IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
IN THE KADUNA JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT KADUNA
ON TUESDAY 29TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2020
BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE S. O. ADENIYI
SUIT NO: NICN/KD/35/2018
BETWEEN:
IBRAHIM A. IDENYI……….…………………....CLAIMANT
AND
1. AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA
2. THE VICE CHANCELLOR, AHMADU
BELLO UNIVERSITY ………………………….DEFENDANTS
J U D G E M E N T
The Claimant is a former Assistant Chief Security Officer in the Security Division of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria Kaduna State. Having being engaged for twenty-nine (29) years in the service of the Defendant; his appointment was terminated on 13th August, 2018. His case is that the purported termination of his appointment by the Defendants was unlawful.
2. Whereof, the Claimant filed a Complaint on 18/10/2018; and by an Amended Statement of Facts filed on 29/01/2020, pursuant to order of Court made on 06/02/2020, he claimed against the Defendants jointly and severally, the reliefs set out as follows:
a. A Declaration that the termination of the appointment of the Claimant by the Defendants from the services of the 1st Defendant vide their letter referenced P.16,573 of the 13th day of August, 2018, is a violation of the Ahmadu Bello University Law; it is therefore invalid, null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
b. A Declaration that the Claimant was not given fair hearing.
c. An Order of this Honourable Court setting aside the letter of termination of the appointment of the Claimant dated the 13th day of August, 2018.
d. A Declaration that the Claimant is still in the lawful employment of the 1st Defendant.
e. An Order of this Honourable Court setting aside the decision of the 1st Defendant’s (Ahmadu Bello University) Council at its 179th meeting of 19th to 20th June, 2018, contained in letter Reference No. P.16,573 of the 13th day of August, 2018 as it relates to the Claimant.
f. An Order reinstating the Claimant to his office and position as the Assistant Chief Security Officer in the Security Division of the 1st Defendant forthwith without loss of rank, salaries and allowances with effect from the 13th day of August, 2018 when his appointment was purportedly terminated.
g. An Order of this Honourable Court that the Claimant was due for promotion to the rank of Deputy Chief Security on the 1st day of October, 2017.
h. An Order directing the Defendants to promote the Claimant to his new rank of Deputy Chief Security Officer with effect from the 1st day of October, 2017 if the Claimant meets the conditions for the promotion.
i. An Order of this Honourable Court directing the Defendants to pay the Claimant accrued arrears of salary for his promotion to the rank of the Deputy Chief Security Officer with effect from the 1st day of October, 2017 to 31st August, 2018 when the Defendants purportedly terminated the Claimant’s appointment and up to the date he is reinstated.
j. An Order of this Honourable Court directing the Defendants to pay the salary of the Claimant from the date of the purported termination till the date of reinstatement.
k. Costs.
3. The Defendants joined issues with the Claimant by filing a Joint Statement of Defence on 21/11/2018 to which a Counter-Claim was subjoined. The Defendants contended, in summary, that a case of gross misconduct was established against the Claimant and that all the applicable laws and regulations were complied with before the Claimant’s appointment was terminated. The Defendants further contended that the Claimant is not entitled to any of his claims.
Whereof the Defendants Counter-Claimed against the Claimant as follows:
i. A Declaration that the Claimant has ceased to be in the employment of the Defendants and not entitled to any of his claims.
ii. N2,000,000.00 (Two Million Naira) being cost of prosecuting this suit.
The Claimant filed a Reply to the Defendants’ Statement of Defence and Defence to Counter- Claim on 23/11/2018 wherein the Claimant denied that the Defendants are entitled to their Counter-Claim.
4. At the plenary trial, the Claimant testified in person and adopted his Witness Depositions on Oath as his evidence-in-chief. He tendered in evidence nineteen (19) documents as exhibits to further support his case. He was duly cross-examined by the Defendants’ learned counsel.
The Defendants, called two witnesses, namely Mrs. Aisha Isah, the Legal Officer and Shehu Usman Bello, the leader of the Security Team of the 1st Defendant. They both adopted their Written Depositions on Oath as their evidence-in-chief and tendered in all, a total of seven (7) sets of documents in evidence. They were also both cross-examined by learned counsel for the Claimant.
5. Upon conclusion of plenary trial, parties filed and exchanged their final written addresses as prescribed by the Rules of Court.
In his final address filed on behalf of the Defendants on 25/11/2019, Abubakar Suleiman, Esq., of counsel, formulated three issues as having arisen for determination in this case, namely:
1. Whether the Claimant has established that the dismissal of his appointment from the employment of the 1st Defendant was unlawful to entitle him to the reliefs he sought in this suit?
2. Whether the 1st Defendant’s Joint Committee of the Council and Senate on Staff Disciplinary Matters which considered and investigated the Claimant’s case was duly constituted in accordance with the extant laws?
3. Whether the Claimant was accorded fair hearing before his appointment with the 1st Defendant was terminated?
In turn, the Claimant’s learned counsel, S. J Gani, Esq., filed his written address on behalf of the Claimant on 16/12/2019, wherein he framed two issues as having arisen for determination in this suit, namely:
1. Whether the Defendants proved the reason for terminating the Claimant’s appointment.
2. Whether in terminating the appointment of the Claimant, the Defendants gave the Claimant fair hearing and complied strictly with the Ahmadu Bello University Act.
6. On the basis of the Claimant’s claim, the relevant evidence adduced at the trial, and the totality of the circumstances of this case, my view is that the critical issues germane for determination in this suit, without prejudice to the issues formulated by learned counsel, could be reframed broadly as follows:
1. “Whether the Claimant clearly established that the termination of his appointment from the employment of the 1st Defendant was unlawful to entitle him to the reliefs he sought in this suit.”
2. “Whether the Defendants are entitled to their Counter-Claim.”
I should also state that I had carefully considered and taken due benefits of the totality of the final addresses filed by the respective learned counsel on either side of the divide; and I shall make specific reference to the arguments canvassed by them as I deem necessary as I proceed with this judgment.
7. By my understanding of the totality of the case of the Claimant, it seems to me that the basic, essential and relevant facts upon which the Claimant has predicated his claim could be enumerated as follows:
1. That he was first employed as a patrolman in the Vice Chancellor’s Office on 25/07/1989 and was later appointed as the Assistant Security Officer in the Division of Agricultural Colleges on 12/08/1999;
2. That on 01/02/2001, the 1st Defendant approved the merger of his appointment as a junior staff with his appointment as an Assistant Chief Security Officer in the Division of Agricultural Colleges;
3. That he rose through the ranks to the position of the Assistant Chief Security Officer of the 1st Defendant;
4. That his appointment was governed by the Laws, Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations governing the conditions of appointment of Senior Staff of the 1st Defendant and that being a pensionable staff, he is entitled to retire on attaining the age of 65 years;
5. That he received a query dated 02/11/2016 accusing him of fraud, extortion of money and allowing trespass in prohibited territory of the 1st Defendant’s property and that he promptly replied the query;
6. That he received invitations for him to appear before the Joint Council & Senate Committee on Senior Staff Disciplinary Matters and the Governing Council of the 1st Defendant;
7. That he appeared before the Joint Council & Senate Committee and the Governing Council to defend himself against all the allegations levelled against him;
8. That the alleged offences levelled against him was based on an anonymous letter dated 30/03/2016 written to the 2nd Defendant;
9. That he received a letter terminating his appointment on 13/08/2018;
10. That the termination of his appointment is in breach of contract of his employment with the 1st Defendant as same was contrary to the Laws and the Regulations governing the Conditions of Appointment of the Senior Staff of the 1st Defendant;
11. That the Defendants acted on an unsigned anonymous letter to terminate his appointment and that the Minutes of 179th meeting of the Council was not signed by Chairman of the Council;
12. That he appealed to the Council against the termination of his appointment;
13. That he was due for promotion to the rank of Deputy Chief Security Officer since 01/10/2017 but the Defendants have refused, failed and/or neglected to communicate same to him.
8. To further support his case, the Claimant tendered in evidence, the following documents:
i. Letters of appointment dated 25th July, 1989 and 12th February, 1999 – Exhibits C1 and C1A.
ii. Letter of confirmation of appointment dated 11th November, 1992 and Letter of merger of service dated 1st February, 2001 – Exhibits C2 and C3.
iii. Letters of promotion dated 02/11/2012, 23/08/2005, 29/03/2006, 10/01/2007, 10/5/2010, 12/10/2015 and the Senior Staff Promotion Guidelines - Exhibits C4 – C4F.
iv. Letter dated 30th March, 2016 titled, A.B.U Zaria Concerned Staff – Exhibit C5.
v. Query dated 31st October, 2016 and Reply to Query – Exhibits C6 and C6A.
vi. Invitations to appear before the Joint Council & Senate Committee on Senior Staff Disciplinary Matters and the Governing Council dated 23rd April, 2018 and 14th June, 2018 respectively– Exhibits C7 and C7A.
vii. Letter of termination of appointment dated 13th August, 2018 – Exhibit C8.
viii. 1st Defendant’s reply to Claimant’s letter of appeal dated 12th October, 2018 - Exhibit C9.
ix. Claimant’s pay statement for July 2018 – Exhibit C10.
x. Regulations governing the conditions of appointment of Senior Staff of Ahmadu Bello University – Exhibit C11.
9. While answering questions under cross - examination, the Claimant testified further that after he replied the query on the alleged offences, his case was referred to the Joint Committee and that thereafter, he was invited by the Council were he made his representation. The Claimant also testified under cross – examination that he did not know the manner at which the Joint Committee was constituted and that he did not protest the composition of its members.
10. The defence put forward by the witnesses of the Defendants as it is material to the issues under resolution is that the Claimant’s appointment was lawfully terminated in accordance with the Laws and the Regulations governing his appointment and that the contract of his employment was not breached by the Defendants.
The Defendant witnesses testified that the 2nd Defendant received a petition and a report against the Claimant alleging fraud, illegal extortion of money and illegal grazing at the prohibited territory of the 1st Defendant. DW1 and DW2 further testified that the Claimant was queried and was thereafter invited to appear before the Joint Committee of the Council and Senate for disciplinary matters; that the said Joint Committee of the Council was duly constituted by the Council at its 176th (Special) Council meeting; that the Claimant was indicted by the said Joint Committee on the allegations leveled against the him; that thereafter, the Claimant was invited to appear before the Governing Council and when the Claimant could not exculpate himself from the allegations that were leveled against him, his appointment was terminated by the Council.
The Defendants’ witnesses maintained that the members of the Joint Committee and the Council were constituted in accordance with the Laws and Regulations of the 1st Defendant and further testified that the Claimant was accorded fair hearing by the Defendants before terminating his appointment.
11. The following documents were tendered by the Defendants:
i. Claimant’s reply to query – Exhibit D1 (This is same as Exhibit C5)
ii. Report of Investigation by the 1st Defendant’s Chief Security Officer on the case of illegal grazing at the University prohibited territory – Exhibit D2.
iii. Report by the Director of Health Services dated 13/01/2017 on case of fraud and illegal extortion of money at the University Health Services – Exhibit D3.
iv. 24th Report of the 1st Defendant’s Joint Council and Senate Committee on Senior Staff Disciplinary matters dated April 2018 – Exhibit D4
v. Minutes of the 176th (Special) Meeting of the Governing Council of the 1st Defendant held on 22nd November, 2017 – Exhibit D5
vi. Letter of appointment to serve as Chairman of the Joint Council and Senate Committee on Senior Staff Disciplinary Matters dated 25th April, 2018 – Exhibit D6
vii. Minutes of the 179th (Regular) Meeting of the Governing Council of the 1st Defendant held on 19th and 20th June, 2018 – Exhibit D7
12. Now, from the totality of the evidence adduced by the Claimant, could it be said that he has satisfactorily established that his appointment was unlawfully terminated by the Defendants as alleged to entitle him to the reliefs he claimed?
By a critical analysis of Exhibit C1A, it is crystal clear that the Claimant’s appointment and the terms thereof including termination of the employment are subject to and governed by the University Laws, Statutes and Ordinances and the Regulations governing the conditions of service of Senior Staff made by the University Council from time to time. To put it differently, the Claimant’s appointment was a statutory employment.
13. The crux of the Claimant’s case and upon which the determination of his claims turns, is the mode or manner of the termination of his appointment by the Defendants.
The Claimant alleged that the procedure for the termination of his appointment was in violation of the Laws and Regulations of the 1st Defendant. The alleged breaches of procedures as stated in Paragraphs 22, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 and 35 of the Amended Statement of Facts are as follows:
(a) The Defendants acted on an unsigned letter dated 30/03/2016 to terminate his appointment;
(b) The Minutes of the 179th meeting of the 1st Defendant’s Council upon which a decision was made was not signed by the Chairman of the Council;
(c) The Chairman of the Council was not at the meeting of the 176th meeting of the Council wherein Dr. A. T. Mora was appointed as the Chairman of the Joint Council and Senate Committee on Senior Staff Disciplinary Matters and the letter of his appointment was also not signed by the Chairman of Council.
14. Citing the cases of Shell Vs Olarenwaju [2008] 12 SCNJ 684 and Fakuade Vs O.A.U [1993] 6 SCNJ (Pt 1) 35, the submission of the learned Claimant’s counsel is that once an employer gave reason or reasons for terminating the employee’s appointment, the onus is placed on the employer to establish the reason for the termination of the employee’s appointment.
Learned Claimant’s counsel argued that the letter - Exhibit C5 (which is the same as Exhibit D1) upon which the Defendants investigated the Claimant and to which his appointment subsequently was terminated was an unsigned document. Learned counsel for the Claimant further submitted that a document which is not signed does not have any efficacy in law and is worthless and that the Defendants ought not to have acted on the said anonymous letter in terminating the Claimant’s appointment.
The learned Claimant’s counsel further argued that the Defendant did not call any of the people who alleged that the Claimant extorted money from them to establish the allegation against him. Learned counsel therefore urged the Court to hold that the Defendants failed to prove the reason they gave for terminating the Claimant’s appointment.
15. The learned counsel for the Defendants’ reaction to this issue is that the termination of the Claimant’s appointment was not predicated only on the allegations stated in Exhibit C5 but also on allegations that the Claimant collected money from herdsmen and gave them permission to graze on prohibited area in the University.
The Defendant witnesses testified that the 2nd Defendant directed the Registrar to investigate both cases. The Defendants in further support of their case tendered in evidence Exhibits D2 and D3 which were the Report of the investigation on the case of grazing at the University prohibited territory and the report of the investigation on case of fraud and illegal extortion of money at the University Health Services. The witnesses further testified that the Claimant was issued query on these allegations based on the findings of both investigative committees.
16. As correctly submitted by the learned counsel for the Claimant, Exhibit C5 is a letter dated 30/03/2016 purportedly written by “A.B.U. Concerned Staff” to the 2nd Defendant. The letter is captioned “Case of fraud and illegal extortion of money at the University Health Services”.
From the evidence on record, I totally agree with the submission of the learned Defendants’ counsel that the termination of the Claimant’s appointment was not merely based on the alleged offence as it is stated in Exhibit C5. The Claimant was also queried on the allegation of collecting money from herdsmen and granting permission to them to graze on prohibited area in the University. I have taken liberty to reproduce the relevant portion of Paragraph 1 of Exhibit C6, the query which states as follows:
“Management has received a disturbing report indicating that you were alleged to have engaged in acts of Gross Misconduct in violation of Section 5c of the Regulations Governing the Conditions of Appointment of Senior Staff of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. The acts of gross misconduct against you include among others (sic) cases of fraud, illegal extortion of money and allowing trespass on University property in prohibited territory.” Underlining mine for emphasis.
I should further note that the Claimant replied the query by Exhibit C6A, and being dissatisfied with his reply, he was invited to appear before the Joint Council and Senate Committee on Senior Staff Disciplinary Matters and the Governing Council.
17. I had carefully reviewed Exhibits D2 and D3 which were the reports of the investigating committees set up by the Registrar. The Claimant appeared before both the Disciplinary Committee and the Governing Council to defend the allegation of fraud and extortion of money as stated in Exhibit C5, as well as the allegation of illegal grazing in the prohibited territory of the 1st Defendant. The Claimant equally made representations before the committee which investigated the case of illegal grazing at the University prohibited territory. Witnesses were invited and interviewed by the committees. My finding from the evidence as set out above is that the termination of the Claimant’s appointment was not solely based on Exhibit C5.
I therefore cannot see any genuine submission advanced or canvassed by the Claimant in justification of his stance to the effect that the Defendants did not establish the allegations as stated in Exhibit C5. The point being made here is that the allegations stated on the query issued on the Claimant and the Claimant’s reply (Exhibits C6 and C6A) are not solely based on Exhibit C5. It is my considered view that the Defendants clearly proved the reason or reasons for the termination of the Claimant’s appointment. And I so hold.
18. The further submission of the learned counsel for the Claimant is that the Claimant’s appointment being a statutory appointment is protected by law in that the terms of employment (which includes the appointment and termination of appointment) are governed by prescribed conditions in the relevant statute or law.
The submission of the learned Claimant’s counsel on the termination of senior members of staff of the 1st Defendant such as the Claimant in the instant case is that the termination must conform with the procedural requirements laid down under Statute 8 (5) (a) and (b) of the 1st Defendant Law, and that any other means adopted by the Defendants is illegal, null and void and of no effect whatsoever for its inconsistency with the University Statutes and Laws. Learned counsel for the Claimant further submitted that the composition of the members of the Disciplinary Committee is clearly stated by the 1st Defendant Statute and argued further that the Disciplinary Committee which submitted the report by which the Claimant’s appointment was purportedly terminated was not properly constituted.
19. Learned counsel further submitted that where a statute confers specific power on any person for the performance of certain acts and duty, it is only that person and no other person that is contemplated in the performance of the act or duty under the relevant law. Learned counsel argued that power conferred on the Chairman of Council as the Chairman of the Joint committee may only be exercised by him and cannot be delegated and therefore, the termination of the Claimant’s appointment by the Committee is contrary to the provisions of the Statute which renders such act or decision reached as unlawful.
In support of his propositions, learned counsel for the Claimant relied inter - alia on the cases of Bamigboye Vs Unilorin & Anor [1999] LPELR 737; Obayuwana Vs Governor, Bendel State & Anor [1982] LPELR 2160; Iderima Vs Rivers State [2005] 7SCNJ 493
20. In reaction, the learned counsel for the Defendants argued that the strict and literal interpretation of Statute 8 (5) (a) and (b) (supra) on the composition of the members of the Joint Council and Senate on Senior Staff Disciplinary Matters will not only be absurd or defeat the object of the Statute but it will also amount to a violation of the principle of natural justice as encapsulated in Section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). Learned counsel further argued that to allow the Chairman of Council chair the investigation of the Disciplinary Committee and thereafter preside over Council will not only be prejudicial to the case of the Claimant but will amount to the Chairman sitting on appeal on his own decision from the Disciplinary Committee. He further submitted that the appointment of Dr. A. T. Mora as the Chairman was to afford the Claimant fair hearing and/or in accordance with the principles of natural justice.
21. Learned counsel argued further that the appointment of Dr. A. T. Mora as the Chairman of the Disciplinary Committee by the Council is pursuant to the Council’s powers under Statute 4 (14) (2) of the 1st Defendant’s Law. His further argument is that the word “shall” as constructed in Statute 8 (5) could be interpreted where the context so admits as “may”. Learned counsel for the Defendants also argued that the Claimant did not protest to the composition of the Disciplinary Committee and he has waived his right to complain about the composition of the Disciplinary Committee. In support of his propositions, the learned Defendants’ counsel relied inter - alia on the following cases: BPS Construction & Engineering Co Ltd Vs Federal Capital Development Authority [2017] 10 NWLR (Pt 1572) 1; Okonkwo Vs UBA Plc [2011] 16 NWLR (Pt 1271) 614; LPDC Vs Fawehinnmi [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt 7) 300; Nnamdi Azikwe University Vs Nwafor [1999] 1 NWLR (Pt 585) 116.
Finally, learned Defendants’ counsel maintained that the termination of the Claimant was not unlawful.
22. Now, issues were not joined by parties on the fact that the Claimant’s employment was statutory and that his appointment was governed by Exhibits C1, C1A and C11.
As rightly submitted by learned counsel for the Claimant, the way and manner prescribed for the termination of statutory employment such as the Claimant’s employment must be religiously observed otherwise, such termination has no effect whatsoever and the employee will be deemed as continuing in his employment. See Olaniyan Vs University of Lagos [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt 9) 599; Iderima Vs Rivers State Civil Service Commission (supra)
As I had earlier noted, the argument of the learned counsel for the Defendants is that allowing the same Chairman of the Committee to preside over the investigation of the Senior Staff Disciplinary Committee and the Governing Council will be prejudicial to the case of the Claimant.
23. In view of its relevance to the determination of this case, I find it necessary to refer to the provisions of Statute 8 (5) of the Ahmadu Bello University Law, Cap A 14 Laws of the Federation, 2004 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). I have reproduced same herein below.
“Subject to the provisions of this Statute and to the terms of his appointment, no member of senior staff shall be dismissed save by the decision of Council and for good cause, which shall mean gross misconduct or inability to carry out the duties of his office or employment.
Provided that:-
(e) Before taking its decision, the Council shall receive and consider a report on the case by a Joint Committee of the Council and Senate consisting of the Chairman of the Council as Chairman and equal members of the Council and of the Senate.
(f) No person shall be dismissed by the Council unless he shall have been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard by the Council”. (Underlining for emphasis)
24. The learned Defendants’ counsel made heavy weather on the use of the word “shall” in the provision under context. It is a settled principle of interpretation of statute that where a Statute used the word "SHALL" it connotes a mandatory obligation or duty or compliance and there is no room for discretion or loose interpretation to accommodate any party. The Courts have emphasized that in its ordinary meaning "shall" is a word of command which must be given an obligatory meaning as denoting compulsion See Ifezue Vs Mbadugha [1984] 1 SCNLR 427; Adams Vs Umar [2009] 5 NWLR (Pt 1133) 41
By my own understanding, the literal interpretation of Statute 8 (5) of the Act is that before a decision can be taken to terminate an employee as the Claimant as in the instant case, the 2nd Defendant, the Council, consisting of the Chairman, must have done two things, namely:-
(1) Received and considered a report of the Joint Committee of the Council and the Senate on the case with the Chairman presiding;
(2) Shall have given the employee reasonable opportunity of being heard.
In other words, no other person can represent or act as the Chairman of the Council at the Joint Council and Senate Committee on Disciplinary Matters. I am of the firm view that the use of the word "shall" in Statute 8 (5) imports mandatoriness and it is a provision that must be complied with fully. It is what I believe the law makers mean by the phrase, “consisting of Chairman of Council as Chairman.” I so hold.
25. Now, it is an elementary and established principle of law that facts admitted needs no further prove. The Defendants admitted in Paragraph 18 of the Statement of Defence that the Chairman of the Council did not preside over the meeting of the Joint Committee of Council and Senate on Disciplinary Matters. Exhibits D5 and D7, the minutes of the Council meetings and Exhibit D6, the letter appointing Dr A. T. Mora as Chairman of the Committee were tendered in proof of their assertions.
26. It is now firmly established and as rightly submitted by the learned Claimant’s counsel, that where a statute confers specific power on any person or authority for the performance of certain acts or duty, it is only that person or authority and no other person that is contemplated in the performance of the acts or duty under the relevant law. Anything short of this cannot be endorsed by the law.
In Bamigboye Vs Unilorin [1999] 6 SCNJ 295, the Apex Court re-stated the law, thus:
“The person to whom an office is delegated cannot lawfully devolve the duty to another unless he is expressly authorized to do so. In the instant case, the power of the University Council to discipline senior administrative, academic and professional staff of the University of Ilorin Act was delegated to it by that Section of the Act, thus the Council cannot delegate it to another, that is the staff Disciplinary and Appeal Committee”.
In his bid to justify the appointment of the Dr. A. T. Mora as Chairman Joint Council and Senate Committee on Senior Staff Disciplinary Matters, learned counsel for the Defendants further argued thus:
“The Defendants were faced with the dilemma of choosing between the devil and the deep blue sea and they elected to swim in the deep blue sea rather than dine with the devil, hoping that by so doing, the provision of Statute 8 (5) which offends the provision of Section 36 of the Constitution (supra) would be set aside to the extent of its inconsistency with the Constitutional provision.”
27. Learned Defendants’ counsel further submission is that the 2nd Defendant is empowered by Statute 4 (14) (2) of Ahmadu Bello University Law to appointment another person as the Chairman.
Statute 4 (14) (2) (supra) which the learned Defendants’ counsel relied on as the provision which gave power of appointment of Chairman of Joint Council and Senate Committee provides as follows:
“The Council may establish disciplinary committees of the Council and the Senate to which the Council may appoint members of Council and Senate. The Council may delegate to any such Joint Committee any powers or functions which it is itself competent to perform”.
The operative words in this provision are: “which it is itself competent to perform.” The pertinent question is, is the Council competent to delegate or appoint another person to act as Chairman of the Joint Council and Senate Committee? The answer to this poser is an emphatic No! The powers of the Council are listed in Section 13 of the Ahmadu Bello University Act (supra). Furthermore, Section 14 of the same Act provides for the Council’s power of delegation. It states as follows:
“The Council may delegate subject to the approval of the President, any of its powers or duties except the powers relating to the making, altering, or annulling of Statutes, to the Chairman of Council, the Vice-Chancellor, the Board of Governors of an Institute or other Units of the University established under this Law or to any Committee appointed by Council and consisting –
(a) of members of the Council; or
(b) of one or more members of Council and such other persons as the Council may appoint to the Committee.”
I agree entirely with the submission of the learned counsel for Claimant that by a literal interpretation of the provision of this Statute, the Council may only delegate powers or functions to any such joint committee which it is itself competent to perform. The Council does not have power to amend the express provision of the composition of its members to substitute the Chairman Council with another member. And I so hold.
28. Permit me at this juncture to deal with the issue as canvassed by the learned Defendants’ counsel that the Claimant has waived his right to challenge the composition of the members of the Committee. The concept of waiver must be one that presupposes that the person who is to enjoy a benefit or who has the choice of two benefits is fully aware of his right to the benefit or benefits, but he either neglects to exercise his right to the benefit, or where he has a choice of two, he decides to take one but not both. In the instant case, can it be said that the Claimant had waived his right to complain about the alleged improper composition of the members of the Joint Council? I think not.
29. I should also note that Exhibit D5 and Exhibit D7 was not signed by the Chairman. Exhibit D5 is the Minutes of the 176th (Special) Meeting of the Governing Council at which Dr. Ahmad T. Mora was purportedly appointed as member of Council and Exhibit D7 is the Minutes of the 179th (Regular) Meeting of the Governing Council which upheld the Committee’s recommendation for the termination of the Claimant.
As rightly submitted by the learned Claimant’s counsel, the point has to be made that the requirement of signature is made by law to determine its origin and authenticity with regard to its maker. Curiously, but critically, Exhibits D5 and D7 were not signed by the Chairman of Council upon which the decision to terminate the Claimant’s appointment was made.
An unsigned document it has been said time and time again by Courts is a useless, weightless and worthless document when the issue turns on authenticity. In Omega Bank Nig Plc Vs OBC Ltd [2005] 8 NWLR (Pt 928) 547, where the Supreme Court per Tobi JSC had pronounced inter – alia thus:
“Where a document is not signed, it may not be admitted in evidence. Even if it is admitted in evidence, the Court should not attach any probative value to it. This is because a document which is not signed has no origin in terms of its maker.”
Given that Exhibits D5 and D7, which ought to be signed by the Chairman of Council, are not signed, it has no evidential value whatsoever. The implication of this is that the entire submission of the Defendants that the Council made a decision based on Exhibit D7 cannot be entertained as it is unsubstantiated. I so hold.
30. Against the foregoing background, I wish to agree with the submission of learned counsel for the Claimant that the termination of the appointment of the Claimant by the Defendants was unlawful. The question really is not whether the Claimant committed any act of gross misconduct (though this is not saying that he did), but the germane question is whether in terminating his appointment, the statutory prescribed procedure was complied with.
Having observed so far, I am of the humble view that because the termination of appointment of the Claimant was not proved and satisfactorily shown to have been made by the Governing Council of the 1st Defendant upon the recommendation of the duly and validly constituted Joint Council and Senate Committee on Senior Staff Disciplinary Matters, it has failed to comply with the provisions of the Act. Furthermore, since the termination of appointment was not shown to have fully been made after the observance of all the laid down procedure, the Governing Council lacked the necessary statutory power to proceed as it did to issue Exhibit C8 to the Claimant.
31. The learned counsel on contending sides had both vigorously canvassed on the issue of whether or not the Claimant was afforded fair hearing before his appointment was terminated. I consider a detailed consideration of the requirement of fair hearing as elaborated by the learned counsel as unnecessary in the light of the conclusion that the Defendants did not strictly comply with the prescribed procedure on the composition of the members. The reasoning for this is premised on the ground that failure to comply with any of the conditions is tantamount to non compliance as there can be no partial or half compliance. The non – observance on the composition of the members in the process of reaching a decision renders the decision itself a nullity. I so hold.
Having held that the Defendants did not strictly and fully comply with the provisions of the Ahmadu Bello University Act the purported termination of the Claimant by the letter of termination of appointment of the Claimant dated 13/08/2018 is hereby set aside as same is unlawful, null, void and of no effect whatsoever. I so hold.
32. It is settled that where there is a breach in the lawful termination of appointment of an employee, the Court will void the unlawful act and order the re-instatement of the victim of the capricious exercise of power. The cases on this point are legion. I will cite only four: Mailiki Vs Michael Imoudu Institute of Labor Studies [2008] LPELR 8467; Shitta Bay Vs FCSC [1981] SC 40, 56; Iderima Vs RSCSC [2005] ALL FWR 431; Olaniyan Vs UNILAG [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt 9) 599.
Indeed, in Olaniyan Vs UNILAG (supra) Karibi-Whyte JSC made far-reaching pronouncements on the propriety of a declaratory relief for the re-instatement of an unlawfully dismissed employee. Hear him:
“The law has arrived at a stage where the principle should be adopted that the right to a job is analogous to a property. Accordingly, where a man is entitled to a particular job, I cannot conceive of any juridical reason against the view that where the termination is invalid and consequently alters nothing, a re-instatement of the employee, barring legal obstacles intervening between the period of purported dismissal and the date of judgment, is the only remedy.”
With humility, I, too, see no juridical reason for not ordering the re-instatement of the Claimant. And I so hold.
33. The Claimant devoted Paragraphs 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 36 of the Statement of Facts on the issue of his claim for promotion. Exhibits C4, C4A, C4B, C4C, C4D, C4E and C4F were admitted in support of this claim.
As correctly submitted by the learned Defendants’ counsel, Exhibit C4F, the Senior Staff promotion guidelines was unsigned. I had earlier held that such unsigned document has no evidential value. Being an unsigned document therefore, Exhibit C4F is worthless. And I so hold. Aside from this, DW2 testified in Paragraphs 6 and 7 of his Witness Deposition on Oath that promotion is not automatic. This is the correct position of the law.
What this signifies is that promotion is a privilege, not a right. It has been held in plethora of cases that promotion of an employee is neither automatic nor as of right, as such the Court will not grant such a relief. See Abenga Vs Benue Judicial Service Commission [2006] 14 NWLR (Pt 1000) 610; The Shell Petroleum Development & 5 Ors Vs E. N. Nwawka & Anor [2001] 10 NWLR (Pt 720) 64; Mr Emmanuel A. Idonije Vs Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (Unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/303/2014, the judgment of which was delivered on 10th July 2017)
34. However, in Mrs Abdulrahaman Yetunde Mariam Vs University of Ilorin Teaching Hospital Management Board & Anor [2013] 35 NLLR (Pt 103) 40 NIC, this Court reviewed the authorities and held that while promotion is neither automatic nor as of right, once an employee can show an entitlement to promotion and that the denial of the promotion by the employer was vindictive and/or mala fide, then the rule in The Shell Petroleum Development & 5 Ors Vs E. N. Nwawka & Anor against a Court interfering in the internal administration of employers will give way to an inquiry into the issue; and if the Court finds that in truth the denial of promotion was vindictive and/or mala fide or that the employee was victimized, then the employee would get a verdict in that regard especially on the ground of unfair labour practice, which this Court now has jurisdiction under Section 254C (1) of the 1999 Constitution.
In the instant suit however, other than the evidence of the Claimant to the effect that as a Senior Staff of the 1st Defendant, he was due for promotion after every three years, there is no evidence before the Court as to the other parameters/requirements for the grant of his claim for promotion. Therefore, this Court cannot ascertain whether the Claimant would have been qualified and entitled to promotion as the Deputy Chief Security Officer as claimed. I so hold.
35. In closing the curtain of this judgement, I am not unaware of the fact that the Defendants filed a Counter – Claim against the Claimant. The Claimant in his Defence to Counter – Claim denied the claims.
It is settled that a counterclaim is for all intents and purposes a separate, independent and distinct action and the counterclaimant, like all Claimant in the main actions, must prove his counterclaim with credible and convincing evidence to obtain judgment. For this reason, the fact that the main claim has succeeded (or failed) does not mean that the counterclaim must fail (or succeed) it all depends on the evidence in support of the Counter-Claim. If the Counter-Claim includes a declaration as it is in this case where the declaration is the fountainhead of the Counter-Claim, the Counter-Claimant must also satisfy the Court with credible evidence that he is entitled to a declaration. That, he has to do on the strength of his case as the fact that the Defendant admits his counterclaim or failed to file a defence is of no consequence. So, did the Defendants as Counter-Claimants adduce necessary credible and convincing evidence through their two witnesses to prove their reliefs, declaratory and otherwise? The answer is in the negative. Without further ado, the Defendants’ Counter – Claim fails in its entirety. I so hold.
36. In the final analysis, standing on the solid position of the law, I hereby grant the Claimant the following reliefs:
1. A Declaration setting aside the decision of the Governing Council of the 1st Defendant made at its 179th Meeting held on 19th and 20th June, 2018.
2. A Declaration that the termination of the appointment of the Claimant by the Defendants from the services of the 1st Defendant vides the letter with Reference No P.16573 dated 13/08/2018 is in violation of the Ahmadu Bello University Law and therefore invalid, null and void and of no effect.
3. An Order of this Honorable Court setting aside the letter of termination the Claimant’s appointment dated 13/08/2018.
4. An Order of this Honourable Court reinstating the Claimant to the position of the Assistant Chief Security Officer in the Security Division of the 1st Defendant.
5. An Order of this Honourable Court directing the Defendants to pay within one (1) month all arrears of salaries, allowances and other entiltlements from the date of the purported termination till date.
Parties shall bear their respective costs.
SINMISOLA O. ADENIYI
(Presiding Judge)
29/09/2020
Legal representation
S. J. Gani Esq. for Claimant
A. Ishaq Esq. for Defendants