IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THEABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDENATABUJA
BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE B. B. KANYIP, PHD, OFR PRESIDENT, NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
DATE: 22 NOVEMBER 2022 SUIT NO. NICN/ABJ/273/2018
BETWEEN
Mohammed Khalid Yakubu - Claimant
AND
1. Transcorp Hilton Abuja
2. Mr Etienne Galilee
3. Transcorp Hotels Plc - Defendants
REPRESENTATION
EmmanuelAudu, with J. J. Uroko, for the claimant.
S. Edward and Henry O. Chichi, with Miss Juliana Ike, Mrs Mandu Ndem, Miss Juliet Nwokocha and M. I. Nnabuihe, for the 2nd and 3rd defendants.
JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION
1. This is an action filed vide a complaint by the claimant on 22 October 2018 against the 1st and 2nd defendants. By way of a motion on notice from the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ counsel, the 3rd defendant was joined in the suit as the 3rd party. The 2nd and 3rd defendants accordingly filed their defence processes. By order of Court made on 15 October 2019, the claimant was allowed to amend his originating summons. By a further order of Court granted on 13 January 2022, the claimant further amended his originating processes. In like manner, the 2nd and 3rd defendants was permitted by the Court to amend their statement of defence the last of which was on on 7 June 2022.
2. The claimant is asking the Court to declare the purported termination of his employment without any notice of termination served on him by the defendants or payment in lieu of notice unlawful, null and void and of no effect.
3. To the claimant, the whole problem that led to the filing of this suit started on 10 February 2015 when the claimant who had worked for 10 years with the defendants went to his department in the course of his job and saw the General Manager then (Mr Etienne Gailliez) and his boss (Head of Housekeeping Department) Mr Paul Agiopu who called him by his name ‘Khalid’ instead of the usual APC as he regularly called the claimant because of his support for ‘APC’. That the claimant jokily asked him why he called him ‘Khalid’instead of the usual ‘APC’. that it was at that point that the General Manager told him that Transcorp Hilton belongs to PDP and
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that he should go and meet APC and Buhari to give him job. That within few minutes, while the claimant was still taking the conversation as a joke, the Director of Human Resources (Omorinsola Sofola) who was ready with his termination letter called him and asked him of what transpired between him and the General Manager and he explained everything to her. After the claimant’s explanation, the Director Human Resources reluctantly gave the claimant the termination/cessation of employment letter without any previous notice of termination given to him by the defendants or payment in lieu of notice. That immediately the termination letter was given to the claimant, the Chief Security Officer escorted him out of the hotel’s premises and he was warned never to come near the hotel — hence the filing of this suit by the claimant against the defendants.
4. By the further amended statement of facts, the claimant is claiming the following reliefs:
(1) A declaration that the purported termination of the claimant’s employment without any notice of termination served on him by the defendants or payment in lieu of notice is unlawful, null, void and of no effect.
(2) A declaration that the claimant is still under the employment of the defendants and he ought to be treated as such.
(3) An order of the court compelling the defendants to pay to the claimant:
(i) Monthly Salary of N92,700 (Ninety Two Thousand, Seven Hundred Naira) to be increased by 10% (ten percent) every year, commencing from February, 2015 until judgment in this suit is given.
(ii) Relief Package of N400,000 for 2016, N420,000 for 2018 and to be continued every two years (with the accrued increment) until judgment in this suit is given.
(iii) End of the Year Bonus; one and half months’ gross salary annually, commencing from 2015 until judgment in this suite is given.
(iv) Service Charge of N10,000 per point (and the claimant is on 12 points) every month; commencing from February, 2015 until judgment in this suit is given.
(v) Feeding Allowance of N10,000 (Ten Thousand Naira) daily, commencing from 11th day of February, 2015 until judgment in this suit is given.
(vi) Leave Allowance of 25% of the claimant (sic) annual basic salary, plus N25000 (which increased to 35,000 in 2016)) every year, commencing from 2015 until judgments in this suit is given.
(vii) Long Service Award of US$430,000 and a gift worth N45,000 because the claimant had served the defendants for over ten years uninterrupted.
(viii) Monthly allowance of N10,000 (Ten Thousand Naira) every month commencing from February, 2015 until judgment in this suit is given.
(ix) Annual fixed lump sum payment of 20% of staff basic salary payable every January; commencing from February, 2015 until judgment in this suit is given.
(4) An order of the court compelling the defendants to pay to the claimant all the money (8% contribution from the claimant and 10% from the defendants every month) which they failed and neglected to remit to the claimant’s pension administrator commencing from February, 2015 until the judgment in this case is given.
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(5) An order of the court converting the purported termination to retirement with effect from the day of this judgment and pay to the claimant all the retirement benefits:
(i) General Manager golden handshake (one year gross salary), (ii) Movement four times annual transport allowance,
(iii) One year Housing Allowance,
(iv) Gift item worth not less than N100,000, (v) Enjoyment of medical premium,
(vi) Eighteen months Service Charge (N10,000 per points), and (vii) award of certificate of service to the claimant.
(6) An order of the court compelling the defendants to pay to the claimant General Damages in the sum of N20,000,000 (Twenty Million Naira) for unlawful termination of the claimant’s employment and the consequential hardship suffered thereto.
(7) An order of the court compelling the defendants to pay to the claimant cost of this litigation in the sum of N5,000,000 (Five Million Naira) only.
(8) An order of the court that all the sum to be granted to the claimant under the judgment to be delivered in this case by the court shall be paid with 15% (percent) interest per month until final liquidation.
(9) An order compelling the defendants to give to the claimant Yearly Hamper of “one bag of rice, one cartovegetable oil, two chicken, one bag of semovita, one packet of magi, ontin of Milo, bonvita and peak milk or in the alternative, 000 (Three Hundred Thousand Naira)” every year, commencing from 2015 until judgment in this suit is given (emphasis is the claimant's)
5. I must state that the reliefs claimed, except for the renumbering I did, are indicated as couched by the claimant with all the attendant errors especially as to relief (9).
6. While, the 1st defendant did not file any defence to the claimant’s suit, the 2nd and 3rd defendants did, which defences processes were later amended pursuant to the order of this Court. The defendants asked the court to strike out the 1st and the 2nd defendants from the suit on the ground that the 1st defendant is not a legal personality capable of suing or being sued, and the 2nd defendant is an agent of a disclosed principal.
7. At the hearing, the claimant testified on his own behalf as CW, and tendered eight documents as Exhibits C1, C2, C2(a), C3, C4, C5, C6 and C7. For the defendants, Johnson Jock, Assistant Human Resources Manager with Transcorp Hilton Hotel, testified as DW and tendered eleven documents as Exhibits D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, D6, D7, D8, D9, D10 and D11.
8. At the close of hearing, parties filed and served their respective final written addresses. The 2nd and 3rd defendants’final written address was filed on 20 July 2022, while the claimant’s was filed on 19 August 2022. The 2nd and 3rd defendants’ reply on points of law was filed on 4 October 2022.
THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE 2NDAND 3RD DEFENDANTS
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9. The 2nd and 3rd defendants submitted a sole issue for determination i.e. whether the claimant is entitled to the reliefs being sought, having regard to the evidence before the Court. To the 2nd and 3rd defendants, the story of the claimant as to his termination, and allusion to political parties, APC and PDP, and that Transcorp Hilton belongs to PDP, is one contrived by the claimant to whip up unnecessary sentiment, which should be discountenanced by the Court.
10. The 2nd and 3rd defendants went on that the claimant had in his original pleadings, before they were amended, stated that he had a CD which recorded the conversation between him, the General Manager, Head of House Keeping Department and Director of Human Resources that led to the termination of his job. To the 2nd and 3rd defendants, the fact that the claimant had dropped the averments in question in his further amended complaint and witness statement on oath does not stop the Court from looking at the claimant’s said statement of facts dated 19 October 2018 and witness statement on oath deposed to on 22 October 2018. That this Court has the power to look at the processes in its file, citing Agbare v. Mimra [2008] NWLR (Pt. 1071) 4, Ndayako v. Dantoro [2004] 13 NWLR (Pt. 889) 187 at 220 and Abiodun v. FRN [2018] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1629) 86 at 103, including the originating process, even if same had earlier been amended. That the law is clear that when an originating process is amended, the original process does not cease to exist. The process still forms part of the Court’s proceedings and can properly be looked at or referred to by the Court in its judgment, citing Uzodinma v. Izunaso (No. 2) [2011] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1275) 30 at 88 and Vatsa v. First Bank of Nigeria Plc [2012] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1283) 1 at 19. The 2nd and 3rd defendants then urged the Court to peruse the said paragraphs 12 and 13 respectively of the claimant’s original statement of facts dated 19 October 2018 and witness statement oath deposed to on 22 October 2018) to see the claimant’s averments that the conversation between him, the General Manager, Head of House Keeping Department and Director of Human Resources that led to the termination of his job was recorded in a CD.
11. That the questions are: if the said conversation was recorded, why did the claimant withhold same from the Court? Why did the claimant remove these helpful averments from his further amended statement of facts and witness statement on oath? To the 2nd and 3rd defendants, the claimant failed to tender the said CD because of his realization that same will be unfavorable to his case. That the position of the law is that evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavorable to the person who withholds same, citing section 167(d) of the EvidenceAct 2011.
12. To the 2nd and 3rd defendants, the claimant’s main complaint can be gleaned from paragraph 16 of his witness statement on oath deposed to on 24 January 2022 wherein he alleged, amongst other things, that the Director of Human Resources reluctantly gave him termination/cessation of employment letter without any previous notice of termination given to him by the defendants or payment in lieu of notice. In reaction, the 2nd and 3rd defendants, at paragraphs 26 and 27 of their witness statement on oath, had this to say:
[26] That the termination of the Claimant’s employment without notice is lawful and within the confines of the 3rd Defendant’s Hotel’s Junior Team Members Conditions of Service.
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[27] That the Claimant, vide the 3rd Defendant’s Hotel’s letter of Cessation of Employment (dated 10th February, 2015), was advised to do his clearance from the respective departments of our Hotel to enable the Hotel's Director of Finance pay him his one month basic salary in lieu of notice but the Claimant, till date, has neglected to do so.
13. That the claimant’s Exhibit C5, which is the same as the defendants’ Exhibit D6, is the 3rd defendant’s Hotel’s letter of Cessation of Employment dated 10 February 2015, and provides as follows, amongst other things:
…By a copy of this letter, and upon successful clearance from respective departments concerned, the Director of Finance is to pay you your one month basic salary in lieu of notice.
Please hand over all hotel properties in your possession to the Security after clearance…
14. It is the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ submission that the termination of the claimant’s employment is lawful and within the provisions of Article 1(G)(i) of Exhibit D5 (that is, the 3rd defendant’s Transcorp Hilton’s Junior Staff Conditions of Service) which allows either of the contracting party, especially in the case of a confirmed employee, to terminate the contract of employment by giving the other party one month notice or one month basic salary in lieu of notice. ThatArticle 1(G)(i) and (ii) of Exhibit D5/C4 provides (see page 2 thereof) as follows:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Condition of Service, the Hotel reserves the right to terminate the appointment of any confirmed employee by giving one month’s notice or one month’s basic salary in lieu and without notice or basic salary for unconfirmed employees. Similarly, a confirmed employee has the right to terminate his or her appointment by giving one month’s notice or one month’s basic salary in lieu. No notice or salary in lieu of is required of an unconfirmed employee.
(ii) Whatever the means of separation is, a clear handover note is required from such an employee.
15. That the claimant did not show that he complied with the above Article 1(G)(ii) of the 3rd defendant’s Exhibit D5/C4. That it is a trite law that parties are bound by the terms and conditions of their contract and cannot operate outside the said terms and conditions, citing Isheno v. Julius Berger (Nig.) Plc [2008] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1084) 582 SC at 609. That it was envisaged by parties that the claimant would do clearance and hand over of the 3rd defendant’s Hotel’s properties in his possession before being paid his salary in lieu of notice. The rationale behind this is that the claimant may be owing the 3rd defendant’s Hotel and there may be need for him to settle his indebtedness from any credit due to him from the 3rd defendant’s Hotel before being paid his balance, if any. For example, the defendants’ Exhibit D11 i.e. the 3rd defendant’s Hotel’s Special Clearance Form, item 3 thereof, shows that the claimant owed Hilton Staff Co-operative Thrift and Credit Society (HISCOOP) the sum of N444,088 (Four Hundred and Forty-Four Thousand, Eighty-Eight Naira) as at 13 December 2013 as a result of the loan extended to the claimant by the said HISCOOP.
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16. That the said Exhibit D11 shows that the claimant got cleared by the said Hilton Staff Co-operative Thrift And Credit Society (HISCOOP) after which the claimant signed the said Exhibit D11 (the claimant’s Special Clearance Form) which shows that he was indebted to Hilton Staff Co-operative Thrift And Credit Society (HISCOOP) in the said sum of N444,088 (Four Hundred and Forty-Four Thousand, Eighty-Eight Naira), referring to paragraphs 38 – 41 of DW’s deposition.
17. Furthermore, that the 3rd defendant’s Hotel Final Pay Calculation (referring to Exhibit D11), the receipt of which the claimant acknowledged by appending his signature thereto, shows, amongst other things, that the amount to which the claimant was entitled as Net Final Pay (after the necessary deduction of the said sum of N444,088 (Four Hundred and Forty-Four Thousand, Eighty-Eight Naira) in favour of Hilton Staff Co-operative Thrift and Credit Society (HISCOOP) is N1,280,787.61 (One Million, Two Hundred and Eighty Thousand, Seven Hundred and Eighty-Seven Naira, Sixty-One Kobo).
18. That it is not in doubt that the claimant got the said balance of N1,280,787.61 (One Million, Two Hundred and Eighty Thousand, Seven Hundred and Eighty-Seven Naira, Sixty-One Kobo) from the 3rd defendant. In any case, UBA Plc confirmed to the 3rd defendant’s Hotel that the said sum of N1,280,787.61 (as indicated in Exhibit D9), that is, the 3rd defendant’s Hotel’s letter to the claimant dated 5 December 2013, had been transferred to the claimant’s Mainstreet Bank Ltd Account No. 5000820255, referring to paragraph 40 of DW’s deposition.
19. To the 2nd and 3rd defendants, the termination of the claimant’s employment without notice is lawful and is within the confines of the claimant’s contract of employment, having regard to the provisions of Article 1(G)(i) and (ii) of Exhibit D5 i.e. the 3rd defendant’s Hotel’s Junior Team Member Conditions of Service. They also argued that an employer who hires can fire at any time, citing Ilesa Local Planning Authority v. Reverend S. Olayide [1990] 5 NWLR (Pt. 342) 91 at 103 and section 11(1)(b) of the Interpretation Act Cap. I23 LFN 2004. That an employer’s motives for terminating his servant’s employment, if any, is not a relevant factor and the court will have no business with such motives but will only give effect to the contract of service between the parties, citing Fakuade v. Obafemi Awolowo University Teaching Hospital Complex Management Board [1993] 5 NWLR (Pt. 291) 47 at 58 and Nigerian Romanian Wood Industries Ltd (NIROWI) v. Akingbulugbe [2011] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1257) 131 at 153.
20. Concerning the claimant’s relief (2) wherein the claimant is seeking a declaration that he is still under the employment of the defendants and that he ought to be treated as such, the 2nd and 3rd defendants submitted that in the unlikely event that the court finds that the claimant’s employment was unlawfully terminated, the Court will not make the order being sought by the claimant. that making the said order will amount to imposing a willing servant on an unwilling master.
21. To the 2nd and 3rd defendants, the measure of damages where notice of termination of employment was not given is the amount the claimant would have earned within the period of
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the notice he was entitled to, which is one month basic salary, citing Ozigbu Engineering Company Ltd v. Iwuamadi (supra) and Union Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Soares [2012] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1312) 550 at 572.
22. The 2nd and 3rd defendants went on that the claimant had tendered his letter of Cessation of Employment (Exhibit C5/D6) to confirm that his employment had been terminated by his employer; and that from the claimant’s evidence, the claimant did not render his services to the hotel since the time his employment was terminated. That if the claimant had not rendered any services to the 3rd defendant’s Hotel from the time his employment was terminated till date, then on what basis is he seeking an order of court compelling the defendants to make the payments referred to in relief (3)(i) – (ix) in the originating process? In any case, that other than the claimant’s ipse dixit at paragraph 10 of his witness statement on oath, the claimant did not establish how he became entitled to the benefits being claimed as relief 3(i) – (ix) in the originating process.
23. The 2nd and 3rd defendants then asked whether the claimant wants the court to assume the duty of relating his Conditions of Service to his case or to take his ipse dixit at paragraph 10 of his witness statement on oath for evidence. That by law, it is the duty of the claimant to relate his said Conditions of Service (Exhibit D5) to his case. That the claimant is not allowed to dump his documents on the trial court, and so the Judge is an adjudicator, not an investigator, citing Omisore v. Aregbesola [2015] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1482) 205 SC at 280 and All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) v. Al Makura [2016] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1505) 316 SC at 343 - 344. That it is obvious from these cases that a party who relies on a document must specifically relate same to his case in his evidence.
24. That a party must also place credible evidence before the court in support of his pleadings as the court cannot speculate or work out either mathematically or scientifically a method of arriving at an answer on an issue (or a claim) which could only be elicited by credible and tested evidence, citing Alechenu v. University of Jos [2015] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1440) 333 at 354 and Dingyadi v. Wamako & 3 ors [2008] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1116) 395 at 405 - 406.
25. Furthermore, that it is a common proof that the legal basis of employment remains the contract of employment between the employer and the employee, referring to Iyere v. Bendel Feed and Flour Mill Ltd [2008] 18 NWLR (Pt. 119) 300 at 325 - 326. That there is nothing in the claimant’s employment contract (Exhibit D5 — the 3rd defendant’s Hotel’s Junior Team Member Conditions of Service), which makes an employee whose employment had been terminated to be entitled to reliefs 3(i) - (ix) as reflected in the originating process, referring to paragraphs 14 – 15 of DW’s deposition as to the benefits the claimant was entitled to prior to the termination of his employment. That these paragraphs were never controverted by the claimant or his counsel during the cross-examination of DW. That it is a trite principle of law that where an adversary or a witness called by him testifies on a material fact in controversy in a case, the other party, should, if he does not accept the witness testimony as true, cross-examine him on that fact or at least show that he does not accept the evidence as true, otherwise the court will be entitled to
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take his silence as acceptance, citing Mantec Water Treatment Nig. Ltd v. Petroleum (Special) Trust Fund [2007] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1058) 451 at 480.
26. Furthermore, that essential allegations in pleadings (such as the defendants’ allegations in paragraphs 34, 42 and 44 of their amended statement of defence to the effect that the claimant was disengaged from his initial employment with the 3rd defendant’s Hotel on 31 December 2012 and thereafter re-engaged as a new staff on 1 January 2013) which are not specifically traversed by the claimant are deemed admitted, citing Danladi v. Dangiri [2015] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1442) 124 SC at 195. That from the undisputed evidence before the Honourable Court, the claimant’s employment took effect from 1 September 2005, referring to paragraph 10 of DW’s deposition.
27. That the claimant was disengaged from his initial employment with the 3rd defendant’s Hotel on 31 December 2012 and thereafter re-engaged as a new staff on 1 January 2013, referring to paragraphs 34, 42 and 44 of DW’s deposition. The disengagement of the claimant from the employment of the 3rd defendant’s Hotel on 31 December 2012 means that the claimant put in seven years and three months in the employment of the 3rd defendant’s Hotel, referring to paragraph 43 of DW’s deposition. The claimant, after being re-engaged as a new staff by the 3rd defendant’s Hotel on 1 January 2013, put in another two years, one month and ten days service up till 10 February 2015 when he was finally disengaged from the employment of the 3rd defendant’s Hotel, referring to paragraph 44 of DW’s deposition as well as Exhibit D6. To the 2nd and 3rd defendants, the claimant would not have put in up 10 (ten) years in the service of the 3rd defendant’s Hotel even where he contends that he was not disengaged from his initial employment on 31 December 2012.
28. The 2nd and 3rd defendants continued that assuming without conceding that the claimant was not disengaged from the service of the 3rd defendant’s Hotel on 31 December 2012, the claimant would have put in 9 years, 4 months and 10 days up to the said 10 February 2015 when his employment was terminated by the 3rd defendant’s Hotel.
29. That the point being made is that the claimant is not entitled to the Long Service Award of US$430,000 and a gift worth 45,000 being claimed by him under his relief 3(vii) and the claimant is being economical with the truth by claiming that he “had served the Defendants for over ten years uninterrupted’’, referring to Article 3 at pages 15 – 16 of Exhibit D5 (the 3rd defendant’s Hotel’s Junior Team Member Conditions of Service) to effect that only employees who have completed anniversaries of 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35 and 40 or years in service are to be presented with appropriate service awards of five years intervals. That the claimant knew that he had been paid his 5 years Long ServiceAward and did not make any claim for same herein.
30. That the Court should note that the claimant did not file any reply to the defendants’amended statement of defence, citing Balogun v. Egba Onikolobo Community Bank (Nigeria) Limited [2007] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1028) 584 CA at 600, which held that all matters not denied in the pleadings, whether raised in the statement of claim or statement of defence, are taken as
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admitted. The 2nd and 3rd defendants then submitted that facts not controverted are deemed admitted and facts admitted need no further proof, citing All Progressive Congress (APC) v. Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) [2015] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1462) 531 at 584 and section 123 of the EvidenceAct 2011.
31. Furthermore, that the claimant, in his relief (4) is seeking “an order of the court compelling the Defendants to pay to the Claimant all the money (8% contribution from the Claimant and 10% from the Defendants every month) which they failed and neglected to remit to the claimant’s pension administrator commencing from February, 2015 until the judgment in this case is given”. That in support of this relief, the claimant has the following to say at paragraphs 19 - 21 of his witness statement on oath:
(19) That the Defendants are now operating contributory pension scheme in line with the Pension ReformAct, 2004 after the termination of the previous gratuity scheme in 2013. (20) That the Defendants deduct 8% of my gross pay every month and remit same to Claimant’s pension administrator (Stanbic IBTC Pension Managers) and the Defendants equally contributes 10% of my gross pay every month to the Claimant’s pension manager. (21) That since the purported termination of my employment in 2015, the Defendant stopped remittance of pension to my pension manager (Stanbic IBTC Pension Managers).
32. To the 2nd and 3rd defendants, the question here is: on what basis will this Court make an order compelling the payment of contribution for the claimant especially when the claimant did not place any evidence before the Court to suggest that he has been rendering his services to the 3rd defendant’s Hotel after the termination of his employment? That the 2nd and 3rd defendants at paragraphs 45 – 46 of DW’s deposition have the following to say in relation to the claimant’s said pension:
(45) The 3rd Defendant had since 10th February, 2015 when the Claimant’s employment was terminated, stopped the remittance of pension to the Claimant’s pension managers, Stanbic IBTC.
(46) The Claimant maintains a personal account with his pension managers, Stanbic IBTC, into which his pensions funds were remitted and which account, the Claimant is entitled to access without reference to the 3rd Defendant.
33. The 2nd and 3rd defendants then urged the Court not grant to the claimant relief (4) as claimed.
34. Concerning the claimant’s reliefs (5) – (9), the 2nd and 3rd defendants submitted that there is no evidence before the Court to justify the grant of these reliefs. The claimant in his relief (5) is seeking, amongst other things, an order of Court converting his termination to retirement with effect from the day of judgment and to pay all his retirement benefits. To the 2nd and 3rd defendants, the said relief of the claimant lacks support both in law and in fact, referring to the procedure for going on retirement in Article 1H, page 3, of Exhibit D5.
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35. The claimant, in his relief (7) is asking the Court to compel the defendants to pay his cost of litigation in the sum of N5,000,000 (Five Million Naira) only. The claimant at paragraph 25 of his further amended statement of facts pleaded the receipt of the purported N5,000,000 (Five Million Naira) payment he allegedly made to Fast-Lane Chambers. At paragraph 24 of the claimant’s witness statement on oath, the claimant has the following to say: “For the filing and prosecution of this matter, I paid the Fast-Lane Chambers the total sum of N5,000,000 (Five Million Naira)”. That the claimant, however, failed to tender the receipt of the said N5,000,000 (Five Million Naira) payment he allegedly made to Fast-Lane Chambers. That even if he tendered any such receipt, there will still be the question of whether he can pass his burden of paying his solicitor’s fee to the defendants, citing Guinness Nigeria Plc v. Nwoke [2000] 15 NWLR (Pt. 689) 135 CA at 150, which held that a claim for solicitor’s fee is outlandish and should not be allowed as it did not arise as a result of damage suffered in the course of any transaction between the parties. To the 2nd and 3rd defendants, it is unethical and an affront to public policy for a litigant to pass the burden of cost of an action including his solicitor’s fees to his opponent in the suit. That this submission is premised on the self-evident truth that solicitor’s fees do not form part of the wrong on which the claimant pivoted his cause of action, citing Nwaji v. Coastal Services Ltd [2004] 36 WRN 1 at 14 - 15.
36. Furthermore, the claimant at paragraph 22 of his witness statement on oath said the defendants disallowed him from accessing and benefiting from medical service even when he was seriously sick in 2017 as a result of the trauma of disengagement which resulted into hypertension and consequential liver problem. The claimant tendered Exhibits C6, National Hospital Receipts (12 copies), to prove his allegation. To the 2nd and 3rd defendants, there is nothing from the face of Exhibit C6 (dated January, 2017) which says that the claimant has hypertension and consequential liver problem or which links the purported sickness of the claimant to the termination of his employment on 10 February 2015; and that the claimant’s Exhibit C6 is lacking in probative value for not being tendered by their makers. That the proper person through whom a document is tendered is the maker of such document because he will be in the proper position to answer questions arising from any cross-examination, citing Iniama v. Akpabio [2008] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1116) 225 at 300. That in law, a party who made a positive assertion has the burden to prove same by evidence, citing Bawa v. Aliyu [2015] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1447) 523 at 547 and Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) & Anor. v. Interstella Communications Ltd & 2 ors [2015] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1463) 1 at 41.
37. Finally, that the 2nd and 3rd defendants, at paragraph 53 of their amended statement of defence, say that they will urge the Court to strike out the 1st and 2nd defendants from this suit on the following grounds:
(a) the 1st Defendant is not a legal person capable of suing or being sued and
(b) the 2nd Defendant, being the General Manager of the 3rd Defendant’s Hotel at the time material to this suit was an agent of a disclosed principal and ought not to be sued.
38. That it is trite law that only natural persons or such bodies or entities clothed with legal personality by law (otherwise called legal persons) that can sue or be sued in any action,
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referring to Fawehinmi v. NBA (No. 2) [1989] 2 NWLR (Pt. 105) 558 at 632, Bank of Baroda v. Iyalabani [2002] 13 NWLR (Pt. 785) 551 at 588 – 589 and section 37 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2020. That the onus is on the claimant who has sued the 1st defendant to show that the latter has the status of a juristic person, which he can only do by producing the Certificate of Incorporation of the 1st defendant, citing Fawehinmi v. NBA (supra), Abakiliki LGC v. Abakiliki RMO [1990] 6 NWLR (Pt. 155) 182 at 192. That where the claimant fails to discharge the onus of establishing that the 1st defendant on record is a legal person by producing the said Certificate of Incorporation as required by law, the proper order to make is an order striking out the said 1st defendant.
39. The 2nd and 3rd defendants then pointed out that the claimant’s counsel, during the cross-examination of DW, confronted DW with Exhibits D6 and D7 and asked DW to confirm that the number on the said Exhibits, RC248514, means Registration Number. Meanwhile, that Exhibit D8 is the Collective Agreement between the 3rd defendant’s Hotel (then known as Transnational Hotels And Tourism Services Limited) and its two unions, the Hotel and Personal Services Senior Staff Association (HAPSSSA) and the National Union of Hotel and Personal Services Workers (NUHPSW) of which the claimant was then a member. That it is clear from the said Exhibit D8 that the Registration Number in question (RC248514) is that of Transnational Hotels and Tourism Services Limited, a company incorporated under the laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
40. That clarifying the point further, the 2nd and 3rd defendants at paragraphs 3 and 9 of their amended statement of defence aver thus:
(3) The 3rd Defendant used to be known as Transnational Hotels and Tourism Services Limited and its Hotel, “Transcorp Hilton, Abuja”, that is, the 1st Defendant, had also, in the past been known by different names, including NICON Hilton, Abuja.
(9) The 3rd Defendant states that as the proprietor of the 1st Defendant, it was known formerly known (sic) by everyone, including the Claimant, as Transnational Hotels and Tourism Services Limited and that its hotel, Transcorp Hilton, Abuja, had in the past been known by different names, including NICON Hilton, Abuja.
The 2nd and 3rd defendants repeated the above averments in paragraphs 2 and 7 of their witness statement on oath.
41. The 2nd and 3rd defendants, at paragraphs 8 and 6 of their pleadings and witness statement on oath respectively, went further to aver that the claimant knows that the 3rd defendant is the proprietor of the 1st defendant and is also aware that the 3rd defendant was his employer who paid his salaries up till the date of termination of his employment, that is, on 10 February 2015. To the 2nd and 3rd defendants, the failure of the claimant to controvert the above averments implies that same have been admitted by him.
42. Furthermore, that the 2nd defendant, the former General Manager of the 3rd defendant’s Hotel, acted as an agent of the 3rd defendant and, therefore, ought not to be sued by the claimant herein. That the law is settled that it is only a disclosed principal that can sue or be sued on the
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act of its agent, citing Kings Planet International v. Carson Products West Africa Limited [2014] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1392) 605 at 640 – 641, Mbata v. Amanze [2018] 15 NWLR (Pt. 1643) 570 at 584, John Davids Construction Company Limited v. Riacus Company Limited & anor [2019] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1697) 143 at 182 and Unity Bank Plc v. Bilwadams Construction Co. Nig. Limited & 2 ors [2020] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1749) 132 at 155 – 156.
43. In conclusion, the 2nd and 3rd defendants then urged the Court is urged to strike out the names of the 1st and 2nd defendants, resolve the sole issue for determination in favour of the 3rd defendant and dismiss this suit.
THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE CLAIMANT 44. The claimant submitted three issues for determination, namely:
(1) Whether the 1st defendant has a defence in this case.
(2) Whether the cessation of the claimant’s employment by the 1st defendant is lawful in view of theArticle 1(G)(i) of Exhibit C4/D5.
(3) Whether the claimant has established his case and is therefore entitled to the reliefs sought.
45. On issue (1), the claimant urged the Court to hold that the 1st defendant has no defence to the claimant’s case. that it is important to note that this contract of employment is wholly between the 1st defendant and the claimant, referring to Exhibits C1/D2, D3, C3/D4, C4/D5 and C5/D6. That the correspondences from the above-mentioned exhibits (letter of the provisional offer, acceptance of the offer, conditions of service as contained in the handbook junior team member conditions of service, letter of confirmation of employment and cessation of employment letter) were strictly between the 1st defendant and the claimant. That nothing in the contents of the aforementioned correspondences as in Exhibits C1/D2, D3, C3/D4, C4/D5 and C5/D6 respectively shows that the 3rd defendant is the proprietor of the 1st defendant or that the 1st defendant is working for or on behalf of the 3rd defendant. That in the instant case, the 1st defendant filed no defence to the claimant’s case, which means the 1st defendant has not join issues with the claimant, citing Egbesimba v. Ezekiel [2002] LPELR-1043(SC). That where no issue is joined, the claimant’s case is deemed established and the claimant will not be required to lead evidence to prove his case, citing Odume v. Nnachi [1964] 1 All NLR 529 and Ajibade v. Mayowa [1978] 9 - 10 SC - the page os not supplied. That this law is predicated on the principle of law that says that where there is no credible case to be put on the imaginary scale in civil case, minimum evidence on the other side satisfies the requirement of proof, citing Nwabuopke v. Ottih [1961] 2 SCNLR 232, Buraimoh v. Bamgbose [1989] 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 352 and Balogun v. UBA [1992] 6 NWLR (Pt. 247) 336.
$6. That where the defendant refuses to join issue with the claimant, it means the claimant’s averments in the statement of facts and the evidence therein are unchallenged. that it is the law that unchallenged evidence is deemed admitted and evidence admitted needs no further proof, referring to section 123 of the Evidence Act 2011, Onogwu v. State [1995] 6 NWLR (Pt. 401) 276 and Odunsi v. Bamgbala [1995] 1 NWLR (Pt. 374) 641. It thus the claimant’s submission
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that the 1st defendant, who entered the contract of employment with the claimant and terminated same contrary to the provision of the contract agreement, has no defence to the claimant’s case and as such, the claimant’s case should be deemed established on the basis of facts contained in his statement of facts and the evidence so far adduced before the Court.
57. Furthermore, that the 1st defendant is not the same as the 3rd defendant and as such, evidence of the 3rd defendant in this suit is not evidence for the 1st defendant as no nexus has been established between the 1st and the 3rd defendants in this case. That all the evidence of the 3rd defendant in this case goes to no issue as there is no contractual relationship between the claimant and the 3rd defendant, urging Court to so hold. That DW during cross-examination confirmed that the 3rd defendant is being joined in this case for the purpose of handling the 1st defendant’s liabilities. The claimant then urged the Court to limit the 3rd defendant to that purpose alone.
58. For issue (2), the claimant urged the Court to hold that the cessation of the claimant’s employment by the 1st defendant’s letter of cessation dated 10 February 2015 (Exhibit C5/D6) was not done in compliance with the provision of the contract agreement (Exhibit C4/D5) and, therefore, unlawful. That Article 1(G)(i) of Exhibit C4/D5 was not followed before the 1st defendant terminated the claimant’s employment. Article 1(G)(i) provides that:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this condition of service, the hotel reserves the right to terminate the appointment of any confirmed employee by given one month’s notice or one month’s basic salary in lieu and without notice or basic salary for unconfirmed employees.
59. That this provision is to the effect that the claimant (who was a confirmed employee of the defendants via Exhibit C3/D4 is entitled to be given one month notice or payment of one-month basic salary in lieu of such notice before the 1st defendant can lawfully terminate his employment. That in the instant case, the 1st defendant terminated the claimant’s employment without notice or payment in lieu of such notice. That compliance with the provision of Article 1(G)(i) of Exhibit C4/D5 wouldn’t have been reasonably possible in view of the aggression upon which the 2nd defendant ordered for the immediate termination of the claimant’s employment.
60. The claimant went on that the issue of PDP and APC transpired between the 2nd defendant and the claimant, the next thing is that the head of human resources gave cessation letter to the claimant who was immediately escorted out of the hotel’s gate — these sequences happened within a very short period of time. That one of the rules in the law relating to master and servant relationship is that the master who is the employer has unfettered right to terminate or dismiss a servant who is an employee at anytime with or without advancing any reason for doing so, but the exercise of that right must be done strictly in the manner provided by the law, citing Fakuade v. OAUTHC Mgt Board [1993] 5 NWLR (Pt. 291) 47, Shitta-Bey v. Fed. Rep. Service Commission [1981] 1 SC 40 at 56 and Advanced Maritime Transport (Nig) Ltd v. Ojugboli & ors [2018] LPELR-46265.
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61. To the claimant, the defendants’assertion that the claimant was advised in the cessation letter to do clearance before payment of one month salary in lieu of termination notice is an afterthought that shows lack of understanding of the provision of Article1(G)(i). That giving of one month notice or payment in lieu of such notice ought to be done before the actual termination of employment as the Article 1(G)(i) never contemplated termination of employment before notice of termination or payment in lieu of such notice or make clearance a condition for the payment in lieu of notice. That the defendant failed and neglected to comply with the provision of the Article 1(G)(i) of Exhibit C4/D5 before the termination of the claimant’s employment. The purported termination of the claimant’s employment was not done in the manner provided by the contract of employment of the parties and as such, it is unlawful, null, void and of no effect. citing Olaniyan v. University of Lagos [1985] 1 NWLR at 599 and Chukwumah v. Shell Petroleum (Nig) Ltd LPELR-864(SC). That once a termination of employment is established to be unilaterally and unlawfully done, the claimant is entitled to all his withheld earning up to the date of the judgment, citing Mobil Producing Nig. Unlt & anor v. Udo [2008] LPELR-8440, Ezekiel v. Westminster Dredging Ltd [2000] 9 NWLR (Pt. 672) 248 at 262 and British Airways v. Makanjuola [1993] 8 NWLR (Pt. 311) 276.
62. Regarding issue (3), the claimant urged the Court to hold that he has established his case and he is, therefore, entitled the reliefs sought. Furthermore, that he has established the contract of employment between him and the 1st defendant and the 2nd and 3rd defendants have admitted that fact, referring to Exhibits C1/D2, D3, C3/D4 and paragraph 12 of the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ amended statement of defence. Also that he has established that there is a written agreement governing the parties’ contract of employment and the said agreement has been breached by the 1st defendant; the 2nd and 3rd defendants have admitted the existence of the written agreement guiding the contract of employment, referring to Exhibit C4/D5 and paragraph 13 of the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ amended statement of defence.
63. The claimant went on that the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ argument that the 1st defendant is not a legal personality that can sue and be sued cannot stand in this instant case because the 1st defendant had held itself out to be capable of entering into a contract and he so entered into a contract of employment directly with the claimant in its name, confirmed the contract and terminated the contract in its name; referring to the footnote of the 1st defendant’s letterhead (Exhibit C5/D6), which carries the Corporate Affairs Commission Registration Number RC NO:248514 that buttresses its legal personality. With this, that it is clear that the 1st defendant held itself out to be a legal person and it so acted from the beginning of the contract to the end of the contract, and as such it cannot be allowed now to hide under its legal personality to dodge liability, citing Kwajafa & ors v. BON Ltd [2004] LPELR-1727(SC).
64. The claimant continued that assuming but not conceding that the 1st defendant is not a legal person that can sue and be sued, it still does not make any difference because it has ab initio held itself out to be a legal person and thus entered into a contract of employment with the claimant and it has to finish what it had started. That the said employment contained the condition and the steps to bring the employment to an end; that condition as contained in the Article 1(g)(i) of
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Exhibit C4/D5 was not complied with and the claimant is simply complaining that the 1st defendant refused to follow the condition for the termination of his contract, and this has nothing whatsoever to do with legal personality of the 1st defendant.
65. That in paragraphs 13 - 15 of the claimant further amended statement of facts and paragraphs 23 - 25 of the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ amended statement of defence, it is clear that the issue of PDP and APC that led to the termination of the claimant’s employment was between the 2nd defendant and the claimant. That the 2nd defendant, apart from being the General Manager of the 1st defendant, was personally at the center of the dispute and he, therefore, becomes a necessary party whose participation in the proceeding of this suit is indispensable for the effectual and complete adjudication of the cause of action, referring to Ehidimhen v. Musa [2000] 8 NWLR (Pt. 669) 540 and Madukolo v. Nkemdilim [1962] 2 SCNLR 606.
66. Again, that where the canopy of a legal entity is being used to justify wrong, human personality behind the incorporation of any company can be unveiled to find out who is behind the improper conduct of a company, referring to Finance Security Ltd v. Jefia [1998] 3 NWLR (Pt. 54) 602 and FNBCL v. Integrated Gas Nig. [1999] 8 NWLR (Pt. 613) 119 at 129. On this, the claimant submitted that the 2nd defendant is the human personality behind the 1st defendant that perpetuated the improper conduct that led to this action; making him a party to participate in this suit for proper adjudication is not wrong.
67. The claimant proceeded that before the purported cessation of his contract of employment, he had already worked with the defendant for 10 years which made him to be on level GA/10; the position that was confirmed in paragraph 16(d) of the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ amended statement of defence. That DW during cross examination explained GA/10 to mean a junior staff that had work with the 1st defendant for ten (10) years. Before the termination of the claimant’s employment, the 1st defendant has already recognized the claimant’s 10 years meritorious service and acted accordingly by putting him on level GA/10 which put him on 12 point service charge and qualified him for long service award. Accordingly, that the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ argument that the claimant worked for less than 10 years with whatever reasons canvassed does not hold water as (the 1st defendant’s calculation of period of service is by year not month or day) a party cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate.
68. To the claimant, a party must be consistent in his litigation and must not be allowed to speak from both sides of the month. That this is often expressed in a latin maxim quod approbo non reprobo. This position of the law that a party cannot approbate and reprobate on one issue has been given a judicial approval in the following decided cases: Ngige v. Obi [2006] 14 NWLR (Pt. 999) 1 at 197, County & City Bricks Development Co. Ltd v. Minister of Environment & Urban Development & anor [2019] LPELR-46548 (SC) and Anike v. SPDC (Nig.) Ltd [2010] LPELR — incomplete citation.
69. That the argument that the claimant was disengaged from his initial employment in 2012 and later re-engaged is not proved, as neither the 1st defendant nor the 3rd defendant disengaged and
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re-engaged the claimant in any material time in the course of his employment. That the DW during cross-examination rightly confirmed that the 1st defendant can never terminate the employee’s employment without a letter to that effect or re-engage an employee without an engagement letter. That since no letter of disengagement/re-engagement of the claimant employment is presented before the Court, the Court should hold that the claimant’s employment was never terminated in 2012 and moreover, the fact that the claimant worked with the 1st defendant for 10 years has been admitted, referring to paragraph 16(d) of the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ amended statement of defence.
70. The claimant went on that argument that the claimant is only entitled to one month salary in lieu of notice cannot stand because as at the time of the termination of the claimant’s employment he was qualified and due for long service award of US$430,000 and a gift worth N45,000. That like every other contract, breach of the claimant’s contract of employment attracts payment of damages, citing Ezekiel v. Westminster Dredging Ltg [2000] 9 NWLR (Pt. 672) 248 at 262.
71. That the argument that the claimant did not file reply to the 2nd and 3rd defendant’s amended statement of defence to respond to vital issues therein is of no consequence as there was no counter-claim from the defendants; the claimant only succeeded in joining issues and when issues are joined, the case goes to trial for Court to decide on such issues. That a reply to the statement of defence is not necessary if the only purpose is to deny allegation of facts made in the statement of defence, citing Unity Bank Plc v. Bouri [2008] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1086) 372, Saidou v. Abubakar [2008] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1100) 201 and Ikonne v. Ezieme [2011] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1259) 536.
72. In conclusion, the claimant urged the Court to give judgment in his favour and to grant all his prayers as contained in paragraph 26 of his further amended statement of facts and to award substantial damages against the defendants for breach of contract.
THE DEFENDANTS’ REPLY ON POINT OF LAW
73. The 2nd and 3rd defendants reacted on points of law. The reaction, however, is essentially a rehash of their submissions in their main address. Reactions of the 2nd and 3rd defendants act the 1st defendant not having legal capacity to sue and be sued, the 2nd defendant being an agent of a disclosed principal and so not a necessary party in this suit, the 3rd defendant being the employer of the claimant, parties being bound by their agreement, the termination being lawful within the provisions of Article 1(G)(i) of Exhibit D5, the measure of damages in termination cases being the amount the claimant would have earned within the period of notice, the claimant not putting up to 10 years in the service of the 3rd defendant, are all a rehash.
74. The 2nd and 3rd defendants pointed out that the entirety of the claimant’s counsel’s submission at paragraphs 4.0 – 4.14 his written address are misconceived and they amount to giving evidence through the claimant’s counsel’s written address, which no matter how brilliant cannot take the place of evidence; and that the advice in the cessation letter to do clearance
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before payment of one month salary in lieu of termination notice cannot be an afterthought given Article 1(G)(i).
75. The claimant had relied on the authorities of Mobil Producing Nig. Unlimited & anor v. Udo [2008] LPELR–8440, Ezekiel v. Westminster Dredging Ltd [2000] 9 NWLR (Pt. 672) 248 at 262 and British Airways v. Makanjuola [1993] 8 NWLR (Pt. 311) 276 as to him being entitled to all his withheld earnings up to the date of the judgment. To the 2nd and 3rd defendants, these cases not applicable to the claimant’s case given that in the said cases, the claimants were dismissed from their employment, whereas in the instant case, the claimant’s case has to do with the purposed unlawful termination of his employment without being given the required one month’s notice or one month’s basic salary in lieu of notice in line with Article 11(G)(i) of Exhibit C4/D5.
76. On the issue of the letterheads of the defendants bearing RC No. 248514, the 2nd and 3rd defendants submitted that Exhibit D8 has put to rest the allegations of the claimant that the 1st defendant is a legal person because the footnotes in Exhibits C5 and C6 reflect RC No. 248514. That it is clear from the said Exhibit D8 i.e. the Collective Agreement between the 3rd defendant’s Hotel (then known as Transnational Hotels and Tourism Service Limited) and its two unions, the Hotel and Personal Services Senior Staff Association (HAPSSSA) and the National Union of Hotel and Personal Services Workers (NUHPSW) of which the claimant was then a member, that the Registration Number in question (RC248514) is that of Transnational Hotels and Tourism Services Limited, which is the same person as the 3rd defendant. That the claimant is not allowed to spring surprise by bringing up the issue of Registration Number that is not supported by pleadings and which, therefore, goes to no issue in law.
77. On the claimant’s submission that the 1st defendant held itself out to be a legal person and as such cannot be allowed to hide under its legal personality, the 2nd and 3rd defendants submitted that the claimant missed the point. That the 3rd defendant, who obviously is not running away from liability, if any, has made it clear that it used to be known as Transnational Hotel and Tourism Services Limited and that it is the proprietor of the 1st defendant, “Transcorp Hilton, Abuja”, which is not a legal person capable of suing or being sued.
78. On the reliance on Kwajaffa & ors v. BON Ltd [2004] LPELR-1727 by the claimant, the 2nd and 3rd defendants submitted that the case is not applicable to the instant case because the defendants did not plead that the contract of employment was illegal or based on fraud.
79. On the the claimant’s submission that DW explained during cross-examination that GA/10 means a junior staff that had work with the 1st defendant for ten (10) years, the 2nd and 3rd defendants submitted that it is a trite principle that this piece of evidence, if at all same was elicited during cross-examination, is inadmissible in law, the same having been based on facts not pleaded before the Court, citing Dina v. New Nigerian Newspapers Ltd [1986] 2 NWLR (Pt. 22) 353, Agnocha v. Agnocha [1986] 4 NWLR (Pt. 37) 366 and MTN (Nig.) Communications Ltd v. Corporate Communication Inv. Ltd [2019] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1678) 427.
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80. The 2nd and 3rd defendants went on that the claimant did not counter the submissions of the defendants that the claimant’s relief (2) is not grantable and that the measure of damages where notice of termination of employment was not given is the amount the claimant would have earned within the period of the notice he was entitled to, which is one month basic salary. That as crucial as the defendants’submissions are before this Court, not a single statement was offered in response by the claimant. That having offered no response to the said submissions of the defendants, the claimant is deemed to have conceded same, urging the Court to so hold, citing Nwakwo v. Yar’Adua [2010] All FWLR (Pt. 534) 1 SC at 22.
81. In conclusion, the 2nd and 3rd defendants urged the Court to hold that the termination the claimant’s employment is not unlawful and that the claimant has not placed any credible evidence before the Court to entitle him to the reliefs sought, and then dismiss this suit with substantial cost.
COURT’S DECISION
82. After due consideration of the processes, evidence and submissions of the parties, I start off with DW’s deposition. At the last page of the deposition would be found two paragraphs 51 and two paragraphs 52. This is bad draftsmanship on the part of counsel to the 2nd and 3rd defendants.
83. I now turn to the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ reply on points of law, which is replete with a rehash of the submissions they did in their main written address. A reply on points of law is meant to be just what it is, a reply on points of law. It should be limited to answering only new points arising from the opposing brief. It is not meant for the party replying on points of law to reargue its case or bring in points it forgot to advance when it filed its final written address. It is not a form to engage in arguments at large. Alternatively put, a reply on points of law is not meant to improve on the quality of a written address; a reply brief is not a repair kit to correct or put right an error or lacuna in the initial brief of argument. See Dr Augustine N. Mozie & ors v. Chike Mbamalu [2006] 12 SCM (Pt. I) 306; [2006] 27 NSCQR 425, Basinco Motors Limited v. Woermann Line & anor [2009] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1157) 149; [2009] 8 SCM 103, Ecobank (Nig) Ltd v. Anchorage Leisures Ltd & ors [2016] LPELR-40220(CA), UBA Plc v. Ubokolo [2009] LPELR-8923(CA), Musaconi Ltd v. Aspinall [2013] LPELR-20745(SC), Ojo v. Okitipupa Oil Palm Plc [2001] 9 NWLR (Pt. 719) 679 at 693, Ogboru v. Ibori [2005] 13 NWLR (Pt. 942) 319 and Cameroon Airlines v. Mike Otutuizu [2005] 9 NWLR (Pt. 929) 202. The effect of non compliance is that the Court will discountenance such a reply brief. See Onuaguluchi v. Ndu [2000] 11 NWLR (Pt. 590) 204, ACB Ltd v. Apugo [1995] 6 NWLR (Pt. 399) 65 and Arulogun & ors v. Aboloyinjo & anor [2018] LPELR-44076(CA). Accordingly, as can be seen, I endeavoured to highlight only the submissions of the 2nd and 3rd defendants in their reply on points of law that were not a rehash.
84. In their reply on points of law, the 2nd and 3rd defendants argued that the claimant conceded to their submission that he is merely whipping up unnecessary sentiment in his favour regarding
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his APC/PDP/Buhari story. Where the claimant made this concession to the defendants is unknown to the Court; and the Court was shown none by the 2nd and 3rd defendants.
85. The defendants had asked the court to strike out the names of the 1st and 2nd defendants from the suit on the ground that the 1st defendant is not a legal personality capable of suing or being sued, and the 2nd defendant is an agent of a disclosed principal. But to the 2nd and 3rd defendants, the 3rd defendant made it clear that it used to be known as Transnational Hotel and Tourism Services Limited and that it is the proprietor of the 1st defendant, “Transcorp Hilton, Abuja”, which is not a legal person capable of suing or being sued. In answer, the claimant submitted that the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ argument that the 1st defendant is not a legal personality that can sue and be sued cannot stand in this instant case because the 1st defendant had held itself out to be capable of entering into a contract and it so entered into a contract of employment directly with the claimant. The claimant referred to the footnote of the 1st defendant’s letterhead (Exhibit C5/D6), which carries the Corporate Affairs Commission Registration Number RC No: 248514 that buttresses its legal personality.
86. The claimant listed the 1st defendant as “Transcorp Hilton Abuja”. When the claimant was employed vide Exhibit C1/D2 dated 24 August 2005, the letterhead through which the offer of appointment was made read, NICON Hilton Abuja”. The address of the claimant on Exhibit C1/ D2 was also put as “C/o Housing Department NICON Hilton Hotel”. No where on Exhibit C1/ D2 did the name, “Transnational Hotel and Tourism Services Limited”, the original name with which the 3rd defendant was known, appear. What appears at the bottom of the exhibit is: “The NICON Hilton is operated by Hilton International Co. pursuant to a Management Agreement”. Exhibit D3 dated 28 August 2005, the letter of acceptance of the employment by the claimant was addressed to Human Resources Manager “Nicon Hilton Hotel Abuja”. Of course, “Transnational Hotel and Tourism Services Limited” is not reflected on the exhibit. Exhibit C3/ D4 dated 20 December 2006, through which the claimant’s employment was confirmed has as letterhead the words, “Transcorp Hilton Abuja”, the very name of the 1st defendant. Once again, no where in it are the words “Transnational Hotel and Tourism Services Limited” to be found. What can be seen at the bottom of the exhibit is: “The Transcorp Hilton is operated by Hilton International Co. Pursuant to a Management Agreement”. Exhibit C4/D5 is the Junior Team Member Conditions of Service of “Transcorp Hilton Abuja”. Exhibit C5/D6, the letter terminating the employment of the claimant has as letterhead “Transcorp Hilton Abuja”. At the bottom are the words, “Transcorp Hilton Abuja”, with Rc248514 also indicated. Once again, no where in it are the words “Transnational Hotel and Tourism Services Limited” to be found. Exhibit C5/D6 itself in terminating the employment of the claimant talks of the claimant’s “services with the Transcorp Hilton Hotel, Abuja”, not with “Transcorp Hotels Plc”. Exhibit D7 dated 27 December 2013 is a letter to The Manager UBA Plc Hilton Branch Abuja. Its letterhead is same with Exhibit C5/D6. Exhibit D10 dated 5 December 2013 and titled “Gratuity Payment” is same with Exhibit C5/D6 in terms of the letterhead. Exhibit D11, the Special Clearance Form simply has “Transcorp Hilton Abuja” as letterhead.
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87. This is the scenario in which the 2nd and 3rd defendants argue that the 1st defendant is not a legal person. In all these communications with the claimant by the 2nd and 3rd defendants, there is nothing in them indicating that there exist an entity called “Transnational Hotel and Tourism Services Limited” or “Transcorp Hotels Plc”, the current 3rd defendant. In paragraph 2 of DW’s deposition, the 2nd and 3rd defendants acknowledged that the 3rd defendant used to be known as Transnational Hotel and Tourism Services Limited and that the 1st defendant is its hotel which used to be known as NICON Hilton, Abuja. And in paragraphs 3 and 7 of same deposition, DW was quite emphatic that the 3rd defendant is the proprietor of Transcorp Hilton, Abuja (the 1st defendant) but that the 1st defendant is not a legal person. Is this deposition itself not contradictory? I think so.
88. So, the communication with the claimant was actually one from Transcorp Hilton Abuja. If this is the entity represented as the employer of the claimant, can the 2nd and 3rd defendants now turn around and claim that there is another entity, the real entity by their reckoning, that should be sued? The 2nd and 3rd defendants owned up to the ownership of the 1st defendant. That to my mind is sufficient to clothe the 1st defendant with legal personality, and hence the capacity to sue and be sued. I accordingly hold the 1st defendant to be a legal person capable of suing and being sued. This being so, the argument to the contrary by the 2nd and 3rd defendants is hereby rejected.
89. I now turn to the second arm of the objection of the defendants as to capacity to be sued i.e. that the 2nd defendant is an agent of a disclosed principal and so should not have been sued. The defendants in paragraph 52(b) of DW’s deposition described the 2nd defendant, Mr Etienne Gailliez, as General Manager of the 3rd defendant at the material time to this suit. This Court, dealing with a similar issue in Ogunbayo Oluwole Michael v. Fidelity Bank Plc & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/350/2013, the judgment of which was delivered on 13 December 2017, held thus:
33. …The claimant put the 2nd defendant in this suit as “Managing Director Fidelity Bank Plc”. To the defendants, the 2nd defendant is not a juristic person and does not fall within the purview of the legally recognized exceptions to the juristic personality. I need not expend energy on this objection of the defendant as to the juristic personality of the 2nd defendant. In labour relations, the definition of an employer has an expansive meaning as to include officers of the employer himself. For instance, section 91(1) of the Labour Act Cap. L1 LFN 2004 defines the “employer” to mean “any person who has entered into a contract of employment to employ any other person as a worker either for himself or for the service of any other person, and includes the agent, manager or factor of that first-mentioned person and the personal representative of a deceased employer”. Of course, by section 18(1) of the Interpretation Act 2004, “person” includes any body of persons corporate or unincorporated. Since the definition of an employer includes the agent, manager or factor of an employer, the 2nd defendant in the instant suit is a juristic person properly sued in this case; and I so find and hold. The argument of the defendant in that regard accordingly goes to no issue and so is hereby discountenanced.
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90. See also Mr Gabriel O. Obahiagbon & ors v. The President, Federal Republic of Nigeria & ors unreported Suit No. NIC/LA/171/2011, the judgment of which was delivered on 9 July 2019, Amalgamated Union of Public Corporations, Civil Service Technical and Recreational Services Employees (AUPCTRE) v. Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/62/2021, the judgment of which was delivered on 7 October 2021 and Mrs Ronke Obaribirin Aliyu v. The Director General, Nigerian Television Authority & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/240/2021, the judgment of which was delivered on 28 April 2022. The point is that this Court has consistently turned down arguments of defendants seeking to strike out heads or key officers of establishments on the ground that they are merely agents of the establishments. The instant case must suffer the same fate. I see no merit in the argument of the defendants that the 2nd defendant cannot be sued as has been done in the instant case. I accordingly hold the 2nd defendant as having been properly sued.
91. The claimant’s main grouse against the defendants is that his termination was unlawful as it was done without any notice of termination served on him by the defendants or payment in lieu of notice. If the Court upholds this, then the claimant should be held to still be in employment and so is entitled to the specified special damages from 2015 up to the date of judgment. Thereafter, the claimant’s termination is to be converted to retirement from the date of judgment, for which certain retirement benefits are due to him. There are other reliefs the claimant is also claiming. In the main, therefore, the key to the claimant’s case is the issue of his termination, whether it is lawful or not.
92. The claimant’s termination was effected vide Exhibit C5/D6 dated 10 February 2015. The letter reads:
We regret to inform you that your services with the Transcorp Hilton Hotel, Abuja are no longer required effective today, 10th February 2015.
By a copy of this letter, and upon satisfactory clearance from respective departments concerned, the Director of Finance is to pay you your one month basic salary in lieu of notice.
Please hand over all hotel properties in your possession to the Security after clearance.
We wish you all the best in your future endeavours.
93. By Exhibit C5/D6, the claimant’s termination was “effective today, 10th February 2015”. This means that it was with immediate effect. See Yunus Adewale Adefowope v. MTN Nigerian Communications Ltd unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/492/2016, the judgment of which was delivered on 15 May 2019 and Emana Ibor Edet v. Fidelity Bank Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/ LA/276/2014, the judgment of which was delivered on 17 December 2019. In Dorothy Adaeze Awogu v. TFG Real Estate Limited unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/262/2013, the judgment of which was delivered on 4 June 2018, this Court at paragraph 59 held that: “A dismissal with immediate effect can never be a dismissal with notice. This is commonsensical”. And in
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paragraph 60 of same case, relying on Akumechiel v. BCC Ltd [1997] (Pt. 484) 695 at 703, Emuwa v. Consolidated Discounts Ltd [2000] LPELR-6871(CA); [2001] 2 NWLR (Pt. 697) 424 and Olayinka Kusamotu v. Wemabod Estate Ltd [1976] LPELR-1720(SC); [1976] 9 - 10 SC (Reprint) 254 held thus:
Now the law which enjoins that termination or dismissal cannot be retrospective means that it can be with immediate effect; but this must be subject to the consequences that follow - consequences that follow termination without reasonable or adequate notice. The common law enjoins that even where the contract of employment does not stipulate a notice period, one that is reasonable must be read into the contract of employment.
94. If dismissal or termination with immediate effect can never be one with notice, then this intuits that such is wrongful since even under common law reasonable notice must be read into an employment contract even when one is not expressly stipulated. The defendants, however, think otherwise. To them, the termination of the claimant’s employment without notice was lawful and was within the confines of the claimant’s contract of employment, having regard to Article 1(G)(i) and (ii) of Exhibit C4/D5 i.e. the Junior Team Member Conditions of Service. They also argued that an employer who hires can fire at any time.
95. Article 1(G)(i) of Exhibit C4/D5 provides thus:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in these conditions of service, the hotel reserves the right to terminate the appointment of any confirmed employee by given one month’s notice or one month’s basic salary in lieu and without notice or basic salary for unconfirmed employees. Similarly, a confirmed employee has the right to terminate his or her appointment by giving one month’s notice or one month’s basic salary in lieu. While no notice or salary is required of an unconfirmed employee.
96. The argument of the defendants here is that the claimant was advised in the cessation letter (Exhibit C5/D6) to do clearance before payment of one month salary in lieu of termination notice. As such, the termination of his employment cannot be unlawful.
97. To the claimant, however, the defendants’assertion that he was advised in the cessation letter to do clearance before payment of one month salary in lieu of termination notice is an afterthought that shows lack of understanding of the provision of Article1(G)(i). That giving of one month notice or payment in lieu of such notice ought to be done before the actual termination of employment as the Article 1(G)(i) never contemplated termination of employment before notice of termination or payment in lieu of such notice or make clearance a condition for the payment in lieu of notice.
98. It has always been understood by this Court, relying on Chukwumah v. Shell Petroleum [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512, that payment in lieu of notice has to be done contemporaneously with the termination if the termination is not to be wrongful. See, for instance, Madam Oyesola Ogunleye v. Sterling Bank Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/430/2014, the judgment of which was delivered on 24 May 2018, Mr Dawodu Azeez v. 3 Peat Investment Limited unreported Suit
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No. NICN/LA/628/2014, the judgment of which was delivered on 16 July 2018, Yunus Adewale Adefowope v. MTN Nigerian Communications Ltd (supra) and Emana Ibor Edet v. Fidelity Bank Plc (supra).
99. It appears, however, that the Court of Appeal has altered this stance. In Ikemba v. Pyrammidt Co. Nig. Ltd [2021] LPELR-56145(CA), this is what the Court of Appeal said:
Appellant's counsel however contended that the payment of the salary in lieu of notice and terminal benefits was not properly done as the payment ought to have been done contemporaneously with the termination of the Appellants (sic) employment. With due respect, the law is not that salary in lieu of notice and terminal benefits must strictly be paid at the same time as the termination of employment. The Supreme Court in CHUKWUMAH V. SHELL PETROLEUM (NIG) LTD (1993) LPELR864 (SC) Pp. 50-51, paras. E-A explained the position of the law thus:
I think the mode and time of payment of the salary in lieu of notice depends on the circumstance of each case. Thus in Morohunfola v. Kwara State College of Technology (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt.38) 732 at 744, the Court of Appeal held the payment of the salary in lieu of notice to the Bank of the employee where his salaries had been ordinarily paid to be sufficient compliance with the term of the contract relating to payment in lieu of notice. As was the case in Ajayi v. Texaco Nigeria Ltd. (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt.62) 577, the letter of termination of an appointment might also inform the employee that salary in lieu of notice and his other entitlement would be paid to him and the actual payment made thereafter. In Olaniyan & Ors. v. University of Lagos (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.9) 559 a cheque for the salary in lieu of notice was sent with the letter of termination…
The Appellant did not place any material before the trial Court to show that his terminal benefits ought to be paid at the same time as the service of the letter of termination on him. He can therefore not claim that he was entitled to be paid his terminal benefits contemporaneously with the termination of his employment, neither can he validly contend that the Respondent was wrong to have informed him in the letter terminating his employment that he would be invited to collect his terminal benefits as soon as possible, which terminal benefits were actually offered to him on 31stAugust, 2012.
100. From Ikemba, therefore, a statement in the letter of termination that payment in lieu of notice will be made suffices to validate the termination of employment. This being so, Exhibit C5/D6 had this statement:
By a copy of this letter, and upon satisfactory clearance from respective departments concerned, the Director of Finance is to pay you your one month basic salary in lieu of notice.
101. Going by Ikemba, the termination of the claimant’s employment vide Exhibit C5/D6 cannot be said to be unlawful. And this remains so despite that the payment of the one month’s basic salary in lieu of notice was made contingent on the claimant’s satisfactory clearance. I
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accordingly hold that the termination of the claimant’s employment by the defendants vide Exhibit C5/D6 was lawful. This means that the claimant’s employment came to an end on 10 February 2015. I so hold. This being so, reliefs (1), (2), (5) and (6) prayed for by the claimant cannot be granted as they are hinged on a holding by this Court that the termination of the claimant’s employment was unlawful. Reliefs (1), (2), (5) and (6) are accordingly and hereby dismissed.
102. Reliefs (3), (4) and (9) are claims for special damages in terms of monetary payments or payments in kind as in relief (9). Except for relief (3)(vii), the claim for “Long Service Award of US$430,000 and a gift worth N45,000 because the claimant had served the defendants for over ten years uninterrupted”, which will accordingly be treated differently, all the other other claims in reliefs (3), (4) and (9) are claims for the period February 2015 to date of judgment. In other words, they are hinged on the Court having to find that the termination of the claimant’s employment was unlawful. Since the Court found otherwise, the claims in reliefs (3), (4), (8) and (9), except for relief (3)(vii), which I will separately consider, all fail and so are hereby dismissed.
103. Relief (3)(vii) is a claim for “Long Service Award of US$430,000 and a gift worth N45,000 because the claimant had served the defendants for over ten years uninterrupted”. This is a claim for special damages. Claims for special damages are governed by special rules. UTC Nig. Plc v. Samuel Peters [2022] LPELR-57289(SC), for instance, held that special damages must not only be specifically pleaded, they must be strictly proved by credible evidence of particular losses. See also Luke N. Onyiorah v. Benedict C. Onyiorah & anor [2019] LPELR-49096(SC), Okafor & ors v. Obiwo & anor [1978] LPELR-2413(SC), NNPC v. Clifco Nigeria Ltd [2011] LPELR-2022(SC) and 7UP Bottling Company Plc v. Augustus [2012] LPELR-20873(CA). Claims for gratuity, pension, housing fund, salary, etc are all special damages and so caught up by the special rules made in that regard. See 7UP Bottling Company Plc v. Augustus (supra). And as far as labour relations adjudication is concerned, to succeed, the claimant must show two things: his entitlement to the long service award of US$430,000 and a gift worth N45,000; and how he came by the quantum of the sums he claims. See Mr Mohammed Dungus & ors v. ENL Consortium Ltd [2015] 60 NLLR (Pt. 208) 39, Ineh Monday Mgbeti v. Unity Bank Plc unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/98/2014, the judgment of which was delivered on 21 February 2017, Stephen Ayaogu & 16 ors v. Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/38/2010, the judgment of which was delivered on 27 October 2017 and Mr Suraju Rufai v. Bureau of Public Enterprises & ors unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/18/2013, the judgment of which was delivered on 4 June 2018.
104. In paragraph 10(h) of his deposition, the claimant averred that by virtue of his contract of employment, before the purported termination of his employment, he has been enjoying among other benefits long service award of “US$300 and a gift worth N45,000 for an employee who has worked with the defendant for 10 years; the payment which has increased to US$430 in 2018”. It should be noted that the claimant in relief (3)(vii) is claiming for US$430,000, not US$430.
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105. In reaction, the defendants vide paragraph 14(h) of DW’s deposition averred that the claimant is not entitled to long service award of US$300 and gift item worth N45,000 because the claimant put in less than 10 years in their employment.
106. The claimant is claiming long service award in virtue of his contract of employment. See paragraph 10(h) of his deposition. Exhibit C1/D2, through which the claimant was employed by the defendants, has no provision regarding long service award. Article 5(I)(vi)(a) of Exhibit C4/ D5, however, make provision for long service award in these words:
Hilton International values its long-term employees and always recognise their services to the Company. All employees who have completed anniversaries of 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35 and 40 or more years of service are to be presented with appropriate service awards of five year intervals.
The award shall be monetary payment in Naira at the prevailing official rate.
5 years 10 years 15 years 20 years 25 years 30 years 35 years 40 years
$175.00 $300.00 $430.00 $500.00 $570.00 $650.00 $725.00 $850.00
Standard Hilton International service pins and certificates signed by the General Manager will accompany the award. Terms and Hilton monetary grant for long term service award remain as per international policy. Management will offer a gift worth N20,000 for every 5 years of completion.
107. Article 5(I)(vi)(a) of Exhibit C4/D5 accordingly gives the claimant entitlement to long service award and a gift worth N20,000 every 5 years but on terms. The claimant must have completed anniversary of 10 years (since it is under this that he claims); the monetary award, though denominated in dollars is to be paid in Naira at the prevailing official rate (the claimant did not plead or prove what the “prevailing official rate” is); the “terms and Hilton monetary grant for long term service award remain as per international policy” (the claimant did not plead or prove what the “international policy” is); and management is to offer a gift worth N20,000 for every 5 years.
108. Like I pointed out earlier, the claimant is claiming US$430,000 but Article 5(I)(vi)(a) of Exhibit C4/D5 talks of $300 for those who have completed anniversary of 10 years. Where did the claimant get US$430,000 from? he did not tell the Court. In claiming N45,000 for gift item instead of N20,000 reflected in Article 5(I)(vi)(a), the claimant did not again tell the Court how he came by the N45,000 he claims.
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109. Article 5(I)(vi)(a) of Exhibit C4/D5 talks of “completed [anniversary] of…10 years” as the qualifying period for the claimant. Did the claimant complete anniversary of 10 years? The defendants had argued that the claimant was disengaged from his initial employment with the 3rd defendant’s Hotel on 31 December 2012 and thereafter re-engaged as a new staff on 1 January 2013 and paid his disengagement benefit’s after which he was re-engaged. But that even if the claimant was not disengaged from the service of the 3rd defendant’s Hotel on 31 December 2012, the claimant would have put in 9 years, 4 months and 10 days by the said 10 February 2015 when his employment was terminated by the 3rd defendant’s Hotel and this means that the claimant is not entitled to the relief being claimed under his relief (3)(vii).
110. In reaction, the claimant submitted that the argument of the defendant that the claimant was disengaged from his initial employment in 2012 and later re-engaged is not proved, as neither the 1st defendant nor the 3rd defendant disengaged and re-engaged him at any material time in the course of his employment. That DW during cross-examination rightly confirmed that the 1st defendant can never terminate the employee’s employment without a letter to that effect or re-engage an employee without an engagement letter. DW under cross-examination testified thus:
Before a confirmed staff is disengaged there must be a written communication. Yes, you cannot engage anyone without a written document.
111. There is actually no document evidencing that the defendants disengaged the claimant and then re-engaged him. Exhibit D9 dated 5 December 2013 is simply titled “Gratuity Payment”. It is addressed to the claimant and signed by the Director of Human Resources. It talks about the negotiation as to cessation of gratuity scheme and terminal benefits. It then informed the claimant that his accrued entitlement will be paid in December 2013. It then appreciated the claimant for the 7 years of meritorious service; and asked the claimant to accept the General Manager’s Pro-rata Golden Handshake in gratitude to his long years of service with the hotel. Exhibit D10 is titled “Final Pay Calculation” and is simply dated “December 2013”. It has a net final pay of “1,280,875.61” of the claimant as “Tanko Mohammed” written on it. Exhibit D11 dated 12/12/13 is a special clearance form of Tanko Mohammed. Despite these documents, it cannot be said that there was a formal letter(s) disengaging and re-engaging the claimant by the defendants. I cannot accordingly agree with the defendants’ assertion in this regard. I reject it.
112. This means that the claimant worked for the defendants from 24 August 2005 to 10 February 2015. as the defendants put it, the claimant accordingly worked for the defendants for 9 years, 4 months and 10 days. This is less than 10 years. But in this Court there is what is called the law of arithmetical approximation (where anything from half but less than one is approximated to the next whole number). By this principle, an employer who lays off an employee for no fault of the employee in circumstances that suggest that had the employee not been laid off, he would have qualified to benefit from some entitlements based on the time spent as an employee, would be held to that responsibility by this Court. See Mr Samson Iyanda v. First Bank of Nigeria Ltd unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/292/2016, the judgment of which was delivered on 28 January 2019 and Olapade Samuel Olatunwo Oyebola & ors v. FAAN unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/259/2013, the judgment of which was delivered on 20th May 2019 especially
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paragraph 57. Had the claimant clocked 10 years, he would have been entitled to the long service award and the gift. Since the termination of the employment of the claimant was at the behest of the defendants, it cannot be held against the claimant that he did not spend 10 years. The 9 years, 4 months and 10 days he spend must accordingly be approximated to 10 years based on the law of arithmetical approximation. I so rule. I hold, therefore, that the claimant spent 10 years in the service of the defendants.
113. Despite this holding, is the claimant still entitled to “US$430,000 and a gift worth N45,000” that he claims? I indicated earlier that special damages must be strictly proved. This the claimant has not done; and so even this claim in terms of relief 3((vii) must fail as the claimant did not tell this Court how he came by the quantum of the sums claimed. Relief 3(vii) accordingly fails and so is hereby dismissed.
114. Relief (7) is for an order of the Court compelling the defendants to pay to the claimant cost of this litigation in the sum of N5,000,000 (Five Million Naira) only. The claimant’s case, as already shown, failed. he cannot be entitled to any cost. Relief (7) accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed.
115. Relief (8) is for an order of the Court that all the sum to be granted to the claimant under the judgment to be delivered in this case by the court shall be paid with 15% (percent) interest per month until final liquidation. This relief too fails since there is no sum awarded to the claimant. it is accordingly dismissed.
116. On the whole, the claimant’s case fails and is hereby dismissed. I make no order as to cost.
…………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD, OFR
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