IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ENUGU JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ENUGU

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE O.O. AROWOSEGBE

 

DATE: TUESDAY JANUARY 25, 2022     SUIT NO.NICN/EN/46/2020

 

BETWEEN:

 

PROFESSOR EMMANUEL C. EJIOGU………………..CLAIMANT/APPLICANT

 

AND

 

1.       UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA

2.      VICE CHANCELLOR, UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA 

3.      PROFESSOR EDLYN ANUGWOM

4.     PROFESSOR PETER-JAZZY EZEH

[Head of Department of Sociology & Anthropology,

University of Nigeria]

5.      MRS. BLESSING PHIL-EZEH                                       DEFENDANTS/

[Faculty Officer, Faculty of the Social Sciences,          RESPONDENTS

University of Nigeria]

6.     PREFESSOR JERRY UGWUANYI

[Council Member of the University of Nigeria]

 

 

APPEARANCES:

1.       M.N. OZOAKA  – FOR THE CLAIMANT/APPLICANT.

2.      DR. M.G. AJOGWU WITH K.K. EWELU AND G.T. EZIOKO – FOR THE DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS.

 

RULING

INTRODUCTION

EX-PARTE motion to restrain the defendants from terminating the claimant’s appointment commenced this suit November 9, 2020. It was accompanied with Motion on Notice of like nature and Complaint and Statement of Facts [SF]. The reliefs claimed in paragraph 51 of the SF are:

(a)                            A Declaration that by the terms of the Claimant’s Letter of Appointment and or the relevant rules guidelines regulations and laws of the 1st Defendant University, the Claimant is entitled to be assessed and regularized for full employment within three months of his assumption of duties on provisional basis at the 1st Defendant University.

(b)                            A Declaration that by the terms of the Claimant’s Letter of Appointment and or the relevant rules guidelines regulations and laws of the 1st Defendant University, the Claimant is entitled to be regularized as Professor in/of the University of Nigeria with effect from May, 2015 the Claimant having met and fulfilled all the applicable requirements and conditions in that regard.

(c)                             A Declaration that the failure refusal and or neglect of the Defendants to regularise the Claimant’s appointment as Professor in the University is due to no fault of the Claimant.

(d)                           A Declaration that the failure refusal and or neglect of the Defendants to regularize the Claimant’s appointment as Professor in the University is unlawful, improper, unfair, unjust, in bad faith, ultra vires the Defendants, a violation of sue [sic] process and gross violation of the guidelines rules and regulations of the 1st Defendant University and extant laws.

(e)                            An Order of the Honourable Court compelling the Defendants and the incumbent holders of the various relevant offices therein at the time of judgment of the Court to regularize the appointment of the Claimant as Professor in the University of Nigeria with effect from May, 2015 with all requisite due and applicable emoluments, entitlements and privileges properly calculated, paid and accorded to the Claimant accordingly.

(f)                              An Order of the Honourable Court compelling the Defendants jointly and or severally to pay to the Claimant the sum of N100,000,000.00 (One Hundred Million Naira only) as general damages for the mental anguish, distress, torment, physical exhaustion and wearing out caused the Claimant by their failure refusal and or neglect to duly regularize the Claimant’s appointment as Professor of/ in the University as and when due.

(g)                            Cost of this action in the sum of N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) only.

 

Subsequently, on 7th December 2020, the claimant filed Motion on Notice praying the Court to set aside the termination of his appointment during the pendency of the Motion on Notice and the substantive suit. Thereafter, the defendants filed Counter Affidavit [CA] against this motion on 6th July 2021 together with motion to enlarge time to file the CA and Statement of Defence [SD]. The application to have the termination, during the pendency of the suit set aside, came up for hearing on the 11th November 2021.

First, the motion to regularise the CA and the SD was taken and granted without objection. Thereafter, the Court permitted the motion to set aside the termination during the pendency of this suit to be taken against the objection of the learned defence counsel because, it ruled that, it accuses the defendants of contempt of court and must therefore be taken immediately. Thereafter, M.N. OZOAKA for the claimant/applicant first withdrew prayer 3 of the said motion, without opposition from the other side. And the said relief 3 was accordingly struck out. Thereafter, the erudite counsel to the claimant moved the said motion. The erudite counsel adumbrated that, the Court ought to set aside any fait accompli foisted on it and restore the parties to the status quo ante because it amounts to self-help. Thereafter, the brilliant DR. M.G. AJOGWU SAN adopted the Written Address [WA] in support of their CA against the motion. In adumbration, the erudite counsel opined that in the CA the defence showed that, the claimant was never employed and as such, the termination was proper.

Thereafter, the brilliant claimant’s counsel adopted the Reply on Points of Law [RPL] filed against the defendants’ address in support of the CA and cited Reliance Telecommunications Limited v. Olaore Olufemi Adegboyega (2017) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1567) 319 at 328-329, B-H and the erudite defence counsel replied that, the case was distinguishable from the instant case because, it was not a case of temporary appointment, which this one is. Thereafter, the case was adjourned 9th December 2021 for ruling. As the ruling was not ready on this date, it was adjourned off record sine die. Ruling having become ready, date for its delivery was communicated to the erudite counsel to the parties.

Having summarised the trajectory of the case to this point, the next thing is to summarise the affidavits filed by the parties.

 

SUMMARY OF THE AFFIDAVITS FILED BY THE PARTIES

A: Affidavit in Support of the Application [AS]

The claimant deposed that, he filed this suit on 9/11/2020 alongside ex-parte application and Motion on Notice wherein in the two motions, he sought to preserve the res and maintain the status quo ante belum pending the hearing and determination of the substantive suit. He further deposed that, the ex-parte application was heard on 10/11/2020 and the Court ordered that, the Motion on Notice be served on the respondents and fixed it for hearing on 19/11/2020 and that, in compliance, the Motion on Notice and the Court’s order were served on the respondents, together with the originating processes and that, the respondents did not come to Court on 19/11/2020 when the Motion on Notice came up, even though, duly served, whereupon the Court adjourned it to 10/12/2020, as the bailiff had not filed up the proofs of services and ordered further service of hearing notices. He deposed that, notwithstanding the due services on respondents twice, the respondents terminated his appointment on 4th December 2020 via a letter transmitted to him through e-mail.

He deposed that, this is an affront to this Court calculated to foist a fait accompli on this Court and that, he is therefore entitled to the relief sought in the application. Thus ended the AF. I move to the CA.

 

B: Counter Affidavit Against the Application

The respondents, through their deponent, deposed that, the claimant/applicant was on temporary appointment since 2014 and that, in accordance with the conditions of service, the claimant was required to submit himself for assessment for professorship and was found unqualified and recommended for interview for the post of Senior Lecturer and the claimant refused to continue with the process; and that, despite the subsequent request of the Council that, the claimant submits his papers for assessment the second time, the claimant refused to budge; and was given another opportunity, which he still refused to honour; and that, consequently, another board meeting was scheduled for the claimant and he appeared this time around, but refused to be interviewed; wherein at the Council meeting of 2nd-3rd December 2020, the Council noted that, the claimant flagrantly disobeyed the regulations guiding temporary appointment and refused to abide several Council’s decisions; and as such, not entitled to the reliefs claimed because, his temporary appointment had lapsed.  

Thus ended the CA. I move to the Further Affidavit [FA] filed by the claimant to refute the contents of the CA.

 

C: Further Affidavit Filed Against the Counter Affidavit

The claimant deposed that, the contents of the CA are false and malicious and that, the result of the internal assessment favoured him wherein, he scored 95.5% and that, he did not reject this assessment as claimed, but only rejected the recommendation of the 3rd defendant as ultra vires and bias and that, the Faculty to which the 3rd defendant’s recommendation was sent, also rejected it and held that, he was qualified for regularization as a professor. He replied that, some of the respondents had been conscripted into the conspiracy to deny him his due and that, it was part of the game to ask him to submit another set of papers wherein he replied that, he had earlier submitted his papers as requested, but still re-submitted these papers. He replied that, after the second submission his papers were forwarded to two internal assessors, while one scored him 87.5%, the other person scored him 33% and that, he objected to being interviewed because, that was not in accordance with the regulations and more so, that he was to be interviewed for Senior Lecturer and not professor, for which he was due.

He replied that, the 2nd-6th respondents have deliberately misled the Council against him and; that, he is entitled to the relief claimed. Thus ended the FA. That being the end of the pleadings and evidence rolled into one presented by the parties, I move to summary of the WAs.

 

SUMMARY OF THE WRITTEN ADDRESSES

A: Claimant’s/Applicant’s Address

MAX NDUKA OZOAKA franked the WA. The erudite counsel started by setting down the prayers contained in the application, to wit:

1.                               An Order of the Honourable Court setting aside the purported Letter of Termination transmitted to the Claimant/Applicant by and or on behalf of the 1st & 2nd Respondents during the pendency of the Applicant’s Notice of Motion and Substantive Suit.

2.                              An Order of the Honourable Court restoring the Parties to the status quo ante litem in this suit, to wit, the Claimant/Applicant remaining in the employ of the 1st Respondent pending the hearing and determination of the motion on notice.

 

The erudite counsel submitted a lone issue for the determination of the application, to wit: “Whether having regard to the circumstances of this suit the Honourable Court has the power to set aside Exhibit UN-4 and restore the parties to the status quo ante litem.” Citing Omoyemi v. CBN (2015) LPELR-25789; Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 621 at 631, R. 9-10 and Agbai v. Okagbue (1991) LPELR-225, 69-70, F-A, the erudite submitted that, it is wrong for a party to do self-help and that, whatever the circumstance, a court of law must not acquiesce self-help. The erudite counsel cited Nwadiajuebowe v. Nawwo (2003) LPELR-7324 and Abioudun v. CJ, Kwara State (2007) LPELR-8308 19-22, C-F to the effect that, once established that, there was self-help during the pendency of a suit, the court must mandatorily pull down such self-help in the course of proceedings. The erudite counsel submitted that, the Court must be master of the case before it and must rise to the occasion to prevent any of the parties from usurping its function and cited S. 6(6)(a)&(b) of the 1999 Constitution in support. The erudite counsel finally urged the Court to set aside the termination during the pendency of the Motion on Notice and substantive suit.

I move to the WA of the erudite counsel to the defendants/respondents in rebuttal.

 

B: Defendants’/Respondents’ Address in Rebuttal

DR. M.E. AJOGWU SAN franked the WA. Recapping the facts, the claimant was on temporary appointment and had failed to meet the conditions for his confirmation as a professor. The erudite counsel submitted that, until confirmed, the claimant’s employment had no statutory flavour. The erudite counsel cited Olaniyan v. University of Lagos (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599 and Imolane v. WAEC (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 265) 303 at 317 on when employment acquires statutory flavour. The erudite counsel submitted that, as a result, the Court cannot impose the claimant on the defendants and cited Joseph v. Kwara State Poly 2013 52 WRN 106. The erudite counsel submitted that, until the regularisation of the appointment, there is no contract of employment between the claimant and the defendants and submitted that, as such, the claimant is not entitled to the relief sought in this application. The erudite counsel submitted that, since the claimant had exhibited gross irresponsibility in failing to present himself for consideration for regularisation, he is estopped from complaining about his sack, and signed off. I therefore move to the RPL filed by the erudite claimant’s counsel.

 

 

C: Reply on Points of Law

NDUKA M. OZOAKA franked the RPL. The erudite counsel replied to the argument that, there is no contract of employment between the claimant and the defendants that, it is the motion to set aside termination during the pendency of the Motion on Notice that is for determination now and not the substantive suit; and as such, the defendants cannot veer off to the substantive suit; and that, heeding to the erudite defence counsel’s proposal would amount to abandoning the application to determine the substantive suit. The erudite counsel cited University Press Ltd v. Martins Ltd (2000) FWLR (Pt. 722 at 732 and Re: Abdullahi (2018) LPELR-45202, 24-25, E-D. On the strength of the foregoing, the erudite counsel submitted that, since the defence failed to respond to the application, but instead, chose to delve into the substantive suit, the Court should ignore the irrelevant address and grant the reliefs prayed in the application.

In the alternative, the erudite counsel cited Reliance Telecom v. Olaore Adegboyega (2017) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1567) 319 at 321 also reported as (2017) 8 CLRN to the effect that, an employer is deemed to waive its rights in insisting on issuance of formal confirmation letter once it allowed the employee to continue the employment beyond the prescribed period of probation. The erudite counsel said this is to checkmate the unsavoury abuse into which employers have turned this right. The erudite counsel argued that, since this is a matter for the substantive case, the Court should grant the reliefs claimed in the application in issue and signed off the RPL.

Having done with summary of the WAs, my next duty is to give my decision and the reasons for it. But before then, I wish to say that, I have carefully read all the processes connected with this application and digested them. I have also consulted the principal authorities cited and made additional researches on relevant authorities. Off to my decision I go.

 

COURT’S DECISION AND THE RATIONES DECIDENDI

In resolving this application, I adopt the lone issue formulated by the claimant’s/applicant’s counsel:

Whether, having regard to the circumstances of this suit the Honourable Court has the power to set aside Exhibit UN-4 and restore the parties to the status quo ante litem?

 

One thing I need clear at the outset is that, the defendants/respondents did not respond at all, to all the material allegations that anchored this application, as contained the claimant’s/applicant’s AS. The implication of this that, all these pieces of evidence are deemed admitted – see Buhari & Ors v. Obasanjo & Ors (2003) LPELR-813 (SC) 54-55, C-A. Instead of reacting to the allegations of terminating the claimant’s appointment after the Motion on Notice to restrain the defendants from terminating his appointment pending the determination of the substantive suit had been served on the defendants, the defendants deposed to facts tending to show that, the claimant, being on temporary appointment, could be terminated at will. The implication of this is that, the defendants/respondents failed to join issue with the claimant/applicant on the pertinent question for determination in this application and thus, the claimant needs only minimal evidence to establish his entitlement to the relief sought – see Alhaji Abdullahi Trader v. Romo (2018) LPELR-46514 (CA) 26-27, A-B.

In this same wise, the erudite SAN did not join issues with the issues raised in the claimant’s WA in support of the application. The erudite Silk did not react to the arguments canvassed in the claimant’s WA. The implication is that, the erudite Silk is deemed to have conceded the correctness of the submissions therein – see Gujba v. FBN Plc & Anor (2011) LPELR—8971 (CA) 42-43, B-A. But I am aware that, that does not absolve of me of the need to check out the correctness of the address against the correct position of law, as counsel’s addresses are not binding on courts, but are just assistance to the courts – see Dangana v. IGP (2018) LPELR-45276 (CA) 21-23, E-C.

Be that as it may. Let us now examine the facts of the case in relation to the law on the issue raised for the determination of this Court. The pertinent paragraphs of the AS are paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5 & 6, the concomitance of which, is that, the suit in which this application was filed was commenced 9th November 2020 together with ex-parte application and application on notice wherein, in the two applications, interim order was sought to restrain the defendants from terminating the appointment of the claimant pending the hearing and determination of the substantive suit and that, this Court ordered on 10th November 2020 that, the Motion on Notice be served on the defendants/respondents and fixed it for hearing a date certain; and accordingly, the order of Court and the Motion on Notice together with the originating processes were all duly served on the defendants/respondents; and that, as the Motion on Notice was not heard on the date fixed for it because of the absence of the defendants/respondents, who were duly served, the Court further adjourned the application and ordered service of hearing notices, which were duly served; and that, despite the double services, evidence of which is attached as exhibits, the defendants/respondents, after these services, terminated the claimant’s appointment on 4th December 2020 before the 10th December 2020 to which the application was adjourned.

As indicated earlier on, the defendants/respondents did not react to these vital paragraphs or any other paragraphs of the AS. In essence, the defendants conceded these facts. Now, what is the law on stealing a match against an opponent when a case is already submitted to the Court with an application to restrain the defendants from carrying out the very actions, which they ignored the court and carried out, to affix the court with a fait accompli? The Supreme Court captured the law on this scenario in its locus classicus of Garba v. FCSC & Anor (1988) LPELR-1304 (SC) 28-29, C-E:

“What remains now is an examination of the act of the Respondents in dismissing the Appellant from office during the pendency of the action. Such action, I think is contemptuous of the judiciary, which has been seised with determination of civil rights under the Constitution and which has been left unscathed by all military coups. For the Judiciary, a powerful arm of government to operate under the rule of law, full confidence, and this must be unadulterated, must exist in that institution. It must indeed be demonstrably shown especially if it is the other arms of government that are involved. In civil days both the Executive and the Legislature must show to the entire nation their demonstrable confidence in the Judiciary… ‘Once a dispute has arisen between a person and the government or authority and the dispute has been brought before the Court, thereby invoking the judicial powers of the state, it is the duty of government to allow the law to take its course or allow the legal and judicial process to run its full course.”

 

The Supreme Court defined self-help in Military Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu & Anor (1986) LPELR-3186 (SC) 44, A-B as, “taking an action in person or by a representative with legal consequences, whether the action is legal or not…” Reiterating the reprehensible nature of self-help with regard to the performance of judicial functions, the Supreme Court in Agbai & Ors v. Okogbue (1991) LPELR-225 (SC) 69-70, F-A held that:

“The ratio decidendi of the decision of this Court in Ojukwu’s case is that once there is lis inter partes and the Courts of law are seised with the dispute, no person or authority, whether parties to the lis or not, is allowed by the Constitution to usurp the functions of the Court of law. It is the duty of every person or authority not to interfere with the legal and judicial process from taking its due course.”

 

The Supreme Court, in Nwakire v COP (1992) LPELR-2097 (SC) 42-43, A-D, reiterated the above view. That self-help is not allowed in adjudication has been firmly ensconced in the jurisprudence of this nation like the Rock of Gibraltar, which position remains as constant, in Caesar’s words in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, “as the Northern Star”. Nevertheless, I am not unaware of the distinction between lis pendis, strictly applicable to reality, as distinct from personal property [see Iheka v. Njoku (2017) LPELR-42002 (CA), 31-32, E-C] and therefore took note that majority of these authorities are on lis pendis. In that wise, I consider these two authorities worthy of consideration before arriving at my decision on this application: Ogologo & Ors v. Uche & Ors (2005) LPELR-2312 (SC) 22-23, F-A [on chieftaincy] and Essien v. University of Calabar (1996) LPELR-3416 (SC) 51, C-E [on employment], which seemed to contain rationes decidendi seemingly in conflict with the established position in Garba v. FCSC [supra] that, once a case is in court, party cannot resort to self-help. In Ogologo’s case [supra] the Supreme Court opined that:

“Where a law has given exclusive power to a body to decide, the court cannot come in before that body has exercised that power. Court can come in only where there is exhaustion of all remedies before that body and court will then be able to decide whether that power had been exercised lawfully.”

 

Yes. That is the correct position of law and, it does not have any bearing on the issue at stake here. The law remains that, where there is an application to restrain an august body from exercising such power duly conferred on it by law, it cannot ignore it and go ahead in self-help, to exercise it, to foist a fait accompli on the court seised of the application. In this regard, distinction must be struck between contempt of court and disrespect to court. Where there is interim application to restrain a party from doing something and this application is duly served on such party and the party goes ahead in self-help to do precisely what he was sought to be restrained from doing before the court decides, for the sole purpose of foisting a fait accompli on the court, that is pure contempt of court, for which the offending party could be convicted and sentenced – see Candide-Johnson v. Edigin (1990) LPELR-20108 (CA) 6-7, C-D:

“Contempt of Court may be described as any act or conduct which interferes with the course of justice and tends to bring the authority and administration of law into disrespect. The aim of the law of contempt of Court, therefore, is to protect the dignity of Court from any conduct that tends to obstruct or interfere with the administration of justice…”               

 

No court of law would allow itself to be presented with a contemptuous fait accompli – see Sodade & Ors v. Imagie & Ors (1989) LPELR-20222 (CA) 23-24, F-A. Ogologo’s case is different from the present case, in that, there was no interlocutory application filed to restrain any of the parties or anybody from doing something, which they ignored and went ahead before the decision of the court on the application to do. It is what was taking to the court that was decided. The whole essence of preventing self-help and contempt is not to decide the substantive matter but to purge the offending party of the attempt to usurp the functions of the courts. It is not what the claimant did or the cause of action in the substantive suit, whether it was right or wrong that is for trial now, but whether it was right and proper for the defendants/respondents to sack the claimant in the course of the Motion on Notice duly served on them to prevent them from sacking him pending the determination of the substantive suit. And to show the fait accompli intent of the defendants/respondents, after sacking the claimant, they proceeded to file their Statement of Defence, calling on the Court to put a toga of legality on their illegality! No Court will allow this.

When there is interim application to restrain a defendant from doing something, which ostensibly it has the legal right to do, the solution is not in ignoring the application duly served on it and going ahead to exercise the very power that it was being sought to be restrained from exercising, but in responding to the seemingly frivolous application promptly and, telling the Court it is being invited to do what it lacked jurisdiction to do. This could even be done orally and promptly too to put an end to the supposedly abuse of process rather than, the protracted contest that would ensue by resorting to contemptuous self-help, which no court would tolerate.

In Essien’s case [supra], the claimant did not challenge the suspension and termination that were carried out during the pendency of the suit, as an affront to the overriding constitutional powers of the court to adjudicate over the matter submitted to it, as no interlocutory application was brought to set aside these foisting fait accompli on the Court or for interference with the court’s proceedings. The plaintiff/respondent merely amended his Statement of Claim in Essien’s case to include the suspension and termination during the pendency of the case, as part of the issues submitted to the Court for substantive trial on the basis that, the defendants/appellants lacked the legal powers to so do by virtue of the conditions of service and the laws governing the employment; and not that, it was wrong to have done so during the course of the case. And the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court that, the claimant was lawfully suspended and terminated. It is thus clear that, issue of contemptuous foisting of fait accompli on the court was neither raised nor decided in the matter. It is also clear that, no interlocutory application was filed and decided on the issues of contemptuous self-help and foisting a fait accompli on the court. What the trial Court decided, which the Supreme Court affirmed, was the substantive suit with regard to the rightfulness of the exercise of the defendants/appellants power to discipline the plaintiff/respondent and not the punitive powers of the Court to set aside for contemptuous self-help foisting fait accompli on the Court, as was decided in Garba v. FCSC & Ors [supra].

Be it be stated that, setting aside an action done at the pendency of a suit for the sole purpose of foisting a fait accompli on the court is neither a determination of the substantive matter nor an endorsement that, the respondent had no legal right to do what it did, if due process were followed, but is strictly a punitive measure to safeguard the sanctity of the administration of justice and the rule of law. It might be that, at the end of the substantive trial that, the contemnor would be adjudged to have the right to do what it did, had it not done it in haste. So, in a nutshell, Garba v. FCSC [supra] remains a valid and unaltered authority on the issue of contemptuous self-help attempting to foist a court with fait accompli till date; and is applicable to this case.

The scenario painted in the instant case is even worse than that painted in Garba’s case, in that, the claimant herein did not only file a suit but also, filed ex-parte application and a Motion on Notice to restrain the defendants/respondents from sacking him till the determination of the substantive suit. The ex-parte motion came up for hearing and the court, in a bid to be even handed between the two sides, refused to grant the ex-parte motion and instead, ordered that, the Motion on Notice be served on the defendants/respondents and fixed it for a short date certain. The order of court, the originating processes and the Motion on Notice were duly served on the defendants/respondents, who did not turn up in Court on the 19th November 2020 fixed for the Motion on Notice, even though duly served, and the Court graciously adjourned the matter to another date and again ordered  service of Hearing Notices on the defendants/respondents, which were duly served too, but before the 10th December 2020 to which hearing of the Motion of Notice was adjourned, the defendants/respondents proceeded recklessly and contemptuously to sack the claimant and thereafter filed their defence processes!

Is the act of the defendants/respondents in question a signal to the claimant, the Court and the general public that, the defendants/respondents are above the Court? What then happens to the order of the Court notifying the defendants/respondents that, the Motion on Notice was fixed for hearing at a certain date duly served on them? Does it mean the rug was pulled off the feet of the Court by foisting upon it a fait accompli? I answer the first poser with a resounding YES; and the second, by saying the defendants/respondents simply usurped the constitutional powers of the Court and treated its order served on them with complete contempt, saying in essence that, the Court had no jurisdiction to invite and preside over them. I answer the third question with capital YES too. No court of law would allow this type of egregious contemptuous behaviour to stand.

To this extent, the suggestion by the exalted counsel to the defendants/respondents that, taking this application or granting it would affect the substantive matter, is misconceived, as earlier explained above. It is rather the action of the defendants/respondents that has attempted to decide the substantive suit by foisting on this Court a fait accompli by their resort to self-help against due process of the law. No court of law would allow such egregious affront to stand. It must be pulled down. Relying on Garba v. FCSC [supra] and Sodade & Ors v. Imagie & Ors [supra] the action of the defendants/respondents in sacking the claimant/applicant as narrated above is hereby dismantled and pulled down. Reliefs 1 & 2 of the application are therefore granted in full as prayed, to wit:

1.                             The Court hereby sets aside the purported Letter of Termination transmitted to the Claimant/Applicant by and or on behalf of the 1st & 2nd Respondents during the pendency of the applicant’s Motion on Notice and the substantive suit.

2.                            The Court hereby restores the parties to the status quo ante litem in this suit, to wit, the claimant/applicant remains in the employ of the 1st respondent pending the hearing and determination of the Motion on Notice.

 

 

CONCLUSION

The above are the orders of this Court on this application. In addition to the above orders, I grant cost of N50,000.00 [Fifty Thousand Naira] only against the defendants/respondents and in favour of the claimant/applicant. Ruling is entered accordingly.

 

………………………….

HON. JUSTICE Oluwakayode Ojo AROWOSEGBE

Presiding JUDGE

ENUGU DIVISION

NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA