IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT ABUJA
BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE B. B. KANYIP, PHD, OFR
PRESIDENT, NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
DATE: 16 MAY 2023
SUIT NO. NICN/AK/04/2022
BETWEEN
1. Yusuf Abdullahi Abdulkadir, Esq
2. Joseph Olodiama Jebba, Esq
3. Felix Oyewole Awoniyi, Esq
4. Andrew Umoh, Esq
5. Kate Obekpa, Esq
6. Sunday Pam, Esq
7. N. J. Abundga, Esq
8. Chibuzo Ehiemere, Esq
9. Babatunde Victor Falodun, Esq
10. S. M. Oguinya, Esq
11. Abdulahi Aminu Shams, Esq
12. Titus Amaechi Ngene, Esq
13. Anthony Omah Wamah, Esq
14. Thomas Anigara, Esq
15. Imomoemi Gbasa, Esq
16. Benjamen S. Abwage, Esq
17. Kamardeen Olajide Bakare, Esq
(For themselves and on behalf of all the members of Law Officers Association of Nigeria) - Claimants
AND
1. Minister of Labour & Employment
2. The Registrar of Trade Unions
3. The Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice
4. The President, Judiciary Staff Union of Nigeria (JUSUN)
(Sued for and on behalf of all the members
of the Judiciary Staff Union if Nigeria) - Defendants
REPRESENTATION
Gbemiga Adaramola, for the claimants.
Mathias O. Agboni, with Valentine Nonso, Miss Florence Ani and Don Bassey, for the 1st and 2nd defendants.
Ekene Vincent Elodimuo, Principal State Counsel, Federal Ministry of Justice, for the 3rd defendant.
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P. S. Umoru and A. M. Agada, for the 4th defendant. At the sittings of 9 March 2023 and 25 April
2023, M. O. Bamidele appeared for the 4th defendant but as holding the brief of V. A. Ofikwu.
JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
1. The claimants are lawyers. They belong to a body called, the Law Association of Nigeria
(LOAN). This body consists of all lawyers serving in Ministries of Justice of the 36 States of the Federation and the Federal Ministry of Justice. On 29 June 2012, they applied to be registered as a trade union under the Trade Unions Act (TUA) Cap T14 LFN 2004. The Registrar of Trade Unions (RTU) declined vide a letter dated 19 September 2012. The claimants, as members of the LOAN, appealed against the decision of the RTU to the Minster of Labour and Employment. No immediate response from the Minister of Labour was received until 3 November 2021 when the claimants received a reply from the Minister of Labour declining their request for registration.
The letter from the Minister of Labour asked the claimants to align with the Judiciary Staff Union of Nigeria (JUSUN), the 4th defendant in this matter.
2. Dissatisfied, the claimants on 3 February 2022 filed this suit against the defendants vide an
Originating summons supported by an affidavit and accompanying written address, which originating summons they later amended. By the amended originating summons, the claimants are seeking the determination of the following questions:
(1) Whether the Registrar of Trade Unions can refuse the registration of Law Officers
Association of Nigeria (LOAN) without any justifiable reason(s).
(2) Whether the Registrar of Trade Unions was not wrong by interpreting the provisions of sections 3(2) and 5(4) of the Trade Unions Act Cap T14 LFN 2004 in refusing the application of the Law Officers Association of Nigeria (LOAN) to be registered as a trade union.
(3) Whether the reason(s) adduced by the Registrar of Trade Unions in his letters dated 19th September, 2012 with reference number: ML.ITU/139/1/18; and 3rd of November, 2021 with reference number ML.18/147/SVI/1/298, for the refusal to register the Law Officers Association of Nigeria (LOAN) wherein he stated thus: “There is also the ‘Judiciary Staff Union of Nigeria’ (JUSUN) registered to organize all employees in the judicial Arm of Government (with exception of the secretariat staff)” and “I am further directed to advise you to abide by the Minister’s letter of 19th September, 2012 in which you were advised to align with Judiciary Staff Union of Nigeria (JUSUN)” respectively are genuine, reasonable and valid to warrant the refusal to register Law Officers Association of
Nigeria (LOAN) as a trade union.
(4) Whether by the combined effects of section 40 of the Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Law Officers Act, Cap L8 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004; and section 5(4) of the Trade Unions Act Cap T14 2004, the Law Officers Association of Nigeria is not entitled to be registered as a trade union by the Registrar of Trade Unions.
3. And upon the determination of the above questions, the claimants seek the following reliefs:
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(1) A DECLARATION THAT the claimants have the rights under the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) and other relevant Laws in Nigeria to associate and function as a trade union.
(2) A DECLARATION THAT the Law Officers who are members of the Law Officers
Association of Nigeria (LOAN) are employees in the Executive Arm of Government and are not in the same employment or organization with the Judiciary Staff Union of Nigeria (JUSUN) who are employees in the Judicial Arm of Government in Nigeria.
(3) AN ORDER OF CERTIORARI quashing the refusal of the Minister of Labour and Employment and/or the Registrar of Trade Unions to register the Law Officers Association of Nigeria (LOAN) and consequently declare same unconstitutional, unjustifiable and therefore, null and void; and
(4) AN ORDER OF COURT directing the Registrar of Trade Unions to register the Law Officers Association of Nigeria (LOAN) as a trade union having fulfilled all the prerequisite and/or requirements for the registration.
4. The 1st and 2nd defendants did not within time enter any appearance, and file any defence processes. However, on 14 February 2023 (after this case had been adjourned to 19 January 2023 for judgment), the 1st and 2nd defendants filed a notion praying for leave to extend time within which to file their memorandum of appearance and defence processes. They equally filed a preliminary objection praying that the suit be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The preliminary objection is supported by an affidavit and a written address. The motion for leave was moved on 25 April 2023. In a Bench ruling, leave to enter appearance was granted in terms of the preliminary objection since a preliminary objection can be moved at any time. However, leave to file defence processes was rejected and so not granted.
5. The 3rd defendant on his part only filed what it termed its legal position on the powers of the Registrar of Trade Unions pursuant to sections 3(2) and 5(4) of the TUA as it relates to the non-registration of LOAN as a trade union.
6. It was the 4th defendant that actually opposed the originating summons by filing a counter affidavit with the accompanying written address. To this, the claimants filed a further affidavit and a reply on points of law.
The 1ST AND 2ND DEFENDANT’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
7. The preliminary objection was filed on 14 February 2023. It prayed for the suit to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It was hinged on four grounds, namely:
(1) That the claimants’ originating summons and other accompanying processes are incompetent in law because the claimants failed to fulfill a condition precedent enshrined in section 5(5)(b) of the TUA before instituting this suit.
(2) That this suit is not properly constituted.
(3) That this suit constitutes an abuse of court process.
(4) That this Court lacks the jurisdiction and competence to entertain this suit as instituted.
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8. These grounds were condensed into three issues for determination, namely:
(1) Whether the claimants’ case as constituted is not incompetent, the claimants having failed to comply with the condition precedent as provided for by section 5(5)(b) of the
TUA.
(2) Whether the claimants’ suit does not constitute an abuse of court process having not complied with a condition precedent.
(3) Whether this Court lacks the jurisdiction and competence to entertain this suit as constituted.
9. All these issues are but different ways of saying the same thing. And so I shall take all the issues together. The crux of the 1st and 2nd defendants’ objection is that the claimants were told on 19 September 2012 that LOAN will not be registered as a trade union and that they have 30 days within which to appeal to the Honourable Minister of Labour against the decision, but the claimants waited until 13 November 2018 before appealing. That this is contrary to 5(5)(b) of the
TUA, which provides that “if the Registrar refuses to register the union…any official or member of the union may, within the period of thirty days beginning with the date so specified, appeal to the Minister against the refusal”. To the 1st and 2nd defendants, compliance with this provision is a condition precedent to instituting this suit. And so failure to comply with it is fatal to the suit.
The 1st and 2nd defendants cited case law authorities on how courts treat conditions precedent, which is that failure to comply with a condition precedent will rob the court of jurisdiction. And because the claimants did nit fulfill the condition precedent enjoined under section 5(5)(b) of the
TUA, the 1st and 2nd defendants submitted that this suit is an abuse of court process, for which this court lacks jurisdiction. The 1st and 2nd defendants also cited a number of case law authorities on abuse of court process; and then urged the Court to grant the preliminary objection as prayed.
10. The 4th defendant alined itself with the above submissions of the 1st and 2nd defendants in terms of the preliminary objection; and then added further that the right of appeal exercised by the claimants have been so dilatory that it has indeed robbed this Court of jurisdictional competence to adjudicate over this matter.
11. The 3rd defendant on his part observed that the issues of jurisdiction raised by the 1st and
2nd defendants have been waived by the 1st defendant, referring to the letter of 3 November
2021 (Exhibit G of the claimants), by which “the 1st defendant exercised the right of appeal in that letter and so should be deemed to have waived the right of appeal”.
12. The claimants orally reacted to the preliminary objection on points of law, having not filed any process against it. The claimants urged the Court to take a closer look at the grounds of the objection. That the 1st and 2nd defendants are objecting to the initial originating summons, which has been amended. That the affidavit in support of the preliminary objection is opposing the amended originating summons filed on 17 March 2022, which is no longer valid as far as this case is concerned. That the only valid originating summons is that filed on 5 May 2022. The
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claimants then referred to AG, Niger State v. Executive Chairman, EFCC & ors [2022] LCN/
15932 CA, which held that an amended process supersedes the initial process before the court.
13. The claimants went on that even if the 1st and 2nd defendants’ process is competent,
paragraphs 34 and 35 of the amended originating summons are evidence that the claimants
appealed within time, referring to paragraphs 1 and 2 of Exhibit G; and also P.W.T.H. AG v.
Ceddi Corp. Ltd [2012] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1285) 465, which held that waiver carries an element of
abandonment of right. The claimants then urged the Court to dismiss the preliminary objection.
14. In reaction, the 1st and 2nd defendants submitted that the Hon. Minister of Labour has no
right to waive the provision of a statute. Secondly, that neither Exhibit G nor Exhibit I attests to
the fact that the Minister waived the right stipulated in section 5(5)(b) of the TUA. Lastly, that a
suit takes effect from the date it was filed. That it is not just the process that they are challenging,
but also the suit itself. That objection can be raised even orally, and so what they are challenging
is the competence of the suit.
15. The issues raised by the 1st and 2nd defendants especially as to section 5(5)(b) of the TUA
were earlier raised by the 4th defendant in their defence submissions against the originating
summons. I shall accordingly treat the 1st and 2nd defendants’ preliminary objection alongside
the defence of the 4th defendant to the originating summons.
THE ORIGINATING SUMMONS
The Submissions of the Claimants
16. The claimants submitted two issues for determination, namely:
(1) Whether the refusal of the Registrar of Trade Unions based on the reason(s) contained
in his letter dated 19th September, 2021 and with reference number ML. ITU/139/1/18;
and the letter dated 3rd November, 2021 with reference number ML.1B/147/SVI/1/298 is
reasonable and justifiable.
(2) Whether or not the claimants are entitled to their reliefs as contained in the amended
originating summons.
17. On issue (1), the claimants submitted that the crux of this case borders on the reasons that the
Registrar of Trade Unions gave for declining to register the Law Officers Association of Nigeria
(LOAN) as a trade union. That the Registrar of Trade Unions in paragraph 2 of his letter dated 19
September 2012 i.e. Exhibit A attached to the affidavit in support of the amended originating
summons stated thus:
In the light of this, Lawyers in the employment of Government owned/public sector
organizations belong to the unions operating in such organizations. There is also the
‘Judiciary Staff Union of Nigeria’ (JUSUN) registered to organize all employees in the
Judicial Arm of Government (with the exception of the secretariat staff).
18. To the claimants, it is rightly stated by the Registrar of Trade Unions that the Judiciary Staff
Union of Nigeria (JUSUN) is registered to organize all employees in the Judicial Arm of
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Government and not in the Executive Arm of Government which the Law Officers belong to and
there is no such union that cater(s) or represent the interest of the Law Officers in Nigeria.
Needless to say that the members of JUSUN are not lawyers but by virtue of the Law Officers
Act, Law Officers are mandatorily lawyers duly called to the Nigerian Bar. And by virtue of their
employment, they are not in the Judicial Arm of Government. That sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Law
Officers Act Cap L8 LFN 2004 lay credence to this submission and they provide thus:
Section 1: This Act may be cited as the Law Officers Act.
Section 2: The offices of Attorney-General, Solicitor-General, and State Counsel are
hereby created.
Section 3: Every person appointed as Attorney-General or Solicitor-General of the
Federation, the Director of Public Prosecutions of the Federation, Legal Draftsman of the
Federation, or State Counsel, shall, so long as he continues to hold such office be deemed
to be, and every person who shall have been appointed to any such office shall have been
deemed to be, a barrister, advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Nigeria ex-officio
and shall be entitled, and shall be deemed to have been entitled, to appear as counsel in all
courts in Nigeria in which counsel may appear.
19. The claimants then submitted that Law Officers are creation and specifically in the Executive
Arm of Government i.e. in the Chambers of the Attorney-General and this is a clear distinction
from the Judiciary Staff who are employees in the Judicial Arm of Government. That the
Registrar of Trade Unions cannot by any stretch of hand merge the Law Officers with the
Judicial Arm of Government without an amendmentto the provisions of the 1999 Constitution.
That sections 3 and 5 of the Trade Unions Act 2004 (as amended) provide thus:
Section 3(2): No combination of workers or employers shall be registered as a trade union
save with the approval of the Minister on his being satisfied that it is expedient to register
the union either by regrouping existing trade unions, registering a new trade union or
otherwise howsoever; but no trade union shall be registered to represent workers or
employers in a place where there already exists a trade union.
Section 5(4): The Registrar shall not register the trade union if it appears to him that any
existing trade union is sufficiently representative of the interests of the class of persons
whose interests the union is intended to represent.
20. It is the claimants’ submission that it was the above section that the Registrar of Trade
Unions and/or the Minister of Labour and Employment misinterpreted and thereby denied the
registration of the meritorious application of the Law Officers Association of Nigeria (LOAN) as
a trade union. The claimants agreed that the Registrar of Trade Unions and/or the Minister may
decline or refuse registration of a trade union if such trade union has in existence a trade union
that adequately represent the interest of the proposed/new trade union, citing RTNA & ors v.
MHWUN & ors [2008] LPELR-3196(SC), which relying on Erasmus Osawe and 2 Ors v.
Registrar of Trade Unions [1985] 1 NWLR (Pt. 4) 755 at 763, held that:
…[the] new provision makes it mandatory for the Registrar of Trade Unions, on receiving
an application to register any trade union, to ensure that there is no other registered trade
union in existence which caters for the same interest as the one applying for registration. If
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there is, it becomes incumbent in my view, for the Registrar, as the custodian of such
information, to decline to proceed to put into effect the machinery for the registration of the
new trade union as set out under Section 5(2) of the trade Union Act, 1973.
21. The claimants went on that where, however, there is no trade union that represents the
interest of the applicant like in the case at hand, the Registrar of Trade Unions should register the
union as a trade union because doing otherwise will amount to reading/interpreting the law
wrongly. The claimants then submitted that the JUSUN and Law Officers are not in the same
class of people and they are not the same. That the Judiciary Staff Union of Nigeria has not at
any time been a union over or catering for the interest of the Law Officers in Nigeria, urging the
Court to so hold.
22. Furthermore, that the reasons given by the Registrar of Trade Unions in refusing the
application of the Law Officers Association of Nigeria is unreasonable and unjustifiable having
regard to the provision of the extant laws, urging the Court to so hold.
23. The claimants then urged the Court to resolve this issue in their favour.
24. Regarding issue (2), the claimants submitted that having regard to the 1999 Constitution, the
Trade Unions Act and the relevant case laws, they are entitled to their reliefs as contained in the
amended originating summons. That section 40 of the 1999 Constitution provides thus:
Every person shall be entitled to assemble freely and associate with other persons, and in
particular he may form or belong to any political party, trade union or any other association
for the protection of his interests: Provided that the provisions of this section shall not
derogate from the powers conferred by this Constitution on the Independent National
Electoral Commission with respect to political parties to which that Commission does not
accord recognition.
25. To the claimants, the right to freely associate and or belong to an association of his/her choice
is inalienable and same is constitutionally guaranteed under the 1999 Constitution. That same has
been given judicial approval in a number of cases, citing Agbai v. Okogbue [1991] 7 NWLR (Pt.
204) 391. That the Registrar of Trade Unions and the Minister of Labour and Employment
cannot work against the provisions of the 1999 Constitution and thus cannot deny the claimants
their request since same is meritorious.
26. What is more, that the two unions that the Registrar of Trade Unions and the Minister of
Labour and Employment are categorising together have nothing in common, their interests differ
in all respect, refer to paragraphs 9, 50, 51, 52, 53 and 54 of the affidavit in support of the
amended originating summons. That it is on this basis that the decision of the Registrar of Trade
Unions and that of the Minister of Labour and Employment are not justifiable and liable to be
quashed by this Court.
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27. The claimants continued that the consequential effect of the quashing order by this Court is to
grant the reliefs of the claimants by directing the Registrar of Trade Unions to register the Law
Officers Association of Nigeria (LOAN) as a trade union in Nigeria.
28. Furthermore, that the writ of certiorari will issue against public officers who fail to determine
issues fairly and in the interest of justice, citing NAGPPE v. Pharmacists Council of Nigeria &
ors [2013] LPELR–21834(CA). The claimants then urged the Court to to resolve this issue in
their favour.
29. In conclusion, the claimants urge the Court to answer all the questions for determination in
their favour and grant all their reliefs.
The Submissions of the 3rd Defendant
30. To the 3rd defendant, it is important for this Court to note that this suit borders on the
interpretation of the powers of the Registrar of Trade Unions to register a trade union and,
therefore, there are no claims against the Hon. Attorney-General of the Federation (HAGF) sued
as the 3rd defendant in this suit. However, that the HAGF will pursuant to its section 150 of the
1999 Constitution guide the Court in interpreting the position of the law to the facts submitted by
the claimants for adjudication as the suit borders on interpretation of the Constitution.
31. In thus making his submissions, the HAGF relied on the facts of this case as submitted by the
claimants and other relevant facts that this Court is invited to take judicial notice of.
32. The 3rd defendant submitted one issue for determination i.e. whether the Registrar of Trade
Unions exercised his statutory discretion within the confines of sections 3(2) and 5(4) of the
Trade Unions Act in declining to register the Law Officers Association of Nigeria (LOAN)
taking into cognizance that there is no trade union that rightly covers the jurisdictional scope of
LOAN. And answered it in the negative.
33. To the 3rd defendant, the claimants are seeking for declaratory reliefs which are equitable in
nature, the grant or refusal of which is subject to the discretionary powers of this Court, referring
to CPC v. INEC & ors [2011] LPELR-8257(SC). And a court’s exercise of its discretionary
powers must be done judicially and judiciously, citing Sunmonu v. Sunmonu [2021]
LPELR-56002(CA). Accordingly, that in an exercise of this discretionary power, the court must
take into cognizance the peculiar facts of each case and circumstances presented to the court
from which it must draw a judicious and judicial conclusion governed by law, justice and
common sense. That the facts of this suit which the claimants have called on this Court to
exercise its discretion favourably is based on the Minister of Labour's letter of 3 November 2021
affirming the decision of the Registrar of Trade Unions declining to register the Law Officers
Association of Nigeria (LOAN) wherein it affirmed the decision as follows: “There is also the
‘Judiciary Staff Union of Nigeria’ (JUSUN) registered to organize all employees in the Judicial
Arm of Government (with exception of the secretariat staff)”; and “I am further directed to
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advise you to abide by the Ministry’s letter of 19th September, 2012 in which you were advised
to align with Judiciary Staff Union of Nigeria (JUSUN)”.
34. The 3rd defendant went on that it can be rightly inferred from facts adduced by the claimants
that the issues in contention in this suit which this Court has been invited to draw a conclusion
governed by law, justice and common sense are the powers of the Registrar of Trade Unions to
register the Law Officers Association of Nigeria (LOAN) i.e. whether the Registrar exercised
such power within the confines of the Trade Unions Act, the substantive statute that regulates the
exercise of his powers to consider and approve application for registration of a body as a trade
union in Nigeria, which he has exercised in the negative by refusal to register same pursuant to
his letter of 19 September 2012 with reference number ML.18/147/SV1/298. That this issue
cannot effectively be determined without taking into wholistic consideration the provisions of the
1999 Constitution, the Trade Unions Act and other relevant applicable statutes that relate to the
case of the claimants.
35. To the 3rd defendant, it is incontestable that the right of citizens to belong to any association
of their choice that propagates and defends its members’ common interest is guaranteed by
section 40 of the 1999 Constitution which provides thus:
Every person shall be entitled to assemble freely and associate with other persons, and in
particular he may form or belong to any political party, trade union or any other association
for the protection of his interests…
That this constitutional provision was given judicial backing in the case of Motorcycle Transport
Union of Nig & ors v. Delta State Motorcyclist Association & ors [2010] LPELR-4503(CA).
36. However, that the HAGF is not unmindful that this right to freedom of association is not
absolute in itself and thus can be curtailed or qualified by the provisions of the Constitution,
specifically section 45(1) of the same Constitution, which provides thus:
(1) Nothing in sections 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 of this Constitution shall invalidate any law
that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society -
(a) in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public
health; or
(b) for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedom or other persons.
37. The 3rd defendant equally conceded to the fact that the Trade Unions Act is a law that is
reasonably justifiable in a democratic society enacted for public order in the management and
administration of trade unions. That it is not in dispute also that the power to register or not to
register the Law Officers Association of Nigeria (LOAN) or any other organization as a trade
union is solely vested on the Registrar of Trade Unions. The Registrar has exercised the latter in
this case pursuant to sections 3(2) and 5(4) of the Trade Unions Act to decline registration.
38. It is, however, the contention of the 3rd defendant that these statutory powers conferred on
the Registrar of Trade Unions must be exercised within the confines of the said statute taking
into cognizance the peculiar facts of each application for registration. That in the construction of
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statutes, powers of a public body invested with statutory power must be construed to be
exercised within the confines of such power so as not to exceed or abuse such power. It must
keep within the limits of the authority committed to it. It must act in good faith. And it must act
reasonably, referring to Wilson v. AG, Bendel State & ors [1985] LPELR-3496(SC). More so,
that a statutory body exercising a statutory power to divest a person’s vested right has the legal
duty to show that its exercise or intended exercise of that power is in accordance with law and
the court has the duty to protect vested rights of citizens, citing Chief Joseph Oyeyemi v.
Commissioner for Local Government, Kwara State [1992] 2 SCNJ 266 at 278, which relied on
Ojo v. Governor of Oyo State [1989] 1 NWLR (Pt. 5) 1 and Wilson v. Attorney-General of Bendel
State (supra).
39. That this Court should also take into cognizance that though it is a general principle of law
that he who asserts must lead evidence of such assertion but in the case of divesting of vested
right by a statutory body the law places the burden on a statutory body to show that divesting a
party’s vested right is within the confines of the law, citing Hart v. Military Governor of Rivers
State & ors [1976] 2 Federation of Nigeria Law Report 215 at 226 - 227. That the law has never
placed any primary obligation on the person whose right is being divested, to show why his right
should not be divested, to show that the exercise of the power is contrary to law. That once a
plaintiff has shown that he has a vested right and that a statutory body has taken away that right
in exercise of a statutory power, he has no duty to show why his right should not be divested.
The burden automatically shifts to the statutory authority to justify the exercise of its statutory
power. If it fails to discharge that burden, then the said exercise of statutory power must be
declared invalid and set aside. Accordingly, that the evidential burden is on the Registrar to prove
that the exercise of his duty in refusing to register LOAN is one that he has done satisfactorily
within the confines of the Trade Unions Act, urging the Court to so hold.
40. Additionally, that it is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes that where the words of
a statute are clear and unambiguous, the courts are bound to apply its ordinary meaning to its
construction especially where doing so will not lead to an absurdity in its application, citing
Abdul v. Shekwolo & ors [2022] LPELR-56682(CA). Premised on this principle of interpretation
of statute, the HAGF canvassed that sections 3(2) and 5(4) of the Trade Unions Act are clear and
unambiguous as to the condition when an association’s right to register as a trade union will be
refused, which is where in the opinion of the Registrar there exists a trade union that sufficiently
represents the interests of the class of persons whose interests the union is intended to represent.
41. Furthermore, that the intention of the legislators in promulgating sections 3(2) and 5(4) of the
Trade Unions Act is to ensure the non-proliferation of trade unions, and that systematized,
cohesive and responsible trade unions are established for the good of society. That the intention
of the legislators cannot be stretched by any bit of imagination to mean outright
disenfranchisement of the constitutional rights of State Counsel in the employment of the
Attorney-General of the Federation and States to belong to a trade union that does not
sufficiently represent the common interest of members (LOAN), taking into consideration that
there is presently no trade union that sufficiently represents the common interest of these State
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Counsel. That any such construction or interpretation of the said sections will lead to absurdity
and the judiciary encroaching into legislative duties. The duty of the courts is to interpret the law
as it is.
42. It is the submission of the 3rd defendant that where there exists no trade union that has the
jurisdictional scope that sufficiently covers the common interest of State Counsel, such
individuals have the unfettered right to form its own trade union which will cater for their
interests. That the cardinal and principal objective of joining a trade union is the expectation that
the union will agitate for and pursue with passion the interest of its members; as such, if
members are not deriving the expected dividends of membership and feel dissatisfied with the
performance of the union, they are entitled to resign, renounce, and withdraw their membership
and cannot be coerced or compelled to remain members against their will, urging the Court to so
hold.
43. To the HAGF/MJ, the reasons adduced by the Registrar of Trade Unions in the letter of 19
September 2012 with reference number ML.18/147/SVI/1/298 are not genuine, reasonable and
valid to warrant the refusal to register Law Officers Association of Nigeria (LOAN) as a trade
union. That this letter is ultra vires and thus constitute a breach of the fundamental rights of State
Counsel in the Office of the Attorney-General of the Federation and that of Attorney-General of
the 36 States of the Federation to belong to an association that projects and protects its common
interest as well, especially where there exists no association that covers that jurisdictional scope.
The 3rd defendant then urged the Court to overturn the decision reached by the Registrar of
Trade Unions given that the only condition in which section 5(4) of Trade Unions Act will
rightly apply is where a trade union is already in existence which is sufficiently a representative
of the class of persons whose interest the union is intended. That in this case, there are sufficient
facts to persuade this Court that the Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria (SCSN)
which most of the members currently belong to and Judiciary Staff Union of Nigeria (JUSUN),
which the Registrar is proposing to LOAN to align with, have parallel interests, urging the Court
to so hold.
44. That it is a fact that the Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria (ASCSN) is a
universal umbrella for all cadres of Senior Civil Servants in the employment of Civil Service of
the Federation. That the only common interest that the association has with State Counsel in the
employment of the Hon. Attorney-General of the Federation is that its members are employed by
the Federal Civil Service Commission and nothing more, which cannot rightly constitute
sufficient representation.
45. The 3rd defendant proceeded to highlight the special factors that distinguish LOAN from
ASCSN and JUSUN. To the 3rd defendant, the the Office of the Honourable Attorney-General of
the Federation is a special office specifically provided for in section 150 of the 1999
Constitution, which in subsection (1) provides thus: “There shall be an Attorney-General of the
Federation who shall be the Chief Law Officer of the Federation and a Minister of the
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Government of the Federation”. That the exercise of the powers of the office is constitutional and
exemplary, and is alluded to more in section 174 as follows:
(1) The Attorney-General of the Federation shall have power –
(a) to institute and undertake criminal proceedings against any person before any
court of law in Nigeria, other than a court-martial, in respect of any offence created
by or under any Act of the National Assembly;
(b) to take over and continue any such criminal proceedings that may have been
instituted by any other authority or person; and
(c) to discontinue at any stage before judgement is delivered any such criminal
proceedings instituted or undertaken by him or any other authority or person.
(2) The powers conferred upon the Attorney-General of the Federation under subsection (1)
of this section may be exercised by him in person or through officers of his department.
46. The 3rd defendant also referred to sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Law Officers Act, already quoted
by the claimants. Also referred to is Saraki v. FRN [2016] LPELR-40013(SC), which per the
concurring judgment of Ibrahim Tanko Muhammed, JSC (as he then was) held thus:
…In view of the fact that the office is created in the Constitution, and unless or until the
office is abrogated, it will continue in perpetuity. And any suit by or against the AttorneyGeneral will in law be absorbed by the office, which never dies unless the Constitution
abrogates it…Thus the absence of an Attorney-General from office either on the basis of
non-appointment of one or on the basis of infirmity of body or mind of the occupant of that
office, that office must remain alive and active. Assignments placed on the office by the
Constitution or other statutes must not stagnate but must be carried out by other competent
officers of the office.
47. That the afore-mentioned Supreme Court authority and statutory provisions cited affirm the
position that the Law Officers in the employment of the Office of the Attorney-General of the
Federation and the States are conferred with the powers of such office which they work for and
are not ordinary civil servants to be lumped with the Association of Senior Civil Servants in the
same trade union. That the Association of Senior Civil Servants cannot propagate common
interest of State Counsel like political interest in the Nigerian Bar Association, special
allowances, attainment of the position of Senior Advocates (SAN) and work packages which are
only peculiar to State Counsel.
48. On the other hand, that interests of State Counsel cannot be equally and properly propagated
adequately by Judiciary Staff Union of Nigeria (JUSUN) for the reasons canvassed above and
the notorious fact that JUSUN represents officers in the judiciary while LOAN when registered
will represent State Counsel in the Executive arm, urging the court to take judicial notice of the
fact that it is common logic that both cadres of workers do not have the same interest. There is no
correlation whatsoever between the functions, duties, particularly the interest of the Law Officers
attached to the Attorneys-General and Officers (law officers or ad hoc officers) attached to the
Judicial arm of Government.
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49. The 3rd defendant proceeded to urge the Court to take into special cognizance of the fact the
Registrar of Trade Union has exercised his statutory discretion favourably in similar
circumstances like that of LOAN, in the registration of trade unions in the medical field. That it
is a fact that there is a general trade union for both medical and non-medical groups called Joint
Health Sector Unions yet there are other numerous trade unions that represent diverse special
interest in the medical field which include but not limited to Nigerian Association of Resident
Doctors (NARD), Nigerian Association of Nurses and Midwifery, Veterinary Association of
Nigeria, “Association of Psychiatrics in Nigeria” and Medical and Health Workers Union of
Nigeria amongst others. This is also the same situation in the field of education. To the 3rd
defendant, an exercise of statutory discretion by the Registrar must be done in good faith,
uninfluenced by irrelevant considerations and not arbitrarily or illegally or upon a misconception
of the law or under a misconception of facts, citing University of Lagos & anor. v. Aigoro [1985]
1 NWLR (Pt. 1) 143; [1985] 1 SC 265 at 271 and Ntukidem v. Oko [1986] — citation is not
supplied.
50. To the 3rd defendant, it will, therefore, be arbitrarily a misconception of law and fact, and
also an exercise in bad faith for the Registrar of Trade Unions to be inconsistent in the
application of his discretionary powers of registration towards LOAN. That what is good for
goose is equally good for the gander. That the case of LOAN ought not be different. Any such
exercise that is not consistent cannot be said to be one exercised in good faith and is, therefore,
arbitrary, urging the Court to so hold. That consistency is an essential characteristic of ethics and
law. Inconsistency in the application of laws will lead to anarchy and disorderliness; an exercise
of such discretionary power that is inconsistent with the provisions of the enabling statute will be
null and void to the extent of such inconsistency, urging the Court to so hold.
51. The 3rd defendant went on that the right to freely belong to a trade union that sufficiently
represents one's common interest is a fundamental right; and that it is an established principle of
law that fundamental rights of citizens are given crucial recognition by courts of law, referring to
Jacob v. Comptroller General of Nigeria Customs Service [2021] LPELR-54793(CA) and
Nigerian Army & ors v. Oyewole [2021] LPELR-55113(CA). Accordingly, that Law Officers in
the Offices of Attorneys-General of the Federation and the States will be denied of this very
important constitutional right of freedom of association which will be fettered further if the
Registrar's letter of 19 September 2012 is not set aside by this Court. That failure to do so will be
this Court wrongly refusing the said citizens of the right to belong to an association of common
interest.
52. That the Black Law Dictionary 8th Edition defined sufficient as adequate, of such quality,
number, force or value as is necessary for a given purpose. We submit that the interest of State
Counsel in the Office of the Attorney-General of the Federation and States cannot be given value
necessary for the purpose of sufficient representation by unions such as Senior Civil Servants of
Nigeria (ASCSN) and Judiciary Staff Union of Nigeria, urging the Court to so hold. More so,
that an act which fetters the citizen’s right to freely join a union that sufficiently covers the
interest of members especially where there exists no other of such association that sufficiently
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covers same, will be restricting State Counsel’s constitutional rights pursuant to section 40. That
where rights are interfered with by statutory authority, the exercise of the purported powers
under the authority will be construed strictly. Where the purported exercise of the powers is not
in conformity with the statute under which it is supposed to have been exercised, there will be no
basis for considering the legality or otherwise of the said act as same will be void ab initio. That
the decision to decline registration of Law Officers Association of Nigeria (LOAN) based on the
reason that there exists other trade union, which is not sufficiently a representative of the
common interest of State Counsel nationwide, should be construed strictly by this Court against
the Registrar of Trade Unions, urging the Court to so hold.
53. It is the further submission of the 3rd defendant that in addition to the claimants’ issues for
determination, the claimants have sought declaratory reliefs, the basis of which two orders of
Court are sought. That it is an established principle of law that reliefs which are declaratory must
be based on certain conditions of law, citing CBN v. Jacob Oladele Amao & 2 ors [2011] Vol.
201 LRCN, which, relying on Chukwumah v. Shell Petroleum [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt.289) 12,
reiterated some of the conditions for grant of declaratory reliefs thus:
(a) A declaration will be granted even when the relief has been rendered unnecessary by
lapse of time for the action to be tried, if at the time the action was brought, it raised
substantial issues of law.
(b) The claim to which the declaratory relief relates must be substantial; that is, the plaintiff
must be entitled to the relief in the fullest meaning of the word.
(c) A declaration will only be granted where there is a breach.
(d) The plaintiff must establish a right in relation to which the declaration can be made
hence the court will not generally decide hypothetical questions.
(e) The relief claimed must be something which would not be unlawful or unconstitutional
or inequitable for the court to grant.
(f) The relief should also not be contrary to the accepted principles upon which the court
exercises its jurisdiction.
54. To the 3td defendant, the claimants have met all the conditions stipulated in the above case
for this Court to grant the declaratory reliefs sought: LOAN has still not been registered as a
trade union and so the relief sought has not been rendered unnecessary by lapse of time —
condition (a); the continued infringement of the rights of State Counsel by the non-registration of
LOAN is substantial and the claimants are entitled to it — condition (b); there is a breach of the
fundamental rights of all State Counsel in Nigeria to freely form its own trade union — condition
(c); the question for determination in this suit is live as the fundamental rights of over three
million State Counsel are in breach and need remedy — condition (d); the continued denial of
the right to associate freely is both unconstitutional and inequitable — condition (e); and there is
nothing contrary to the principles upon which the Court exercises its jurisdiction but there has
been injury and the Court has the remedy — condition (f). Accordingly, that it is crystal clear
that the claimants are fully entitled to the declaratory reliefs sought having satisfied all the
conditions laid down in CBN v. Jacob Oladele Amao & 2 ors (supra).
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55. The 3rd defendant proceeded to distinguish the Supreme Court cases of Osawe & ors v.
Registrar of Trade Unions [1985] LPELR-2792(SC) and RTNA & ors v. MHWUN & ors [2008]
LPELR-3196(SC) & this present suit. To the 3rd defendant, he is very much aware of the
position of the Supreme Court in the cases of Osawe & ors v. Registrar of Trade Unions [1985]
LPELR-2792(SC) and RTNA & ors v. MHWUN & ors [2008] LPELR-3196(SC), that right of
freedom of association to register as a trade union can be curtailed by the provisions of section
3(2) and 5(4) of the TUA. However, that the facts of this present case and the referred Supreme
Court cases are not the same. That the Supreme Court decided in case of RTNA & ors v.
MHWUN & ors [2008] LPELR-3196(SC), which followed the principle in Osawe & ors v.
Registrar of Trade Unions [1985] LPELR-2792(SC), that:
Sections 37 and 41 of the 1979 Constitution referred to in Osawe’s case (supra), are the
same as Sections 40 and 45 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. In
this regard, His Lordship in the Osawe’s case had these to say: “As regards ground 2, it
was not disputed that the fundamental right enshrined under Section 37 of the Constitution
of 1979 for freedom of association as trade unions was subject to the derogation set out in
Section 41(1)(a) of the said Constitution. Hence Section 37 of the Constitution is not
absolute as it cannot invalidate any law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic
society ‘in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, or public
health’. It was not also the contention of the appellants that Section 3(2) of the Trade
Unions Act, 1973 as amended by Section 1(1)(a) of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act,
1978 was a law reasonably justified in a democratic society. It was in fact in order to
maintain public order out of a chaotic situation that the exercise of 1978 was embarked
upon which gave rise to the promulgation of the Trade Unions Amendment Act 1978. I am
therefore unable to agree that Section 3(2) of the Trade Unions Act 1973 as amended
contravenes Section 37 of the Constitution of 1979. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the
Court of Appeal was right in allowing the appeal and in setting aside the order of the High
Court Benin City which ordered the respondent to register the appellants’ union.” Since I
am bound by these pronouncements, I agree with the Court below, that the said Sections 3
and 5 of the Act are not inconsistent with the provisions of the 1999 Constitution, I hold
specifically, that Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution is not absolute. I also hold that
Section 3(2) of the Act, does not contravene Section 37 of the 1979 Constitution (as
Amended).
56. That cases are authority on facts which it was decided on. Two cases are not similar in facts
and it will be an injustice to apply a principle in one case to another case without taking into
consideration the peculiar facts of each case. That the Supreme Court rightly applied the above
principle to the two cases owing the fact that in Osawe’s case there was already a registered trade
union known as Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational & Associated Institutions which the
Registrar of Trade Unions relied on to advise the appellant in that case, Nigerian Unified
Teaching Service Workers, to subsume into. In this case there is a sufficient representative of
common interest as both unions are non-academic trade unions operating in the public sector,
while in the case of Law Officers Association of Nigeria (LOAN), Association of Senior Civil
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Servants of Nigerian (ASCSN) does not sufficiently represent the common interest of State
Counsel pursuant to section 5(4) of the Trade Unions Act, urging the Court to so hold.
57. Similarly, that in RTNA & ors v. MHWUN & ors [2008] LPELR-3196(SC), the Medical and
Health Workers Union of Nigeria is an already registered trade union that sufficiently represent
the common interest of Nigerian Association of Community Health Practitioners of Nigeria, the
trade union sought to be registered. Thus, the refusal by the Registrar of Trade Unions is
understandable to curtail the proliferation of trade unions where there already exists one that
sufficiently covers the interest of Nigerian Association of Community Health Practitioners of
Nigeria. That this is not the case as relates to Law Officers Association of Nigeria (LOAN),
urging this Court to distinguish this present case with the aforementioned Supreme Court cases.
58. That the peculiar facts of this case are also emboldened by the fact the Attorney-General of
the Federation and the thirty-six states (36) concede to the fact that registration of Law Officers
Association of Nigeria will bring systematized and cohesive order for the good of the Ministries
of Justice in the Federation in carrying out the powers of the Honourable Attorneys-General in
the country.
59. The 3rd defendant then urged the Court to take judicial notice of these facts that are common
knowledge, relying on section 124 of the Evidence Act:
(a) That Joint Health Workers Union, National Association of Resident Doctors (NARD),
Nigerian Medical Association (NMA) are registered trade unions in Nigeria.
(b) That there are no trade unions in Nigeria presently that sufficiently represent the
common interest of law officers in Nigeria.
60. In conclusion, the 3rd defendant urged the Court to interpret sections 3(2) and 5(4) of the
TUA in relation to the constitutional right of the claimants to freely associate in a trade union
that sufficiently represents their common interest as the 3rd defendant did.
The Submissions of the 4th Defendant
61. Ther 4th defendant submitted two issues for determination, namely:
(i) Whether the claimants can sue the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants for not registering it as
trade union or the 4th defendant.
(ii) Whether or not the plaintiff (Law Officers Association of Nigeria) having not yet been
registered under the relevant laws can validly sue through its representatives.
62. The 4th defendant, on issue (i), submitted that the claimants cannot sue the 1st, 2nd and 3rd
defendants for not registering it as a trade union or the 4th defendant as it is presently
constituted. In the first place, that this action is incompetent and cannot invoke the jurisdiction of
the Court to hear and determine same given the failure of the claimants to comply with the
condition precedent in order to maintain the action, citing Shelim v. Cobang [2009] 37 WRN 32,
Lawal v. Oke [2001] 7 NWLR (Pt. 711) 88 and Adigun v. Osaka [2003] 5 NWLR (Pt. 812) 95.
That once a party raises objection as to the non-compliance with a condition precedent to the
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exercise of the court’s jurisdiction, it is for the court seized of the proceedings to examine the
objection whether it can adjudicate on the matter. That where a statute or the rules of court
prescribe a condition precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction, that condition precedent must
first be fulfilled before there is jurisdiction, citing Agboola v. Agbodemu [2009] 37 WRN 59,
Ezegbu v. FATB Ltd [1992] 1 NWLR (Pt. 216) 197 and Madukuolu v. Nkemdilim [2001] 46 WRN
1; [1962] 2 NSCC (Vol. 2) 374; [1962] 1 All NLR (Pt. 4) 587; [1962] 2 SCNLR 341 at 348.
63. It is the 4th defendant’s submission that the claimants failed woefully to meet the condition
precedent before filing this suit. That the time for appeal against the decision of the Registrar of
Trade Unions as provided by section 5(5)(b) of the Trade Unions Act Cap T14 LFN 2004 was
not complied with by appealing to the Minister for Labour and Employment within the 30 days
allowed. Hence, it provides: “Any official or member of the union may, within the period of 30
days beginning with the date so specified, appeal to the Minister against the refusal”. That in the
absence of the members of the Law Officers Association not complying in filing the appeal with
30 days, it robs the Court the jurisdiction to entertain this suit. This is because it is not initiated
by due process of law upon the fulfillment of the 30 days being condition precedent to the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court.
64. That beside the 30 days required by the TUA, there are other conditions to be fulfilled,
referring to the following:
(i) Exhibits B, C and D are the purported re-applications pleaded and relied on by the
claimants. They are made on the letterheads of the Association even though not registered.
They are bereft of the signatures of at least 50 of the members, as required by section 3(1)
(a) of the TUA.
(ii) The claimants also did not satisfy the requirement of two copies of the rules of their
Association with the list and particulars of the persons by whom the application is signed
and each official of the Association as enjoined by section 3(6)(a) - (b) of the TUA.
(iii) The claimants did nit satisfy the requirement of registered rules as enjoined under
section 4 (2)(a) of the TUA.
(iv) The claimants did not satisfy rules as enjoyed under section 4 of the TUA.
65. To the 4th defendant, from the provisions of the Trade Unions Act cited above, it is clear that
the claimants in its re-applications to be registered as a trade union failed to comply and fulfill
the requirements stated therein before purporting to apply to the Registrar of Trade Unions. This
can be inferred from the contents and totality of the documents annexed to this suit by the
claimants. That the word used in the above provisions is ‘shall’ which connotes a mandatory
provision that must be adhered to, citing Onochie v. Odogwu [2006] 17 WRN 1 at 34 - 35.
Therefore, the claimants must first of all comply with the provisions of the Trade Unions Act
stated above. That instead of the claimants complying with the provisions of the Trade Unions
Act in making the applications, they decided to seek solace in the content of the refusal letter
which by their inaction they also failed to appeal against the decision within the 30 days allowed.
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66. In short, that the action of the claimants before this Court is belated and thus a waiver of their
right to file this suit, citing PWTH AG v. Ceddi Corp. Ltd [2012] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1285) 465. That
the claimants waived their right to utilize the 30 days within which to appeal the decision of the
Registrar of Trade Unions to the Minister of Labour and Employment. That it is not in doubt that
while the claimants were filing this suit they were not aware of the provision of section 5(5)(b)
of the Trade Unions Act, which gives them the option and right to appeal the decision of the
Registrar of Trade Unions within 30 days but choose not to do so till date.
67. The 4th defendant went on that in Exhibit A, the Registrar of Trade Unions at paragraph 3
reminded the claimants of their right of appeal within 30 days. In Exhibit B at paragraph 2, the
claimants admitted and apologized that they delayed and lapsed in following up their rights in
these words: “May we first and foremost apologize for the delay and the lapse of following up
this subject for this length of time it is coming up. It was simply due to tussles for a change of
our leadership which by our constitution a new leadership is finally put in place just recently”.
That the law is that in order to establish a waiver, it must be shown that some steps have been
taken which is only necessary or only useful if the objection has been actually waived or has
never been entertained, citing PWTH AG. v. Ceddi Corp. Ltd (supra) and Saraki v. Kotye [1990]
4 NWLR (Pt. 143) 144. Furthermore, that waiver carries with it element of abandonment of a
known legal right, which can be seen in the action of the claimants in Exhibit B and all other
correspondences attached to the originating summons.
68. It is the 4th defendant’s submission that the claimants having claimed to have started taking
steps to register their association and stopped pursing the same right, they have by their actions
waived their rights. That it is to be noted that the claimants at paragraph 34 of the affidavit in
support of the application claimed to have appealed via a letter dated 15 October 2012 to the
Minister of Labour and Employment. However, no such letter is attached to the application and
therefore, the said paragraph is speculative in nature contrary to section 115(2) of the Evidence
Act 2011, urging the Court to so hold.
69. In the same vein it is the deposition of the 4th defendant that paragraphs 51, 53, 56, 58, 59
and 62 of the affidavit in support offend section 115(2) of the Evidence Act, which provides thus:
“An affidavit shall not contain extraneous matter, by way of objection, or prayer, or legal
argument or conclusion”. That a careful perusal of these paragraphs of the affidavit in support
shows that the claimants used words like: “are predominately not lawyers”, “There is no Trade
Union that is protecting their interest”, “is against any logic and not back up with a justifiable
reason”, “After considering the unjustifiable reasons proffered”, “were not justifiably issued” and
“same was breached unfairly, unjustifiably and without due regards”. That these words or
phrases are either conclusions or legal arguments, which are not allowed in affidavit evidence;
urging the Court to expunge them.
70. The 4th defendant then proceeded to “take a cursory look at the issues raised by the
Claimants for determination”. On whether the Registrar of Trade Unions can refuse the
registration of Law Officers Association of Nigeria (LAON) without any justifiable reason(s), the
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claimants had contended that the Registrar of Trade Unions, having given a reason for a refusal,
such reason(s) is not tenable. To the 4th defendant, before the reason given by the Registrar of
Trade Unions in the letter dated 19 September 2012 can be held unto by the claimants, they are
bound to have complied with the condition precedent earlier raised in the 4th defendant’s
submissions.
71. Furthermore, that the 4th defendant is a union like any other union registered by the Registrar
of Trade Unions having complied with the requirements of the provisions of the Trade Unions
Act. That by the said registration, the 4th defendant assumed the position of a legal entity with all
rights conferred on it by the Act. That it is glaring that from the claims of the claimants, no where
is it stated that the 4th defendant imposed itself on the claimants or aided in the refusal of her
registration by the Registrar of Trade Unions.
72. That beside the members of the Law Officers Association of Nigeria coming from the office
of the Attorney-General of the Federation/States, Solicitor General and State Counsel, etc, in the
High Courts, there are Registrars, Deputy Registrars, Legal Assistants to Judges of High Courts,
in the Court of Appeal, in the Supreme Court, while Magistrates and Upper Area Courts have
judges who are legal practitioners called to the bar to practice law and are covered by the 4th
defendant.
73. It is the 4th defendant’s submission that while the claimants have the right to be registered as
an Association, the Registrar of Trade Unions has his discretion to do so, referring to section 5(4)
of the Trade Unions Act
74. On whether or not the claimants are entitled to their reliefs as contained in their amended
originating summons, the 4th defendant submitted that the claimants are not entitled to the reliefs
sought for having breached the condition precedent and waived their right to institute this action.
75. That section 40 of the 1999 Constitution states: “Every person shall be entitled to assemble
freely and associate with other persons, and in particularly he may form and belong to any
political party, trade union or any other association for the protection of his interest”. To the 4th
defendant, it appears that the claimants have misconstrued and misinterpreted this section of the
Constitution by applying it wrongly in this situation. That the fundamental right to form a trade
union is not an absolute one. The Constitution provides for derogation on grounds of public
safety, public order, public morality or health in the interest of defence or for the purpose of
protecting the rights and freedom of other persons. The derogation thus permitted is by law and
such law must meet the criteria stipulated which are reasonably justifiable in a democratic
society for any one of the grounds stated above. That this Court in Nigerian Civil Service Union
v. Association of Senior Civil Servants [2004] NLLR (Pt. 3) 429 held that: “Right to freedom of
association guaranteed under the Constitution are quantified and not absolute rights, thus, the
rights of associate with other persons to form a trade union must be within the limit by the Trade
Unions Act”.
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76. That the claimants intended to be registered as a trade union wherein there is law governing
trade unions which prescribed the conditions precedent to be met in order to be registered as a
trade union. That the claimants intentionally ignored and refused to fulfill the conditions already
addressed above and hoping to hide under section 40 of the 1999 Constitution to enforce their
perceived right. That he who comes to equity must come with clean hands or he who wants
equity must do equity, citing Chabasaya v. Anwasi [2010] 25 WRN 30 at 55 and Moghalu v.
Bobo [2005] 11 WRN 115 at 138. That what the Constitution preaches is different from the
reasons adduced by the Registrar of Trade Unions for the refusal to register the claimants as a
trade union. That section 40 of the 1999 Constitution does not encourage the claimants to breach
or flout other laws.
77. Furthermore, that the refusal by the Registrar of Trade Unions to register the claimants as a
trade union does not offend section 40 of the Constitution because it does not stop the claimants
from associating, or assembling, or forming, or belonging to any political party and/or trade
union. That the refusal letter simply states: “I refer to your letter dated 29th June, 2012 on the
above subject matter and hereby inform you that your association Law officers Association of
Nigeria, cannot be registered as trade union in view of sections3(2) and 5(4) of the Trade Unions
Act, CAP T14, LFN 2004". That from the contents of this letter, the Registrar only refused to
register the claimants as a trade union due to statutory reasons, but did not stop the claimants
from forming association of their choice which the above section of the Constitution guarantees.
That in the light of the above, it will be safe to say that the letter of refusal dated 19 September
2012 does not in any way contravene section 40 of the 1999 Constitution. That the claimants,
having waived their right to appeal the decision of the Registrar of Trade Unions within the 30
days allowed for them to do so, cannot rectify same by filing this suit, urging the Court to
dismiss the claims of the claimants in their entirety and with substantial cost for being
incompetent.
The Claimants’ Reply on Points of Law to the 4th Defendant’s Submissions
78. The claimants reacted on points of law only in respect of the 4th defendant’s submissions
given that the submissions of the 3rd defendant supported the position of the claimants. The
claimants had earlier filed a 28-paragraphed further affidavit in response to the 4th defendant’s
counter-affidavit.
79. On the 4th defendant’s issue (i), i.e. whether the claimants can sue the defendants for not
registering it as a trade union, the 4th defendant had argued that the claimants failed to comply
and fulfill the requirements stated in sections 3(1) and 4(2) of the Trade Unions Act. To the
claimants, the 4th defendant cannot create a different cause of action other than the one presented
by the claimants before this Court. That the case of the claimants is that the 1st and 2nd
defendants denied and/or refused the claimants application for registration as a trade union in
Nigeria. The refusal and/or denial was based on the reasons given in Exhibits A and G attached
to the affidavit in support of the originating summons and Exhibit I attached to the further
affidavit in response to the 4th defendant's counter-affidavit. That the basis of the denial of the
1st and 2nd defendants was specifically on sections 3(2) and 5(4) of the Trade Unions Act 2004
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and not on sections 3(1) and 4(2) of the Trade Unions Act as contemplated by the 4th defendant.
That the provisions of the sections of the law are quite different.
80. Furthermore, that the 1st and 2nd defendants reserved the right to deny registration of a trade
union based on legal and justifiable reason(s). The 2nd defendant by his letter in Exhibit A after
the receipt of the application letter of the claimant dated 29 June 2012 has specifically stated the
reasons for his refusal and/or denial to register the claimants’ Association based on the reason
that the claimants should align themselves with the 4th defendant as a trade union because the
two unions fell in the Judicial Arm of Government. The 1st and 2nd defendants did not state it in
their different letters i.e Exhibits A, G and I that the claimants did not attach the Rules/
constitution with their application letter and sections 3(1) and 4 of the Trade Unions Act were not
the basis of the 1st and 2nd defendants denial and/or refusal to register the claimants’ Association
as a trade union but sections 3(2) and 5(a) of the Trade Unions Act.
81. The claimants then referred to AG, Federation v. Abacha [2010] LPELR-8997(CA) for the
definition of cause of action, which is the entire set of facts or circumstances giving rise to an
enforceable claim, and includes all those things necessary to give a right of action and every
facts which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed. And that it is the
originating processes of the claims that will be considered in determining the cause of action. To
the claimants, the 4th defendant cannot create a different condition for denying and/or refusal to
register the claimants’ Association by the 1st and 2nd defendants apart from the reasons earlier
stated in Exhibits A, G and I because that was not the claimants' complaint against the 1st and
2nd defendants before the Court. That assuming but without conceding that the 1st and 2nd
defendants had included the provisions of sections 3(1) and 4 of the Trade Unions Act as part of
the basis of their refusal/denial of the claimants’ Association registration, the line of action of the
claimants would have been different entirely. The claimants then urged the Court to hold that the
defendants, nay the 4th defendant, cannot maintain a different cause of action apart from that of
the claimants in this case and in the way the 4th defendant is putting same forward.
82. The claimants went on that the 4th defendant erroneously argued that the claimants failed to
appeal the decision of the 2nd defendant within 30 days but resorted to Court; and that
accordingly, the claimants have waived their rights to appeal the decision of the 2nd defendant.
To the claimants, the claimants appealed the decision of the 2nd defendants to the 1st defendant
within the stipulated 30 days i.e. on 15/10/2012 coupled with several reminder letters. The 1st
defendant equally responded to the appeal by the claimants and affirmed the decision of the 2nd
defendant in Exhibit G attached to the affidavit in support of the originating summons and
Exhibit I attached to the further affidavit in response to the 4th defendant’s counter-affidavit. It is
the claimants’ submission that the mere fact that the 1st defendant delayed in responding to the
letter of appeal dated 15/1012072 and reminder letters of appeal by the claimants i.e. Exhibits B,
C and D should not be used against the claimants but rather against the 1st and 2nd defendants.
83. The 4th defendant further argued that the claimants did not utilized their right to file an
appeal to the 1st defendant, hence, they have waived their rights to appeal and that the present
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case is incompetent. To the claimants, the argument of the 4th defendant is misconceived given
that the claimants wrote a letter of appeal to the 1st defendant within the stipulated 30 days and
even wrote several reminder letters before the 1st defendant responded to the appeal and
affirmed the decision of the 2nd defendant.
84. That assuming without conceding that the claimants did not write the letter of appeal within
30 days i.e. on 15/10/2012, Exhibits B, C and D were also in respect of the appeals to the 1st
defendant to review the decision of the 2nd defendant. Though Exhibits B, C and D were written
outside the 30 days but the 1st defendant acted upon them and thereafter affirmed the decision of
the 2nd defendant in Exhibits G and I. That it was in this wise that the 1st defendant, who
reserves the right to reject the letter of appeal purportedly written outside the 30 days, waived his
right and acted on same without any complaint. That PWTH AG v. Ceddi Corp. [2012] 2 NWLR
(Pt. 7285) 465 cited by the 4th defendant is actually in favour of the claimants in this respect.
The claimants accordingly submitted that their action seeking the order of Court by a way of
certiorari to quash the decision of the 1st and 2nd defendants herein is in order and proper.
85. The claimants continued that it also beats one’s imagination to hear from the 4th defendant
that members of the 4th defendants who are Registrars of Court are also Law Officers in the
Chambers of the Hon. Attorneys-General of the 36 States as well as that of the Federation. The
claimants once again referred to sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Law Officers Act Cap L8 LFN 2004
and then submitted that the Law Officers are creation of law and specifically in the Executive
Arm of Government i.e. in the Chambers of the Attorneys-General and this is a clear distinction
from the judiciary staff who are employees in the Judicial Arm of Government.
86. On the 4th defendant’s issue (ii) i.e. whether the claimants (LOAN), having not been
registered under the relevant laws, can validly sue through its representatives, the claimants
submitted that a glance through the 4th defendant’s written address in support of its counteraffidavit shows that the 4th defendant did not in any way argue the 2nd issue it formulated;
hence, same is deemed abandoned, urging the Court to so hold. It is thus the claimants’
submission that the 4th defendant did not argue its issue (ii) and so abandoned same, urging the
Court to discountenance same and consequently hold that after placing all the relevant facts
before this Court, the claimants can sue for themselves and on behalf of other members of the
Association. Furthermore, that the Registrar of Trade Unions can only refuse and/or deny
registration of a trade union based on justifiable reasons and not as he did in this case. The
claimants urged the Court to discountenance the written address of the 4th defendant and grant
the claimants’ prayers.
COURT’S DECISION
87. I took my time to consider the processes and submissions of the parties in terms of the
preliminary objection of the 1st and 2nd defendants and in terms of the originating summons. I
need to state first that in paragraph 5.03 of their written address, the claimants referred to an
incomplete case, merely said to be Abdulahi. In so doing, the quotation from the said Abdulahi is
incomplete as is the said paragraph 5.03 itself.
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88. The 4th defendant had argued that paragraphs 51, 53, 56, 58, 59 and 62 of the claimants’
affidavit in support offend section 115(2) of the Evidence Act because the claimants used words
like: “are predominately not lawyers”, “There is no Trade Union that is protecting their interest”,
“is against any logic and not back up with a justifiable reason”, “After considering the
unjustifiable reasons proffered”, “were not justifiably issued” and “same was breached unfairly,
unjustifiably and without due regards”, which words are either conclusions or legal arguments
not allowed in affidavit evidence. I read through these paragraphs. I do not see anything
fundamentally wrong with them. Even if there was, it does not go to the root of this case as to
affect the outcome of the case, one way or the other. I so rule.
89. The 4th defendant had raised the issue of the competence of this suit. Inferring from the
contents and totality of the documents annexed to this suit by the claimants, the argument of the
4th defendant is that the claimant’s case is incompetent because they did not satisfy the
requirements of sections 3(1)(a) - (b), 3(6)(a) - (b) and 4 of the Trade Unions Act (TUA) Cap
T14 LFN 2004. This argument, I must state, is one that is misconceived. Having to exhibit in this
case the rules and the particulars enjoined by these provisions upon which the Law Officers’
Association of Nigeria (LOAN) was to be registered in order to make this suit competent is not
necessary given that the 1st and 2nd defendants did not state that that is the reason for which
LOAN was not registered. The claimants are contesting the reason(s) given by the 1st and 2nd
defendants for not registering LOAN. They are accordingly entitled to assume that all other
things necessary for registration of LOAN were met except of course the things associated with
the reasons the 1st and 2nd defendants gave. So it is misplaced for the 4th defendant to expect
that everything required for registering LOAN must be placed before this Court by the claimants
in order to make the case competent. Accordingly, I reject the argument of the 4th defendant in
that regard. I so rule.
90. It is also the argument of the 4th defendant that this suit is incompetent because the claimants
did not appeal to the Minister for Labour and Employment against the decision of the Registrar
of Trade Unions (RTU) within the 30 days window allowed by section 5(5)(b) of the Trade
Unions Act (TUA) Cap T14 LFN 2004. It is in this sense that the argument of the 4th defendant
coincides with the preliminary objection of the 1st and 2nd defendants, which is also hinged on
the claimants’ failure to comply with section 5(5)(b) of the TUA. It is the argument of the 1st and
2nd defendants that thereby this suit is not only incompetent for that failure but also an abuse of
court process, for all of which this Court lacks the jurisdictional competence to hear and
determine this case. I must state right away that the question of the claimants not appealing
against the decision of the Registrar of Trade Unions (RTU) within the 30 days allowed by the
RTU is one that does not really relate to the competence of this suit given that it is not related to
an appeal to the Court but to an administrative officer. Secondly, it is a question that can only be
raised by the officers allowed by the law i.e. the 1st to 3rd defendants, certainly not the 4th
defendant.
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91. Given that the 1st and 2nd defendant defendants raised the issue vide their preliminary
objection, I shall proceed to consider it. The claimants in paragraph 14 of their further affidavit
in response to the 4th defendant’s counter-affidavit actually indicated that they wrote an appeal
on 15 October 2012, which is within the 30 days allowed by the RTU but that same was not
attended to by the 1st defendant. By Exhibit H dated “October 2022” (the office of the RTU
acknowledged receipt of this letter on 26 October 2022), written after 3 February 2022 when this
suit was filed, the claimants asked the RTU for the certified true copies of three letters which
they said were in the custody of the RTU. They are: letter dated 29 June 2012 written by LOAN
to the RTU; letter dated 15/10/2012 written by LOAN to the Minster of Labour and
Employment; and letter dated 27 January 2015 written by LOAN to the Minister of Labour and
Productivity. There is nothing before the Court to show that the RTU reacted to, or complied
with, the request of the claimants.
92. Exhibit G (attached to the affidavit in support of the originating summons) is the same with
Exhibit I (attached to the claimants’ further affidavit in response to the 4th defendant’s counter
affidavit) and Exhibit T3 (attached to the affidavit of the 1st and 2nd defendants in support of
their preliminary objection). In Exhibit G/I/T3, dated 3 November 2021 and signed by the
Director Trade Union Services and Industrial Relations for the Honourable Minister, the
Honourable Minister acknowledged the receipt of the claimants’ application and previous
communications since 2012 on the matter and then declined to grant the claimants’ application,
advising them to abide by the Ministry’s letter of 19 September 2012. Exhibit G/I/T3
acknowledged that there were several communications between the claimants and the 1st and
2nd defendants. Paragraph 14 of the claimants’ further affidavit in response the 4th defendant’s
counter-affidavit actually indicated that they wrote an appeal on 15 October 2012, which is
within the 30 days allowed by section 5(5)(b) of the TUA but that same was not attended to by
the 1st defendant. Exhibit H (attached to the claimants’ further affidavit in response to the 4th
defendant’s counter affidavit) is simply dated “October 2022” is a letter from LOAN to the RTU
asking for the certified true copies of the letters of 29 June 2012, 15 October 2012 and 27
January 2015 written by LOAN to the RTU and the Minister of Labour. There is no reply from
the 1st and 2nd defendants to Exhibit H; and there is no contrary evidence against the deposition
in paragraph 14 of the claimants’ further affidavit in response to the 4th defendant’s counteraffidavit. I accordingly take the said paragraph 14 (supported by Exhibit H) to be true. This being
so, the question of the claimants not appealing against the refusal to register LOAN as a trade
union is a non-issue. The preliminary objection of the 1st and 2nd defendants and the challenge
to the competence of this suit by the 4th defendant, all of which are hinged on the argument that
the claimants did not comply with section 5(5)(b) of the TUA must fail. As it is, I do not see
them as competent issues the questions of the competence of the suit and the jurisdiction of this
Court to hear and determine same raised by the 4th defendant and the 1st and 2nd defendants.
Arguments in their regard are accordingly discountenanced. I so rule. The preliminary objection
of the 1st defendant accordingly fails in its entirety and is hereby dismissed.
93. I now turn to the merit of the case. The claimants want their association, LOAN, to be
registered as a trade union. The RTU refused the application to so register LOAN. The refusal
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was communicated to the claimants vide Exhibit A dated 19 September 2012. In Exhibit A, the
National Secretary of LOAN was told that LOAN cannot be registered as a trade union in view
of sections 3(2) and 5(4) of the TUA. In particular, Exhibit A went on to state thus:
In the light of this, lawyers in the employment of government owned/public sector
organizations belong to the unions operating in such organizations. There is also the
“Judiciary Staff Union of Nigeria” (JUSUN) registered to organize all employees in the
Judicial arm of government (with exemption of the secretarial staff).
You have the right to appeal the refusal to register your Association as trade union to the
Hon. Minister of Labour within 30 days in consonance with Section 5(6) (sic) of the Trade
Unions Act CAP. T.14 of 2004.
94. Sections 3(2) and 5(4) of the TUA provide as follows:
3(2) No combination of workers or employers shall be registered as a trade union save with
the approval of the Minister on his being satisfied that it is expedient to register the union
either by regrouping existing trade unions, registering a new trade union or otherwise
howsoever, but no trade union shall be registered to represent workers or employers in a
place where there already exists a trade union.
5(4) The Registrar shall not register the trade union if it appears to him that any existing
trade union is sufficiently representative of the interests of the class of persons whose
interest the union is intended to represent.
95. From Exhibit A, what I gather is that the claimants’ LOAN was not registered because there
was in existence another trade union(s) sufficiently representing the interests of the claimants.
This is the essence of the reference in Exhibit A to sections 3(2) and 5(4) of the TUA. One of
such existing trade unions is JUSUN. There are of course other trade unions in government
owned/public sector organisations such as Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria and
Senior Staff Association of Statutory Corporations and Government owned Companies, which
the claimants as senior staff in the employment of government can join.
96. Exhibit B, dated 13 November 2018, is the appeal by LOAN to the Minister of Labour
against the decision of the RTU not to register LOAN as a trade union. In Exhibit B, the
claimants apologized for not following up the matter and gave the reason for this as the “tussles
for a change of our leadership”. Exhibits C, D and E are reminders from LOAN. Exhibit F, dated
21 June 2021, is a letter from LOAN to the Attorney-General of the Federation & Minster of
Justice, the 3rd defendant in this suit, seeking the intervention of the Attorney-General of the
Federation in the matter. Exhibit G/I/T3, dated 3 November 2021, is the letter conveying the
decision of Minister of Labour affirming the earlier decision not to register LOAN as a trade
union.
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97. Were the 1st and 2nd defendants right in rejecting the registration of LOAN as a trade union
for the reasons they gave? This remains the question. The claimants relied on section 40 of the
1999 Constitution, which provides thus:
Every person shall be entitled to assemble freely and associate with other persons, and in
particular he may form or belong to any political party, trade union or any other association
for the protection of his interests: Provided that the provisions of this section shall not
derogate from the powers conferred by this Constitution on the Independent National
Electoral Commission with respect to political parties to which that Commission does not
accord recognition.
98. Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution is, however, not absolute. For instance, section 45(1) of
same Constitution provides thus:
(1) Nothing in sections 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 of this Constitution shall invalidate any law
that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society-
(a) in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public
health; or
(b) for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedom or other persons.
99. Section 45(1) of the 1999 Constitution or its equivalent under the 1979 Constitution has been
used to justify the provisions of sections 3(2) and 5(4) of the TUA, and hence the refusal of the
RTU to register bodies that applied to be trade unions. Osawe & ors v. Registrar of Trade Unions
[1985] LPELR-2792(SC), for instance, held that:
…it [is] mandatory for the Registrar of Trade Unions, on receiving an application to
register any trade union, to ensure that there is no other registered trade union in existence
which caters for the same interest as the one applying for registration. If there is, it
becomes incumbent in my view, for the Registrar, as the custodian of such information, to
decline to proceed to put into effect the machinery for the registration of the new trade
union as set out under Section 5(2) of the Trade Unions Act, 1973. Per Kazeem, JSC
delivering the leading judgment.
100. And Registered Trustees of National Association of Community Health Practitioners of
Nigeria (RTNA) & ors v. Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria & ors (MHWUN) [2008]
LPELR-3196(SC) affirmed Osawe & ors v. Registrar of Trade Unions and then held thus:
…there are many materials in the documents before this Court that confirm that the 1st
appellant had all along been catered for by a wider and encompassing body, which is the
1st respondent. After an investigation there was no way the 1st appellant would have been
registered in the circumstances. Besides the law is not such that registration is automatic. It
is at the discretion of the Registrar after he would have made his investigations and became
satisfied.
101. In his concurring judgment in Registered Trustees of National Association of Community
Health Practitioners of Nigeria (RTNA) & ors v. Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria
& ors (MHWUN), His Lordship Pius Olayiwola Aderemi, JSC intoned thus: “By the provisions
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of the Trade Unions Act reproduced above, the decision to register or not to register a trade union
inheres in the Registrar of Trade Union and not the Minister of Labour and Productivity”.
102. And Governing Council of NTI, Kaduna & anor v. NASU [2018] LPELR-44557(CA) would
go to state that: “The membership of a person to a trade union must be to the union he is or has
been normally engaged in”.
103. The claimants themselves acknowledged that the 1st and 2nd defendants may decline or
refuse registration of a body applying for registration as a trade union if there is already in
existence a trade union that adequately represents its interest. The argument of the claimants,
however, is that LOAN is different and has no other trade union representing its interest. That
JUSUN is a judiciary staff trade union restricted as such to the judiciary. On the other hand
members of LOAN are in the Executive arm of government. And that even though trade unions
like the Association of Senior Civil Servants of Nigeria and the Senior Staff Association of
Statutory Corporations and Government owned Companies exist in the Executive arm of
government, they are not sufficiently representative of the interests of LOAN, a body composed
of only law officers as defined under sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Law Officers Act Cap L8 LFN
2004. The claimants would also acknowledge in paragraph 47 of their affidavit in support of
their amended originating summons that LOAN belong to a professional body, the Nigerian Bar
Association (NBA).
104. The 3rd defendant added its voice to those of the claimants. To the 3rd defendant, Saraki v.
FRN [2016] LPELR-40013(SC) and sections 150 and 174 of the Constitution, as well as sections
1, 2 and 3 of the Law Officers Act affirm the position that the Law Officers in the employment of
the Office of the Attorney-General of the Federation and the States are conferred with the powers
of such office which they work for and are not ordinary civil servants to be lumped with the
Association of Senior Civil Servants in the same trade union. Also, that the Association of Senior
Civil Servants cannot propagate common interest of State Counsel like political interest in the
Nigerian Bar Association, special allowances, attainment of the position of Senior Advocate of
Nigeria (SAN) and work packages which are only peculiar to State Counsel
105. I agree with the claimants and the 3rd defendant here. This being so, Registered Trustees of
National Association of Community Health Practitioners of Nigeria (RTNA) & ors v. Medical
and Health Workers Union of Nigeria & ors (MHWUN) and Osawe & ors v. Registrar of Trade
Unions (both supra) are distinguishable and so do not apply in the instant case.
106. Registered Trustees of National Association of Community Health Practitioners of Nigeria
(RTNA) & ors v. Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria & ors (MHWUN) and Osawe &
ors v. Registrar of Trade Unions are distinguishable on another ground. They were all decided
before the coming into effect of section 254C(1)(f) and (h), and (2) of the 1999 Constitution.
Section 254C(1)(f) and (h), and (2) of the 1999 Constitution and section 7(6) of the National
Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006 permits this Court to, when adjudicating, apply international
best practices in labour and the Treaties, Conventions, Recommendations and Protocols on
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labour ratified by Nigeria. Accordingly, section 254C(1)(f) and (h), and (2) of the 1999
Constitution and section 7(6) of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006 merely keep faith
with section 19(d) of the 1999 Constitution.
107. The Supreme Court had as far back as 2000 in two concurring judgments of Achike, JSC
and Uwaifo, JSC in Abacha & ors v. Fawehinmi [2000] LPELR-14(SC); [2000] 6 NWLR (Pt
660) 228 respectively held that “conventions and treaties create rights and obligations not only
between Member States themselves but also between citizens and Member States and between
ordinary citizens”; and that “the spirit of a convention or a treaty demands that the interpretation
and application of its provisions should meet international and civilized legal concepts…
concepts which are widely acceptable and at the same time of clear certainty in application”.
Additionally, by section 19(d) of the 1999 Constitution, the foreign policy objectives of
Government include the respect for international law and treaty obligations.
108. By 2020, His Lordship Ogakwu, JCA in Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v. Mrs Olawunmi
Oyebola [2020] LPELR-51806(CA) would read section 254C(1)(f) and (h), and (2) of the 1999
Constitution as imposing an “obligation on [the National Industrial Court of Nigeria - NICN] to
now apply good or international best practices in adjudication”. His Lordship proceeded to hold
thus:
…I am mindful of the fact that it may appear that international best practices, like public
policy, may be an unruly horse and might be difficult to apply. Alluding to a similar
situation as it relates to public policy in ENDERBY TOWN FC vs. FOOTBALL
ASSOCIATION (1971) 1 CH 591 at 606-6077, Lord Denning, MR asseverated that public
policy is an unruly horse. So obstreperous is the horse that no judge should ever try to
mount it lest it runs away with him. I disagree. With a good man in the saddle, the unruly
horse can be kept in control. It can jump over obstacles. It can leap the fences put up by
fictions and come down on the side of justice. Now, on my part, I ask if a judge is such a
good man (jockey)? I would think so. If the Judge of the lower Court, that specialized
Court in employment and labour related matters, be that intrepid man of great learning,
then the application of international best practices would not be difficult, abstruse or arcane
in its application and would always end up on the side of justice…
109. Now, Nigeria is a member of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and in virtue of
its membership is bound by the core Freedom of Association and Protection to the Right to
Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) — ILO Convention No. 87. Nigeria ratified this Convention
o n 1 7 O c t o b e r 1 9 6 0 . S e e https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?
p=NORMLEXPUB:11200:0::NO::P11200_COUNTRY_ID:103259 as accessed on 2 May 2023.
The key provisions of Convention No. 87 are Articles 2, 3, 8 and 11, which provide thus:
Article 2
Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish
and, subject only to the rules of the organisation concerned, to join organisations of their
own choosing without previous authorisation.
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Article 3
(1) Workers' and employers' organisations shall have the right to draw up their
constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives in full freedom, to organise their
administration and activities and to formulate their programmes.
(2) The public authorities shall refrain from any interference which would restrict this right
or impede the lawful exercise thereof.
Article 8
(1) In exercising the rights provided for in this Convention workers and employers and
their respective organisations, like other persons or organised collectivities, shall respect
the law of the land.
(2) The law of the land shall not be such as to impair, nor shall it be so applied as to impair,
the guarantees provided for in this Convention.
Article 11
Each Member of the International Labour Organisation for which this Convention is in
force undertakes to take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that workers and
employers may exercise freely the right to organise.
110. Since this Court is now obliged to apply this ratified Convention No. 87, I will need to refer
to ILO jurisprudence on Convention No. 87 to ascertain how it is understood and applied by the
ILO. In this regard, reference will be to ILO’s Freedom of Association: Compilation of Decisions
of the Committee on Freedom of Association (International Labour Office: Geneva), 2018, 6th
Edition. Article 8 of Convention No. 87 acknowledges that in exercising rights under the
Convention, the law of the land is to be respected, but this must not be at the expense of the
guarantees provided by the Convention.
111. Paragraphs 456 and 457 of ILO’s Freedom of Association: Compilation of Decisions of the
Committee on Freedom of Association (International Labour Office: Geneva), 2018, 6th Edition
in the first place acknowledge that an appeal should lie to the courts against any administrative
decision concerning the registration of a trade union; and that a decision to prohibit the
registration of trade union should not become effective until the statutory period of lodging an
appeal against the decision has expired with out an appeal having been lodged, or until it has
been confirmed by the courts following an appeal.
112. Before delving into the ILO jurisprudence proper, I need to correct a submission that the 3rd
defendant made. The 3rd defendant had argued that the RTU in rejecting the registration of
LOAN as a trade union, exercised its discretion appropriately since in the past he registered other
trade unions in similar stance as LOAN. But in advancing this argument, the 3rd defendant relied
on a fallacy. The fallacy is the assertion in paragraph 4.53 of the 3rd defendant’s written address
that Joint Health Workers Union, National Association of Resident Doctors (NARD) and
Nigerian Medical Association (NMA) are registered trade unions in Nigeria. This is incorrect as
it is fallacious. The names of these three bodies will not be found in the list of trade unions under
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the TUA. And the 3rd defendant did not even supply their certificates of registration as trade
unions to show their registration as such. To the best of the knowledge of this Court, the
appellation “Joint Health Sector Unions” is just a convenient description of the various trade
unions in the health sector and is used as such when they are involved in a common labour
dispute or struggle. And even when it is used descriptively, the full names of the trade unions
involved in the dispute/struggle are often cited and listed out.
113. Secondly, the allusion to Veterinary Association of Nigeria, and Association of Psychiatrics
in Nigeria as registered trade unions leaves much to be desired. Once again, these bodies will not
be found in the list of trade unions under the TUA. And again, the 3rd defendant did not even
supply their certificates of registration as trade unions. The 3rd defendant must note that
registration of a body under Part C of the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) is not
tantamount to registration under the TUA as a trade union. NARD, for instance, is an affiliate of
the Nigerian Medical Association, which itself is not a trade union. Even affiliates of registered
trade unions are not in themselves autonomous trade unions. They derive their legitimacy from
the parent trade union although they may in appropriate cases be given legal recognition to sue or
be sued in their affiliate status in this Court. The 3rd defendant appears not be cognizant of all of
this given the fallacious premise of his argument here.
114. I indicated earlier that the claimants acknowledged in paragraph 47 of their affidavit in
support of their amended originating summons that LOAN belong to a professional body, the
Nigerian Bar Association (NBA). The NBA is a professional body of and for lawyers. Like the
Nigerian Medical Association, the NBA is not a trade union. If members of the NBA desire to be
registered as a trade union, they must apply and go through the processes enjoined by the TUA,
which is what members of LOAN did. Was the RTU right in denying them registration as a trade
union? This remains the question.
115. I now return to the ILO jurisprudence on Convention No. 87. The ILO jurisprudence
regarding Article 2 of Convention No. 87 dictates that workers and employers have the right,
without distinction whatsoever, to establish and join organisations of their own choosing without
previous authorization. This accords with section 40 of the 1999 Constitution. Paragraph 336 at
page 63 of ILO’s Freedom of Association: Compilation of Decisions of the Committee on
Freedom of Association (International Labour Office: Geneva), 2018, 6th Edition is emphatic in
stating that public servants, like all other workers, without distinction whatsoever, have the right
to establish and join organisations of their choosing, without previous authorization, for
promotion and defence of their occupational interests. But in paragraph 340, it is acknowledged
that there are no grounds for challenging the validity of special legal regulations which govern
public servants’ right to organise in so far as such regulations comply with the provision of
Convention No. 87.
116. For staff of the judiciary, paragraphs 351 and 352 state thus:
351. A provision that denies the right to set up trade unions to judges and public
prosecutors is contrary to the principles of freedom of association as laid down in the
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relevant Conventions, according to which workers “without distinction whatsoever” shall
have the right to establish and join organizations “of their own choosing” without previous
authorization.
352. Judges, like all other workers, should benefit from the right to freedom of association.
117. Paragraph 419 under Chapter 4 dealing with the right of workers and employers to establish
organizations without previous authorization, in elaborating on the requirement of previous
authorization, explains that the principle of freedom of association would often remain a dead
letter if workers and employers were required to obtain any kind of previous authorization to
enable them establish an organization. In cases where registration is optional, the fact that the
competent authority to effect registration has discretionary power to refuse this formality is not
very different from cases in which previous authorization is required.
118. By paragraph 421, a law providing that the right of association is subject to authorization
granted by a government department purely in its discretion is incompatible with the principle of
freedom of association.
119. Chapter 5 deals with the right of workers and employers to establish and join organizations
of their own choosing. By paragraph 475, “the right of workers to establish organizations of their
own choosing implies, in particular, the effective possibility of forming…organizations
independent both of those which exist already and of any political party”. Accordingly, “the right
of workers to establish organizations of their own choosing implies, in particular, the effective
possibility to create — if the workers so choose — more than one workers’ organizations per
enterprise” (paragraph 479). And by paragraph 477, “the existence of an organization in a
specific occupation should not constitute an obstacle to the establishment of another
organisation, if the workers so wish”. As can be seen, these principles, which provide guarantees
under Convention No. 87, are far beyond what the claimant envisages in terms of sections 2(1),
3(2) and 5(4) of the TUA.
120. From all of this, the generally accepted principle by ILO is trade union plurality. But if the
workers or employers so wish, the decision being theirs, they can settle for trade union
monopoly. Paragraphs 478 to 501 then go on to espouse on this principle of trade union plurality
relative to the principle of trade union monopoly. And so statutory (including constitutional)
provisions prohibiting the creation of more than one trade union for a given occupation or
economic category (paragraph 478) or a law which does not authorise the establishment of a
second union in an enterprise (paragraph 481) or require a singe union for each enterprise, trade
or occupation (paragraph 482), the prevention of two enterprise trade unions coexisting
(paragraph 480), all fail to comply with Article 2 of Convention No. 87.
121. So, “while it may generally be to the advantage of workers to avoid a multiplicity of trade
union organizations, unification of the trade union movement imposed through state intervention
by legislative means runs counter to the principle embodied in Articles 2 and 11 of Convention
No. 87…” (paragraph 485). Additionally, “while it is generally to the advantage of workers and
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employers to avoid the proliferation of competing organizations, a monopoly situation imposed
by law is at variance with the principle of free choice of workers’ and employers’ organizations”.
(paragraph 486). By paragraph 487, “unity within trade union movement should not be imposed
by the State through legislation because this would be contrary to the principles of freedom of
association”. Trade union unity voluntarily achieved should not be prohibited and should instead
be respected by public authorities (paragraph 498).
122. ILO feels strongly about trade union pluralism that in paragraph 492, it is stated thus:
The Committee has suggested that a State should amend its legislation so as to make it
clear that when a trade union already exists for same employees as those whom a new trade
union seeking registration is organizing or is proposing to organize, or the fact that the
existing union holds a bargaining certificate in respect of such class of employees, this
cannot give rise to objections of sufficient substance to justify the registrar in refusing to
register the new union.
123. So whether it is on the basis of the arguments of the claimants and the 3rd defendant, or the
ILO jurisprudence just espoused on Convention No. 87, the 1st and 2nd defendants acted
wrongly when they denied the registration of LOAN as a trade union. Already, in Tricycle
Owners Association of Nigeria v. Federal Ministry of Labour and Employment & anor
unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/216/2022, the judgment of which was delivered on 17 January
2023, this Court in applying ILO jurisprudence as to Convention No. 87, held that the
Honourable Minister, as well as the Ministry of Labour, cannot constitute a caretaker committee
for any trade union. The power and jurisdiction (and hence obligation) of this Court under
section 254C(1)(f) and (h), and (2) of the 1999 Constitution and section 7(6) of the National
Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006 to, when adjudicating, apply international best practices in
labour and the Treaties, Conventions, Recommendations and Protocols on labour ratified by
Nigeria, inures “notwithstanding…anything contained in this Constitution”. And section 45 of
the 1999 Constitution is one of such “anything contained in this Constitution” that must be read
subject to section 254C(1)(f) and (h) of the 1999 Constitution.
124. The claimants’ case must accordingly succeed. I so rule. In that regard, I declare and order
as follows:
(1) It is declared that the claimants have the rights under the 1999 Constitution and other
relevant laws in Nigeria to associate and function as a trade union.
(2) It is declared that Law Officers who are members of the Law Officers Association of
Nigeria (LOAN) are employees in the Executive Arm of Government and are not in the
same employment or organization with the Judiciary Staff Union of Nigeria (JUSUN) who
are employees in the Judicial Arm of Government in Nigeria.
(3) An order of certiorari is hereby made quashing the refusal of the Minister of Labour
and Employment and/or the Registrar of Trade Unions to register the Law Officers
Association of Nigeria (LOAN) as a trade union, which said refusal is consequently
declared unconstitutional, unjustifiable and, therefore, null and void.
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(4) The Registrar of Trade Unions shall forthwith register the Law Officers Association of
Nigeria (LOAN) as a trade union having fulfilled all the prerequisites and/or requirements
for the registration.
125. Judgment is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost.
…………………………………………
Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD, OFR
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