefs outside of strict labour and employment even where such claims are closely linked with labour matters…It is now settled principle of interpretation of statutes that the law makers does not use any words in vain . The argument here is the repetitive use of the words; ‘connected with’, “related to”, “pertaining to”, “arising from”, “incidental thereto”, or “connected with” used in Section 254C(1)(a)…were not used in vain as the law makers must have meant their use to emphasize and reiterate the wide jurisdiction…over all issues arising from employment and labour disputes regardless of the nature of the claims or reliefs in the suit… The tort of defamation…is an actionable wrong which depends on a set of factual situations which gives [sic] rise to the claim of the claimant…Where the factual situation on which the claim is anchored is one that is based on an employment dispute or matters arising from the workplace, then such claims falls squarely within the ambit of Section 254C(1)(a) of the Constitution, regardless of reliefs claimed…If this is not a classic case of an alleged defamatory claim arising from a purely labour and employment relationship arising from the workplace and relating to or connected with any labour, employment dispute as envisaged by Section 254C(1)(a), this Court therefore wonders what else will be.”

I take the second example from the expansive school of thought from the Court of Appeal’s case of Okoro v. Ecobank Nigeria Ltd [supra], which is the latest directly on point:

“Put in another way, the said claim of defamation could not be determined without a determination of whether the contract of employment between the parties was lawfully terminated or not…

The argument of the learned counsel for the Respondent that the Appellant has severed his employment with the Respondent or that the Appellant’s claim is for defamation simpliciter cannot be countenanced. By the said Appellant’s claim, the issue of defamation is dependent on the claim of the lawfulness or otherwise of the termination of the contract of employment between the Appellant and the Respondent.

In the circumstance, the learned trial judge was right to have held that the proper court to try the Appellant’s claims is the National Industrial Court of Nigeria.”

In the first place, it is necessary to observe that NIC’s jurisdiction is even wider than envisaged in the second authority from the expansive school of thought and, for workplace defamation, the employee-victim of the alleged defamation might not even challenge his discharge but only the defamation in the discharge letter, because s/he might no longer be ready to work with the employer or might only be interested in clearing his name. See for example, the now notorious UK case in which a former Nigerian Deputy Senate President and another Nigerian were sentenced for human trafficking for organ harvesting, modern slavery and related offences. The victim, even though poor, flatly rejected compensation. And the Court respected his wish. This shows that it is the right of victims to choose the cause of action to pursue and the reliefs to claim. Once they prove the cause of action chosen, the court is not concerned with the cause of action abandoned. And that does not take away the factual connection of the cause of action pursued to the one abandoned. It is a matter of pleading and evidence. Coming back to our position before the cognate digression, workplace defamation might more negatively affect the future employability of the victim-employee or has actually negatively affected him in the case of compelled self-publication.

The mere fact that the victim-employee decided not to challenge the discharge but only the workplace defamation does not remove the workplace defamation from its employment relation’s fulcrum. Cases of defamation relying on compelled self-publication are brought after discharge and not to challenge the discharge but the injury of inability to get new jobs as a result of the libel in the discharge letter. So, the first authority cited from the expansive school: MHWUN v. Ehigiegba [supra]: captures the breadth of the NIC’s civil jurisdiction over workplace defamation better and, the nature of its expansive civil jurisdiction. So also did Nwagbo v. NIA [supra]. Clearly, both MHWUN v. Ehigiegba and Okoro v. Ecobank as excerpted above, and from the expansive school of thought, are directly on point.

In the first, claim in defamation was the main claim and it arose out of the workplace and in the cause of industrial relations, while in the second, the defamation arose from the workplace and in the cause of dismissal. From the point of view of the latest in the series of authorities that is directly on point, as I have found earlier in this judgment, is Okoro v. Ecobank Nig. Ltd [supra] and it therefore takes the trophy, while the opposing authorities that were later than it were on tort of malicious prosecution and, not tort of workplace defamation. They have different requirements on pleadings and proof. Going by the standard principle of choosing between two conflicting stare decisis , the latter in time prevails. Okoro v. Ecobank Nig Ltd [supra], from the expansive school of thought, is therefore the extant latest authority that is directly on point and, consequently I am bound by it. And I so hold.

However, I have found earlier on that, since all these authorities from both schools of thought are on torts generally, and the authorities from the restrictive school of thought seemed to make sweeping statements on the lack of NIC’s jurisdiction on torts generally, it might be that there is no discernable ratio decidendi common to the conflicting decisions of both the NIC and the Court of Appeal on this issue and therefore, going by Ngun’s case [supra], I am bound to make a choice between the two sets of authorities on this issue. I logically take side with the expansive school of thought. I have given the detailed reasons for my choice earlier in this judgment. I only need to add that, it is fitting to look more critically at the constitutional provisions on the jurisdiction of the High Court itself, which the Court of Appeal, within the confines of the restrictive school of thought, with the utmost respect, has repeatedly held, has jurisdiction over workplace torts, including workplace defamation, for the purposes of comparative analysis with that of the NIC, since it is in the centre of the whole controversies. S. 272(1) of the Constitution provides for the High Court’s jurisdiction thus:

“Subject to the provisions of section 251 and other provisions of the Constitution, the High Court of a State shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil proceedings in which the existence or extent of a legal right, power, duty, liability, privilege, interest, obligation or claim is in issue…”

The above are the provisions of S. 272(1) of the Constitution that deal with the civil jurisdiction of the High Court, the remaining, which I did not reproduce, deal with its criminal jurisdiction; which is not our inquiry here. First, it must be cleared at the outset that the jurisdiction of the High Court is no longer unlimited as it was under the 1963 Constitution. Unfortunately, it appears the restrictive school of thought seemed to feel it still is. Things have changed: first, with the creation of the FHC and later, with the creation of the NIC. The High Court is now a court of residual civil jurisdiction while both the FHC and the NIC are courts of exclusive jurisdictions. I think the correct statement of the law extant is that the NIC’s civil jurisdiction is enumerated and general on all matters related to the enumeration howsoever styled or called, while the High Court’s civil jurisdiction is limited to the residues left by the FHC and the NIC. And the implication is that, whatever the NIC’s civil jurisdiction expressly or impliedly covers, the High Court’s civil jurisdiction is automatically ousted. That is the meaning of residual.

But while the NIC’s civil jurisdiction is exclusive, its exclusivity is of general and expansive nature on the subject matters covered and, extends to all other subject matters that arise from workplace or that are connected to them or incidental to them such that, these issues and matters are included in the general coverage of its expansive civil jurisdiction. It is irrelevant whether they are independent subjects on their own or not, once they are matters arising from workplace, the NIC has exclusive civil jurisdiction over them. And when such matters are said to be ancillary, it is the Constitution that effected a change in that law to make them ancillary; and our previous knowledge of the law has nothing to do with the matter. They are simply ancillary from the wording of S. 254C of the Constitution.

Now, the main anchor of the arguments of the restrictive school of thought is that, the Constitution did not specifically mention defamation or torts in relation to the NIC’s civil jurisdiction. Combing through the High Court’s civil jurisdiction too, as conferred by S. 272(1) of the Constitution, and as reproduced above, I could not find where it too, mentioned torts or defamation. And S. 272(1) neither uses the all-inclusive expansive phrases: “relating to”, “connected with”, “matters arising from workplace”, “incidental thereto”, “connected therewith” nor does it provide the High Court with a civil jurisdiction to eradicate unfair labour practices or enjoined it to apply international best practices in the adjudication of labour disputes. And these are the clauses that give NIC expansive civil jurisdiction on all things connected with labour or work-context. Noteworthy is the fact that, S. 272(1) of the Constitution that ushered in the civil jurisdiction of the High Court self-subject itself to the other provisions of the Constitution whereas, NIC’s civil jurisdiction subjects all other provisions of the Constitution to itself to have unobtrusive expansive coverage.

It is not therefore feasible to restrictively construe the jurisdictional provisions of S. 254C of the Constitution, which grants the NIC’s expansive civil jurisdiction, subject to S. 272(1) of the Constitution, which grants the High Court’s limited residual civil jurisdiction. With the clear provisions of the S. 254C-(1)(a) that, all “matters arising from workplace” and matters relating to or connected with labour, employment and industrial relations and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith: how could the High Court have jurisdiction over workplace torts in general and workplace defamation in particular, which are not residues left for it? It looks illogical. The phrase “matters arising from workplace” is very clear and unambiguous and does not lead to ambiguity or absurdity. The High Court clearly lacks jurisdiction over “matters arising from workplace” and “matters arising from workplace” clearly covers workplace defamation. To hold otherwise would mean the drafters of S. 254C of the Constitution used those phrases in vain.

The argument that the NIC’s civil jurisdiction is limited is therefore not correct. It is better to say the jurisdiction of the NIC is enumerated and encompasses all unenumerated things arising from workplace or connected with or ancillary to labour, union and employment relations. The notion of the NIC’s limited jurisdiction is only accurate to describe its jurisdiction under the TDA and NICA. Under the TDA, its jurisdiction was limited to only the cases referred to it by the Minister of Labour and the Industrial Arbitration Panel, while under the NICA, its jurisdiction though expanded, was still not directly incorporative of individual employment suits and thus, limited in that regard. As far as labour relations law and things arising from the workplace are concerned, the NIC’s civil jurisdiction is unlimited, which is why the constitution drafters used those incorporative and expansive words and phrases. If we follow the prescription of the Court of Appeal in Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v. Oyebola [supra] that new statutes are to be construed with a clean-slate mind, it would have been easy to buy into the thoughts of the expansive school of thought.

Having arrived at this juncture, I hold that the NIC has non obstante civil jurisdiction over all workplace torts, including workplace defamation, whether it stands alone or not, so far it arose out of the workplace or, in conjunction with other claims or not, all connected with labour or arising from the workplace or ancillary to these matters. That is what the Court of Appeal aptly pointed out in Nwagbo’s case [supra] when it stated the law thus:

“It is clear from the provisions of Section 254C of the Constitution that the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court is not limited to disputes between employer and employee only; it extends to any dispute related to labour and industrial relations.”

Be that as it may, I wish to observe that some of the arguments raised in the objection were not wary of the need to avoid multiplicity of suits as enjoined by S. 254C of the Constitution and S. 14 of the NICA. The main object of the NIC’s expansive civil jurisdiction is the need to obviate unwittingly imposing multiplicity of actions on the parties in industrial relations disputes, especially the workers, who are treated as hapless underdogs in labour law. The Court of Appeal equally made it abundantly clear in Omang v. Nsa [supra] that it is necessary to take into account the need to avoid multiplicity of actions in construing the NIC’s jurisdiction – P. 86, E-H. It is because the labour law regards workers as hapless underdogs that in some jurisdictions, they have what is called ‘small claims’ for which loose procedures are designed in their labour courts while others even totally barred lawyers from appearing in small employment claims[38].

Obviously, from the phraseology of S. 254C of the Constitution, workplace defamation is at worst, ancillary to industrial relations and at best, arises from the workplace and from industrial relations. Ancillary in this sense is not related to the distinctive nature or the supposed independent nature of the subject matter [workplace defamation] in issue but as nominated by the Constitution in relation to labour matters. And when the Constitution says something is ancillary to another, that to which the Constitution makes it ancillary, is the main subject by constitutional force and, we cannot wriggle out by saying because, in ordinary parlance, the thing made ancillary by the Constitution , is an independent subject on its own in law, we will not obey the Constitution . The factual relations created by the Constitution must prevail. The Constitution made any other subjects connected with industrial relations or arising from work-context ancillary, however independent they normally are, that is the law: we cannot wriggle out of that.

And being ancillary, the court with jurisdiction over the main subject to which it is ancillary has jurisdiction over it – Gafar v. Govt of Kwara State & Ors (2007) LPELR-8073 (SC) – and it does not mean that the main subject must be claimed as a cause of action in the suit. Where only the ancillary is claimed, the main claim could always be deduced from the pleadings showing the main cause of action and the question would be: had the claimant filed action on the main cause of action, would this Court have had jurisdiction? If it yields yes: the NIC is good to go. It is a matter of choice to the claimant to nominate his cause of action and matter of evidence and pleadings to prove it. The defendant and the court cannot dictate to the claimant, which of the multiple causes of action s/he must pursue.

The duty of the court is to adjudicate the cause of action, which is within its jurisdiction according to law and, the defendant’s duty is to defend the cause of action filed against it and not to object that the court lacks jurisdiction because, multiple causes of action were not filed. So, defamation, however independent it might be thought to be, as a subject in law could after all, be ancillary to labour relations under the tenor of S. 254C of the Constitution. In actual fact, how independent really are workplace defamations and other species of tort generally? They are just topics in the subject: Law of Tort, and the whole Law of Tort itself could be ancillary to labour relations under the canopy of S. 254C of the Constitution, not to talk of just a topic in the whole.

It is not generally realised that part of the core advantages aimed at in the all-inclusive expansive tenor of S. 254C of the Constitution is the need to avoid multiplicity of suits on issues that could arise from the same subject matter with common threads running through them. S.14 of the NICA is cognate. For example, the same evidence that would be presented to prove workplace defamation in the course of dismissal would be exactly the evidence needed to prove wrongful dismissal. This is what the Court of Appeal illustrated in Okoro v. Ecobank Nigeria Ltd [supra]. Whether or not the claimant now sued for dismissal with the defamation is not material. What is material is whether an examination of the facts showed this connection. Why would defamation go to High Court and wrongful dismissal stay in the NIC? That would amount to a classic example of unwittingly promoting multiplicity of actions on causes that could be conveniently and easily tried by one of the two courts. And since the High Court could not try wrongful dismissal, it is the NIC that must have jurisdiction on both, and once both are or either of the causes of action is provable by their connection with labour relations.

All the examples of the adoptions of such grotesque methods of multiplicity of actions on labour matters I read arose in situations where the labour courts concerned were inferior tribunals and none, where the industrial courts were superior courts with the requisite jurisdiction and powers of High Court, even if their jurisdictions were couched in general terms. To avoid any problem, the Nigerian Constitution, like the Kenyan Constitution, in its wisdom, nominated the NIC with exclusive civil jurisdiction over all matters connected with labour relations and all “matters arising from workplace”.

Reflecting the contemporary thinking on labour court’s jurisdiction over workplace torts, the New Zealand Supreme Court [NZSC] even decided in FVM v. TZB that the Employment Relations Authority [ERA], an inferior tribunal, had exclusive civil jurisdiction over workplace defamation and workplace torts generally, in so far the claims were framed around “employment relations problems” or “work context” over which S. 161(1) of the Employment Relations Act grants the ERA exclusive civil jurisdiction, notwithstanding that S. 161(1)(r) of the Act excludes its jurisdiction over torts. S. 161(1)(r) was deemed as producing an ambiguity resulting in absurdity against the legislative tenor marshaled out in S. 161(1). How much more, with the NIC, that has its jurisdiction firmly entrenched non obstante in the grundnorm, with clear mandate over: “matters arising from workplace”, employment, industrial and labour relations?

The NZSC took into consideration the problems of multiplicity of actions on the hapless employees/workers. In relation to similar arguments about independence of torts, the NZSC held that the phrase “employment relations problems” was used to capture factual situations or ramifications of problems arising from employment relations irrespective of legal concepts or compartmentalization like torts, contracts, etc. and captures torts, once the factual situations connect the problems to employment relations or they happened within work-context. In a nutshell, the phraseology breaks barriers. This solves all the arguments about the impossibility of torts being ancillary or related to or connected with or arising from employment and labour relations because, they are independent, which have been the fort of the restrictive school of thought in Nigeria. Therefore, the clause “matters arising from workplace” means what it means and captures any matter whatsoever that arises from the work-context.

It is not generally realised that easy access to labour justice is one of the core insignia of the decent work agenda of the ILO, which informed the intendment of Nigeria, at the ILO’s incitement, to fuse all causes of actions related to labour and employment relations in the NIC, to afford easy access to labour justice. Multiplicity of actions, especially when foisted unwittingly by courts as a result misinterpretation of statutes on the hapless workers, is a classical example of denial of access to justice, either by reason of excessive costs that would be incurred litigating the multiple causes of actions that could be conveniently tried by one court or, by reason of exasperation from dissipation of energies in pursuing causes of actions that could have been conveniently tried together in one court – S. 17(2)(c)&(e) of the Constitution , of which (c) says government actions shall be humane while (e)’s guarantee of easy access to courts is impacted.

Could a situation where litigants are tossed about by difficulties in determining the appropriate court to file their cases or where hapless workers have to split their common actions into several for litigation in separate courts where one court could easily try all, be said to be humane or guarantee easy access to justice? The answer is no. SS. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution together with SS. 13-19, especially S. 14 of the NICA, make the provisions of S. 17(2)(c)&(e) of the Constitution justiciable on avoidance of multiplicity of actions and shows that the NIC, which has all the powers of a High Court and much more than that, has exclusive civil jurisdiction over workplace defamation. What determines jurisdiction in such instances is that where there are two interconnected or interrelated causes of action and the NIC clearly has jurisdiction on one, the other is automatically ancillary to the one on which the NIC has absolute jurisdiction and must be heard in the NIC because, that is the only way to avoid multiplicity of actions on such interrelated causes of actions. A contrary interpretation leads to the absurdity of unwittingly encouraging multiplicity of actions.

In this connection, it is necessary to state at this point that in the Kenyan case discussed earlier on this issue, the Kenyan Court of Appeal also took into serious consideration the need to avoid multiplicity of actions that could be conveniently tried by the Kenyan Industrial Court in arriving at the conclusion that the Kenyan Industrial Court had exclusive jurisdiction over workplace defamation. By dint of the NIC’s mandate under S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution to apply international best practices in the adjudication of labour disputes, the NIC and nay, the Court of Appeal, is bound to apply these international best practices to prevent multiplicity of actions in all matters connected with industrial relations in Nigeria. The NIC , like the Kenyan Industrial Court, has all the powers of a High Court and much more by virtues of SS. 6(1), (3), (6)(a); 254D of the Constitution , and 12-19 of the NICA. S. 14 of the NICA especially enjoined the NIC to avoid multiplicity of actions that could be conveniently tried together at the NIC.

Since there are no inhibiting factors as regards the reliefs that the NIC could grant and S. 254C of the Constitution clearly grants the NIC exclusive civil jurisdiction on workplace torts, I hereby declare the NIC is the exclusive court over the cause of action in this suit. In fact, the NIC, by virtues of S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution and S. 12-19 of the NICA, has much more powers to grant reliefs beyond what is grantable at the High Court . The phrase “matters arising from workplace” appeared after the matters arising from employment and labour relations or matters connected with them and so could not be interpreted to mean exactly the same thing or to mean what it does not ordinarily suggests. It must have additional meaning different from those other clauses. It suggests ordinarily that matters that arise from the workplace, whether independent or not, the NIC has exclusive civil jurisdiction over them. There is no ambiguity or absurdity in that.

Another disconcerting aspect of this conundrum is that some workplace cases might end up never being heard because of the uncertainties on which court has jurisdiction on them. Such an unfortunate example is reflected in the decision of the NIC in Dr. Sinyeofori A. Brown v. University of Uyo & Ors. The matter was originally filed at the FHC, Uyo Division and later transferred to the NIC Uyo Division, and the same point that necessitated the transfer from the FHC to the NIC was raised again as objection at the NIC; and the NIC acceded to the objection that it lacked jurisdiction and struck out the suit, even though, by virtue of S. 24(5)&(6) of the NICA, it ought to have stated a case to the Court of Appeal to decide which Court has jurisdiction. Maybe, the learned trial judge was of the opinion that a case over which a court lacks jurisdiction cannot be transferred to the court that has jurisdiction, as some authorities have stated that the power of inter-courts transfer of cases is unconstitutional, and as a result, it was not necessary to state a case for the Court of Appeal, is a mute point.

But the central concern is that, the matter might continue ad infinitum on the merry-go-round without being heard, as the High Court, where it is most likely to be filed anew, having suffered setbacks in the two courts already, might again decline jurisdiction and transfer it back to the NIC the second time, to continue its never-ending macabre dance! Going by Okoro v. Ecobank, which is the latest Court of Appeal’s authority directly on workplace defamation, there is the real possibility because, the case emanated from the High Court and, it flatly declined jurisdiction, which declination, the Court of Appeal upheld. Be that as it may, I will like to cite the erudite authors: Lawyers for Justice, in their incisive article: “How to Prove Workplace Defamation” [supra] wherein it was observed:

“Regardless of your dedication and commitment to your job, workplace defamation can completely ruin your reputation. It can even lead to a loss of promotion, bonuses, or your position and prevent you from getting hired.”

How could a defamation that could cause these direct employment misfortunes to the employee-victims, be said not to be closely connected with employment relations? Why would the High Court or any other court have jurisdiction over it in the face of an employment court with the full powers of a High Court? Would the High Court, being a general jurisdiction court, be in a good position as a specialised labour court to appreciate the nuances needed to appreciate the degree of damages such workplace defamation occasioned in employment relations? I think all these questions must be answered against the High Court and in favour of the NIC by virtue of SS. 254B-(3)&(4) & 2454C-(1)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution.

Gleaning from the expansive school of thought on the jurisdiction of this Court over tortious claims arising out of the employment relationship, one will come to an irresistible conclusion that this school of thought represent the true interpretation of 254C-(1) - (h) &(2) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. For this reason, I align myself with this line of thought, not only because it is the mirror of the positive interpretation of 254C-(1) - (h) & (2) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, but it is also without ambiguity and absurdity. I hereby hold that the National Industrial Court of Nigeria is competent to assume jurisdiction over tortious claims arising out of the employment relationship. I so hold.

Before finalising on this issue, Counsel for the Defendants submitted that this suit in its entirety is premature. The Claimant has failed to comply with the conditions stipulated in Order 3 Rule 12(1) (d) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017, pertaining to payment or non-payment of a purported monetary claim or salary or allowance, which forms the crux of this claim.

A further reading of Order 5 Rule 2 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 shows that an objection founded on the non-compliance with the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules will only be allowed where such an application is made within a reasonable time and before the Defendants/Objectors takes any fresh step after becoming aware of the non-compliance with Order 3 Rule 12(1) (d) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria. Besides, an objection on the non-compliance with the Rules of Court is by way of summons or motion on notice.

The Defendants filed a Memorandum of Appearance and the Statement of Defence on the 18^th of February 2025, by paragraph 10 of the Statement of Defence, the Defendants were aware of the non-compliance with Order 3 Rule 12(1) (d) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, the Defendants participated in all the proceedings of the Court to the adoption of the Final Written Address. The objection of the Defendants on the non-compliance with Order 3 Rule 12(1) (d) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria at this stage is not only belated but it is also akin to playing devil’s advocate, which is a mere technicality taken too far. Consequently, issue one is therefore resolved in favour of the Claimant. I so hold.

On issue two, which bothers on the nature of the relationship between the Claimant and the Defendants. The Defendants led evidence to state that the employment of the Claimant was a secondment from Alibert Product (Nigeria) Limited to sell its product at the premises of the 1^st Defendant. In Exhibit CW001, written by the 2^nd Defendant to the EFCC, the 1^st Defendant admitted that the Claimant and one Halima Aliyu were his employees. In addition to this, the 2^nd Defendant also stated in Exhibit CW002 that:

I am here to adopt my petition to EFCC dated 22^nd May 2023 against Joshua Cheto and Halema Mini Mart Limited RC 393416 located at No 70 Isa Kaita Road, Malale Kaduna. I have employed the two of them Halim and Joshua for about a year working as manager and deputy manager at Alibert Furniture Section of my business.

This statement made by the 2^nd Defendant at the EFCC is an admission of the relationship between the Claimant and the Defendants. Regardless of the arrangement between the Defendants and Alibert Product (Nigeria) Limited, the cause of action of the claim of the Claimant occurred while the Claimant was working for the Defendants. The law is that where there is an admission by a party against his interest, such an admission will be admissible against him and document which constitutes an admission by a party against his interest is admissible in law: see the cases of SYLVA V. I.N.E.C. (2018) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1651) 310 and FAGUNWA V. ADIBI (2004) 17 NWLR (Pt. 903) 544. In view of the foregoing, the Defendants will be liable to the Claimant for any claim successfully proved against the Defendants by the Claimant. Issue two is thus resolved in favour of the Claimant. I so hold.

On issue three, which revolves around the claim of the Claimant, issue three has four layers, and the Court will treat them one after the other. Before going into that, may I first address the legal efficacy of paragraph 2 of the Defendants’ Joint Statement of Defence which states thus:

The Defendants are not in a position to admit or deny the averments contained in paragraphs1, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48 of the Statement of Facts as the facts stated therein are not within their knowledge.

The rule of pleading is that there must be a specific denial or admission of the statement of fact; otherwise, a general traverse by the phrase ‘a party is not position to admit or deny the averment in specific paragraphs’ amounts to admission because it will be deemed that no issue has been joined. Where a statement of defence avers that it is not in a position to deny or admit, it is deemed not to have denied the averments in the statement of claim, and therefore the averments therein in the statement of claim will be deemed not to be in issue. See the case of OMPADEC V. DALEK (NIG.) LTD. (2002) 12 NWLR (Pt. 781) 384. In OSENI V. DAWODU (1994) 4 NWLR (Pt. 339) 390 P. 410 paras G – H where the Supreme Court held that:

The rule of pleadings is that in order to raise an issue of fact, there must be a proper traverse. If a defendant refuses to admit a particular allegation in a Statement of Claim, he must state so expressly and specifically and he does not do this satisfactorily by pleading that he is not in a position to admit or deny a particular allegation or/and that he will at the trial put the plaintiff to the strictest proof thereof. Paragraph 1 of the respondents' amended Statement of Claim was therefore not effectively or successfully traversed and on the state of the authorities must be deemed as admitted.

In BUA V. DAUDA (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt. 838) 657 P. 679 paras B – E where the Supreme Court held that

As for issue (i), it is important to realise first that there was only one version of the incident before the trial court. The 1st defendant who filed a statement of defence tendered no evidence. He was alleged to have absconded and therefore he abandoned his defence. The appellant in his own statement of defence did not respond to the allegations in the statement of claim in a manner that would suggest that he might directly wish to controvert those allegations. In fact, he pleaded in para. 3 to those allegations that:

"The 2nd defendant is not in a position to admit or deny the averments in paragraphs 3-12, 26, 27 as they are facts within the exclusive knowledge of the plaintiff."

Such pleading in law may be taken as an admission of the facts contained therein: see Lewis and Peat (NRI) Ltd. v. Akhimien (1976) 7 SC 157; or at any rate it is likely to be construed as placing no burden on the plaintiff unless by implication from the other paragraphs of the statement of defence that there has been a denial.

In view of the foregoing, I will ignore paragraph 2 of the Defendants’ Joint Statement of Defence as though it did not exist. The Defendants are left with paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the Defendants’ Joint Statement of Defence. Ignoring paragraph 2 of the Defendants’ Joint Statement of Defence will not liberate the Claimant from the burden of proof the law placed on the Claimant, since the mantra in civil proceedings is that he who asserts must prove. By virtue of section 136(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011, the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence: see the case of OJO V. ABT ASSOCIATES INCORPORATED (2017) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1570) 167.

On the claim of the Claimant on the defamation of character, the Claimant led evidence to state that The Claimant's employment with the 1^st Defendant was interrupted when officers of the EFCC approached him at his place of work in the 1^st Defendant's office and arrested him. The Operatives of the EFCC came into the premises in large numbers, sealing the premises. As two of them were stationed at the entrance of the premises, then four operatives came up to the Claimant's and placed him under arrest in the presence of his colleagues, staff and customers who had come to patronise the company. The operatives later brought the Claimant down to his car and searched it, and then seized his car keys, laptop, wallet and two mobile phones. Thereafter, the EFCC officers transported the Claimant to the EFCC Kaduna Zonal Office where he was detained in their cell. During the Claimant's stay in the custody of the EFCC, he was informed orally of the written petition submitted by the 2^nd Defendant on behalf of the 1^st Defendant Company against him and one Halima Ali, who was an assistant manager with the 1^st Defendant, accusing the Claimant of fraud, stating that he had conspired with the said Halima to fraudulently divert proceeds of furniture sales in the sum of N50,000,000.00 into an Access Bank Account opened by the Claimant and Halima. The Claimant tendered Exhibit CW001 and CW002 to prove the publication.

In OMON V. EKPA (2019) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1696) 504 P. 533 paras C – E the Court of Appeal gives what a claimant must prove to establish a claim of defamation against him as follows:

There are two species of defamation: libel and slander. Libel is any publication in print, writing, pictures or signs that injures the reputation of somebody. Slander, on the other hand, means a defamatory statement made/conveyed by spoken words, sounds, looks, signs and gestures which injure the reputation of somebody. To succeed in an action for defamation, which is actionable per se, the defamed person must conjunctively prove:

a. Publication of the offending words.

b. That the offending words refer to him.

c. That the offending words are defamatory of him.

d. That the offending words were published to a third party.

e. That they are false or lack accuracy and

f. That there are no justifiable legal grounds for the publication of the defamatory words.

Also in KLM ROYAL DUTCH AIRLINES V. TAHER (2014) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1393) 137 pp. 202 – 203 paras G – B where the Court of Appeal held that:

a defamatory imputation consists of the publication to a third person or persons of any words or matter which tend to lower the person defamed in the estimation of right thinking members of society generally or to cut him off from society or to expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule or to injure his reputation in his office, trade or profession or to injure his financial credit. Therefore, to succeed in the case of defamation, the plaintiff on whom the onus lies to prove the same, must establish before the court that the said defamatory words were published to a third party. The third party must not only be named but must also be clearly identified.

In this instant suit, the 2^nd Defendant published Exhibit CW001 alleging against the Claimant fraud, breach of trust and theft. The publication was made to the EFCC and the criminal allegations made in Exhibit CW001 led to the arrest and detention of the Claimant from the 14^th of June 2023 to the 5^th of July 2023. DW1 in his evidence stated that the Claimant received money into his personal account from customers without the knowledge or approval of the Defendants. The question that agitates the mind of the Court is that, does the complaint made by the 2^nd Defendant to the office of the Economic and Financial Crime Commission amounts to defamation? In SALAUDEEN V. OKUNLOYE (2020) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1727) 455, the precis of the fact of this case is that the appellant instituted this action against the respondent and claimed the sum of N500,000,000.00 (Five hundred million naira), being general damages for libel committed by the respondent, and an order compelling the respondent to publish an unreserved apology. On 12^th of October 2016, while at work, the appellant said his wife called him and informed him that she was in receipt of a petition written to the Director of State Security Services against him. At about the same time, he received phone calls from the palaces of the Olusin of Isin and Alaba of Oke-Oba (royal fathers), both summoning him in respect of the same petition that the respondent wrote to the DSS against him. The appellant contended that the petition, which was captioned “complaint of harassment, molestation, extortion and threat to life” depicted and presented him as a thug leader, hooligan, and troublemaker.

The respondent admitted writing the petition complained of by the appellant but stated that it was because of the apprehension and threat to his life by the armed men hired by the appellant that made him write the petition to the DSS. The purpose of copying the Chairman of Isin traditional council with the petition was because both Oke-Aba, where the appellant comes from, and Ijara-Isin, the country home of the respondent, are just a few kilometres apart, and the two towns fall within the domain of the Chairman of Isin Traditional Council.

At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found that Exhibit 2 written to the DSS was a criminal complaint, and as such, it did not defame the appellant; the words complained of were not libellous, and damages were refused. The appellant was aggrieved with the judgment of the trial court and appealed to the Court of Appeal . The Court of Appeal unanimously held at P. 479, paras. E-G that:

In the case of Udofia & Anor. v. Okon & Ors. (2018) LPELR- 46154(CA), Nimpar JCA held at page 31 to 35 that:

Therefore a written complaint to the police alleging the commission of a crime cannot amount to libel. There is a constitutional right and civic duty for a citizen of this Country to report crime and a statutory duty on the police to receive such complaint and take necessary steps to investigate. There cannot be a liability for doing so.

In this case, Exhibit CW001, which was written by the 2^nd Defendant to the EFCC for the investigation, cannot amount to defamation of character, and the Defendants cannot be found liable for making a complaint to the security agency. That is not all, more is coming!

Now, does that mean that anybody can just wake up from their troubling sleep and write a complaint to security agencies alleging crimes against a citizen without just cause? I do not think so, but what does the law say? In OGUEBIE V. FBN PLC (2020) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1715) 531 pp. 552 - 553 paras H – B where the Supreme Court held that:

The law is well settled that a citizen’s civic responsibilities include reporting crimes and perceived or suspected criminal acts either to his person or to the person of a fellow citizen, and such a citizen, after making such complaints to the appropriate security agencies, cannot be held culpable for performing his civic responsibility, unless at the conclusion of the investigations of the complaints he made, it is found that they were baseless and made mala fide.

(underlined mine for emphasis)

The 2^nd Defendant, in his statement at EFCC (Exhibit CW002), stated that:

I have been alerted by a friend/customer that Chato Joshua asked her to pay directly into his personal account for a set of furniture she bought. After that I sent a friend to pretend to purchase some items from shop, the same Chato Joshua provided her an access bank number 1722377663 bearing the name Dalema Mini Mart Limited which is not our account.

However, the Claimant stated in his evidence that in the written statement to the EFCC, the 2^nd Defendant mentioned account number 1722377663 with Access Bank as the account provided to customers by the Claimant, which account the 2^nd Defendant mentioned does not belong to the 1^st Defendant. The said account number 1722377663 is registered with the POS device of the 1^st Defendant. This piece of evidence was not challenged or controverted by the defence. Evidence that is unchallenged and uncontroverted ought to be acted upon by the trial court. In other words, evidence that is not discredited is taken to be the true position of affairs: see the case of G.S. & D. IND. LTD. V. S.O.C.D. CO. LTD. (2020) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1704) 99.

From the gamut of evidence before this Court, I cannot resist boldly saying that the complaint made by the 2^nd Defendant to the EFCC alleging the Claimant for fraud, breach of trust and theft is made in mala fide for the reason that the account number 1722377663 with Access Bank purported to have been opened by the Claimant in the name of the 1^st Defendant was actually opened by the Defendants in the name of the 1^st Defendant. Again, the EFCC did not find any account alleged to have been opened by the Claimant in the name of the 1^st Defendant, neither did the EFCC find proceeds of the sale of furniture amounting to N50,000,000.00 or any amount purported to have been channelled to other accounts alleged to have been opened in the name of the 1^st Defendant by the Claimant. There is nothing before this Court that the EFCC’s investigation incriminates the Claimant of any of the allegations made by the 2^nd Defendant in Exhibits CW001 and CW002. If the conduct of the Defendants, particularly the 2^nd Defendant against the Claimant through Exhibit CW001 and CW002 is not malicious, I do not know how best to describe malice.

If the 2^nd Defendant did not make a spurious and malicious allegation against the Claimant, which led to the arrest and detention of the Claimant, the EFCC would not have arrested and detained the Claimant. The Claimant has not only proved that the 2^nd Defendant acted in mala fide by Exhibit CW001 to EFCC but also that the Defendants failed woefully to prove the allegation made against the Claimant in Exhibits CW001 and CW002. In OKAFOR V. ABUMOFUANI (2016) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1525) 117 Pp. 140, paras. C-D where the Supreme Court held that:

Now in the instant case, the appellant pleaded in paragraphs 4(4)(9) and of his statement of defence, that the respondent broke into his house in 1997 and he reported the matter to the police. However, the respondent gave evidence on the report made by the appellant to the police against him in three sections of the police, whereupon he was invited by police, arrested and detained on each of the occasions before being admitted to bail. His case was posted on police notice board for the public to see. The police did not however prosecute him after their investigations. It is trite law, that where a report is made against a person specifically mentioned as a suspect or accused person and the report is later found to be false, malicious, ill-motivated and unfounded, the person so reported, arrested and detained is entitled to damages to be paid to him by the person who made the false report since he is the person who set the law in motion against the victim falsely. The victim also needs (sic) not join the police as party as he can sue in his personal capacity as done by the respondent in the present case.

It is therefore the finding of the Court that the allegation contained in Exhibits CW001 and CW002 is not libellous, but Exhibits CW001 and CW002 are made in mala fide since the Defendants failed woefully to prove the allegations contained therein. I so hold.

On the issue of publishing the assertion of crime of fraud and theft against the Claimant to the Managing Director of Alibert Products Limited, Maged Taan and Jacob Cheto, there is no evidence before this Court that the Defendants published the assertion of crime of fraud and theft against the Claimant to the Managing Director of Alibert Products Limited, Maged Taan and Jacob Cheto. I so hold.

Uncontroverted evidence before this Court abounds, where the Claimant proved that the 1^st Defendant caused the arrest and detention of the Claimant by EFCC from the 14^th of June 2023 to the 5^th of July 2023. In ZENITH INTL BANK LTD. V. ALOBU (2017) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1554) 135 P. 149 paras B – E where the Court of Appeal held that

False imprisonment involves the unlawful and unjustifiable restraint of a person’s right and liberty to move about freely. The tort of false imprisonment consists of the acts of arrest and detention or imprisonment of a plaintiff without lawful justification by the police or other law enforcement agencies on complaints or information received in the course of their duties. The position of the law is that it is not enough for a plaintiff in a claim for false imprisonment to plead and provide evidence that the defendant merely made a report against him to the police in which his name was mentioned as a suspect, but must also plead and establish that there are no reasonable and probable cause for making the report. In other words, a plaintiff has the legal burden of showing that there was no reasonable and probable cause for making the report and that the report is false, frivolous without foundation and actuated by malice.

In this instant case, the Claimant has proved that the 1^st Defendant caused the arrest and detention of the Claimant by EFCC from the 14^th of June 2023 to the 5^th of July 2023, and also proved that there is no reasonable justification for the arrest and detention of the Claimant because the account number 1722377663 with Access Bank purported have been opened by the Claimant in the name of the 1^st Defendant was actually opened by the Defendants. Again, the EFCC did not find any account alleged to have been opened by the Claimant in the name of the 1^st Defendant, neither did the EFCC find proceeds of the sale of furniture amounting to N50,000,000.00 or any amount purported to have been channelled to other accounts alleged to have been opened in the name of the 1^st Defendant by the Claimant. With this piece of evidence, I have no hesitation in holding that the Defendants are liable for causing the false imprisonment of the Claimant without probable justification. I so hold.

The Claimant further led evidence to state that after the salary of May 2023, the Claimant was not paid his salary anymore, not even for the days he worked from 1^st to 14^th of June 2023 when he was arrested, nor for the 21 days he spent in the custody of the EFCC following the Petition. This averment is not controverted; the law is that an uncontroverted fact needs no further proof. When averments in pleadings are not denied or controverted, they are deemed to be admitted: see the case of A.C.B. PLC. V. N.T.S. (NIG.) LTD. (2007) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1016) 596. In view of the foregoing, the Claimant is entitled to the June salary, having worked for the Defendant between the 1^st – 14^th of June when the Defendants caused the arrest and detention of the Claimant. I so hold.

Lastly, the Claimant led evidence to prove that from March 2022 when the Claimant was employed by the 1^st Defendant, the Claimant was paid 0.5% Commission of the proceeds of Furniture sales. The Claimant was, however, not paid the 0.5% Commission on sales for May and June 2022 and April and May 2023. The Claimant is therefore entitled to a total of N405,215.5 of unpaid commission. The Claimant tendered Exhibit CW003 to prove the sales in May and June 2022 and April and May 2023.

The Defendants, however, stated that they are not aware of what the bases are for arriving at the spurious figures quoted by the Claimant, especially in Paragraph 51, which never made any demand for payment.

Exhibit CW003 was not signed, and the Court informed the parties at the point of admitting it that the Court would determine the probative value to be attached to Exhibit CW003. An unsigned document is a worthless piece of paper, which is incapable of conferring legal benefit: see the case of BODAI V. MUHAMMED (2023) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1915) 63. To say this does not mean there are no special circumstances where an unsigned document will be admissibly carried heavy weight. In BABA V. YAHUZA (2023) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1895) 243 P. 283, paras. B – E where the Supreme Court held that:

I am aware of the 1^st and 2^nd respondents’ complaint and challenge to the effect that the said document is worthless and cannot be relied upon because same was not signed. Yes, the position of the law is well settled that unsigned documents command no judicial validity and have no evidential or probative value. However, as we said in Ashakacem Plc v. Asharatul Mubashshurun Investment Ltd. (2019) LPELR-46541 (SC), (2019) 5 NWLR (Pt.1666) 447 it is not in every circumstance that unsigned document will be held to be worthless or inadmissible. The legal requirement of signature on a document is to determine the document’s origin and authenticity regarding its maker. So, where certain situations exist, an unsigned document could be admissible where there is evidence on record disclosing the authorship of the document and if the pleading or deposition of a party shows that a document given to him or handed over by him was unsigned, then such an unsigned document is admissible in proof of what is alleged by the party.

In this instant case, the Claimant laid a foundation to Exhibit CW003 where the Claimant pleaded and led evidence to state that as a Showroom/Sales Manager of the 1^st defendant, the Claimant was responsible for recording and keeping records of sales in the Company's Daily Sales Book. The Claimant also prepares and keeps personal records of the sales in his personal computer, indicating the figures of the sales for May and June 2022 and April and May 2023 and this piece of evidence was not denied or controverted by the Defendants. It goes without saying that the Claimant has proved himself to be the author of Exhibit CW003 in the course of business of the 1^st Defendant as a Showroom/Sales Manager of the 1^st Defendant. Thus, Exhibit CW003 is admissible and the Court shall accordingly ascribe the probative value to it. I so hold.

Interestingly, Exhibit CW003 was frontloaded with the originating process filed by the Claimant; the Defendants did not deny the content of Exhibit CW003, neither did the Defendants deny the existence of the practice of giving the Claimant 0.5% of the commission on each sale of the furniture in the showroom where the Claimant managed. The Defendants merely said that the Claimant never made any demand for payment, and the Defendants did not know the basis for arriving at the spurious figures quoted by the Claimant. The algorithm of evidence before this Court is overwhelmingly in favour of the Claimant, as the Defendants did not deny the content of Exhibit CW003; there is no evidence before this Court that the Claimant did not make the sales in May and June 2022 and April and May 2023 as contained in Exhibit CW003. Given this fact before the Court, I have no reason to doubt the evidence of the Claimant as the Claimant has sufficiently proved his entitlement to the sum of N405,215.5. I so hold.

Flowing from the foregoing, the Claimant has proved his case against the Defendants as required by law. Issue three is hereby resolved in favour of the Claimant. No doubt, the Claimant has proved his entitlement to the special damages as contained in prayers (d) and (e) as sought by the Claimant, in addition to that, the Claimant is also entitled to general damages. Awarding both special and general damages will not amount to double compensation: see the case of S.P.D.C., NIG. V. OKONEDO (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1091) 85 P. 125 paras B – C where the Court of Appeal held that:

The law no doubt frowns at double compensation in award of damages to a successful litigant. In the instant case, the claim of the respondent before the trial court was of trespass and having established ownership and unlawful interference, the award of N2,000,000.00 general damages by the learned trial Judge in addition to the award of special damages cannot and did not amount to double compensation in the circumstances of this case. The respondent is entitled to succeed on both his claims of special and general damages. The award of general damages to the respondent is not vitiated by any of the circumstances that would entitle an appellate court to interfere with an award of damages.

I am, however, not comfortable with granting general damages for each of the claims successfully proved by the Claimant, as granting the same will amount to double compensation. In THOMPSON V. AKINGBEHIN (2021) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1802) 283 P. 312 para B where the Supreme Court held that:

It is however trite that the law frowns on double compensation. Where a party has been sufficiently compensated for a wrong under one head of claim, it would amount to double compensation to grant an award for the same injury under a different head.

In view of the foregoing, I hereby order as follows:

b. Special damages in the sum of N100,000.00 as unpaid salary for June 2023.

c. The payment of the sum of N405,215.5 from the 1^st Defendant to the Claimant being his unpaid commission on the sale of furniture.

d. Order of award of general damages in the sum of N3,000,000.00 in favour of the Claimant against the Defendants for the malicious report of criminal allegations of fraud, breach of trust and theft which led to the arrest and detention of the Economic and Financial Crime Commission.

e. All the terms of Judgment are to be complied with within 30 days from today without prejudice to the right of Appeal by both Parties.

Judgment is hereby entered accordingly.

HON. JUSTICE B. A. ALKALI

(HON. JUDGE)

NATIONALINDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

KADUNA JUDICIAL DIVISION