IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT ABUJA
BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE B. B. KANYIP, PHD, OFR
PRESIDENT, NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
DATE: 30 MAY 2023
SUIT NO. NICN/ABJ/250/2022
BETWEEN
Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational & Associated Institutions (NASU) - Claimant
AND
Comrade Niyi Akinnibi (Sued as the National President of National Association of
Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities (NANTS) - Defendant
REPRESENTATION
B. A. Ogunleye, with Rotimi Olujide, for the claimant.
Ifeanyi Ogwuasi, holding the brief of S. T. A. Raji, for the defendant.
JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
1. The claimant, a registered trade union, filed this suit on 22 August 2022 against the defendant vide an originating summons supported by an affidavit and written address. The claimant submitted four questions/issues for the determination by this Court, namely:
(1) Whether by the provision of Section 2(1) of the Trade Union Act CAP. T14 LFN
2004, the National Association of Non-Teaching Staff Of Nigerian Universities being coordinated and represented by the Defendant can operate and perform the functions of a Trade Union when same has not been dully registered under the Trade Unions Act or any other known law in Nigeria.
(2) Whether by the Provision of Section 3(2) of the Trade Unions Act, Cap. T14, LFN
2004, the National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities being
Coordinated and represented by the Defendant can be registered as a Trade Union to represent the Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities where there already exists a Trade Union such as the Claimant.
(3) Whether by the Provision of Section 25 of the Trade Unions Act, Cap. T14, LFN
2004, the Nigerian Universities and other publicly and privately owned institution are bound under the provisions of this law to recognize and continue with the recognition of the Claimant as a registered Trade Union specified in Part A & B of the Third Schedule to the Trade Unions Act for as long as the Claimant remain a registered Trade Union conferred with the jurisdictional scope of unionizing all eligible Non-Academic Staff
1 of 20 workers employed in publicly and privately owned education, research and associated institutions including University Teaching Hospital...
(4) Whether by the Provisions of Section 2 and 25 of the Trade Unions Act Cap. T14,
LFN 2004, the National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigeria Universities
(NANTS) Coordinated and represented by the Defendant qualified to be recognized as a
Trade Union under Trade Union Act by any University in Nigeria.
2. The claimant then prayed for the following reliefs:
(i) A DECLARATION that by the Provision of Section 2(1) of the Trade Unions Act,
Cap. T14 LFN 2004, the National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian
Universities (NANTS) Coordinated and represented by the Defendant cannot operate and
perform the functions of a Trade Union when same has not been duly registered under the
Trade Unions Act.
(ii) A DECLARATION that by the Provision of Section 3(2) of the Trade Unions Act,
Cap. T14 2004, the National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities
(NANTS) being so called, Coordinated and represented by the Defendant cannot be
registered as a Trade Union to represent the Non-Academic Staff of the Nigerian
Universities where there already exists a Trade Union such as the Claimant.
(iii) A DECLARATION that by the Provision of Section 25 of the Trade Unions Act, Cap.
T14 LFN 2004, that all Nigerian Universities are bound under the provision of the Act to
recognize and continue with the recognition of the Claimant as a registered Trade Union
specified in Part A and B of the Third Schedule to the Trade Unions Act for as long as the
Claimant remain a registered Trade Union conferred with the jurisdiction scope of
unionizing all eligible Non-Academic Staff of the Educational institutions including all
Nigerian Universities.
(iv) A DECLARATION that by the Provisions of Section 2 and 25 of the Trade Unions
Act, Cap. T14 LFN 2004, the unregistered National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of
Nigerian Universities (NANTS) Coordinated and represented by the Defendant is not
qualified to be recognized as a Trade Union under the Trade Union Act by any Nigerian
Universities.
(v) AN ORDER of this Honourable court restraining the Defendant and his led Executive
Body and members from operating or performing the functions of a Trade Union since
the said National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities (NANTS)
which they sought to operate and represent is not a registered Trade Union.
(vi) AN ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant, his Executive Body
and members, agents, servants, privies or anyone or whosoever operating under the name
of National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities (NANTS) from
writing or publishing any write up against the officers or leadership of the Claimant either
in the dailies, social medias, including Whatsapp or messenger platforms.
(vii) AN ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant, his servant, privies or
agents from parading itself as a Trade Union capable of unionizing Non-Academic Staff
Workers/Employees of Nigerian Universities who are already eligible and bonafide
members of the Claimant’s Union.
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(viii) AND FOR SUCfH FURTHER ORDER OR OTHER ORDERS OR RELIEFS just
and fair this Honourable Court may deem fit to grant in the circumstances.
3. In opposition, the defendant filed his counter-affidavit with Exhibits A, A1, A2, A3, A4, A5,
A6 and B, and a written address. While paragraph 3(iv) of the defendant’s counter-affidavit talks
of “Exhibits A-A100” being attached to the counter-affidavit, only Exhibits A, A1, A2, A3, A4,
A5 and A6 were so attached. Secondly, while paragraph 3(xviii) and (xxi) of the defendant’s
counter-affidavit talks of Exhibits B, C and D being attached to the counter-affidavit, only
Exhibit B was so attached. To be clear, Exhibits C and D are not before this Court in this matter.
3. In reply, the claimant filed a further and better affidavit in support of the originating summons
and a reply on points of law.
THE CASE BEFORE THE COURT
4. To the claimant, “the Defendant is a promotes of Association of Non-Teaching Staff of
Nigerian Universities (NANTS) an Association not registered under the Trade Union Act but
trying to operate as a Trade Union in the Nigerian Universities where the Claimant is operating”.
That an initial attempt to register a similar union by the name, Nigeria Universities Admin and
Technical Staff Union, O.A.U, was resisted by the claimant in Suit No. NICN/LA/407/2017
between Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational & Associated Institutions (NASU) v. O. A.
Ajagbe & 2 ors. That at the determination of Suit No. NICN/LA/407/2017, Honourable Justice
(Dr) I. J. Essien among other orders held that the Nigeria University Admin and Technical Union
(NUATSU) O.A.U cannot be registered as a trade union to represent the Non-Academic Staff
where the claimant already exists as a trade union. That the Court went further to restrain the
defendants and their led Executive Body and members from operating or performing the
functions of a trade union since the said union which they sought to operate and represent is not a
registered one. That the present defendant in this current suit is a strong member and supporter of
the former union declared illegal and unregistered one.
5. The claimant went on that the current defendant again decided to promote a body known as
Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities (NANTS) by issuance of a circular
dated 30 June 2022 with Reference No. NANTS/UV/C/VOL.1/2 and sent same to all Nigerian
Universities where the claimant has its original jurisdictional scope and operating. Pursuant to
the said circular, which is marked Exhibit B, the claimant instituted this action.
6. To the defendant, the claimant in 2017 dissolved the executives at the Obafemi Awolowo
University (OAU) branch of the union and expelled the defendant alongside others from the
claimant union. That this decision was taken to frustrate the agitations of staff of the University
who were at the time members of the claimant, and working together with other friendly unions
within the University to resist the imposition of an unpopular candidate as the Vice Chancellor of
the University. That the decision of the claimant did not go down well with the former members
hence their decision to withdraw their membership of the claimant. That the claimant insisted
that the workers are compelled by law to be unionized by compulsion and without their consent.
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7. That the claimant accordingly instituted Suit No. NICN/LA/407/2017 against the erstwhile
members of the claimant challenging their right to congregate under another association and
urging the Court to compel the Vice Chancellor of the University to continue to deduct check-off
dues from salaries of those ex-members against their will. That this Court granted the claimant’s
reliefs whereupon the defendants appealed to the Court of Appeal and simultaneously filed a
motion for stay of execution. That while awaiting a hearing date for the pending appeal, the
claimant again filed this suit against the defendant, being one of the persons expelled from the
claimant union, seeking reliefs similar to those in NICN/LA/407/2017.
THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE CLAIMANT
8. The claimant adopted the 4 questions it posed as the issues for determination. And in arguing
these issues, the claimant took questions/issues (1) and (2) together. Here, it is the claimant’s
contention that by virtue of section 2(1) of the Trade Unions Act (TUA) the National Association
of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities (NANTS) being an unregistered trade union is
prohibited or outlawed to perform the functions of a registered trade union. That it is also an
offence punishable under section 50 of the TUA for any official or union that performs any of the
acts prohibited under section 2(1) of the TUA. Section 2(1) of the TUA provides that: “A trade
union shall not perform any act in furtherance of the purposes for which it has been formed
unless it has been registered under this Act”. That section 2(1) of the TUA was considered by this
Court in SSAUTHIRIAI & 6 ors v. Federal Ministry of Health and Social Services and anor
(Digest of Judgments of NIC 1978 - 2006) 404 at page 406 where it was held that section 2 of the
TUA prohibits a trade union which has not been registered from performing any act in
furtherance of a trade union.
9. To the claimant, NANTS, which the defendant is claiming to be its National President, is
arrogating the functions of a registered trade union to itself as if same is registered. That the
defendant together with its faceless Executive Body of NANTS are involved in running an
unregistered Union. That by issuing Exhibit B duly signed by the defendant, the National
Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities is competing with the claimant’s
members in all Nigerian Universities when it was not known as a trade union under the Trade
Unions Act. It is thus the claimant’s submission that the NANTS being coordinated and
represented by the defendant is prohibited from performing the functions of trade unions since
same is not registered in accordance with section 2 of the Trade Unions Act.
10. It is the further contention of the claimant that by the clear provision of section 3(2) of the
TUA, the NANTS being coordinated and represented by the defendant cannot be registered as a
trade union under the TUA to represent the Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities since the
claimant already exists as a trade union. Section 3(2) of the TUA provides thus: “No combination
of workers or employers shall be registered as a trade union save with the approval of the
Minister on being satisfied that it is expedient to register the union either by regrouping existing
trade unions or otherwise howsoever, but no trade union shall be registered to represent workers
or employers in a place where there already exists a trade union” (emphasis is the claimant’s).
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That the italicized words of section 3(2) of TUA just quoted are very clear, unambiguous, and the
world word “shall” is used in that section which connotes command and leaves no room for
discretion, citing Bamaiyi v. AG, Federation [2001] FWLR (Pt. 64) 344, Amokeodo v. IGP
[2001] FWLR (Pt. 33) 344, Okeowo v. AG, Ogun State [2002] FWLR (Pt. 93) 1878 and OAU v.
R. A. Oliyide & Sons Ltd [2002] FWLR (Pt. 105) 799. That the word “shall” as used in section
3(2) of the TUA is intended to forbid the defendant from proceeding with the registration of the
said association where the claimant is still in existence and representing the class of interests the
NANTS sought to represent. That it is contrary to section 3(2) of the TUA for a new union such
as NANTS or in whatever name to be allowed in any Nigerian University.
11. The claimant proceeded to take questions/issues (3) and (4) together. Here, the contention of
the claimant is that by sections 2 and 25 of the TUA, NANTS coordinated and represented by the
defendant does not qualify to be recognized as a union under the TUA by any Nigerian
University. That section 2(1) of the TUA prohibits the defendant from operating or performing
any act in furtherance of the purposes for which the NANTS has been formed until it has been
registered under the TUA.
12. The claimant then asked whether the purported NANTS being coordinated and represented
by the defendant qualifies as a trade union deserving recognition by any Nigerian University. In
answer, the claimant referred to Management of Joki (Nig.) Limited v. Union of Shipping,
Clearing and Forwarding Agencies (Digest of Judgment of NIC, 1978 - 2006) 200 at page 201,
where this Court held that a trade union must satisfy the following conditions to be entitled to
recognition by an employer:
(a) The union must be registered by the Registrar of Trade Unions in accordance with
section 5 of the Trade Unions Decree, 1973 as amended by the Trade Unions (Amended)
Decree of 1978.
(b) The trade union must have persons in the employment of the employer as members of
the union. In other words, membership of the employees in the trade union must first be
established before the trade union can claim that it is entitled to recognition by the
employer.
13. That it is an established fact that the NANTS represented by the defendant is an unregistered
trade union, deserving no recognition by any Nigerian University, citing Management of Joki
(Nig.) Ltd .Vs. Union of Shipping, Clearing and Forwarding Agencies (supra). That the claimant
is the union body with jurisdictional scope granted by the Trade Union Act to unionize all
eligible members of Non-Academic Staff of Education and Associated institution in Nigeria
including Nigerian Universities, referring to the jurisdictional scope of the claimant contained in
paragraph No. 27 of Part B of the Third Schedule to the TUA which provides thus “All nonacademic workers employed in a publicly and privately owned education, research and
associated institutions…” Furthermore, that the claimant is the only union body in Nigeria
recognised and permitted by law to unionize all Non-Academic Staff of Educational Institutions
and no other union howsoever called can unionize or can be registered to unionize members of
Non-Academic Staff of Universities or Non-Teaching Staff of the Nigerian Universities.
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14. The claimant continued that it has been held that having to restructure trade union along rigid
lines of named unions and clothed them with jurisdiction and circumscribed membership (as
done in Parts A, B and C of the Third Schedule to the TUA) was necessitated by the need to
check the proliferation of trade unions, which is capable of yielding to chaotic labour regime
which the defendant is seeking to do. That the Supreme Court has given its stamp of approval to
this fact in Osawe v. Registrar of Trade Unions [1985] 1 NWLR (Pt. 4) 755; [2004] 1 NLLR (Pt.
1) 34 SC, and went on to confirm the constitutionality of a restrictive trade unions regime in the
country, referring to CAC v. AUPCTRE [2004] 1 NLLR (Pt. 1) 1 NIC.
15. Accordingly, that the NANTS coordinated and represented by the defendant is not a
registered trade union under the TUA and as such entitled to no recognition as a union by any
Nigerian University, urging this Court to so hold. The claimant concluded by urging the Court to
grant all its reliefs.
THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE DEFENDANT
16. The defendant submitted a sole issue for determination, namely: whether having regards to
the facts and circumstances of this case, the defendant and other non-academic staffs (sic) of the
Universities across the country have lost their constitutional rights of freedom of Association
guaranteed by section 40 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 to warrant
their being compelled to continue to be members of the claimant despite their unequivocal
decision to the contrary. In arguing this issue, the defendants posed the following questions:
(a) Whether there is any provision of any law compelling any non-academic staff of
Universities across the country, including the defendant, to be members of the claimant
union against their will.
(b) Whether the non-academic staffs (sic) of the Universities across the country including
the defendant, are forbidding (sic) from becoming members of any trade union other than
the claimant.
17. To the defendant, the defendant with 8 others mentioned in the letter of 20 April 2017
(Exhibit D) were expelled from the claimant union. Also, that by Exhibits A-A100, other
erstwhile members of the claimant at OAU, where the defendant is a staff, exercised their
fundamental right to freedom of association by opting out of the claimant union. That the
claimant has relied on Osawe v. Registrar of Trade Unions [1985] 1 NWLR (Pt. 4) 755 SC,
section 3(2) of the TUA and CAC v. AUPCTRE [2004] 1 NLLR (Pt. 1) 1 NIC in arguing that the
defendant and others are precluded from congregating together in another association other than
the claimant union. To the defendant, CAC v. AUPCTRE recognised the freedom of employees to
associate and dissociate under section 40 of the 1999 Constitution and the inappropriateness of
group disengagement from membership of a trade union. That from the facts of this case, not
only has the defendant and others been expelled from the claimant union, there are no
membership of the claimant at OAU where the defendant is a staff.
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18. The defendant went on that the requirement of section 3(2) of the TUA would, therefore,
appear not to have been met where the affected persons are denied membership by the same
claimant who was also contending that such members should be denied the right to join other
trade unions or associations. That a denial of persons expelled by the claimant from its
membership, and all of those sympathetic to their cause, from joining another association of their
choice would amount to a violation of their right under section 40 of the 1999 Constitution and
oppressive, citing NASU v. NOTSUP (Non Teaching Staff Union of Polytechnics) — citation is
not supplied. The defendant concluded by urging the Court to dismiss this suit.
THE CLAIMANT’S REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW
19. The claimant reacted on points of law. On whether the defendant and other non-academic
staff of Universities across the country have lost their constitutional right of freedom of
association guaranteed by section 40 of the 1999 Constitution, the claimant submitted that the
right to assemble freely and to form or belong to any political party, trade union or other
association guaranteed under section 40 of the Constitution is not absolute and shall not
invalidate any law that is reasonable in a democratic society, placing reliance on section 45(1) of
the Constitution and insisting that the Trade Unions Act was enacted to prevent a chaotic trade
union system and public disorder in the country and section 8 of the Trade Unions Act says that a
person shall not be eligible for membership of a trade union unless he is or has been normally
engaged in the trade or industry which the trade union represents. That whilst the defendant
along with others are at liberty to belong or refrain from belonging to a trade union, they can
only belong to that particular trade union in the trade or industry they are normally engaged in
and not any other union that catches their fancy on the flimsy excuse that the relevant union is
not protecting their interest, calling in aid Osawe v. Registrar of Trade Unions [1985] 1 NWLR
(Pt. 4) 755 at 763, and NACHPH & 2 ors [2005] 13 NWLR (Pt. 35) 155, which upheld the
constitutionality of the re-structured and highly compartmentalized trade union regime in the
country; and insisting that the freedom to opt out of a trade union under section 5(3) of the
Labour Act cancels out whatever compulsion that can be said to exist under the trade union
regime.
20. To the claimant, there is a clear distinction which exists between a political party and a trade
union in that whilst a person can freely move from one political party to another, this is not so in
the case of an employee or worker whose membership of a trade union is confined to the
particular trade or industry in which he is engaged. That the fundamental rights, including the
right to associate and dissociate, are rarely absolute but subject to derogation, the bone of
contention always is as to how to validly disentangle from a political party, trade union or other
association. That the point to vigorously underscore is that the right to join or not to join a trade
union, and the larger issue of unionization especially under the current constitutional
dispensation, is not as unfettered as it might appear at first blush. That the Constitution provides
in section 45(1) that:
Nothing in Sections 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 of this Constitution shall invalidate any law
that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society -
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(a) in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health;
or
(b) for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedom or other persons.
21. That construing analogous provisions of the 1979 Constitution in Osawe v. Registrar of
Trade Unions [1985] 1 NWLR (Pt. 4) 755, [1985] NSCC Vol. 16) 766, the Supreme Court held
at pages 772 - 773 (per Kazeem JSC) that the fundamental right enshrined under section 37 of
the 1979 Constitution (same with section 40 of the 1999 Constitution) for freedom of association
as trade unions is subject to the derogation set forth is section 41(1)(a) of the said Constitution
(same with section 45(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution), hence section 37 of the Constitution is not
absolute and cannot invalidate any law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society in
the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health (notably, the
Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 1978); and in Osawe (supra) at page 776 (per Aniagolu JSC)
that it is in the interest of the public order that systematized, cohesive and responsible trade
unions be established, for the good of society.
22. That it is perhaps an uncanny coincidence of history that what was at issue in that case was
the resolve by representatives of schools and colleges in the defunct Bendel State to break away
from NASU and register a proposed trade union called the “Nigeria United Teaching Services
Workers Union” otherwise known as “Nigerian Administrative Staff Union of Primary and Postprimary Schools”.
23. The claimant continued that the right to form or belong to a trade union guaranteed under
section 40 of the Constitution is amply reflected in section 12(4) of the Trade Unions Act (which
provides that: “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act membership of a trade union
shall be voluntary and no employee shall be forced to join any trade union or be victimized for
refusing to join or remain a member”; as well as section 9(6) of the Labour Act (which provides
that “no contract shall make it a condition of employment that a worker shall not join a trade
union or shalt relinquish membership of a trade union”), but hastened to point out that this right
is not absolute, but restrictive. That the liberty granted to individual to belong to a trade union
under section 40 of the Constitution is made relevant to the provisions of section 8 of the Trade
Unions Act which reads that the qualification of membership of a trade union which shall include
the provision to the effect that a person shall not be eligible for membership unless he is or has
been normally engaged in the trade or industry which the trade union represents.
24. That the purpose of this section is to be sure that a worker’s membership is sought into a
trade union that normally engages in the trade or industry in which he is or has been engaged. In
other words, membership of a trade union is generally open to all persons employed in a
particular trade. That the provision of paragraph I of the First Schedule of the Trade Unions Act
is not against the spirit of freedom of association as guaranteed by the Constitution.
25. To give a bit of perspective on the evolution of trade unionism in Nigeria, the claimant
submitted that the restructuring of trade unions was informed by the necessity to check the
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proliferation of trade unions, which was capable of yielding to a chaotic labour regime. That
beginning with Legal Notice No. 92 Re-structuring of Trade Unions, Official Gazette of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria No. 6 of 8 February 1978, the exercise culminated in Decrees 4 and
26 of 1996 where trade unions were restricted into named unions listed out and their respective
jurisdictional scope provided for, all in the Third Schedule Parts A, B and C to the Trade Unions
Act. That it is noteworthy that the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act of 2005 provides in section
12(4) that “membership of a trade union by employees shall be voluntary and no employee shall
be forced to join any trade union or be victimized for refusing to join or remain a member”, but
not a single provision of the Third Schedule Parts A, B and C of the Trade Unions Act Cap. T14
LFN 2004 was repealed, amended or substituted.
26. Thus, section 12(4) of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act of 2005 cannot be understood in
isolated but must be considered alongside other provisions of the Trade Unions Act as well as the
1999 Constitution. That the jurisdictional scope as contained in the Third Schedule Parts A, B
and C to the Trade Unions Act remains applicable to all the trade unions and that there is no
inconsistency between the Third Schedule Part B as contained in the Trade Unions Act and
section 40 of the 1999 Constitution. This, therefore, conduces to the proposition that the freedom
to choose which union to belong to, is a qualified right that is severely limited to the unions
empowered to operate within a clearly defined jurisdictional scope. That is to say, voluntarism
must exist within and not outside all existing relevant laws and regulations, citing Osawe v.
Registrar of Trade Unions (supra), R.T.N.A.C.H.P.N. v. M & H.W.U.N [2008] 2 NWLR (Pt.
1072) 575 and Sea Trucks (Nig.) Ltd v. Pyne [1999] 6 NWLR (Pt. 607) 514 at 536 -537 wherein
it was held that the phrase “for the protection of his interest” in section 40 of the Constitution
does not give citizens unrestrained freedom to join any trade union “that please their fancy”.
27. That the right enshrined in section 40 of the Constitution is not absolute but a qualified right
of members of a trade union to join or opt out of a trade union, which right can only be exercised
within the ambit of, and in the manner provided by law. In this regard, section 5(3) of the Labour
Act provides that upon the registration and recognition of any of the trade unions specified in
Part A of the Third Schedule to the Trade Unions Act, the employer shall (a) make deductions
from the wages of all workers eligible to be members of the union for the purpose of paying
contributions to the trade union so recognized; and (b) pay any sum so deducted to the union, but
a worker may contract out of the system in writing; and where he has done so, no deductions
shall be made from his wages in respect of contributions mentioned in paragraph (a) of this
section.
28. That deduction and payment of check-off dues are necessary incidents of trade unionism, but
it would seem that this is based not on membership of a trade union per se but on eligibility to be
a member of such a trade union. An employer can compulsorily make the deduction and remit
same to the relevant trade union listed under Part A of the Third Schedule to the Trade Unions
Act without the consent of the employee, citing Udoh v. Orthopaedic Hospitals Management
Board [1990] 4 NWLR (Pt. 142) 52.
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29. That as it relates to the trade unions listed in Part C (which are senior staff and employers’
associations), section 5(4) of the Labour Act provides that no deductions shall be made from the
wages and salaries of persons who are eligible members of any of the trade unions specified in
Part B of Schedule 3 to the Trade Unions Act except if the person concerned has accepted, in
writing, to make voluntary contributions to the trade union. That the rule of unionism, therefore,
is that whereas a junior staff is presumed to be member of a relevant trade union with
jurisdictional scope over the trade or industry in which he is or has been engaged, senior staff are
not so presumed to be members of the relevant union until and unless they opt in. The premise of
this dichotomy is the assumption that senior staff are generally of higher learning and in a more
vantage position to make informed choices as to whether to join a trade union or not, whilst the
law assumes paternalism towards junior staff by making eligibility the yardstick for trade union
membership but donates to him the right to opt out in writing if he finds that his interest is not
being served.
30. To the claimant, no doubt by Article 2 of the Convention, 1948 (No. 87) for Freedom of
Association and Protection of the Right to Organize clearly says:
Workers and employers without distinction whatsoever shall have the right to establish
and, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, to join organization of their
own choosing without previous authorization.
That this freedom is not absolute just as section 40 of the 1999 Constitution was made subject to
section 45 of the Constitution. By Article 8(1) of the Convention, 1948 (No. 87) its says: “In
exercising the rights provided for in this convention workers and employers and their respective
organizations like other persons or organized collectivities shall respect the law of the land".
31. Therefore, the defendant cannot be deemed to be exercising his constitutional rights under
the ILO Convention (No. 87) 1948 by floating an illegal and unregistered union or association
and be collecting check-off dues from the claimant’s eligible members due to his acts of
indiscipline in breaching the claimant’s rules and constitution.
32. Finally, that by paragraphs 3(xv), (xvi) and (xvii) of the defendant’s counter-affidavit, it was
admitted that judgment was entered in favour of the claimant in a similar illegal union being
floated by the defendant’s cohorts. Indeed by paragraph 3(xix), the defendant said as follows:
“That the Defendant herein have continued to exercise their right to congregate by adopting
another name that would not amount to a violation of the judgment of this Honourable Court
now on appeal”. That these paragraphs actually expose the defendant’s intention not only to
circumvent an order of this Court but to get through the back door what was lost in Suit No.
NICN/LA/407/2017. That no court of law will allow its order to be violently violated. The
equitable dictum that says “he who comes to equity must come with a clean hand” is applicable
in this case. That the defendant in this matter did not come with a clean hand; and both in law
and equity this Court will not aid the defendant.
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33. The claimant then urged this Court to dismiss the counter-affidavit of the defendant together
with the submissions made therein and resolve all issues raised by the claimant in its favour and
grant all its prayers.
COURT’S DECISION
34. I took time to consider the processes and submissions of the parties. Before considering the
merit of the case, I need to point out that the defendant referred to NASU v. NOTSUP (Non
Teaching Staff Union of Polytechnics) in paragraph 3.10 of his written address, but did not
supply the citation. The law is that whoever wants the court to apply a case law authority must
supply the citation. See Major General Kayode Oni (Rtd) & 4 ors v. Governor of Ekiti State &
anor [2019] LPELR-46413(SC), where His Lordship Augie, JSC stated the law thus:
It is an elementary principle, very elementary, that Counsel who want the Court to make
use of authorities cited in Court must provide the name of Parties, the year the case was
decided, and where the case is reported, name of the Law Report, the year, volume and
page must be cited. But if the said case is unreported, Counsel must provide the Court
with a certified true copy of the Judgment sought to be relied upon - see Chidoka & anor
v. First City Finance Co. Ltd [2013] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1344) 144 and Ugo-Ngadi v. FRN
[2018] LPELR-43903(SC)…
This being the case, I cannot accord NASU v. NOTSUP any consideration in this judgment. I so
rule.
35. The complaint of the claimant is that the defendant is President of, and hence leading, an
unregistered body known as the National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian
Universities (NANTS). That an earlier association, “Nigeria University Admin and Technical
Staff Union” (NUATSU) of Obafemi Awolowo University (OAU) had earlier been held by this
Court in NASU v. O. A. Ajagbe & 2 ors unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/407/2017, the judgment of
which was delivered on 14 February 2019 as “not qualified to be recognized as a Trade Union
under the law by the 3rd defendant”.
36. It is thus the contention of the claimant that NANTS is arrogating the functions of a
registered trade union to itself as if same is registered. That the defendant together with its
faceless Executive Body of NANTS are involved in running an unregistered union. That by
issuing Exhibit B duly signed by the defendant, NANTS is competing with the claimant’s
members in all Nigerian Universities when it was not known as a trade union under the Trade
Unions Act (TUA) Cap 14 LFN 2004. Exhibit B, dated 30 June 2022, is a Circular Ref. No.
NANTS/UV/C/VOL.I/1 signed by the defendant as President of NANTS to “All NANTS
Members in the Nigerian Universities and Inter-Universities Centres”. In it, the defendant
complained of the overbearing nature of the claimant and its leadership, its membership drawn
from institutions that go well beyond the Universities, and then called for, like is the case with
Polytechnics, a union specifically tailored for Universities. It is thus the issuing of Exhibit B that
the claimant concludes is evidence of the defendant embarking on trade unionism.
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37. The question that presently arises is whether the fact of issuing Exhibit B is tantamount to
trade unionism. And even if it is, whether NANTS thereby can be said to have fallen foul of the
law as to enable the claimant to be entitled to all the reliefs it prays for in this suit, as was the
case in the earlier decision of this Court in Suit No. NICN/LA/407/2017. By definition, trade
unionism according to the New Oxford American Dictionary is “the policies and practices of
labor unions”. Beyond issuing Exhibit B, what is it that the defendant did to qualify as the
policies and practices of labour unions? Or is issuing Exhibit B itself the policy and practice of
labour unions? I am of the view that much more is needed for any conclusion to be reached that
the defendant, beyond issuing Exhibit B, was embarking on trade unionism. This means that if
the argument of the claimant is to be accepted that issuing Exhibit B is tantamount to trade
unionism, then we may be stretching that phrase beyond its normal understanding.
38. In Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) v. Amalgamated Union of Public Corporations and
Civil Service Technical and Recreational Service Employees (AUPCTRE) unreported Suit No.
NICN/ABJ/45/2021, the judgment of which was delivered on 27 May 2021, a not too dissimilar
issue arose i.e. whether mere agitation for the interest of senior staff meant that the junior staff
union in issue crossed the line and was unionizing, not for junior staff, but senior staff. This is
what this Court held at paragraphs 89 and 90:
[89[ I indicated earlier that the claimant’s case is structured on faulty premises chief of
which is its understanding of what unionism or unionisation is. The verb “unionise/
unionize” by The New Oxford American Dictionary means “become or cause to become
members of a labor union”. The question then is: how can agitation for the interest of
senior staff be said to be an act of the defendant geared towards making senior staff
become or cause to become members of the defendant union? It is because the claimant
misunderstands the meaning of unionisation that prompts it to file this case as it did. The
judgment of 17 December 2019 held that the defendant can only unionise junior staff.
Did the claimant show to this Court that the defendant asked any senior staff in the
service of the claimant to be its member? Did the defendant embark on any membership
drive in respect of senior staff in the service of the claimant? Did the defendant ask of the
claimant the deduction of check-off dues in respect of its senior staff? The answer to all
these questions is NO. I asked the claimant’s counsel in open court to show me a
paragraph in all the exhibits they attached to the claimant’s processes showing where the
defendant did any of these acts and all he did was to refer me to paragraphs stating that
the defendant was agitating for the interests of senior staff.
[90] The claimant even restated this in very strong terms when in paragraph 2.18 of its
reply on points of law it stated thus:
It is submitted that the Claimant cannot ever have any better evidence of the
activities of the defendant agitating for the interest other than that of the junior
staff than the one contained in Exhibit B…
I must state, however, that agitating for the interest of senior staff is not the unionization
that the judgment of 17 December 2019 frowned on as against the defendant union. Trade
unions may agitate. But that in itself is not what defines unionism or unionisation. It is
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commonplace in the world of work for sympathy or secondary strikes to occur in support
of causes by unions other than the secondary or sympathetic strikers. Here, it is not
uncommon for a junior staff union to sympathize or support the strike of a senior staff
union. Such agitation does not make the junior staff union a senior staff union. The
claimant does not seem to understand this, hence the filing of this suit as it did.
39. Coming back to the instant case, in support of its contention, the claimant relied on sections
2(1) and 3(2) of the TUA. But in relying on section 2(1) of the TUA, the claimant once again
forgot or deliberately omitted to refer to the proviso. Section 2(1) of the TUA provides that:
A trade union shall not perform any act in furtherance of the purposes for which it has
been formed unless it has been registered under this Act:
Provided that nothing in this subsection shall prevent a trade union from taking any steps
(including the collection of subscriptions or dues) which may be necessary for the
purpose of getting the union registered.
40. By the proviso to section 2(1) of the TUA, a would be trade union is not prohibited “from
taking any steps (including the collection of subscriptions or dues) which may be necessary for
the purpose of getting the union registered”. I indicated earlier that in Exhibit B the defendant
complained of the overbearing nature of the claimant and its leadership, its membership drawn
from institutions that go well beyond the Universities, and then called for, like is the case with
Polytechnics, a union specifically tailored for Universities. Do all these not qualify as “any
steps…necessary for the purpose of getting the union registered”? I think so.
41. Section 3(2) of the TUA on its part provides thus:
No combination of workers or employers shall be registered as a trade union save with
the approval of the Minister on his being satisfied that it is expedient to register the union
either by regrouping existing trade unions, registering a new trade union or otherwise
howsoever, but no trade union shall be registered to represent workers or employers in a
place where there already exists a trade union.
42. To the claimant, the word “shall” as used in section 3(2) of the TUA is intended to forbid the
defendant from proceeding with the registration of the said association where the claimant is still
in existence and representing the class of interests NANTS sought to represent. The claimant
placed great reliance on a number of case law authorities especially Osawe v. Registrar of Trade
Unions [1985] 1 NWLR (Pt. 4) 755; [2004] 1 NLLR (Pt. 1) 34 SC as well as Article 2 of ILO
Convention No. 87, which provides as follows:
Workers and employers without distinction whatsoever shall have the right to establish
and, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, to join organization of their
own choosing without previous authorization.
43. The claimant proceeded that this freedom is not absolute just as section 40 of the 1999
Constitution was made subject to section 45 of the Constitution. That by Article 8(1) of the ILO
Convention No. 87: “In exercising the rights provided for in this convention workers and
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employers and their respective organizations like other persons or organized collectivities shall
respect the law of the land”. Accordingly, that the defendant cannot be deemed to be exercising
his constitutional rights under the ILO Convention (No. 87) 1948 by floating an illegal and
unregistered union or association and be collecting check-off dues from the claimant’s eligible
members due to his acts of indiscipline in breaching the claimant’s rules and constitution.
44. In citing Article 8(1), the claimant cleverly left out Article 8(2) of same Convention, which
qualifies Article 8(1) in these words: “The law of the land shall not be such as to impair, nor shall
it be so applied as to impair, the guarantees provided for in this Convention”. So while, as argued
by the claimant, the law of the land is to be respected, this must not be at the expense of the
guarantees provided by the Convention itself. What then are these guarantees provided by
Convention No. 87? This remains the question. None of the parties, however, told me what these
guarantees are. To be able to ascertain what these guarantees are, only a closer look at the ILO
jurisprudence regarding Convention No. 87 will reveal them. In this regard, reference will be to
ILO’s Freedom of Association: Compilation of Decisions of the Committee on Freedom of
Association (International Labour Office: Geneva), 2018, 6th Edition.
45. Before taking a closer look at Convention No. 87, I need to point out that the claimant had
stressed in its reply on points of law that even with section 40 of the 1999 Constitution, the
freedom to choose which union to belong to is a qualified right that is severely limited to the
unions empowered to operate within a clearly defined jurisdictional scope. That is to say,
voluntarism must exist within and not outside all existing relevant laws and regulations, citing
Osawe v. Registrar of Trade Unions (supra), Registered Trustees of National Association of
Community Health Practitioners of Nigeria (RTNA) & ors v. Medical and Health Workers Union
of Nigeria & ors (MHWUN) [2008] LPELR-3196(SC); [2008] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1072) 575 and Sea
Trucks (Nig.) Ltd v. Pyne [1999] 6 NWLR (Pt. 607) 514.
46. I am aware that Registered Trustees of National Association of Community Health
Practitioners of Nigeria (RTNA) & ors v. Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria & ors
(MHWUN) [2008] LPELR-3196(SC) affirmed Osawe & ors v. Registrar of Trade Unions.
However, both cases are distinguishable to the case at hand. They were all decided before the
coming into effect of section 254C(1)(f) and (h), and (2) of the 1999 Constitution.
47. The Court of Appeal decision in Nasarawa State Specialist Hospital Management Board &
ors v. Mohammed [2018] LPELR-44551(CA) recognized the necessity to treat/apply older case
law authorities with caution, especially case law authorities that pre-date the Third Alteration.
For instance, on the Supreme Court case of Osoh v. Unity Bank Plc [2013] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1358) 1,
this is what the Court of Appeal said:
Osoh v. Unity Bank Plc supra, which the lower Court relied on is inapplicable to the
instant matter as it was decided on the basis of the Trade Dispute Act and the 1979
Constitution which did not give jurisdiction on matters relating to employment to the
National Industrial Court. The Supreme Court was not called upon to consider sections
6(1)(5)(cc) and 254C(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria.
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48. This Court has quoted and applied this reasoning of Nasarawa State Specialist Hospital
Management Board & ors v. Mohammed in National Union of Hotels and Personal Services
Workers (NUHPSW) v. National Union of Air Transport Employees (NUATE) & anor unreported
Suit No. NICN/ABJ/207/2018, the judgment of which was delivered on 4 July 2019 and Road
Transport Employers’ Association of Nigeria (RTEAN) v. Comr. Celestine Afam Anere & anor
unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/269/2021, the judgment of which was delivered on 28 April
2022, at paragraph 81.
49. NASU v. O. A. Ajagbe & 2 ors Suit No. NICN/LA/407/2017 (supra), equally relied on by the
claimant, is also distinguishable on the ground that the ambit of the guarantees under Convention
No 87 were not considered. In fact, ILO Convention 87 was neither referred to nor canvassed by
any of the parties in that case.
50. Section 254C(1)(f) and (h), and (2) of the 1999 Constitution and section 7(6) of the National
Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006 permits this Court to, when adjudicating, apply international
best practices in labour and the Treaties, Conventions, Recommendations and Protocols on
labour ratified by Nigeria. The claimant did not address its mind to this point. The Supreme
Court had as far back as 2000 in two concurring judgments of Achike, JSC and Uwaifo, JSC in
Abacha & ors v. Fawehinmi [2000] LPELR-14(SC); [2000] 6 NWLR (Pt 660) 228 respectively
held that “conventions and treaties create rights and obligations not only between Member States
themselves but also between citizens and Member States and between ordinary citizens”; and
that “the spirit of a convention or a treaty demands that the interpretation and application of its
provisions should meet international and civilized legal concepts… concepts which are widely
acceptable and at the same time of clear certainty in application”. Additionally, by section 19(d)
of the 1999 Constitution, the foreign policy objectives of Government include the respect for
international law and treaty obligations. Accordingly, section 254C(1)(f) and (h), and (2) of the
1999 Constitution and section 7(6) of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006 merely keep
faith with section 19(d) of the 1999 Constitution.
51. By 2020, His Lordship Ogakwu, JCA in Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v. Mrs Olawunmi
Oyebola [2020] LPELR-51806(CA) would read section 254C(1)(f) and (h), and (2) of the 1999
Constitution as imposing an “obligation on [the National Industrial Court of Nigeria - NICN] to
now apply good or international best practices in adjudication”. His Lordship proceeded to hold
thus:
…I am mindful of the fact that it may appear that international best practices, like public
policy, may be an unruly horse and might be difficult to apply. Alluding to a similar
situation as it relates to public policy in ENDERBY TOWN FC vs. FOOTBALL
ASSOCIATION (1971) 1 CH 591 at 606-6077, Lord Denning, MR asseverated that
public policy is an unruly horse. So obstreperous is the horse that no judge should ever
try to mount it lest it runs away with him. I disagree. With a good man in the saddle, the
unruly horse can be kept in control. It can jump over obstacles. It can leap the fences put
up by fictions and come down on the side of justice. Now, on my part, I ask if a judge is
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such a good man (jockey)? I would think so. If the Judge of the lower Court, that
specialized Court in employment and labour related matters, be that intrepid man of great
learning, then the application of international best practices would not be difficult,
abstruse or arcane in its application and would always end up on the side of justice…
52. In an earlier case, Ferdinand Dapaah & anor v. Stella Ayam Odey [2018]
LPELR-46151(CA); [2019] 16 ACELR 154, His Lordship Nimpar, JCA held that this Court
“was also empowered by the Constitution to rely and apply international conventions which have
close bearing to claims related to workplace, employment and labour matters… ([2019] ACELR
at 181).
53. Now, Nigeria is a member of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and in virtue of its
membership is bound by the ILO Convention No. 87, a core Convention, which Nigeria ratified
o n 1 7 O c t o b e r 1 9 6 0 . S e e https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?
p=NORMLEXPUB:11200:0::NO::P11200_COUNTRY_ID:103259 as accessed on 2 May 2023.
The key provisions of Convention No. 87 are Articles 2, 3, 8 and 11, which provide thus:
Article 2
Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish
and, subject only to the rules of the organisation concerned, to join organisations of their
own choosing without previous authorisation.
Article 3
(1) Workers' and employers' organisations shall have the right to draw up their
constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives in full freedom, to organise their
administration and activities and to formulate their programmes.
(2) The public authorities shall refrain from any interference which would restrict this
right or impede the lawful exercise thereof.
Article 8
(1) In exercising the rights provided for in this Convention workers and employers and
their respective organisations, like other persons or organised collectivities, shall respect
the law of the land.
(2) The law of the land shall not be such as to impair, nor shall it be so applied as to
impair, the guarantees provided for in this Convention.
Article 11
Each Member of the International Labour Organisation for which this Convention is in
force undertakes to take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that workers
and employers may exercise freely the right to organise.
54. Since this Court is now obliged to apply this ratified Convention No. 87, I will proceed to
consider the ILO jurisprudence relating to it in order to ascertain how it is understood and
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applied by the ILO, something that the claimant, even when he relied on Articles 2 and 8 the
Convention, did not in greater details delve into.
55. The ILO jurisprudence regarding Article 2 of Convention No. 87 dictates that workers and
employers have the right, without distinction whatsoever, to establish and join organisations of
their own choosing without previous authorization. This accords with section 40 of the 1999
Constitution. Paragraph 336 at page 63 of ILO’s Freedom of Association: Compilation of
Decisions of the Committee on Freedom of Association (International Labour Office: Geneva),
2018, 6th Edition is emphatic in stating that public servants, like all other workers, without
distinction whatsoever, have the right to establish and join organisations of their choosing,
without previous authorization, for promotion and defence of their occupational interests. But in
paragraph 340, it is acknowledged that there are no grounds for challenging the validity of
special legal regulations which govern public servants’ right to organise in so far as such
regulations comply with the provision of Convention No. 87.
56. Paragraph 419 under Chapter 4 dealing with the right of workers and employers to establish
organizations without previous authorization, in elaborating on the requirement of previous
authorization, explains that the principle of freedom of association would often remain a dead
letter if workers and employers were required to obtain any kind of previous authorization to
enable them establish an organization. That in cases where registration is optional, the fact that
the competent authority to effect registration has discretionary power to refuse this formality is
not very different from cases in which previous authorization is required.
57. By paragraph 421, a law providing that the right of association is subject to authorization
granted by a government department purely in its discretion is incompatible with the principle of
freedom of association.
58. Chapter 5 deals with the right of workers and employers to establish and join organizations
of their own choosing. By paragraph 475, “the right of workers to establish organizations of their
own choosing implies, in particular, the effective possibility of forming…organizations
independent both of those which exist already and of any political party”. Accordingly, “the right
of workers to establish organizations of their own choosing implies, in particular, the effective
possibility to create — if the workers so choose — more than one workers’ organizations per
enterprise” (paragraph 479). And by paragraph 477, “the existence of an organization in a
specific occupation should not constitute an obstacle to the establishment of another
organisation, if the workers so wish”. As can be seen, these principles, which provide guarantees
under Convention No. 87, are far beyond what the claimant envisages in terms of sections 2(1)
and 3(2) of the TUA; or even section 5(4) of the TUA, which provides that:
The Registrar shall not register the trade union if it appears to him that any existing trade
union is sufficiently representative of the interests of the class of persons whose interest
the union is intended to represent.
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59. From all of this, the generally accepted principle by ILO is trade union plurality. But if the
workers or employers so wish, the decision being theirs, they can settle for trade union
monopoly. Paragraphs 478 to 501 then go on to espouse on this principle of trade union plurality
relative to the principle of trade union monopoly. And so statutory (including constitutional)
provisions prohibiting the creation of more than one trade union for a given occupation or
economic category (paragraph 478) or a law which does not authorise the establishment of a
second union in an enterprise (paragraph 481) or require a singe union for each enterprise, trade
or occupation (paragraph 482), the prevention of two enterprise trade union coexisting
(paragraph 480), all fail to comply with Article 2 of Convention No. 87.
60. So, “while it may generally be to the advantage of workers to avoid a multiplicity of trade
union organizations, unification of the trade union movement imposed through state intervention
by legislative means runs counter to the principle embodied in Articles 2 and 11 of Convention
No. 87…” (paragraph 485). Additionally, “while it is generally to the advantage of workers and
employers to avoid the proliferation of competing organizations, a monopoly situation imposed
by law is at variance with the principle of free choice of workers’ and employers’ organizations”.
(paragraph 486). By paragraph 487, “unity within trade union movement should not be imposed
by the State through legislation because this would be contrary to the principles of freedom of
association”. Trade union unity voluntarily achieved should not be prohibited and should instead
be respected by public authorities (paragraph 498).
61. ILO feels strongly about trade union pluralism that in paragraph 492, it is stated thus:
The Committee has suggested that a State should amend its legislation so as to make it
clear that when a trade union already exists for same employees as those whom a new
trade union seeking registration is organizing or is proposing to organize, or the fact that
the existing union holds a bargaining certificate in respect of such class of employees,
this cannot give rise to objections of sufficient substance to justify the registrar in
refusing to register the new union.
62. This is the labour jurisprudence that should today guide the adjudication of labour and
employment disputes such as the instant case. Already, this Court, in Tricycle Owners
Association of Nigeria v. Federal Ministry of Labour and Employment & anor unreported Suit
No. NICN/ABJ/216/2022, the judgment of which was delivered on 17 January 2023, had started
applying the said labour jurisprudence. This is because the power and jurisdiction (and hence
obligation) of this Court under section 254C(1)(f) and (h), and (2) of the 1999 Constitution and
section 7(6) of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006 to, when adjudicating, apply
international best practices in labour and the Treaties, Conventions, Recommendations and
Protocols on labour ratified by Nigeria, inures “notwithstanding…anything contained in this
Constitution”. And section 45 of the 1999 Constitution is one of such “anything contained in this
Constitution” that must be read subject to section 254C(1)(f) and (h) of the 1999 Constitution.
All of this signifies that sections 2(1), 3(2) and 5(4) of the TUA, and section 45 of the 1999
Constitution cannot be used to thwart or frustrate the application of ILO Convention No. 87 in
the manner canvassed by the claimant in this case.
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63. With all this in mind, I shall proceed to answer the questions posed by the claimant. On
question (1) i.e. whether by the provision of section 2(1) of the TUA, NANTS being coordinated
and represented by the defendant can operate and perform the functions of a trade union when
same has not been dully registered under the TUA or any other known law in Nigeria, the answer
is: pending formal registration as a trade union, NANTS can take any step “(including the
collection of subscriptions or dues) which may be necessary for the purpose of getting the union
registered”. Exhibit B issued by the defendant was in this direction.
64. On question (2) i.e. whether by section 3(2) of the TUA, NANTS being coordinated and
represented by the defendant can be registered as a trade union to represent the Non-Teaching
Staff of Nigerian Universities where there already exists a trade union such as the claimant, the
answer is in the affirmative given ILO Convention No. 87, which is now applicable in virtue of
section 254C(1)(f) and (h), and (2) of the 1999 Constitution and section 7(6) of the NIC Act
2006.
65. On question (3) i.e. whether by section 25 of the TUA, the Nigerian Universities and other
publicly and privately owned institutions are bound under the provisions of this law to recognize
and continue with the recognition of the claimant as a registered trade union specified in Parts A
& B of the Third Schedule to the TUA for as long as the claimant remains a registered trade
union conferred with the jurisdictional scope of unionizing all eligible non-academic staff
workers employed in publicly and privately owned education, research and associated
institutions including University Teaching Hospitals, the answer is in the affirmative but subject
to the right of other associations like NANTS to also be registered as trade unions once they
apply to be so registered.
66. Section 25 of the TUA itself makes provision as to the obligatory nature of the recognition of
registered trade unions in these words:
(1) For the purposes of collective bargaining all registered unions in the employment of
an employer shall constitute an electoral college to elect members who will represent
them in negotiations with the employer.
(2) For the purposes of representation at Tripartite Bodies or any other body the
registered Federations of Trade Unions shall constitute an electoral college taking into
account the size of each registered Federation, for the purpose of electing members who
will represent them.
67. As can be seen, section 25 talks of “all registered trade unions in the employment of an
employer”. This intuits that there can be more than one trade union in an employment. For
purposes of collective bargaining, these registered trade unions in an employment shall constitute
an electoral college to elect members who will represent them in negotiation with the employer.
Section 25 does not intuit trade union monopoly. It intuits trade union plurality.
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68. On question (4) i.e. whether by sections 2 and 25 of the TUA, NANTS coordinated and represented by the defendant is qualified to be recognized as a trade union under the TUA by any University in Nigeria, the answer is in the affirmative subject to it applying for registration as a trade union and it being so registered under the TUA and in accordance with the precepts just enunciated in this judgment.
69. Having answered all the questions posed by the claimant against the claimant, the reliefs prayed for by the claimant are not grantable. They must fail. All the reliefs are accordingly dismissed.
I so order.
70. Judgment is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost.
…………..……………………………………
Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD, OFR