IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE AWKA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT AWKA

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE J. I. TARGEMA, Ph.D

 

DATE: SEPTEMBER 16, 2021                                  

SUIT NO: NICN/AWK/13/2018

 

BETWEEN

Engr. Emmanuel Eze                                                      –                      Claimant

 

AND

Paul – B Nigeria Plc                                                         –                      Defendant

 

REPRESENTATION:

C. J. Okeke with E. L. Ngede and T. S. Nwali, for the claimant.

Edward Molokwu with C. M. Amankwe and C. J. Modeme, for the defendant.

 

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

1.        The claimant commenced this action vide a complaint filed on 19 April 2018 together with the accompanying processes. The defendant by order of court granted on 16 July 2018 filed its memorandum of appearance, statement of defence and other accompanying processes. The claimant by order of court granted on 17 June 2019 filed his amended statement of facts, further written statement on oath and additional list of documents to be tendered at the trial vide another order of court dated 4/12/2019 extending the time to do so. By his amended statement of facts, the claimant is asking from the court, against the defendant, the following reliefs:

A.       A declaration that the unilateral termination of Claimant’s contract by the Defendant was wrongful and unjustifiable.

B.       An order of this Honourable Court mandating the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of ₦796,150.00 (Seven Hundred and Ninety Six Thousand, One Hundred and Fifty Naira only) being the outstanding sum of his unpaid remuneration from August 2017 to December 2017 before his contract with the Defendant was unlawfully and unilaterally terminated by the Defendant.

C.       An order directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of ₦18,400.00 (Eighteen Thousand, Four Hundred Naira) being expenses the Claimant expended in the course of his employment with the Defendant.

D.      ₦10 million as general damages against the Defendant for wrongful termination of employment.

E.       Cost of this suit assessed at ₦2 million.

 

2.         At the trial, the Claimant testified on his behalf as CW and tendered Exhibits CW1 to CW5. The Defendant objected to Exhibits CW1, CW2 and CW5 and offered to give the reasons for its objection in the final written address. For the Defendant, John Bosco Nnaemeka, Project Accountant with the Defendant, testified as DW and tendered Exhibits DW1, DW2, DW3, DW4 and DW5.

 

3.        At the close of trial, parties filed their respective final written addresses. The defendant’s final written address was filed on 26 November 2020, while the claimant’s was filed on 21 December 2020. The defendant’s reply on points of law was filed on 13 January 2021.

 

THE CASE BEFORE THE COURT

4.        The claimant’s case is that on 15 March 2017, the defendant’s Chief Executive Officer sent him a text message requesting to know if the claimant was free and the claimant replied in the affirmative; that on 16th March 2017, the defendant’s CEO requested audience with the claimant at Defendant’s Neni Asphalt Plant in Anambra; that on 20th March 2018, the defendant’s CEO offered to employ the claimant as its Geotechnical Engineer; that after series of negotiations, he was invited to attend management/staff meetings on 7 August 2017 and 20 August 2017 at which he actively participated. That claimant was invited and he accepted to work at defendant’s project in Abia State on condition that he would be paid ₦180,000.00 as remuneration and same was accepted by the defendant. That even though the commencement of works at Abia State was stalled, he abandoned other offers made to him and he continued to attend Defendant’s management/staffs meetings in the interim. That claimant later received an offer letter of contract appointment dated 27th November 2018 instead of his anticipated August 2017 date; that the defendant unilaterally dismissed the claimant on 9 December 2017 without payment of his expenses and earned remunerations.

 

5.        On her part, the Defendant maintained that the claimant is not entitled to all the reliefs sought as there is not existing contract between the claimant and the defendant; that the claimant unilaterally resigned his appointment when it became obvious to him that the offer of appointment was not acceptable to him; that the date of commencement of appointment in the offer of contract is clear to take effect from the 24 November 2017; that the claimant eventually resigned on 11 November 2017, a period of just fifteen (15) days; that the sum of ₦18,000.00 (Eighteen Thousand Naira) claimed by the claimant arose out of the claimant’s imagination because no approval, written or oral, was given to the claimant to use his personal money and indeed no such expenditure was done by him. That ₦10 million damages is untenable because there is no contract between the parties.

 

 

THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE DEFENDANT

6.        The defendant, upon being served with the claimant’s complaint in this suit, filed a statement of defence on 29 June 2018 and amended same dated 2nd December 2019 to the amended claim of the claimant dated 26 November 2019 wherein the defendant denied the claims of the claimant and urged the court to dismiss the suit with substantial cost. Accordingly, the defendant submitted a sole issue for determination, id est, whether the claimant is entitled to the grant of the reliefs sought in this suit.

 

7.        To the defendant, by virtue of Section 131, 132 and 133 (1) of the Evidence Act, 2011, the burden of proof generally in the sense of establishing a case virtually lies on the plaintiff or the initiator of a suit; that if he fails to do so, his case fails; that on the other hand, if he succeeds in adducing evidence to prove the facts he pleads, he is said to have discharge (sic) the burden of proof that rest (sic) on him. That the burden then shifts to his adversary to prove that the facts established by the evidence adduced would not on the preponderance of evidence, result in court giving judgment in favour of the plaintiff; that until the plaintiff has discharge (sic) the onus cast on him by law, the onus does not shift. See Buhari v. Obasanjo (2005) 2 NWLR (Pt. 910) 241; Igwe v. ACB Plc (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt. 605) 1; Ajadi v. Ajibola (2004) 16 NWLR (Pt. 898); Haruna v. Modibo (2004) 16 NWLR (Pt. 900) 487.

 

8.        That, no doubt, the claimant sought a declaratory relief amongst other reliefs in his writ of summons/complaint which incepted this suit; that a claimant in a declaratory relief must lead credible evidence in support of his case and must rely on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defendant’s case. See CPC v. INEC (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1279) 153. That in response to the claimant’s averments in paragraphs 4, 6, 9, 14, 15 and 17 of his amended statement of facts, the defendant made its averments appropriately in paragraphs 3 (i), (ii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) and (viii) of her amended statement of defence.

 

9.        The defendant went on that it is pertinent to note that the offer of Contract Appointment is the kernel of this suit. See Exhibit CW1 especially paragraphs 4 and 5 thereof. That the pertinent question at this stage is whether the claimant accepted the offer given to him by the defendant as contained in Exhibit CW1 (also Exhibit DW1) and in the manner and form prescribed by that offer; that it is clear from the evidence of the claimant that he did not accept of contract of appointment given to him by the defendant company. That the necessary conclusion from the foregoing is that there was no contract between the claimant and the defendant ab initio. See Taiwo Olufunke v. Minister of Federal Capital Territory & Anor (Unreported judgment of Court of Appeal, Abuja Division) delivered on 15th December 2017.

 

10.   The defendant continued that in the instant suit, the claimant upon a successful interview was offered a contract of appointment; that the said offer of Contract of Appointment as evidenced in CW1 (also Exhibit DW1) was given to the claimant with a condition that the offer must be accepted by him; that the claimant did not accept the said offer. It is therefore the defendant’s contention that there is no valid or any enforceable contract ad (sic) initio between the claimant and the defendant in this suit. That an offer can only mature to a contract where the offeree signifies a clear and unequivocal intention to accept the offer. See Bilante International Limited v. NDIC (2011) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1270) and Nneji v. Zakhem Const. (Nig) Ltd (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 994) 297 at 311 Para H.

 

11.   That the law is trite that in contract, in order to establish that parties have formed a contract, there must be evidence of consensus ad idem between them;  that in the instant suit, paragraph 5 of Exhibit CW1 mandated the claimant to accept the offer given to him upon receipt of the letter of appointment issued to him. That again, the manner of indicating an acceptance is as provided in the defendant’s Staff Rules and Regulation Booklet – see Item 1 on Obligation of the Employee at page 3.  That the claimant clearly did not accept the offer as contained in Exhibit CW1 (also Exhibit DW1); that no doubt, from the state of evidence adduced at the trial, there is absence of consensus ad idem between parties; that the claimant by his own admission at the trial agreed that he did not accept the offer given to him by the defendant.  That it is trite law that what is admitted goes to no issue, fact admitted need no further proof.  See Reptico S.A. Geneva v. Afribank (Nig.) Plc (2013) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1373) 172 SC Kubor v. Dickson (2013) A (sic) NWLR (Pt. 1345) 534 SC.

 

12.   On whether there is subsisting contract of employment between the claimant and the defendant upon which the claimant will be entitled to the reliefs sought, the defendant contends that there is no existing contract between the claimant and the defendant to ground the claimant’s reliefs in this suit, that the Court is duty bound to confine itself to the terms of contractual agreement between parties.  See Nneji v. Zakhem Const. (Nig.) Ltd (supra).

 

13.   It is submitted by the defendant that it is the act of acceptance in the form and manner prescribed by the offeror that propels the contract; that the offeree in a contract has two available options; first, is to accept the contract in the form prescribed or second, to reject the offer by making a counter offer; that there is no evidence, either by document or oral, that the claimant accepted the offer of appointment given to him. That the claimant in this suit has a duty and a mandatory one indeed, to accept the defendant’s offer as contained in Exhibit CW1 (also Exhibit DW1) in the manner prescribed by the offeror, i.e. the defendant; that the acceptance must be in writing.  That claimant failed to do so despite the repeated demand (sic) by the management of the defendant for him to do so.  See Bilante International Limited v. NDIC (supra).

 

14.   That indeed, the offer letter was unequivocal in stating the terms and conditions of the contract; that the claimant’s claim that he did not write to accept the offer because there was supposed error does not hold water; that the claimant’s refusal to accept the offer upon whatsoever alleged reason amounts to a counter offer which the company did not accept.  See Akinyemi v. Odu’a Investment Co. Ltd (2012) 17 NWLR (part 1329) 209 at 240 Paras A-B. That in the instant suit, the claimant though did not formally accept his appointment, voluntarily resigned when his counter offer/extraneous issues he raised were not accepted by the defendant; that upon his voluntary resignation, claimant handed over the defendant’s properties in his possession; that all these are evidenced by Exhibits DW3, DW4 and DW5 respectively.  That despite the clear situation that there was no existing contract between the claimant and the defendant company, the defendant, out of love and magnanimity still paid the claimant for the 15 days he worked with the defendant, particularly given the time and money he spent on his various visits to the company during the period of interview and negotiations.

 

15.   On whether the claimant is entitled to any damages and indeed all other claims contained in his reliefs, the defendant submits that the claimant in the instant suit did not prove any enforceable contract which is binding on the defendant; that there can be no breach of a non-existent contract.  See Best (Nig.) Ltd v. Black Wood Hodge (Nig) Ltd & ors (2011) 1 SCNJ 282 at 299 and Bilante v. NDIC (supra). That there is no existing valid contract between the claimant and the defendant to ground the reliefs sought by the claimant in this suit; and the Court is urged to so hold.

 

16.   On admissibility of electronic documents, the defendant argued that at the hearing of this suit, the claimant sought to tender a text message conversation in Techno Y4 mobile phone between him and an employee of the defendant which was vehemently opposed by the defendant’s counsel; that the Court however provisionally admitted the said mobile phone as Exhibit CW5 and asked defendant’s counsel to address it at final address.  That it is pertinent to note that the claimant only dumped the said Exhibit CW5 on the Court without any printed copy of the contents of the alleged text message conversation between claimant and the defendant’s employee; that the defendant’s counsel could not even assess the content of the said mobile (Exhibit CW5) as same was completely off and non – functional; that the essence of law of evidence is discovery of the truth.  The defendant contends that the claimant failed to comply with the provisions of the Evidence Act 2011 for the admissibility of the statement allegedly contained in “Exhibit CW5”. See Section 84 (1) of the Evidence Act 2011.

 

17.   The defendant went on that “document” as defined in Section 258 (1) (d) of the Evidence Act 2011 includes Exhibit CW5 (Mobile phone) tendered by the claimant; that the content of the message or information was not read in the open Court by the claimant as is the case with documentary evidence for identification evidence of the sender/receiver of such massage; that the defendant joined issues with the claimant at paragraph 3 of the amended statement of defence with respect to the contents of Exhibit CW5 (GSM phone); that yet, the claimant did not lead evidence to prove the contents of the information  contained therein.  See Orogun & Anor v. Fidelity Bank Plc (2018) LPELR – 46601 (CA).

 

18.   In view of the foregoing, the defendant submits that Exhibit CW5 is inadmissible as same was not tendered in compliance with the Evidence Act.  The defendant urged the Court not to attach any probative value to it and to reject and mark same as rejected; and to expunge the testimonies of the claimant which were based on Exhibit CW5.

 

19.   In conclusion, the defendant urged the Court to dismiss this suit with substantial cost on the grounds that the claimant failed to show by credible evidence that there is existing contract between him and the defendant company and/or substantiate his claim against the defendant.

 

THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE CLAIMANT

20.   The claimant in turn raised a sole issue for determination of (sic) thus: whether from the totality of the facts and evidence before this Court, the claimant has proved his case to warrant the grant of the reliefs sought in this suit? To the claimant, it is crystal clear from the facts and evidence before the Court, that the claimant was able to prove that there was an employment contract agreed orally between the claimant and the defendant which allowed the claimant to work in the Defendant company as a Geotechnical Engineer from August 2017 to December 2017 before the claimant was wrongfully dismissed by the defendant without any justifiable reason.

 

21.   That a contract may be oral or in writing or a combination of both by virtue of Section 6 of the Contract Law Cap 32, Laws of Anambra State, 1991 and several judicial authorities.  See Hussaini v. Sambo & Ors (2018) LPELR – 46682 (CA).  That in Taura v. Chukwu (2018) LPELR – 45990 (CA), the Court held that a contract can be oral and can also be inferred from the conduct of the parties thereto.  That in each case, all the ingredients of a valid contract must be present; that they are offer, acceptance, consideration, intention to create legal relationship and capacity to contract; that all these five ingredients are essential,  and a valid contract cannot be formed if any of them is absent.  See BFIG v. BPE (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 416) 1915.  That in the instant case, the claimant entered into an oral contract of employment with defendant to work as a Geotechnical Engineer at the Nigeria Erosion and Watershed Management Project (NEWMAP) in Abia State on the terms and conditions which is crystal clear between the parties on the 21st day of August, 2017.

 

22.   The claimant added that this contractual oral employment agreement existing between the claimant and the defendant is evidenced from the series of texts (sic) messages exchanged between the claimant and defendant’s CEO.  (see paragraphs 3 and 5 of the Amended Statement of Facts) and the meeting exclusively between the claimant and the defendant’s CEO where the defendant offered to employ the claimant as its company’s (Defendant) Geotechnical Engineer with the proposed remuneration of ₦120,000.00 monthly (sic) while the claimant insisted that his remuneration must be ₦180,000.00. See paragraph 4 of the Amended statement of claimant (sic).

 

23.   That furthermore, the claimant’s invitation by the defendant to attend the management/staff meeting of 7th August 2017 and subsequent meeting of 21stAuguest 2017 where the defendant specifically told the claimant to work as its Geotechnical Engineer at the Nigeria Erosion and Watershed Management Project (NEWMAP) in Abia State and the claimant’s acceptance to work in the said site on the condition that he would be paid ₦180,000.00 (One Hundred and Eighty Thousand Naira) only as a remuneration and same was accepted by the defendant.  (See paragraphs 7 and 9 of the Amended Statement of Facts). That these are established conducts from which inference of a valid contract can be deduced from; that the claimant subsequent commencement of work at defendant’s company and his continuous work to the defendant from August 2017 to December 2017 goes to show or prove that there is oral Agreement/Contract between the parties.

 

24.   The claimant continued that from the above, it is undisputed that the five ingredients for creating a valid contract are present in the case; that parties intended for the contract to be binding and enforceable even though it was oral contract agreement; that claimant further contends that the conduct of the defendant especially the Managing Director/Alter ego shows without any scintilla of doubt that a valid contract was created between the parties and that the contract took effect from August 2017.  See Taura v. Chukwu (supra); Njionye v. MTN NG. Comm. Ltd (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1092) 339; PTF v. WPC Ltd (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt.1055) 478; Metibaiye v. Nareili International Ltd (2009) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1167) 326; Dodo v. Solanke (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 346) 57.  See also Ememchukwu v. Okoye & Anor (supra).

 

25.   The claimant went on that the defendant never denied the existence of the terms and conditions of the oral agreement were clearly understood between the parties as same were unequivocal, simple and straight forward; that the defendant never denied the existence of the terms and condition of the claimant’s employment in its amended statement of defence nor in evidence. That in fact, the defendant did not deny that the claimant is its employee working as a Geotechnical Engineer; that in same vein, the terms of the engagement of the claimant by the defendant was that he would work as a Geotechnical Engineer at Umuogele Umuakwu, Abia State but the defendant made him work at Neni Asphalt Plant Anambra State, contrary to the terms of engagement and at great inconvenience to the claimant.

 

26.   To the claimant, DW knew absolutely nothing about the contract of employment of the claimant as shown under cross – examination; that the legal implication of the obvious hollow evidence presented by DW is that the defendant has no defence to the case of the claimant; that as such, the case presented by the claimant ought to be accepted by the Court as the true account of what transpired between the parties; and the Court is urged to give (sic) accept same and grant the reliefs sought by the claimant.

 

27.   That the defendant’s (sic) argued in its final address that there is no contract agreement between the parties and as such claimant is not an employee of the defendant; that this argument is belated and an afterthought; that, in fact, the defendant admitted in paragraph 3 (viii) of its amended of defence that the claimant was allowed to do documentation and after he finished his documentation, he resumed work accordingly, given the terms and conditions of their oral agreement. That this is a clear indication that there is an oral agreement between the parties which allowed the claimant do his documentation and resume work in the company as Geotechnical Engineer; that if there is no oral contract between the parties and the claimant is not an employee of the defendant, the defendant would not allowed or asked the claimant to do documentation and resume work.  That this goes to show the mischief of the defendant and this Court should not allow the defendant to get away with it.

 

28.   That the mischief of the defendant is evidenced by Exhibit CW3 (sic); that the said Exhibit is a letter entitled “Acceptance of your Resignation” made on 15th January 2018 long after the claimant was dismissed by the defendant on 9th December and consequently handed over on 14th December 2017. That Exhibit CW3 (sic) was made and issued to the defendant (sic) to cover up its mischief; that the defendant after it dismissed the claimant on 9th December 2017, and the claimant handing over on 14th December 2017,  the defendant took the handing over by claimant to be his resignation and that was the reason behind Exhibit CW2.  That it is trite law that fact admitted need no further prove (sic).  See Bunge V. Governor of River State (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 995) 573 at 599 – 600; Aromolaran v. Oladele (990) (sic) 7 NWLR (Pt. 162) 262 at 368 Paras E – F per Kolawole JCA; Biezan Exclusive Guest House Ltd v. Union Home Savings & Loans Ltd (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1246) 246 at 258 Paras C – D per Awotoye JCA and Section 123 of the Evidence Act, 2011.

 

29.   That it is settled law that an oral agreement/contract can be used to explain a written contract, that this is because every written contract was first discussed an (sic) agreed upon orally before it was reduced in writing. See Law and West Africa Nig. Ltd v. Nig. Breweries Plc (2018) LPELR – 49358 (CA).  That it is therefore clear that the oral agreement between claimant and Management of the Defendant together with the conduct of the defendant MD/CEO can be used to explain or throw more light on Ex. (sic) CW1 in the circumstances especially so as the commencement date of the contract is in contention.

 

30.   The claimant submitted further that the law is very trite that a party to a contract has no right to avoid the contract unless he can show that it is avoidable at his option.  See Punch (Nig.) Ltd v. Jumsum Nig. Ltd (2011) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1260) 168.  That in the instant case, the defendant failed to reflect the already agreed date of commencement of work by the claimant on the offer letter which was 21st August 2017; that when the claimant raised the issue however, instead of addressing it, the defendant avoided the contract by dismissing the claimant unilaterally without payment of his entitlement as agreed.  That in the same vein, the defendant ought not to have avoided the contract by dismissing the claimant without payment of his remuneration as that amounts to wrongful dismissal or termination of the contract of employment.  See Gumba v. Kwara Investment Co. Ltd (2005) NWLR (Pt. 917)160 and Osisnsanya v. Afribank (Nig) Plc (2007) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1031) 565.

 

31.   That where the contract of employment is wrongfully terminated as in the instant case, the remedy accrued to the claimant is a claim for damages.  See Osisanya v. Afribank (Nig) Plc (2007) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1031) 565; Isheno v. Julius Berger (Nig) Plc (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 415) 1632 at p. 1654, Paras A – D. That the claimant is therefore entitled to the grant of his relief (D).

 

32.   That under relief (B), claimant sought for an order for payment of his outstanding remuneration from August – December 2017 for the sum of ₦796,154.00 only; that the claimant is unequivocally entitled to be paid for his outstanding remuneration which was unpaid before his contract was wrongfully terminated on the 9th December 2017.  That Courts are in agreement that where the employer wrongfully terminates a contract of an employee without the payment of his outstanding salary or entitlements, the employee is entitled to the unpaid salary.  See Adeniran v. NEPA (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt. 786) 30 at 48; Nigerian Produce Marketing Board v. A. O. Adewunmi (1972) All NLR 870; SPDC Ltd v. Olarewaju (2008) 12 SC (Pt. III) 27; New Nigeria Newspaper Ltd v. Mr. Felix Atoyebi (2013) NGSC 2. That the claimant is therefore entitled to be paid for his outstanding remuneration by the defendant.

 

33.   That under claim (C), the claimant averred in paragraph 21 of his statement of facts that he expended his personal money to the tune of ₦18,400.00 which the defendant is yet to refund to him while working for the defendant; that claimant firmly submits that he is entitled to the refund of his personal money he spent while working for the defendant.  That the defendant made the claimant to work at Neni Aspalt (sic) Plant Anambra State contrary to the terms of engagement that he would work as a Geotechnical Engineer at Umugele Umuakwu Abia State at a great inconvenience to the claimant; that it was in course of performing his duty to the company (Defendant) that the claimant expended his personal money and he is entitled to a refund by the defendant. On award of cost, see Amira (Nig.) Ltd v. Mal (Nig) Ltd (2001) FWLR (Pt. 771) 896.  See also Obayagbonna v. Obazee (1972) 5 SC 247 and Adenaiye v. Governor-in-Council (1962) 1 SCNLR 442.

 

34.   Regarding admissibility of electronic document (Exhibit CW5), the claimant argued that during the hearing of this matter, he sought to tender a text message in his (claimant’s) Tecno Y4 mobile phone; that it was provisionally admitted by the Court as Exhibit CW5 and then (sic) asked the parties to address it (sic) in their final written addresses (sic).  That the text messages contained in Exhibit CW5 were produced by Tecno Y4 during the period which the Tecno Y4 was used regularly to store or process information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over the period of the contract between the claimant and the defendant and beyond; that other text messages were equally supplied to Exhibit CW5 during that period of contract between  the claimant and the defendant and duly contained in the said exhibit; that also, throughout the period of the contract between the claimant and the defendant, and till it was tendered, Exhibit CW5 was operating properly and functionally.

 

35.   That the defendant contended in its address that the content of the message or information was not read in the open Court by the claimant; that the defendant’s counsel never requested to access or read the content and defendant’s CEO in open Court; that the issue of identification of the sender/receiver of such messages was never raised by the defendant during the trial or in its pleading.  That, in fact, the identity of the sender/receiver of the text message was never an issue throughout the trial as it was crystal clear that it was between the claimant and the defendant’s CEO; that what that (sic) guides admissibility is relevance.  That Exhibit CW5 is very relevant to this suit; that if was equally pleaded and duly complied with the requirements of Section 84 of the Evidence Act.  The claimant then urged the Court to admit Exhibit CW5 and attach probative value to it.

 

36.   In conclusion, the claimant implored (sic) the Court to graciously grant his claims on the strength of the evidence placed before the Court.

 

DEFENDANT’S REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW TO CLAIMANT’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS

37.   It is submitted by the defendant that contrary to the contention of the claimant’s counsel’s arguments and submissions as contained in paragraphs 4.01 to 4.29 of the claimant’s address, the entire argument of counsel is totally misplaced; that the contract agreement for employment between the claimant and the defendant company was never in an oral form but was reduced in writing in a clear document as evidenced in Exhibit CW1 – offer of appointment letter.  That all the claimant’s stories about oral agreement and by conduct of parties were erroneously hinged on assumption of the claimant as clearly demonstrated in his pleadings.

 

38.   That the claimant was never at anytime engaged or employed by the defendant sometime in August 2017 as alleged by the claimant; that the defendant clearly denied this allegation, that the period of August 2017 alluded to by the claimant was only periods of interviews and negotiations which culminated to the actual offer of employment given to the claimant in November 2017.  That as can be seen from Exhibit CW1, claimant’s employment was to take effect from 24 November 2017 which was actually the day claimant started work with the defendant company.  That it is trite law that once the term of any contract is reduced into writing, oral evidence cannot be admitted to vary same.  See SPDC & Anor v. Pessu (2014) LPELR – 23325 (CA).

 

39.   The defendant submitted further that it is immaterial that DW1 (sic) who testified for the defendant does not know about the contract of employment of claimant; that the document evidencing the contractual intention of the parties in this suit with respect to the employment of the claimant is in evidence.

 

40.   That contrary to the claimant counsel’s specific submission in paragraph 4.15 of his final written address  with respect to the counsel’s alleged “mischief” evidenced in Exhibit CW3, this Court is once again invited to take a careful look at Exhibit DW4 which is a handwritten correspondence of 14/12/2017 written personally by the claimant; that it is clear from Exhibit DW4 that the claimant resigned on his own volition and handed over the defendant’s properties in his custody; that the claimant handed over the defendant’s properties in his custody; that, no doubt, Exhibit CW3 was in fact on acknowledgement of the claimant’s resignation as contained in Exhibit DW4.

 

41.   That contrary to the counsel’s submission on the admissibility of Electronic Documents (Exhibit CW5) as contained at paragraphs 4.30 to 4.34 of the claimant’s final address, the defendant submits that counsel’s submission and arguments thereto are mere after-thought; that this is because a party’s address cannot take the place of pleadings or evidence. That claimant’s counsel only tried to play smart by seeking to lay proper foundation for admissibility of Exhibit CW5 which he failed to do so; both in the claimant’s pleadings and his evidence at the trial of this suit; that the mandatory condition for admissibility of CW5 is as provided in Section 84 of the Evidence Act, 2011.  See Adeyemi v. Orba (2017) All FWLR (Pt. 870) P. 1004 at 1059 Paras C.

 

42.   On the scope of address of counsel, the defendant cited Cargill Ventures Ltd v. Coastal Serv. Nig. Ltd (2012) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1304) P. 60 at 64 Ratio 9.  And on whether address of counsel substitutes for evidence, the defendant cited Ucha v. Elechi (2012) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1317) P. 330 at 362 Paras F – H. It is the contention of the defendant that this Court is not an investigator to start going through Exhibit CW5 which was dumped on it without leading evidence to show its content(s). On whether Court can investigate document not properly before it, the defendant cited Ucha v. Elechi (supra). That on the whole, the defendant submits that Exhibit CW5 being electronic evidence is not is no admissible by the Provisions of the Evidence Act for failure to comply with the Provisions of Section 84 0f the Evidence Act for its admissibility; that the Court is urged to reject same and expunge any evidence led thereto.  The defendant maintained that the claimant failed to discharge the burden on him to be entitle (sic) to his claim as there was not (sic) binding contract between parties in this suit.

 

COURT’S DECISION

43.   I have given due consideration to all the processes and submissions of the parties.  I need to start with a few remarks. Firstly, the law is that a reply on points of law is meant to be just what it is, a reply on points of law.  It should be limited to answering only new points arising from the opposing brief.  It is not meant for the party replaying on points of law to reargue its case or bring in points it forgot to advance when it filed its final written address.  It is not a forum to engage in arguments at large. Alternatively put, a reply on points of law is not meant to improve on the quality of a written address; a reply brief is not a repair kit to correct or put right an error or lacuna in the initial brief of argument. See Dr. Augustine N. Mozie & Ors v. Chike Mbamalu (2006) 12 SCM (Pt. I) 306; (2006) 27 NSCQR 425; Ecobank (Nig) Ltd v. Anchorage Leisures Ltd v. Aspinall (2013 LPELR – 20745 (SC); Ojo v. Okitipupa Oil Palm Plc (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt. 719) 679 at 693; Ogboru v. Ibori (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 942) 319 and Cameroon Airways v. Mike Otutuizu (2005) 9 NWLR (Pt. 929). The effect of non compliance is that the Court will discountenance such reply brief on admissibility of electronic documents, claimant’s employment by the defendant and Exhibit DW 4.  See Onuguluchi v. Ndu (2000) 11 NWLR (Pt. 590) 204; ACB Ltd v. Apugo (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt. 339) 65 and Arulogun & Ors v. Aboloyinjo & Anor (2018) LPELR – 44076.

 

44.   Counsel to the claimant on his part in paragraph 5.3 of the claimant’s final written address stated thus: “We humbly employ (sic) your Lordship to graciously grant our claims…” I do not know if counsel is actually unaware that this Presiding Judge is already an employee of this Court. In the circumstance, counsel can, at best, implore, and not employ, this Court in his prayers.

 

45.   I indicated earlier that the defendant objected to the admissibility of Exhibits CW1, CW2, and CW5 at the hearing of this suit.  Exhibit CW1 is defendant’s letter of offer of contract appointment to claimant dated November 27, 2017.  Exhibit CW2 is claimant’s letter to the chairman of the defendant dated December 5, 2017 titled: Application for the Correction of my Date of Appointment, while Exhibit CW5 is claimant’s Tecno Y4 mobile phone.  The Court had directed counsel to the defendant to address the Court in final written address.  By paragraph 5.0 to 5.04 of the defendant’s final written address, counsel to the defendant has elected to address the Court on Exhibit CW5. In effect, it stands to reason that the defendant has abandoned its objection to the admissibility of Exhibits CW1 and CW2.  Therefore, both stand admissible accordingly as exhibits in this suit. I so hold.

 

46.   The defendant contends that the claimant failed to comply with Section 84 (1) of the Evidence Act, 2011 as claimant only dumped Exhibit CW5 (a Tecno Y4 mobile phone) on the Court without any printed copy of the contents of the alleged message conversation between the claimant and the defendant’s employee; that defendant’s counsel could not even assess (sic) the contents of the said mobile phone as same was completely off and non-functional; that the essence of law of evidence is discovery of the truth.  See Oregun & Anor v. Fidelity Bank Plc (supra). In reaction, the claimant maintained that the text messages contained in Exhibit CW5 were produced by Tecno Y4 during a period which the Tecno Y4 was used regularly to store or process information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over the period of the contract between the claimant and the defendant was operating properly and functionally; that the defendant’s counsel never requested to access or read the content and defendant’s CEO in open Court; that the issue of identification of the sender/receiver of such messages was never raised by the defendant during trial or in its pleading; that in fact, the identity of the sender/receiver of the text message was never an issue throughout the trial as it was crystal clear it was between the claimant and the defendant’s CEO.  That what that (sic) guides admissibility is relevance; that Exhibit CW5 is very relevant to this suit; that Exhibit CW5 was equally pleaded and duly complied with the requirements of Section 84 of the Evidence Act.

 

47.   On the conditions precedent for admissibility of electronic evidence, the law as stated by Section 84 (2) (a) of the Evidence Act, 2011 is that:

the document containing the statement was produced by the computer during a period over which the computer was used regularly to store or process information for the purposes of any activity regularly carried on over that period whether for profit or not by anybody, whether corporate or not, or by any individual.

 

48.   In a case where written records are kept by a mobile phone user such written records are admissible to prove and/or corroborate the call logs on the said GSM phone as stated in the case of R. v. Singh (2006) 1 WLR 1564 where the holder of the GSM phone kept a separate notebook which he recorded numbers he had saved in the memory of the GSM phone.  In this case, it was held that evidence in the notebook in which the user traced to the defendant, was admissible to show that the number saved belonged to the defendant.   In paragraph 3 of his amended statement of facts, the claimant pleaded the text message communication correspondence between him and defendant’s CEO as clearly found in the claimant’s Tecno Y4 and shall rely on all the text message conversations between him and the defendant ‘s CEO as saved/contained in the said phone during trial.

 

49.   His Lordship, the learned author, Alaba Omolaye – Ajileye, in the book: Electronic Evidence, Revised Edition, 2019 discussed the ambit of the law relating to admissibility of short messages services (SMS) and instant messages (im). For instance, the learned author stated at pages 314, 315 and 316 thus:

The easiest way to authenticate a text message is to have the opposing party admit that he sent it. This is on the basis of the principle that what is admitted need no proof. Like emails, text messages have certain seemingly self – authenticating features. For instance, a text message is marked with the sender’s cell phone number. Nevertheless, given the possibility of a third party intervention by which such a message could be generated under the guise of the named sender, courts have been wary in attributing a text message exclusively to the person to whom the phone number is assigned. Indeed the underlying reason for authentication requirement is the possibility that a third party could have used the cell phone to send a text message. Therefore, a text message may not have originated from the person who appears to have sent it. See Commonwealth v. Koch. No 1669 – MDA 2010, 2011 Pa. Super Lexis 2716 (September 16 2011) See: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/pa-superior-court/1580343.html.21/04/2018...

That emails and text messages are documents and subject to the same requirement for authenticity as non-electronic documents generally… The Court ruled further that the defendant’s ownership of the phone was not enough to prove that she had sent the message in question. The Court declared that parties seeking to introduce electronic materials, such as cell phone text messages and email, must prepare to substantiate their claim of authorship with “circumstantial evidence” that collaborates the sender’s identity. That evidence may come in the form of testimony from the sender or recipient, testimony of witnesses to the creation of the correspondence, or even “contextual clues” in the message itself.  

 

50.   The claimant’s argument that “the text messages contained in Exhibit CW5 were produced by Tecno Y4 during a period which the Tecno Y4 was used” without the user (i.e. the claimant) producing the document containing the statement/text messages therein is, in  my contemplation, hollow and does not satisfy the requirements of Section 84 of the Evidence Act, 2011.  The argument of the claimant that the defendant’s counsel never requested to access or read the content and defendant’s CEO in open Court, in my view, is a starkly disingenuous way of passing the buck and laying his burden of proof on counsel to the defendant. It is not done like that.  Exhibit CW5 is deaf and mute.  It was needlessly dumped on the Court by the claimant.  It is impishly composed of unresolved issues as to the sender of any message.   For all the reasons stated above, I shall discountenance Exhibit CW5 for purposes of this judgment. I so hold.

 

51.   Given the reliefs claimed by the claimant, the issues before the Court are: whether the unilateral termination of claimant’s contract by the defendant was wrongful and unjustifiable; whether the claimant is entitled to be paid unpaid remuneration from August 2017 to December 2017; and expenses claimant expended in the course of his employment with the defendant; general damages and cost of this suit.

 

52.   The instrument by which the claimant in the instant case is said by the defendant to have resigned is Exhibit DW4. In paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 23 and 24 of the statement of facts as well as the supporting depositions in paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 23 and 24 of CW’s depositions of 26th November, 2019.  On the 20thAugust 2017, he and others were summoned to a management/staff meeting of the defendant wherein the defendant informed the claimant and other staff present that it would commence project at the Nigeria Erosion and Watershed Management Project (NEWMAP) in Abia  State the next day being 21st August 2017 and the claimant would specifically work there as its geotechnical engineer; that the claimant accepted to work at the said site on the condition that he would be paid ₦180,000.00 as remuneration and same was accepted by the defendant; that in spite of the fact that the date earlier scheduled for work at the NEWMAP site was botched, the defendant during the intervening period, initiated series of management/staff meetings which were duly attended by the claimant; that as a follow-up to such meetings, the claimant with other staff kept visiting the NEWMAP project site for site inspection.  That perturbed by the non-issuance of appointment letter to him, the claimant notified/reminded the defendant’s CEO after one of such strategy meetings that having been absorbed as one of the defendant’s staff as clearly evidenced by series of conduct and oral agreement thereto, there was need to avail him an appointment letter to further formalize/concretize his appointment and that the said appointment letter must take cognizance of the fact that service contract between them started in the month of August 2017.  That the claimant later received, with great shock and dismay an offer of contract of employment letter dated 27th November 2018 from the defendant stating that his appointment took effect from Friday, 24th November, 2017; that claimant raised the issue in one of the meetings with the defendant and was assured that the mistake in the date of commencement would be corrected; that as further directed by the defendant, he put his complaint in writing via a letter dated 5th December 2007 (sic) and titled: “Application for the Correction of my Date of Appointment”; that on 9th December 2017, the defendant unilaterally dismissed the claimant from work without any justification.  That the claimant handed over all defendant’s materials and documents in his possession to the defendant despite the fact he had not been paid a dime.

 

53.   The defendant’s denial of this is in paragraphs 3(i) to (xi) and 4 (i) to (vii) and (ii) to (vi) (sic) of its statement of defence as well as the supporting depositions in paragraphs 3 to 21 of DW’s deposition of 2nd December 2019.  In the above paragraphs of the statement of defence, the defendant specifically pleaded that it advertised for recruitment of staff to fill the various vacant positions in the company, and invited suitably qualified person(s) to apply in line with their area of specialisation; that one of the vacant positions was that of a Geotechnical Engineer that will oversee the company’s project on Nigeria Erosion and Watershed Management Project (NEWMAP) in Abia State of Nigeria; that in line with the defendant’s company policy of staff recruitment the entire applications received were filtered, at the end of which remaining applicants, which included the claimant herein were shortlisted for interview. That the claimant and the other applicants made several visits/phone calls after the oral interview in order to find out the outcome of the oral interview; that the successful applicants which included the claimant were subsequently issued with the offer of contract appointment; that claimant herein was issued with the offer of employment through the correspondence dated 27th November 2017 but the appointment took effect from the 24th November 2017, stating the terms and conditions of the employment. That the claimant duly received the offer of appointment letter from the defendant but fail (sic) to accept the offer in the form and manner stipulated in the appointment letter and the Staff Rules and Regulations Booklet; that claimant did not accept the offer made to him by the defendant. The argument of the counsel to the defendant in paragraph 4.08 of defendant’s final written address is that the claimant did not accept the offer of contract of appointment given to him by the defendant company; that the necessary conclusion from the foregoing is that there was no contract between the claimant and the defendant ab initio. See Taiwo Olufunke v. Minister of Federal Capital Territory & anor (supra), Bilante International Limited v. NDIC (supra) and Nneji v. Zakhem Const. (Nig) Ltd (supra).

 

54.   Now, the law is that a matter can be proved by either oral or documentary (or both) evidence though documentary evidence is preferable. See Vincent U. Egharevba v. Dr. Orobor Osagie (2009) LPELR – 1044 (SC). The burden of proof lies on the person asserting; in the instant case, on the claimant. Once a fact is proved, the burden then shifts to the defendant to show otherwise. The claimant’s evidence vide paragraph 23 of his amended statement of facts as well as the supporting deposition in paragraph 23 of his deposition of 26th November 2019 averred that the defendant on the 9th December 2017 unilaterally dismissed claimant from work without any justification; that no reason was given to him as to why he was dismissed from work and no query was issued to him by the defendant prior to the dismissal; that equally, no notice of termination of the contract was issued to him by the defendant. Under cross-examination, the claimant stated that: “…I had several meetings with the management of the defendant company before my eventual engagement as a contract staff… It was consequent upon my discussions with the defendant that Exhibit CW1 was issued to me by the defendant. The company (defendant) engaged me as a Geotechnical Engineer in its site at Umuogela, Abia State. By Exhibit CW1, my engagement by the defendant was to be guided by the defendant company’s policies, rules and regulations… On receiving the letter (of appointment) I noticed that there was an error concerning the date as it was dated 24/11/2017 instead of August 2017 when I had started. I put a letter to the Manager to correct the defect. That was why I did not write formally to accept the offer of appointment on the terms and conditions stated therein… There was an oral agreement that I start work in August 2017…”

 

55.   There is the additional evidence of Exhibits DW3 and DW4. Exhibit DW3 is dated 14/12/2017 while Exhibit DW4 is dated 11th December 2017. Exhibit DW4 is the claimant’s letter to the Plant Manager of Defendant company. It is titled: Request for my entitlements. It states thus:

Sir, I really appreciate the job offer been (sic) given to me. Sir, in the course of asking me to stop work, I want to bring to your notice that I spent ₦18,400 while installing concrete poles for fencing at Obizi and Ekwulobia, as well as clearing of bush/grasses at Obizi site which can be verified.

Sir, with a humble mind, I ask for my salaries which I am entitle (sic) for and as well as compensation for the job offer the management asked me to forfeit.

Thanks in anticipation.

 

56.   In reaction to claimant’s letter (Exhibit DW4), the Defendant’s Plant Manager minuted to the Defendant’s MD/CEO on 12/12/2017 that: “Engr Emmanuel Eze resigned his appointment with effect from 11th December 2017. He was employed as a Geotechnical Engineer on monthly payment of ₦180,000.00 with effect from 24th November 2017. He has handed over. I wish to recommend for acceptance of his resignation and payment of his entitlement. You are directing, Sir.

 

57.   Exhibit DW3 dated 14/12/2017 is claimant’s letter to the defendant’s Plant Manager. The letter is titled: Letter of Handover. It states that: “Sequel to my resignation, I wish to return the following (12 items in all), which are in my possession to the Management.” The Project Manager then minuted to the QS (Ubaka) the same date (14/12/2017) to: “Urgently go through above handover items, confirm and report back that if (sic) it been completed.” QS (Ubaka) in response dated 14/12/2017 stated thus: “The mentioned documents listed by Engr. Emma Eze are complete and received by me.”

 

58.   By the pleadings and evidence adduced by both parties, the claimant had expected that his employment should take effect in August 2017 while the defendant insisted that the employment date for claimant be 24th November 2017. Seeing that he was in a state of take-it-or-leave-it, my take is that the claimant opted to throw in the towel and take a walk; hence Exhibit DW4. And it did not matter that the defendant had waived the non-acceptance of the offer of appointment/contract by claimant in writing within the period specified, and took claimant on for the 20 days he worked for the defendant as acknowledged by the Plant Manager and QS (Ubaka). The rule however, is that an employer who upon the knowledge of an infraction by an employee chooses to condone same i.e. forgive, overlook or act so as to imply forgiveness of the infraction cannot be heard to complain later. See Ekunda v. University of Ibadan (2000) 12 NWLR (Pt. 681) 220 CA; ACB Plc v. Nbisike (1995) 9 NWLR (Pt. 416) 725 CA, Nigerian Army v. Brig. Gen. Maude Aminu-Kano (2010) LPELR – 2013 (SC); (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1188) 429; (2010) 1 MJSC (Pt. 1) 151 and Lawrence Idemudia Oborkhale v. LASU (2013) 30 NLLR (Pt. 85) 1 NIC.

 

59.   As to whether defendant unilaterally terminated the claimant’s employment or the claimant resigned on his own, the question to ask would be: are the words or actions of resignation unambiguous? By claimant’s pleadings in paragraph 9 of his amended statement of facts as well as the supporting deposition in paragraph 9 of claimant’s deposition of 26th November 2019, the claimant’s expectation was that the project at NEWMAP would commence on 21st August 2017. And claimant was shocked upon being told that the proposed date was shifted by the defendant to a future date. Exhibit CW2 dated December 5, 2017 is claimant’s application to the defendant’s chairman for the correction of his date of appointment on 21st August 2017. Exhibits DW3 and DW4 which are a letter of handover and request for entitlements respectively from the claimant to the defendant are clear indicators that the defendant would have none of claimant’s request in Exhibit CW2. As I stated earlier, the claimant had found himself in a take-it-or-leave-it situation. In Sovereign House Security Services Ltd v. Savage (1989) IRLR 115, Savage, a security officer, was told that he was to be suspended pending police investigation into the theft of money from the employer’s office. Savage told his immediate supervisor to pass on the fact that he was “jacking it in”. The Court of Appeal agreed that the employer was entitled to treat these words as amounting to a resignation. May, L. J. said:

In my opinion, generally speaking, where unambiguous words of resignation are used by an employee to the employer direct or by an intermediary, and are so understood by the employer, the proper conclusion of fact is that the employee has in truth resigned. In my view tribunals should not be astute to find otherwise. However, in some cases, there may be something in the context of the exchange between the employer and the employee or, in the circumstances of the employee him or herself, to entitle the Tribunal of fact to conclude that notwithstanding the appearances there was no real resignation despite what it might appear to be at first sight. (emphasis mine).

           

60.   By Western Excavation (EEC) Ltd v. Sharp (1978) QB 761 Court of Appeal, per Lord Denning MR: “If the employer is guilty of conduct which is a significant breach going to the root of the contract of employment, or which shows that the employer no longer intends to be bound by one or more of the essential terms of the contract, then the employee is entitled to treat himself as discharged from any further performance. If he does so, then he terminates the contract by reason of the employer’s conduct. He is constructively dismissed. The employee is entitled in those circumstances to leave at the instant without giving any notice at all or, alternatively, he may give notice and say he is leaving at the end of the notice. But the conduct must in either case be sufficiently serious to entitle him to leave at once. Moreover, he must make up his mind soon after the conduct of which he complains for, if he continues for any length of time without leaving, he will lose his right to treat himself as discharged. He will be regarded as having elected to affirm the contract.

 

61.   I must state here and emphasize that in interpreting contracts of employment, ambiguity must be resolved in favour of that which gives the employee an advantage. See James Adekunle Owulade v. Nigerian Agip Oil Co. Ltd unreported suit No. NICN/LA/41/2012, the judgment which was delivered on 12th July 2016 and Mr. M. A. Chiroma v. Forte Oil Plc unreported suit No. NICN/ABJ/165/2018, the judgment of which was delivered on 2nd May 2019. The claimant might, as well, have opted to resign as indicated in Exhibit DW3. However, construed pari passu with Exhibit CW2 (Application for the correction of date of my appointment), Exhibit DW4 (Request for my entitlements), defendant’s condonation and the law as stated in the authorities above, it is my determination that the defendant unilaterally/constructively terminated the claimant’s contract. I so find. Same is wrongful. I so hold.

 

62.   Reliefs (B) and (C) are claims for monetary sums. The first for ₦796,154.00 being the claimant’s outstanding sum of his unpaid remuneration from August 2017 to December 2017 before the claimant’s contract with the defendant was unlawfully and unilaterally terminated by the defendant. And the second for ₦18,400.00 being expenses the claimant expended in the course of his employment with the defendant.

 

63.   The argument of the defendant is that the claimant is not entitled to the reliefs sought in this claim; that the sum of ₦18,400.00 arose out of the claimant’s imagination, because no approval written or oral was given to him to use his personal money and indeed no such expenditure was done by him.

 

64.   Reliefs (B) and (C) are claims for special damages, which must be specially pleaded, particularized and specifically proved. See 7UP Bottling Company Plc v. Augustus (2012) LPELR – 20873 (CA) and NNPC v. Clifco Nigeria Ltd (2011) LPELR – 2022 (SC). Claiming remunerations and expenses means that the Court must be told in the pleadings what the claimant’s salary and expenses are upon which he lays his claim. There are no such pleading in the amended statement of facts. The law is that pleadings without evidence go to no issue, and evidence without pleading also goes to no issue. See Ifeta v. SPDC (2006) LPELR – 1436 (SC); (2006) 8 NWLR (Pt. 983) 585 and The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited v. Kwameh Ambah (1999) LPELR – 3202 (SC); (1999) 3 NWLR (Pt. 593) 1; (1999) 2 SC 129. This means reliefs (B) and (C) have not been proved and so cannot be granted. I so hold.

 

65.   Relief (D) is for general damages in the sum of ₦10 million against the defendant for wrongful termination of employment. Since the claimant succeeded only in terms of relief (A), I assess the damages awardable at ₦1 million only, which must be paid by the defendant to the claimant for wrongful termination of employment.

 

66.   Relief (E) is ₦2 million as cost of the action. Although cost follows event in litigation, it is at the discretion of the Court. See NNPC v. Clifco Nigeria Ltd (2011) LPELR – 2022 (SC).

 

67.   On the whole, the claimant’s case succeeds in part and only in terms of the following declaration and order:

(1)              It is hereby declared that the unilateral/constructive termination of claimant’s contract by the defendant was wrongful.

(2)              For wrongful termination of employment, the defendant is to pay the claimant within 30 days of this judgment the sum of One Million Naira (₦1,000,000.00) only as damages. Failing this, the said sum shall attract 10% simple interest per annum until the said sum is fully paid.

 

68.    Judgment is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost.

 

 

 

Hon. Justice J. I. Targema, PhD