Mr. John Tanimola Johnson -VS- Law Union and Rock Insurance Plc- National Industrial Court of Nigeria

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HONOURABLE JUSTICE E. N. AGBAKOBA

DATED18^THMAY 2020 SUIT NO. NICN/ABJ/45/2016

BETWEEN

MR. JOHN TANIMOLA JOHNSON ………………………….. CLAIMANT

AND

LAW UNION & ROCK INSURANCE PLC ……………….. DEFENDANT

REPRESENTATION

C. J. DIMGBA for the Claimant

D. B. OHEMU holding the brief of PETERS AMEH for the Defendant

JUDGEMENT

1. The claimant, by a General Form of Complaint filed on 5^thFebruary, 2016 with the accompanying frontloaded documents, approached the Court for the following reliefs:

a. A DECLARATION that the summary dismissal of the Claimant on the ground of fraud on the 27ih March, 2013 is null and void as it violated the constitutional right of the Claimant.

b. A DECLARATION that the Claimant is entitled the sum of N1,210, 442.61k (One Million Two Hundred and Ten Thousand, Four Hundred and Forty-Two Naira Sixty One Kobo being the three months’ salary in lieu of notice which the Claimant is entitled to.

c. A DECLARATION that the Claimant is entitled to the sum of N1,050,000.00 (One Million and Fifty Thousand Naira) only being the housing allowance for the year 2013 paid to the workers in the cadre of the Claimant and which the Defendant usually pay in the month of January every year to workers in the cadre of the Claimant.

d. A DECLARATION that the Claimant is entitled to the sum of N150,000.00k (One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira) only for the 1st quarter of 2013 being the furniture allowance paid to the workers in the cadre of the Claimant every quarter.

e. A DECLARATION that the Claimant is entitled to the sum of N263,099.82 (Two Hundred and Sixty-Three Thousand and Ninety Nine Naira Eighty- Two Kobo) only for the year 2013 being the leave allowance paid by the defendant to the workers in the cadre of the Claimant and usually paid in February of every year.

f. A DECLARATION that the Claimant is entitled to the sum of N420,000.00k (Four Hundred and Twenty Thousand Naira) only being the amount of money which was deducted from the salary of the Claimant from November, 2009 till March, 2013 as contribution to the Law Union & Rock Insurance Staff Cooperatives, thrift savings account of the Claimant excluding accruing interest.

g. A DECLARATION that the Claimant is entitled to the sum of N10,650,000.00 (Ten Million Six Hundred and Fifty Thousand naira) only being the productivity bonus on the production made by the Claimant to the defendant between January -March 2013 and which are listed as follows;

xii. National Assembly- N96,000,000.00k (Ninety Six Eight Million Naira) only

xiii. Nigeria Security Printing & Minting Company- N22,000,000.00k (Twenty- two Million Naira) only

xiv. Transmission Company of Nigeria- N17,000,000.00k (Seventeen Million Naira) only

xv. Federal Road Safety Corps (Fire and Burglary) -N15,085,747.87k (Fifteen Million and Eight Five Thousand Seven Hundred and Forty Seven Naira Eight Seven Kobo) only

xvi. Federal load Safety Corps (Group Personal Accident)- N14,500,000.00k (Fourteen Million Five Hundred Thousand Naira) only

xvii. Federal Mortgage sank of Nigeria-N5,000,000.00k (Five Million Naira only)

xviii. Central sank of Nigeria- N7,600,000.00k (Seven Million six hundred thousand naira only)

xix. Nigeria Television Authority (NTA)- N4,200,000.00k (Four Million two hundred thousand naira only)

xx. Sadogi Nigeria Limited- N5,000,000.00k (Five Million naira only

xxi. Nigerian Meteorological Agency (NIMET)- N24, 000,000.00k (Twenty Four Million Naira only

xxii. National Health Insurance Scheme -N7,500,000.00k (Seven Million Five Hundred Thousand Naira only).

h. A DECLARATION that the Claimant remains the owner of the second hand Toyota Corolla Saloon Car which the Management of the Defendant Company gave to him when the Defendant could not afford to buy a brand new car for his official use for officer of his cadre.

i. Alternatively, a declaration that the Claimant is entitled to Toyota corolla vehicle with the registration number RC 175 AAA after spending his own money up to the tune of N396,000 for the total overhauling of the said Toyota Corolla car after informing the defendant of the state of the car or

j. Alternatively, a declaration that the Claimant is entitled to the sum of N396,000.00k (Three hundred and ninety six thousand naira only) being the amount of money spent by the Claimant for the total overhauling of the said Toyota Corolla

k. A DECLARATION that the Claimant on approval of his retirement from the service of Law Union & lock Insurance Plc is entitled to the sum of N3, 932,498.53k (Three Million Nine Hundred and Thirty-Two Thousand four Hundred and Ninety Naira Fifty three kobo) only which were not paid as the terminal benefit to the Claimant by the defendant.

l. AN ORDER of this court compelling and mandating the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum stated in PRAYERS (b) to (k) above with immediate effect.

m. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the Defendant to pay interest on the judgment sum at 2l% from the day the judgment is delivered till liquidation of the judgment sum.

n. AN ORDER of this Court directing the Defendant to pay the cost of this suit being N10,000,000.00k (Ten Million Naira) only.

CLAIMANTS CASE

2. The Claimant was a seasoned insurance practitioner was employed by Law Union & RockInsurance Plc. as the Head, Abuja 1 on the 19th October, 2009.The Defendant is a CompanyIncorporated under the Company and Allied Matters Act, 1990, and it’s into the business of General Insurance and has its place of business in White House, block &, 79, Adetokunbo Ademola, Street, Wuse 2, Abuja with its head office at 14, Hughes Avenue, Alagomeji, Yaba, Lagos.

3. The Claimant by virtue of his position as the Head, Abuja 1 also has as part of his work schedule/responsibilities the supervision of other Northern branches of the defendant.The Claimant was given an offer of employment on the 19th October, 2009 wherein his remuneration was listed. The said offer of employment is hereby pleaded. The Claimant’s appointment was by a letter dated 22nd July 2010 confirmed bythe defendant. A copy of the said “Confirmation of Appointment” is hereby pleaded. On the 24th March, 2011 and 6th September, 2012, the Claimant salary was restructured by two separate letters titled salary review and Salary Restructuring respectively. Copies of the these lettersare hereby pleaded.

4. The Claimant as the Supervising Head of the Northern Region, was very productive as was evident by his successful bringing in businesses to the defendant that fetched the defendant hundreds of millions.

5. The Claimant avers his production for the first quarter of this year alone are as follows;

i. National Assembly N96, 000,000 00k (Ninety Six Eight Million Naira) only

ii. Nigeria Security Printing & Minting Company- N22, 000,000.00k (Twenty-two Million Naira) only

iii. Transmission Company of Nigeria- N17, 000,000.00k (Seventeen Million Naira) only

iv. Federal Road Safety Corps (Fire and Burglary) -N15, 085,747.87k (Fifteen Million and Eight Five Thousand Seven Hundred and Forty Seven Naira Eight Seven Kobo) only

v. Federal Road Safety Corps (Group Personal Accident) - N14, 500,000.00k (Fourteen Million Five Hundred Thousand Naira) only

vi. Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria-N5, 000,000.00k (Five Million Nora only)

vii. Central Bank of Nigeria- N7, 600,000.00k (Seven Million six hundred thousand naira only)

viii. Nigeria Television Authority (NTA) - N4, 200,000.00k (Four Million two hundred thousand naira only)

ix. Sadogi Nigeria Limited- N5, 000,000.00k (Five Million naira only)

x. Nigerian Meteorological Agency (NIMET) - N24, 000,000.00k (Twenty Four Million Naira only)

xi. National Health Insurance Scheme -N7, 500,000.00k (Seven Million Five Hundred Thousand Naira only).

6. The defendant was appointed the lead insurer for National Assembly on Fire & Special Perils Policy- the Senate Office Complex. Notice is hereby given to the defendant to produce the original copies of appointment of defendant as insurer to Companies/Government Institutions listed paragraph 8 (i-xiv) at the trial of this suit. The Plaintiff hereby pleads all the related letters and documents mentioned in paragraph 8 (i) (xi) above.

7. The Claimant was not allowed to go on leave throughout the duration he worked for the defendant, although the defendant always paid him his leave allowance. the only time he was given leave was for the burial of his father and the defendant only gave him one week’s leave.

8. The Claimant’s problem in the company of the defendant started when the defendant changed its management following the emergence of a new core investor which necessitated the defendant to introduce a new management.The management immediately embarked on the sack/dismissal of workersperceived to be loyal to the former Managing Director in the person of Mr. Yinka Bolarinwa.The Managing Director on her first visit to Abuja told the Claimant in the presence of other workers that she was going to sack him.

9. Sometimes in December 2012 the Claimant received query through an email from the head office of the defendant in Lagos. Part of the query was as his role on

i. “The amount approved and paid by the previous management as processing fee of 300/c facilitation instead of the 10% agreed for facilitators on NIGCOMSAT account.

ii. Concealing material facts from management on NIGCOMSAT/INEC account

iii. Receiving monetary gains from the fraudulent transactions, which has resulted in the loss of business and a significant sum of money to the company.”

10. The Claimant vehemently denied all the allegations before thepanel that was constituted by the defendant.

11. The Claimant informed the panel that the transactions in respect NIGCOMSAT and INEC were presented before the management and that the management of the defendant company duly approved the transactions and also that it was the same management that made payment to the facilitators.

12. The Claimant also informed the panel that the company’s management who is the approving authorities approved the said transactions and that all due processes were duly complied with before payments were made. The document evidencing the approving authorities for the company is hereby pleaded.

13. The Claimant maintains that the business of NIGCOMSAT for the year 2010 was not only done by Law Union & Rock Plc. but that other insurance Companies like NEM Insurance Plc. also participated in it and paid 30% as facilitators’ fees.

14. The Claimant maintains that the business for which he was being queried was done about three years before the resumption of the new Management headed by Mrs. ToyinOgunseye, the Managing Director. And that there was nothing wrong with the transactions stated above but that the new Management were just on a witch hunting exercise to deal with the perceived loyalists of the former Managing Director in which he was fingered as one of the loyalists.

15. The Claimant maintains that despite presenting this position to the panel constituted by thedefendant, the defendant was not satisfied as the defendant was hell bent on destroying the reputation of the Claimant. And that the panel while asking him question particularly asked him not to cover the former Managing Director but that he should implicate him.

16. The Claimant maintains that it was when he insisted that there is no cover up and he had no incriminating evidence against the former Managing Director that the members in the panel told him that he would face the music.

17. On the 26th March, 2013 he received a letter dated 25th March, 2013 from the defendant head office titled, “Outcome of disciplinary panel hearing on December 21, 2012” wherein the defendant wrote that he confessed to

i. Processing 30% facilitation fee instead of the 10% agreed for facilitation on NIGCOMSAT account.

ii. Concealing material facts from management on NIGCOMSAT/INEC account.

iii. Receiving monetary gains from the fraudulent transactions, which has resulted in the loss of business and a significant sum of money to the company. A copy of the letter is hereby pleaded.

18. The Claimant promptly replied the letter above through an email sent to the Managing Director wherein he vehemently denied that ever making a confession to the panel. A copy of the reply to the Outcome of disciplinary panel hearing is hereby pleaded. On the 27th March, 2013 he received a letter from the defendant titled “Letter of summary dismissal for fraud”. A copy of the said letter is hereby pleaded.

The Claimant maintains that issue of fraud in the said letter of dismissal was never investigated nor was it proved against him.

19. After receiving the letter, he approached his solicitors, Messrs ADEYA & ADEYA & CO. who caused a letter to be written to the defendant. A copy of the letter is hereby pleaded and shall be relied upon at the trial of this suit.

20. The Claimant maintains that he had done nothing wrong for him to warrant the defendant to dismiss him for fraud and that his dismissal for fraud was done in bad faith so at to punish him for his refusal to implicate the former Managing Director and to also destroy the reputation he had built in the last 23 years and make it completely difficult for him to transfer his production success to another insurance company.

21. The Claimant contends that as the Head of a Regional Branch, he was entitled to a brand new car as official car which the company could not afford to buy at the time of his appointment. And because the defendant could not afford a brand new car, the defendant therefore offered him, a rickety Toyota Corolla Saloon car with Registration number RC 175 AAA which the former Managing Director, Mr. Yinka Bolarinwa personally took the vehicles particulars to the office of Vehicle Inspection Officers wherein the particulars were changed to the Claimants name. The proof of ownership of the vehicle and other particulars of the Vehicle are hereby pleaded.

22. The Claimant avers further that the said Toyota car was rickety, the gear was malfunctioning, this the Claimant informed the defendant. And that he wrote several correspondences to the defendant for the repairs/total overhauling of the said car as the vehicle no longer befit the status of the Claimant has the Head of the Regional Branch of the defendant company.

23. The Claimant avers that when the defendant was not forthcoming as regards the repair of the said vehicle, the Claimant was left with little or no choice but to commit his money into repairing the vehicle after obtaining quotations from a mechanic trading under the name and style of Philoy Motors who gave the Claimant a bill of N170,500:00k (One Hundred and Seventy Thousand and Five Hundred Naira only) for the body work on the said Toyota Corolla car while the Claimant bought spare parts for the said vehicle at the total cost of (N189,400:00k) One Hundred and Eighty Nine Thousand Four Hundred Naira only). The Claimant hereby pleads the quotation for the motor mechanic, receipts issued to the Claimant where he bought the spare parts of the said vehicle and they will be relied upon at the trial of this suit.

24. The Claimant avers that while at the defendant’s office the defendant was deducting the sum of N10, 000.00k (Ten Thousand Naira only) from his salary as his contribution to his thrift savings account deposit with the staff multi-purpose cooperative. The pay slip of the Claimant is hereby pleaded.

25. That since the Claimant left the defendant office the defendant has refused and or neglected to pay the sum of Four Hundred and Twenty Thousand Naira only being the total deductions from the Claimant’s salaries over the year to the Claimant’s cooperative thrift account savings in the staff cooperative multi-purpose.

DEFENDANTS CASE

The Defendant filed their STATEMENT OF DEFENCE on 17^th June 2016.

26. The Defendant stated that the said restructuring of salary and other emoluments was a general restructuring that is applicable to all employees in the Defendant’s employment at that material point in time and not just the Claimant in particular.

27. The Defendant denying paragraph 8 of the Statement of Claim maintain that: -

a. that the Claimant was not very productive neither did he successfully bring in businesses to the Defendant that fetched the Defendant hundreds of millions of naira.

b. that an investigation conducted by the Defendant on 17th March 2010 in the Defendant’s Abuja branch which revealed that the Claimant and the employees in his branch who were under his supervision not only had constantly flouted the Defendant’s underwriting and administrative policies, as well as regulatory guidelines, which exposed the Defendant to potential regulatory penalties and which also had an adverse effect on the Defendant’s income to wit:

I. that most basis documents such as Proposal Forms, Personal and Counter Indemnity, Letters of Award of Contract, Photographs of Directors of companies to whom Bond are issued by the Claimant’s branch are not in the Defendant’s Abuja office files. That this act of the Claimant is not a mere administrative incompetence on the part of the Claimant as the head of the branch, that the said act also constitutes serious regulatory infractions which attracts severe sanctions from the National Insurance Commission and other regulators.

II. that the Defendant’s head office in Lagos was not being informed by the Claimant on the Bonds issued by the Claimant’s branch, hence the Defendant is not aware of the level of its exposure to risk.

III. that Cover Notes were issued, signed and forwarded to clients by the Claimant’s branches without regard to due process.

IV. that Premium payments on Bonds issued by the Claimant’s branch remained outstanding as evidence of such payments were not made available by the Claimant’s branch to the Defendant’s head office.

c. that the failure of the Claimant to collect outstanding premium on Bonds issued by his branch was manifestly injurious to the Defendant’s business as the payment of premium is a condition precedent to a valid contract of insurance and thus, the Claimant had in the course of his employment with the Defendant been providing insurance cover to third parties in this regard thereby exposing the Defendant to grievous financial risk and possible severe sanction by the Nigerian Insurance Commission. The Defendant shall at the trial of this suit rely on the email of Ogwugwa Charity to the Defendant’s former Managing Director [i.e. Mr. BolarinwaYinkaj dated 17th March, 2010 which details the outcome of the investigation conducted on the Claimant’s branch by the Defendant.

d. that pursuant to the Claimant’s poor performance and work ethic as stated above, the Claimant being the Regional Manager North 1- Abuja was issued a query by the Defendant as it was evident that the Claimant’s performance was grossly below expectation and inimical to the development of the Defendant as a leader in the insurance industry in Nigeria.

28. Defendant denying paragraph 17 of the Statement of Claim averred that in the cause of the Disciplinary Committee hearing, the Claimant admitted to have received monetary gain and secret profit from the Commission paid by the Defendant to the Facilitator in respect of the NIGCOMSAT insurance transaction which was a breach of his fiduciary duty to the Defendant as an employee and which he did not disclose to the Defendant’s management and Board.

29. Defendant admitted paragraphs 18, 19 and 20 of the Statement of Claim only to the extent that the Defendant’s management approved the 30% Commission paid to the Facilitator in respect of NIGCOMSAT insurance transaction. And that the Claimant informed the Disciplinary Committee that some of the funds meant as commission for the facilitator in respect of the NIGCOMSAT insurance transaction were paid directly into his account for onwards transmission to the facilitator and that he benefitted from such transaction.

COUNTER-CLAIM

30. The Defendant reiterates all the averments contained in paragraphs 1 — 48 of the Statement of Defence.

31. The Defendant states that upon the summary dismissal of the Claimant from the employment of the Defendant the Claimant is obligated to return forthwith all the Defendant’s properties in his custody and/or possession inclusive of the Toyota Corolla car with registration No. RC 175 AAA which the Defendant bought from Elizade Nigeria Limited for the sum of =N=3,400,000.0O [Three Million, Four Hundred Thousand Naira]. It is the Defendant’s case that at all material time, the Defendant is the owner of the Toyota Corolla car with registration No. RC 175 AAA and that the Claimant and the Defendant’s former Managing Director [i.e. Mr. Yinka Bolarinwa] are both aware of this fact.That the Claimant has since refused to return and/or surrender the Toyota Corolla car with registration No. RC 175 AAA to the Defendant despite repeated demand for same by the Defendant. Furthermore, the Claimant has fraudulently and secretly without the knowledge and consent of the Defendant unilaterally transferred the ownership of the said vehicle to himself thereby representing to be the owner of the said vehicle.

32. The Defendant stated that as at the date the Claimant was summarily dismissed, the Toyota Corolla car with registration No. RC 175 AAA which was assigned to him by the Defendant solely for official purposes was in a perfect and excellent working condition with all the fixtures and fittings intact.It is the Defendant case that despite repeated demand by the Defendant for the immediate return of the Toyota Corolla car with registration No. RC 175 AAA, the Claimant has bluntly refused to return same to the Defendant and that the said car is still in the Claimant’s exclusive possession.The Defendant states that the daily use of the Toyota Corolla car with registration No. RC 175 AAA by the Claimant after his summary dismissal and his refusal to surrender same to the Defendant has had a material adverse effect on the Defendant’s business operations and logistics in Abuja.

33. WHEREOF the Defendant claims against the Claimant as follows:

A. A DECLARATION that the Claimant’s summary dismissal by the Defendant was in order.

B. A DECLARATION that the Defendant is the owner of the Toyota Corolla car with registration No. RC 175 AAA.

C. A DECLARATION that the Claimant’s refusal to surrender the Toyota Corolla car with registration No. RC 175 AAA to the Defendant after his summarily dismissal is wrongful and actionable per se.

D. AN ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the Claimant either by himself, his agents, privies, assigns, personal representatives or any person however called acting for him or through him and/or holding in trust for him from either using, selling, disposing off and or exercising any act of possession and/or ownership over the Toyota Corolla car with registration No. RC 175 AAA pending the final determination of this suit.

E. AN ORDER directing the Claimant to return forthwith to the Defendant the Toyota Corolla car with registration No. RC 175 AAA in the same excellent and perfect working condition in which it was as at 27th March, 2013 when the Claimant was summarily dismissed with all fixtures and fittings intact.

F. AN ORDER directing the Claimant to pay the Defendant the sum of =N=4,500.000.O0 [Four Million Five Hundred Thousand Naira] being the cost of the Toyota Corolla car with Registration No. RC 175 AAA.

G. AN ORDER directing the Claimant to pay the Defendant the sum of =N=5,000,000.00 [Five Million Naira] as damages for the wrongful seizure, conversion and unauthorised use of the Defendant’s Toyota Corolla car with registration No. RC 175 AAA by the Claimant after his summary dismissal on 27th March, 2013.

H. AN ORDER directing the Claimant to pay the Defendant interest on the combined judgement sum at the rate of 21% per annum from the date of judgement until the entire judgment sum is fully liquidated.

I. AN ORDER directing the Claimant to pay the Defendant the Cost incurred by the Defendant in this action information contained in all the emails are derived from information supplied.

CLAIMANTSREPLY AND DEFENCE TO COUNTER CLAIM dated 23^rdJanuary, 2017.

34. The Claimant denied ever flouting the Defendant’s underwriting and administrative policies, or regulatory guidelines and never exposed the Defendant to potential regulatory penalties which had an adverse effect on the Defendant’s income.

35. The Claimant admitted paragraph 5 (e) of the Statement of Defence that to the extent that Salary Restructuring comprise 75% guaranteed and 25% performance but the Defendant never considered and therefore did not pay the Claimant for his production which ought to form the 25% performance for his 2012 and first quarter of 2013.

36. The Claimant admitted paragraph 7 of the Statement of Defence to the extent that the Defendant approved the sum of N80,000:00k to assist in his father’s funeral expenses but the Defendant only gave him one week leave.

37. Denying paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Statement of Defence, claimant averred the he never a confessed or admitted to have received monetary gain and secret profit from the commission paid by the Defendant to the facilitator in respect of the NIGCOMSAT insurance transaction and therefore did not breach his fiduciary duty to the Defendant as an employee and that full disclosure of the transaction was disclosed to the Management of the Defendant and approval obtained in respect, of the said transaction.

38. The Claimant admitted paragraph 13 of the Statement of Defence to the extent that the sum of N4,185,043.20 (Four Million, One Hundred and Eighty Five Thousand, Forty Three Naira and Twenty Kobo) was paid to his account and which he collected and gave them to Kenneth Olusola, a staff that was working under him then in the Defendant’s company and he never benefitted anyway or in any manner whatsoever from the commission paid by the Defendant in respect of the transaction.

39. Claimant in further denial of paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 (a-j) of the Statement of Defence, the stated that he does not know or have anything to do with any Obiageli Esther in respect of NIGCOMSAT transaction. And that it was Kenneth Olusola that paid the facilitator directly.

40. The Claimant denied paragraph 33, 34 and 35 of the Statement of Defendant and in response stated that at the time of his interview with the Defendant, the Defendant offered to buy a brand new car for him as the Claimant’s official car.

41. The Claimant in response to paragraph 35 (d) of the Statement of Defence, averred that the then Managing Director of the Defendant, Mr. Yinka Bolarinwa personally effected the change in ownership of the Toyota Corolla car with Registration No. RC 175 AAA and gave later gave the Claimant an Internal Memo dated November, 2009 stating that the said Car is “now your belonging”.

42. Claimant stated that he is entitled to the sum of N420,000.00 (Four Hundred and Twenty Thousand Naira) only being a refund of his thrift contribution to the Defendant’s Staff Multi-purpose Cooperative Society; and that he is further entitled to the 21% interest on the sum of N420,000.00k (Four Hundred and Twenty Thousand Naira) till the sum is paid.

43. The Claimant denying paragraph 48 (a) of the Statement of Defence stated that the “Handbook for General Administration” is not known to the Claimant and it is therefore a fabrication of the Defendant, that instead the Claimant’s employment was regulated by a “Law Union & Rock Insurance of Nigeria Plc Staff Service Conditions”.

44. Reacting to paragraph 48 (b) (c) of the Statement of Defence, claimant averred that the Claimant’s housing allowance was always paid to him by the Defendant at the January of every year while he was at the employment of the Defendant; and also that his furniture allowance was always paid to him by the Defendant at the first quarter of every year.

45. The Claimant denying paragraph 48 (f) of the Statement of Defence, stated that the Defendant has paid him productivity bonuses before as evident in the payment of N124, 630.03 (One Hundred and Twenty- Four thousand, Six Hundred and Thirty Naira Three Kobo) on the 3rd December,2010.

46. That the statement referred in paragraph 49 were regularly supplied to the Claimant’s ipad in the ordinary course of performing functions relating to the Defendant’s business as expected of the Claimant and that throughout that material time , the ipad was operating properly and that the information contained in all emails were derived from information supplied to the Claimant’s ipad by him or email received from colleagues and management of the Defendant in the ordinary course of discharging their official duties.

47. The Claimant contended that the counter-claim is frivolous, gold-digging and an abuse of Court process and should therefore be dismissed.

DEFENDANT’S REPLY TO CLAIMANT’S DEFENCE TO DEFENDANT’S COUNTERCLAIM filed on 5^thMay, 2017.

48. In Reply to paragraph 3 (a) — (j) of the Claimant’s Defence to the Defendant’s Counterclaim, the Defendant reiterated the averments contained in paragraphs 5 (a) — (i) and 6 of its Statement of Defence and further averred that the Claimant has not been very productive and successful as claimed neither has the Claimant brought in businesses to the Defendant that fetched the Defendant several millions of Naira as allegedly stated in the said paragraph 3 (a) (j) of the Claimant’s Defence to the Defendant’s Counterclaim. In Reply to 1paragraph 12 of the Claimant’s Defence to the Defendant’s Counterclaim, the Defendant repeats the averment contained in paragraph 5 (e) of its Statement of Defence and Counterclaim and states that the Claimant was duly paid his 75% guaranteed salary and 25% variable salary for 2012 and the first quarter of 2013 respectively.

49. Answering paragraphs 15 - 21 of the Claimant’s defence to the Defendant’s Counterclaim, the Defendant reiterated the averments contained in paragraphs 8 30 of its Statement of Defence and Counterclaim and further stated as follows:—

a. that the Claimant knows Obiageli Esther and that the Claimant dealt with her in respect of the NIGCOMSAT transaction. That the Claimant was also directly involved in the paying the facilitators.

b. that the said Obiageli Esther is not a creation of the Defendant the Claimant is hereby put to the strictest proof thereof.

c. that full disclosure of the NIGCOMSAT transaction was not disclosed by the Claimant to the management and that consequently, the approval given by management was based on the fraudulent misrepresentation given to management by the Claimant.

50. In Reply to paragraph 23 of the Claimant’s defence to the Defendant’s Counterclaim, the Defendant stated that the issue of fraud for which the Claimant was being accused of was investigated by the Defendant and that same was not done in bad faith with a view to injuring the Claimant’s reputation.

51. Responding to paragraph 24 of the Claimant’s defence to the Defendant’s Counterclaim, the Defendant stated that the Claimant was not the main sustenance of finance for the Defendant and neither did the Claimant bring in all the insurance businesses/transactions for the year 2012 and the first quarter of 2013.

52. In Reply to paragraph 47 of the Claimant’s defence to the Defendant’s Counterclaim, the Defendant stated that the Claimant is not entitled to the Toyota Corolla car with Registration No. RC 175 AAA as the said vehicle belongs to the Defendant.

53. At the trial, which commenced on 13^th January 2018, the Claimant called two witnesses, the claimant testified first as CW, adopted his written statements on oath of 5^th February 2015 and 23^rd January 2017 which were marked C1and C2. he proceeded to tender an initial 17 other documents which were marked as Exhibits C3 – C17. Exhibits C15 and C16 were admitted under protest. Thereafter the Claimant tender an additional 9 documents which were marked C18 – C26 amongst which Exhibits C19- C23, C25- C26 were also admitted under protest. the Claimants second witness was Remi Olatunji who testified as CW2, adopted his written statement on oath of 23^rd January 2017 which was marked C27. both witnesses were duly cross examined by the Defendant Counsel and the Claimants case was closed.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

1. OFFER OF LETTER OF APPOINTMENT- EXHIBIT A – C3

2. CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENT- EXHIBIT B – C4

3. SALARY REVIEW- EXHIBIT C –C5

4. LETTER OF SALARY RESTRUCTURING- EXHIBITC2 —C6

5. LETTER OF APPOINTMENT AS INSURER TO VARIOUS INSTITUTIONS- EXHIBIT DAD – C7

6. APPROVAL DOCUMENT- DAD2 — C8

7. OUTCOME OF DISCIPLINARY PANEL LETTER- EXHIBIT E – C9

8. REPLY TO DISCIPLINARY PANEL LETTER- EXHIBIT F –C10

9. LETTER OF SUMMARY DISMISSAL FOR FRAUD- EXHIBIT G – C11

10. SOLICITOR’S LETTER- EXHIBIT H – C12

11. VEHICLE DOCUMENTS- EXHIBIT H2 – C13

12. CONDITIONS OF VEHICLE - EXHIBIT I – C14

13. QUOTATION FROM MECHANIC- EXHIBIT J – C15

14. QUOTATION FROM MECHANIC- EXHIBIT J2 - C16

15. PAY SLIP- EXHIBIT K – C17

LIST OF ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS TO BE RELIED ON BY THE CLAIMANT DURING TRIAL

1. DOCUMENT TITLED “RE-QUERY” DATED 18/03/2010 – C18

2. COUNTER GUARANTEE INSURANCE DOCUMENTS – C19

3. COUNTER GUARANTEE BONDS DOCUMENTS - C20

4. NORTHERN REGION 2012 BUSINESS PLAN - C21

5. LAW UNION & ROCK LETTER TO ADEYA & ADEYA & CO. – C22

6. PROFORMAL INVOICE FROM GLOBE MOTORS - C23

7. INTERNAL MEMO DATED 4TH NOVEMBER 2009 – C24

8. LAW UNION & ROCK INSURANCE OF NIGERIA PLC STAFF SERVICE CONDITIONS – C25

9. STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT – C26

54. The Defendants called two witnesses, the first to testify was Habib Emmanuel Abiodun, the Head of the Defendant’s Internal Audit who testified as DW1, adopted his written statement on oath of 17^th May 2017 which was marked D1, proceeded to tender34 Documents which were marked D2 – D34. Exhibit D12 and D24 were admitted under protest. The defendant’s second witness Rotimi Odufote, the Head of the Defendant’s Staff Multipurpose Cooperative Society, he testified as DW2, adopted his written statement on oath of 17^th May 2017 which was marked D35 he was duly cross examined by claimant Counsel.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS TO BE RELIED ON BY THE DEFENDANT DURING TRIAL

1. E-mail of Ogwugwa Charity to the Defendant’s former Managing Director dated 17th March, 2010. D2

2. The Defendant’s Internal Memo to the Claimant dated 18th March, 2010 titled QUERRY.D3

3. Memo from the Defendant’s Acting Head, Human Capital Management to the Claimant dated 28t April, 2011. D4

4. Memo from the Defendant’s Acting Head, Human Capital Management to the Claimant dated 15th March, 20l2. D5

5. E-mail from the Head of the Defendant’s Human Resource Management to the Defendant’s Company Secretary and Head Legal Service dated 21st April,2016. D6

6. The Claimant’s appraisal dated 4th February, 2012. D7

7. The Internal Memo from the Defendant’s Human Capital Department to the Defendant’s Account Department dated 18th March, 2013. D8

8. The Internal Memo from the Defendant’s Human Capital Department to the Claimant dated 26th March, 2013. D9

9. Skye Bank Plc cheque issued by the Defendant in favour of the Claimant for the sum of =N=80,000.00 dated 20t March, 2013. D10

10. Defendant’s Internal Memo containing the Disciplinary Committee’s Report dated 24th December, 2012. D11

11. E-mail of Obiageli Esther to the Defendant’s then Managing Director [i.e. Mrs. Toyin Ogunseye] dated 13th December, 2012. D12

12. The Defendant’s Annual Report and Account for the year 2010. D13

13. Elizade Nigeria Limited Motor Vehicle Sales Invoice dated 2nd March, 2009. D14

14. Elizade Nigeria Limited Delivery Note dated 2nd March, 2009. D15

15. The Defendant’s Proof of Ownership Certificate dated 3rd March, 2009. D16

16. Allocation of Registration Number to New Vehicle dated 3rdMarch, 2009. D17

17. Staco Insurance Plc’s Certificate of Insurance No. 007:1523 for the year 1stJanuary, 2011 — 31st December, 2011. D18

18. Staco Insurance Plc’s Certificate of Insurance No. 0095806 for the year 1stJanuary, 2012 — 31st January, 2012. D19

19. Staco Insurance Plc’s Certificate of Insurance No. 0140704 for the year 1st January,2013 — 31st December, 2013. D20

20. The Defendant’s Cover Note dated 4th March, 2009. D21

21. Memo from the Defendant’s Regional Manager (North) 1 dated 13thJanuary,2010. D22

22. The Defendant’s letter to the Claimant dated 12th April, 2013. D23

23. The Defendant’s petition to the police dated 3rd February, 2016. D24

24. The Defendant’s Staff ‘Handbook for General Administration’ which came into effect in July, 2006. D25

25. The Memorandum of Understanding between Law Union & Rock Insurance Plc and Proof Nigeria Limited dated 11th August, 2011. D26

26. Internal Memo from the Claimant to the Head of the Defendant’s Branch Operations dated 26th January, 2012. D27

27. The Defendant Skye Bank Plc cheque dated 21/02/2012 for the sum of =N =N=4,865,572.00 issued in favour of Proof Nigeria Limited. D28

28. The Defendant’s Memo to the Claimant dated 17th August, 2010 titled ‘Operational Restructuring. D29

LIST AND COPIES OF ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS

1. The signature of Mr. Yinka Bolarinwa endorsed by him on Skye Bank Plc’s Mandate Card. D29(1)

2. The Defendant’s Internal Memos dated 1st July, 2011 from the Defendant’s Admin & General Services Department to the Defendant’s Regional Manager North 1, Abuja. D30

3. The Defendant’s Internal Memo dated 1st July, 2011 from the Defendant’s Admin & General Services Department to the Defendant’s BDM (Benin office). D31

4. The registration certificate of the Defendant’s Staff Multi-Purpose Cooperative Society. D32

5. The Defendant’s certificate of incorporation. D33

55. Thereafter the defendants closed their case and the matter was adjourned for the filing of final written addresses in line with Order 19 rule 22.

The DEFENDANT’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS was filed on 21^st November 2019.

ISSUES

1. Whether the conduct of the Claimant for which he was summarily dismissed amounts to gross miss conduct.

2. Whether in the light of issue one above if determined in the affirmative; the Claimant may be summarily dismissed without wages and other entitlements.

ON ISSUE 1

Whether the conduct of the Claimant for which he was summarily dismissed amounts to gross miss conduct.

56. Learned Counsel to the Defendant submitted that gross misconduct is a prerequisite for the summary dismissal of an employee by an employer. EZE V. SPRING BANK PLC (2012) VOL. 205 LRCN PAGE 163; TeliatSule v. Nigerian cotton board (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.5) 17, at pages 176UJJ &177A; Babatunde Ajayi v. Texaco Nigeria Ltd &Ors. (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt.62) 577.

ON ISSUE 2

Whether in the light of issue one above if determined in the affirmative; the Claimant may be summarily dismissed without wages and other entitlements.

57. Defendants Counsel contended that Claimant may be summarily dismissed without wages and other entitlements. EZE V. SPRING BANK PLC (2012) VOL. 205 LRCN PAGE 163; Olaniyan v. University of Lagos (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.9) 599.Counsel argued that there has been no evidence adduced by the Claimant indicating his demand for his monthly contribution from the defendants Staff Cooperative, neither has he presented any facts or evidence showing that the defendant collected such contributions. Durosaro v. Ayorinde (supra) at page 1038; Olujinle v. Adeagbo (1998) 2N.W.L.R. (part 75) 238; Adejumo v. Ayantegbe (1989) 3 N.W.L.R. (part 110) 417; U.B.A. Ltd v. Achoru (1990) 6 N.W.LR. (Pt. 156) 254; Ornoregbe v. Lawani (1980) 3-4 SC 108 at 117.

The CLAIMANTS’ FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS was filed on 13^thDecember, 2019.

ISSUES

i. Whether the allegation of fraud has been proved by the defendant against the claimant.

ii. Whether there was a privity of contract between the claimant and the subsidiary company of the defendant.

iii. Whether the defendant has substantiated its pleadings with credible evidence to be entitled to its counter-claims.

iv. Whether the dismissal of the claimant in the manner he was dismissed was in order.

v. Whether in the light of the evidence before this Honourable court, the claimant is entitled to the reliefs claimed.

ON ISSUE 1

Whether the allegation of fraud has been proved by the Defendant against the Claimant.

58. Counsel to the Claimant submitted that he who alleges must prove, and where crime is alleged in a civil suit, the proof of the alleged criminal offence is beyond reasonable doubt, thus, the complainant must prove the alleged offence by credible and unassailable evidence without leaving room for reasonable doubt. Akinbade v. Babatunde(2018) 276 LRCN PG. 48 AT PG. 85, PARAS. EQ; Agi v. People’s Democratic Party (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1595) pg. 386 at 454, paras. A-B; Maihaja v. Gaidam (2017) 274 LRCN at page 83PU.Claimant Counsel posited that ‘’the law is that where the party to a case fails or refuses to submit the issues he raised in his pleadings for trial by giving evidence in their support, the trial court must resolve the case against the defaulting party except there are other legal reasons to the contrary,” as was held in the case of OSADIM V. TAVVO (2010) 6 NWLR (PART 1189) PAGE 155 AT 182-183, PARAS. H-A; NSIONU V. NSIONU 92011) 16 NWLR (PT. 1274) PAGE 536 AT 547, PARA.G. He argued that from the pleadings of the parties before the Court, it is evident that the Claimant debunked and refuted the allegations of fraud, forgery, misrepresentation, concealment and every other material allegation of fact and crime levelled against him by the Defendant. It is an elementary principle of law that pleadings are not evidence. MONKOM V. ODILI (2010) 2 NWLR (PT. 1179) PAGE 419 AT 443, PARAS. A-B. Furthermore, that it is the law that “Pleadings do not constitute evidence and therefore, where such pleading is not supported by evidence —oral or documentary- it is deemed by the court as having been abandoned,” as was held in MISS EZEANAH V. ALHAJI ATTA (2004) 2 SCNJ 200 AT 235 AT PG. 2109 JJ.

ON ISSUE 2

Whether there was a privity of contract between the Claimant and the subsidiary company of the Defendant.

59. Counsel to the Claimant submitted that once an admission made by a party to a suit is unequivocal and clear, as in the instant case, the facts admitted need not be proved and the Court is entitled to act on such facts. HABIB NIG. BANK LTD. V. GIFTS UNIQUE NIG. LTD. (2004)15 NWLR (PT. 896) 408.Furthermore, that a fact admitted under cross-examination requires no further proof. JOLASUN V. BAMGBOYE (2011) ALL FWLR (PT. 595) 203 S.C.It is counsel’s submission that ‘’a subsidiary company has its own separate legal personality. That in general, the acts of a subsidiary company cannot be imputed to the parent company and vice versa. A subsidiary company has its own separate legal personality. In general, the acts of a subsidiary company cannot be imputed to the parent company and vice versa”. ASSET MANAGEMENT NOMINEES LTD. & ANOR. vs. FORTE OIL PLC &ORS.(2017)LPELR-43553(CA).

ON ISSUE 3

Whether the Defendant has substantiated its pleadings with credible evidence to be entitled to its counter-claims.

60. Learned Claimant Counsel posited that it is elementary law that pleadings, no matter how elegant or brilliant they may have been prepared, do not constitute evidence. NSIONU V. NSIONU (2011) 16 NWLR (PT. 1274) PAGE 536 AT 547, PARA. G.He submitted that “It is trite law that averments in pleadings are not evidence. They mainly highlight the evidence that a party is likely to present so that the other side would not be caught unaware or unprepared or to eliminate surprise. The position of the law is that pleadings are the body and soul of any case in a skeleton form and are built and solidified by evidence in support thereof. See: chime v. chime (2001) 3 NWLR (Pt. 701) 527; Garba v. Lobi Bank (2003) FWLR (Pt. 173) 106 and Ezeanah v. Attah (2004) 7 NWLR (Pt. 873) 468. Averments in pleadings must be proved by evidence, except where they are admitted by the other party. MONKOM V. ODILI (2010) 2 NWLR (PT. 1179) PAGE 419 AT 443, PARAS. A-B; ORLU V. ONYEKA (2018) 3 NWLR (PT. 1607) PG. 467 AT 486-487, PARAS. H-A.Counsel submitted that it is wrong for the Defendant to dump documents before this Honourable Court without leading evidence in support thereof. OMISORE V. AREGBESOLA (2015) 15 NWLR (PT. 1482) PG. 205 AT Pg. 333, PARAS. A; OKEREKE V. UMAHI & ORS. (2016) LPELR40035(SC).Counsel contended that the Defendant only dumped before this Honourable Court documents which it did not lead any oral evidence on and this Honourable Court cannot embark on the herculean task of linking those documents of the Defendants to any allegation of the Defendant. He urged the Court to discountenance the documents and reject all the reliefs sought by the Defendant in its counter-claim. UGOCHUKWU V. CO-OPERATIVE BANK (1996) 7 SCNJ 22.It is counsel’s submission that “Any party tendering documentary evidence has the task of linking such documents to the specific aspects of his case. In other words, he should not merely dump them in the Court or Tribunal and expect the Tribunal or Court to embark on speculation in determining the purport for which it was intended or to which aspect of the case such document relates without being guided by any oral evidence led in open Court”. OKEREKE V. UMAHI & ORS. (2016) LPELR-40035(SC).He argued that almost all the documents put in by the Defendant through DW1 are in their secondary form and the Defendant did to lay foundation for the admissibility of the documents. ABUBAKAR V. CHUKS (2007) LPELR-SC and MOTANYA V. ELINWA & ORS. (1994) LPELR-1919 (SC).Learned Counsel posited that where the party to a case fails or refuses to submit the issues he raised in his pleadings for trial by giving evidence in their support, the trial court must resolve the case against the defaulting party except there are other legal reasons to the contrary. OSADIM V. TAWO (2010) 6 NWLR (PART 1189) PAGE 155 AT 182-183, PARAS. H-A; and that “Pleadings do not constitute evidence and therefore, where such pleading is not supported by evidence —oral or documentary- it is deemed by the court as having been abandoned”. MISS EZEANAH V. ALHAJI ATTA (2004) 2 SCNJ 200 AT 235.

61. It is counsel’s contention that the Defendant/Counter-claimant failed to substantiate its claims with evidence —oral or documentary- and there is nothing before the Court to give effect to the claims of the Defendant/Counter-claimant. That it is trite that a party cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay there, as it will collapse. MACFOY V. UNITED AFRICA CO. LTD. (1963) 3 WLR 1405 AT PP. 1409-1410.Counsel submitted that evidence elicited from a party or his witness(es) under cross-examination which goes to support the case of the party cross-examining, constitutes evidence in support of the case or defence of that party. And if at the end of the day the party cross-examining decides not to call any witness, he can rely on the evidence elicited from cross- examination in establishing his case or defence. AKOMOLAFE V. GUARDIAN PRESS LTD. (PRINTERS) (2010) ALL FWLR (PT. 517) 773 AT 784 S.C.

62. He maintained that documentary evidence is the best evidence and it is the best proof of its contents. No oral evidence will be allowed to discredit or contradict the contents thereof except where fraud is pleaded. Where there is oral as well as documentary evidence, the latter should be used as a hangar from which to assess the oral evidence. EGHAREVBA V. OSAGIE (2010) ALL FWLR (PT. 513) 1255 S.C; ANYANWU V. UZOWUAKA (2009) ALL FWLR (PT. 449) 4411 S.C.

ON ISSUE 4

Whether the dismissal of the Claimant in the manner he was dismissed by the Defendant was in order

63. Claimant Counsel argued that it is against natural justice for a person to be a judge in his own cause. The Defendant constituted itself as a Court and a Judge in passing judgment on the Claimant and dismissing him on the ground of fraud. Thereby making the Claimant a criminal in the eyes of ordinary persons of the society and damaging the reputation of the Claimant. This is in blatant breach of the Claimant’s right to fair hearing guaranteed under Section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). MR. YESUFU AMUDA GARBA & ORS. V. THE UNIVERSITY OF MAIDUGURI (1986) NWLR (PT. 18) 550; MEDICAL AND DENTAL PRACTITIONERS DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL V. OKONKWO (SC.) 213/1999; DENLOYE V. MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS COMMITTEE (1968) 1 ALL NLR 306.It is the Claimant’s contention that his right to fair hearing was breached by the Defendant when the Defendant accused him of the criminal offence of fraud without framing any formal charge against him or charging him to a Court of competent jurisdiction for the determination of that allegation, but proceeded to try the Claimant and summarily dismissed him. Section 36(4), (5) of the 1999 Constitution; NDUUL V. WAYO (2018) 75 NSCQR.

ON ISSUE 5

Whether in the light of the evidence before this Honourable Court the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs claimed.

64. Counsel submitted that a party whose document has been admitted in evidence should not just rest on the fact that such a document has been admitted in evidence but should go further to adduce evidence of its contents, as the court has no duty to embark on an investigation of the contents of the document to arrive at a decision. AWUSE V. ODILI (2005) ALL FWLR (PT. 261) 248 CA; OB.M.C. LTD. V. M.B.A.S. LTD. (2005) ALL FWLR (PT. 261) 216 S.C.Similarly, that if such party wants to relate the exhibit to an aspect of his case, he should do so and not just leave the court to investigate the contents of the document, which would amount to a breach of the fair hearing rule. NWAGA V. REGISTERED TRUSTEES, RECREATION CLUB (2004) FWLR (PT. 190) 1360 C.A; ABI V. C.B.N. (2012) 3 NWLR (PT. 1286) 1 C.A.Counsel posited that it is trite law that the Court cannot force a willing employee on an unwilling employer and that an employer of labour or a public limited liability company like the Defendant in this case does not have any obligation to retain the services of any unwanted employee and may terminate the employment of the employee without any reason. OFORISHE V. NIGERIAN GAS COMPANY LIMITED (2018) 2 NWLR (PT. 1602) PG. 35 AT 61, PARA. F.; (2018) 275 LRCN PG. 106.However, in the exercise of its discretion and right to terminate the employment of an employee, the employer of labour must ensure that same is done in line with the terms of the employment of such an employee. PROMASIDOR (NIG.) LTD. ANOR. V. ASIKHIA (2019) LPELR-46443(CA).

The DEFENDANT’S REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW TO CLAIMANT’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS filed on 31^st January2020.

65. Counsel to the Defendant referring the Court to the written depositions of DW1 particularly paragraphs 22, submitted that the issue of fraud as raised by the Claimant in his final written address, was substantially proved by the Defendant. That the Defendant’s witnesses led credible and tenable evidence to substantiate the reason for the lawful dismissal of the Claimant from the Defendant’s employ.He submitted that he who asserts must prove, seeing as the Claimant made heavy weather on the fact that his salaries were deducted. That the Claimant also failed to show or tender before this Honorable Court any document whatsoever to show these alleged deductions. Section 131(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011 (as amended). The Defendant Counsel contended that the Defendant is entitled to its counter claim against the Claimant as the Defendant led credible evidence, both oral anddocumentary, in proof of same. And that where evidence led by a party supports the case of the said party, he would be entitled to judgment. F.C.D.A v Nzelu (2014) 5 NWLR (part 1401) 565 at 580 paras. C-H.

Court’s Decision

66. I have carefully summarized the evidence of both sides, the arguments of opposing counsel and having carefully reviewed all the authorities cited, read through all the relevant processes and digested the contention of the parties and their written submission are herewith incorporated in this Judgement and specific mention would be made to them where the need arises. The issue for determination in this suit to my mind is whether either or both the Claimant and the Defendant Counter claimant are entitled to the reliefs sought in this suit.

67. During the course of this trial, both sides of the divide raised objection to specific exhibits to wit; - the defendants objected to the admission of Exhibits C19- C23, C25- C26 while the Claimant raised objections to Exhibit D12 and D24.By the rules of this Court, all frontloaded documents are deemed admitted unless specifically objected to by the opposing part in their consequential pleadings. This practice enables the parties inform the court, that Exhibits to which they object and then in their final written addresses raise their arguments to support the objection and the issue would be resolved in this Court judgment.

68. I find that neither the Claimant northe Defendant counsel substantiated their objections to the documents they indicated during the trial in their final addresses, these objection having not been substantiated in law or adumbrated in their final addresses of parties I consider and deem as having been abandoned.

69. For ease of consideration I shall reproduce the claimant’s reliefs accordingly:

a. A DECLARATION that the summary dismissal of the Claimant on the ground of fraud on the 27th March 2013 is null and void as it violated the constitutional right of the Claimant.

e. A DECLARATION that the Claimant is entitled to the sum of N263,099.82 (Two Hundred and Sixty Three Thousand and Ninety Nine Naira Eighty- Two Kobo) only for the year 2013 being the leave allowance paid by the defendant to the workers in the cadre of the Claimant and usually paid in February of every year.

xii. National Assembly- N96,000,000.00k (Ninety Six Eight Million Naira) only

xiii. Nigeria Security Printing & Minting Company- N22,000,000.00k (Twenty-two Million Naira) only

xiv. Transmission Company of Nigeria- N17,000,000.00k (Seventeen Million Naira) only

xv. Federal Road Safety Corps (Fire and Burglary) -N15,085,747.87k (Fifteen Million and Eight Five Thousand Seven Hundred and Forty Seven Naira Eight Seven Kobo) only

xvi. Federal load Safety Corps (Group Personal Accident)- N14,500,000.00k (Fourteen Million Five Hundred Thousand Naira) only

xvii. Federal Mortgage sank of Nigeria-N5,000,000.00k (Five Million Naira only)

xviii. Central sank of Nigeria- N7,600,000.00k (Seven Million six hundred thousand naira only)

xix. Nigeria Television Authority (NTA)- N4,200,000.00k (Four Million two hundred thousand naira only)

xx. Sadogi Nigeria Limited- N5,000,000.00k (Five Million naira only)

xxi. Nigerian Meteorological Agency (NIMET)- N24, 000,000.00k (Twenty Four Million Naira only)

xxii. National Health Insurance Scheme -N7,500,000.00k (Seven Million Five Hundred Thousand Naira only).

h. A DECLARATION that the Claimant remains the owner of the second hand Toyota Corolla Saloon Car which the Management of the Defendant Company gave to him when the Defendant could not afford to buy a brand new car for his official use for officer of his cadre.

j. Alternatively, a declaration that the Claimant is entitled to the sum of N396,000.00k (Three hundred and ninety-six thousand naira only) being the amount of money spent by the Claimant for the total overhauling of the said Toyota Corolla

k. A DECLARATION that the Claimant on approval of his retirement from the service of Law Union & lock Insurance Plc is entitled to the sum of N3, 932,498.53k (Three Million, Nine Hundred and Thirty-Two Thousand Four Hundred and Ninety-Eight Naira Fifty-three kobo) only which were not paid as the terminal benefit to the Claimant by the defendant.

l. AN ORDER of this court compelling and mandating the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum stated in PRAYERS (b) to (k) above with immediate effect.

m. AN ORDER of this Honorable Court directing the Defendant to pay interest on the judgment sum at 2l% from the day the judgment is delivered till liquidation of the judgment sum.

N .AN ORDER of this Court directing the Defendant to pay the cost of this suit being N10,000,000.00k (Ten Million Naira) only.

70. Apart from four of the Claimants 14 reliefs the claimant is seeking declaratory pronouncements and in ''A plaintiff who seeks a declaratory relief must show that he has an interest or right which forms the foundation for that right. The plaintiff must establish a right in relation thereto. See ALAO V. AKANO (2005) 11 NWLR (PT.935)160. Also in EKANEM V. A.I.G.P. (2008) 5 NWLR (PT. 1079) 97 AT P. 111, PARA. Cit was held that "A declaratory order of court simply proclaims the existence of an event or a legal situation. It may contain a specific order to be carried out and it may not necessarily direct the carrying out of the order. [AKUNNIA V. A.-G., ANAMBRA STATE (1977) 5 SC 161; FEDERAL MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS V. DARMAN (1982) 3 NCLR 915.]" Per Omage, JCA which the declaration can be made.'' Per MUSDAPHER, J.S.C (P. 11, paras. B-C). "A declaratory relief is one that seeks the pronouncement of the court as to the status of a named matter, thing or situation. See: NWAGU V. FADIPE(2012) LPELR-7966(CA)ENEKWE VS I.M.B. (NIG.) LTD. (2007) ALL FWLR (349) 1053 AT 1073 H; ALIMS NIG. LTD V. U.B.A. PLC (2007) ALL FWLR (348) 971 AT 981. It is a discretionary relief." Per Kekere-Ekun, J.C.A (P. 16, paras. F-G).)"It is trite that in cases where declaratory reliefs are claimed as in the present case, and notwithstanding the fact that the defendant/or respondent did not call evidence to challenge the appellants evidence that failure of the respondent would not relieve the said appellant from satisfying the tribunal by cogent and reliable proof or evidence in support of his claim or petition. AGBAJE V. FASHOLA (2008) 6 NWLR (PT. 1082

71. In relief (a) the claimant is seeking a legal pronouncement as to the propriety of his summary dismissal for fraud and whether the act of the defendant in so dismissing him did not infringe the Claimants fundamental Human Rights.

72. In reliefs (b - g) the Claimant is seeking separate legal pronouncements as to his entitlement to six separate named allowances and the sums claimed per se. In relief h) is for a pronouncement as to the ownership status of the Toyota Corolla Vehicle registration number RC 175 AAA, whereas Reliefs (i and k) are in the alternative of relief (k) seeking the legal pronouncements as to theentitlement and payment of thesums. The claimant expended on the said Vehicle, while reliefs l, m and n are for corresponding executory orders incidental to the foregoing.

73. In order to consider whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought in this suit it is necessary to determine the nature of the Claimants employment and the propriety of the defendants action determining the Claimants employment in the manner in which the defendants did, that gave rise to this suit.

74. The Supreme Court in the case of LONGE Vs. FBN LTD [2010] LPELR 1793 SC held that “…. that there are three categories of employment

(a) Purely Master and Servant relationship

(b) Servants who hold their office at the pleasure of the employer

75. In support of the employment the Claimant tendered Exhibit C3- 17, from the claimants documents I find that the Claimants employment is one of Employer / Employee Relationship commonly known as Master Servant Employment.

76. The Employer / Employee Relationship commonly known as Master Servant Employment are governed by the agreement of the parties. Their contract of employment. The position of the law is as was stated in Sasegbon’s Laws Of Nigeria, in the book titled “An Encyclopaedia Nigerian Law And Practice”, First Edition, Volume 16. Paragraph 233- Determination Of Master And Servant Relationship. Stated that “… In other cases governed only by, agreement of the parties and not by statute as in the present case, removal by way of termination of appointment or dismissal will be in the form agreed to between the parties in the agreement binding on them. It is the law that master and servant relationship may be governed by both common law and statute, and that termination of an appointment depends upon what the contract between the parties provides (OLANIYAN v. UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS (NO.2) (1985) 2 NWLR (PT. 9) 599 @ 612.” –Per Awogu, J.C.A. in DAVID-OSUAGWU v. A.G. ANAMBRA STATE SUIT NO. CA/E/80/91; (1993) 4 NWLR (PT. 285) 13 @ 41.

77. Sasegbon’s continues that “Any other form of removal not in accordance with the terms of the agreement connotes only wrongful termination or wrongful dismissal, which cannot be declared null and void. The only remedy available to an employee removed contrary to the terms of his employment is a claim for damages for the wrongful termination or wrongful dismissal. This is based on the notion that no servant can be imposed by the court on an unwilling master or employer even where the employer’s behavior towards the employee is wrongful. Thus, for the wrongful act of the employer, he is only liable to his wronged employee in damages and nothing more. UNION BEVERAGES LTD. v. OWOLABI (1988) 1 NWLR (PT. 68) 128 and UNION BANK OF NIGERIA LTD. v. OGBOH (1995) 2 NWLR (PT. 380) 647 @ 664.” – per Mohammed J.C.A. in OLANIFIMIHAN v. NOVA LAY-TECH LTD. SUIT NO. CA/B/120/97; (1998) 4 NWLR (PT. 547) 608 @ 620.

78. The defendants maintain that the Claimant was summarily dismissed for his conduct which to the defendant amounted to gross misconduct and contend that their action in dismissing the claimant was lawful and proper. The Claimant raised the argument that for fraud, a criminal offence is required to be proved and the question of lack of fair hearing with respect to not prosecuting the criminal offence in a Court of Law. A similar argument, to the effect that in a dismissal based on an allegation of crime, the allegation must first of all be proved before the dismissal can stand or that it is trite that conduct amounting to crime must first of all be a matter for the Court or criminal tribunal before disciplinary issues or action can be raised, was advanced inIKE EDWARD CHUKWUEMEKA V. ENTERPRISE BANKunreported Suit No. NICN/LA/181/2011 the judgment of which was delivered on May 13, 2014. In reviewing the authorities, this is what this Court said at pages 16 to 17 –

a. The claimant was invariably relying on the old dispensation as evinced by case law authorities such as BIISHI V. THE JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION [1991] 6 NWLR (PT. 197) 331 CA, which were to the effect that where a criminal offence is alleged against an employee, he must first be prosecuted for the offence before disciplinary measures if necessary are taken against him. The new dispensation is, however, exemplified by cases such as ARINZE V. FIRST BANK (NIG.) LTD [2000] 1 NWLR (PT. 639) 78 CA, which laid down that it is not an immutable principle that where the act of misconduct by an employee also amounts to a criminal offence the employee must first be prosecuted before the employer can exercise his power of summary dismissal of the employee. The Supreme Court in same case, ARINZE V. FBN LTD [2004] 12 NWLR (PT. 888) 663 SCaffirmed this principle when it held that an employer can dismiss an employee where the accusation against such employee is of gross misconduct involving dishonesty bordering on criminality; and in such a case, it is not required under section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution that an employee must first be tried in a court of law. That it is, therefore, erroneous to contend that once crime is detected, the employer cannot discipline the employee unless he is tried and convicted first. The Supreme Court went on that in cases of misconduct bordering on criminality, all that is required of an employer before summarily dismissing an employee is to give him fair hearing by confronting him with the accusation made against him and requiring him to defend himself; and to satisfy the rule of natural justice and fair hearing, a person likely to be affected directly by the disciplinary proceedings must be given adequate notice of the allegation against him to afford him the opportunity for representation in his own defence. The Court of Appeal in ATA POLY V. MAINA [2005] 10 NWLR (PT. 934) 487 CAreiterated and applied this principle.

79. In the instant case, therefore, the argument of the claimant in that regard accordingly goes to no issue; and I so find and hold.

80. It is the case of the defendants that the Claimant was summarily dismissed for his conduct which to the defendant amounted to gross miss conduct and Contend that their action in dismissing the claimant was lawful and proper. In support of their position the Defendants’ tendered in particular Exhibit D11 being the Report of the Disciplinary Committee that looked into the issue of improper payment of facilitation fees by the company management, as well as Exhibits D3 – D5in support of their position of gross misconduct. I will address Exhibits D3 and D4 later on in this judgement.

81. Exhibit D5 is the query served on the Claimant in respect of the Facilitation Fee incident and Exhibit D11 is the report of the Disciplinary Committee. A careful perusal of Exhibit D11reveals a narrative reportage of a Disciplinary hearing where the Claimant was deemed to have stated that the former management had deducted 30% of the NIGCOMSAT Insurance Contract as facilitation fee and N4million, One Hundred and Eighty Five Thousand was paid into his account and from which the facilitator was paid among others while a further and N4 million, Eight Hundred and Sixty Five Thousand and Seventy- Two Naira was paid to Proof Nigeria Limited a Company the Claimant described as a Special Purpose Vehicle. To the defendants the company was charged 30% as facilitation fee for the NIGCOMSAT Insurance Contract which amounted to N9, 050, 615, 20 Nine Million, Fifty Thousand, Six Hundred and Fifteen Naira Twenty Kobo, the facilitator was actually paid N2,340, 000,00 (Two Million. Three Hundred and Forty Thousand Naira) as facilitation Commission and the sum of N 6, 710, 615,20 (Six Million Seven Hundred and Ten Thousand Six Hundred and Fifteen Naira was shared by the Claimant and the former Managing Director of the Company. the Defendants considered this action of the Claimant as being reprehensible and a breach of the Claimants fiduciary duty.

82. The Claimant maintained that he had rendered full disclosure at the Disciplinary committee and that the management of the defendants at that time approved the payment of 30% and denied making a confession or admissions as to have received monetary gain and secret profit from the commission paid by the Defendant to the facilitator in respect of the NIGCOMSAT insurance transaction and therefore did not breach his fiduciary duty to the Defendant.

83. I find that the Defendants although have presented a clear concise report of the activities of the claimant and the circumstances of the outstanding facilitation fee Exhibit D 12, the Defendants have not refuted the contention of the Claimant that all the circumstances of the 30% facilitation where authorized and approved by the former management of the defendants. This fact was all but admitted. The Defendants in their Statement of Defence Paragraph 14 had maintained that “The Defendant admits paragraph 18, 19 and 20 of the Statementof Claim only to the extent that the Defendant’s management had approved 30% Commission paid to the facilitator in respect of NIGCOMSTAT Insurance Transaction. And facts admitted have no need of proof. See USMAN v. FIRST BANK & ORS 2019 LPELR CA. Furthermore, Exhibits D26 and D27 all indicate that this facilitation saga was a creation of management, approved by same and executed by same. I believe the Claimant that this arrangement was approved and undertaken by the erstwhile management,

84. The Defendants DW1 had also testified in Exhibit D1 paragraph 19 to management’s approval to pay the facilitator 30% and he further testified that the Claimant had implicated the former Managing Director Yinka Bolarinwa and Executive Director Segun Iloriyet no evidence was presented to this court as to the action or reason for non-action taken against these persons or any evidence as to the complicity or otherwise of the said Management, in the disbursementof the said 30%. As it isthe fact that the Claimant played a role in the execution of the disbursement arrangement does not detract from the fact that whatever role he played was with the approval of management, especially as there is no evidence to the contrary. the position of the law in relating to evidence of a witness is was stated in ELE V. STATE(2006) LPELR-11649(CA)"It is well settled principle of law of evidence that in an account which a party gives of a transaction the whole must be taken together. An admission of a fact disadvantageous to the accused cannot be admitted without admitting his contemporaneous assertion of fact favourable to him”. What that means in context is that the defendants are required to accept the whole evidence of the claimant and not only part thereof, soif the Defendants wish to rely on the claimants claim that the management authorized the 30% deduction as facilitators fee and that part of this fund was paid into the account of the Claimant theyhave to accept his narrationof how the money was disbursed. And in this instant the claimant maintains that it was done under management direction and the Defendants cannot expect this court to pick and choose from the Claimant’s narration.

85. The National Industrial Court of Nigeria like other court of law is a Court of Law and a Court of Justice, and is required to make its findings on the evidence placed before it and draw inferences based on evidential evaluation of the evidence on the whole. Now, the Defendants did not present any evidence from the facilitator Mrs. Esther Obiageli, particularly as to the means or method by which she received the N2, 390, 000k being amount paid to her, evidence of who paid her the amount she complained was short by N648,742.88. although listed as a witness Mrs. Obiageli Esther was never called as a witness and Exhibit D12 is of no assistance in resolving this pointThe persistent contention of the Claimant that Mrs. Esther Obiageli is a figment of the Defendant’s imagination if nothing else would have been laid to rest.

86. In respect of misconduct, the law is that misconduct is whatever the defendant determines it to beSee EZE V. SPRING BANK (2011) 12 SC PT.1 PG.173;and that gross misconduct Gross misconduct has been described as conduct that is of a grave and weighty character as to undermine the relationship of confidence which should exist between the employee and his employee See YUSUF V. U.B.N. LTD. (1996) 6 NWLR (PT.457)632

87. It is against that backdrop that I shall consider the action of the claimant as to whether it rises to the level of gross misconduct.

88. Traditionally, “In a master/servant relationship there is a general power reposed in the employer to dismiss an employee for misconduct of any kind that can justify dismissall (albeit that this is no longer the position of modern labour law”). Although, there has been no clear definition under the law as to what constitutes a misconduct, gross misconduct has, however, been defined as conduct of a grave and weighty character as to undermine the confidence which should exist between the employee and his employer. Misconduct, in the circumstance, is what the employer makes it out to be. It could be a series of disobedient actions, acts of insubordination, absenteeism, embezzlement or some conduct considered detrimental to the corporate existence of an institution. Thus, where an employee is guilty of gross misconduct he could be lawfully dismissed summarily without notice and without wages”. See BORISHADE V. N.B.N. LTD (2007) 1 NWLR (PT. 1015) 217 AT 234 PARAS. D - E; 235 PARA. B; 241 PARAS. E - H (CA); following ABUKOGBO V. AFRICAN TIMBERS & PLYWOOD LTD (1996) 2 ALL NLR 87; COLLEGE OF MEDICINE OF UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS V. ADEGBITE (1973) 3 SC 149; UNION BANK OF NIGERIA LTD. V. OGBOH (1995) 2 NWLR (PT. 380) 647; SULE V. NIGERIA COTTON BOARD (1985) 2 NWLR (PT. 5. 17); MOHAMMED V. ALI (1989) 2 NWLR (PT. 103) 349.

89. That the acts of the Claimant, which the Defendants in this suit are complaining about were executed under a previous management, a management that not only sanctioned but one that approved and undertook in the fall out of the said action. Considering this can an action executed under direction of management, with the full support and assistance of the management be said to be inimical to that same management. With regards to the defendants contention that the action of the Claimant amounts to gross misconduct, while glossing over the role of the then Management I find this contention unsupportable considering the defendants have not tied the malfeasance to the claimant absolutely neither had they negated the evidence and argument of the Claimant of the management involvement. I also find that to punish the Claimant with a summary dismissal without determining the complicity or otherwise of thethen management. I hold to be excessive, in bad faith anda case of inordinate scapegoating. It appears that just because he remained in the company he is left carrying the can for what also appeared to be a business decision, the Defendants had argued that the proper percentage was 10% but did not show that the claimant suo moto jacked up the amount all by himself, or that he benefited solely. Relief a).therefore, succeeds. Having held that the Claimants actions fall short of gross misconduct and considering that in a Master and Servant relationship even when wrongfully determined in law stands terminated, in the circumstances I find that the Claimants employment no longer exists and that this is a proper situation for the court to convert the claimants summary dismissal to termination. And I so order.

90. Now with regard to the other Exhibits; Exhibit D3 and Exhibit D4,the Defendants had argued that branches under the claimant’s supervision constantly flouted the Defendant’s underwriting and administrative policies, as well as regulatory guidelines, thereby exposing the Defendant to potential regulatory penalties which had an adverse effect on the Defendant’s income. It is the position in labour law that an employee has the right to forgive, pardon, condone or punish the employee for a lesser offence but having done so the employer is not allowed to subsequently punish the said employer for forgiven or condoned act. In GEORGE v. FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA PLC (2014) 41 NLLR (PT. 126) 264 NIC @ 271that “If after the knowledge of fraud committed by an employee, the employer elects to retain him in his services, the employer cannot at any subsequent time dismiss him on account of that which he has waived or condoned.In that instant case, the claimant was accused of illegal withdrawal through an ATM from a deceased person’s account, which ultimately caused the claimant the loss of #726, 900.00. This occurred before the claimant was disengaged from the services of the defendant and the claimant brought before a disciplinary committee. Instead of pursuing disciplinary hearing to its logical end, the defendant elected to merely disengage the claimant from its services. In electing to disengage the claimant instead of disciplining her for whatever infraction she was suspected to have committed, the defendant must be read to have waived its right or condoned the action of the claimant. An employer is free to impose a lesser punishment for a more grievous infraction on the part of the employee. EKUNDA v. UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN (2000) 12 NLWR (PT. 681) 220; ACB v. NBISIKE (1995) 8 NWLR (PT. 416) 275

91. From Exhibit C 6and Exhibit D 29 the Claimant was commended for his services and upgraded and in such wise,I hold that all the evidence with regards to queries and complaints prior to 17^th August 2010Exhibit D 29. before the said date on Exhibit D29followingGEORGE V FBN Supra, Exhibits D2 and D3 are deemed to have been condoned. And are of no moment with regard to the propriety of the claimant’s summary dismissal. I am not unmindful of the probative value of these said queries in rebut of the claimant’s averment to have served the defendant diligently.

92. with regards to reliefs b) -g) I had found that the Claimant is seeking separate legal pronouncements as to his entitlement to six separate named allowances and the sums claimed per se, and as such the reliefs must be reviewed separately.

93. With regards to relief b, the claimants three months salary in lieu of notice, having converted the Claimants gross misconduct to termination. The claimant by pleading, frontloading and tendering of Exhibit C3 wherein paragraph 6 page 2 provides; ‘Either party giving One (1) months’ notice of salary in lieu during probation or three (3) months ‘notice salary in lieu thereafter can terminate the appointment’. with Exhibits C3 and C4 (Letter of Confirmationthe claimant has proved entitlement to three months’ salary in lieu of notice and with Exhibit C17 (December 2012 pay-slip) the claimant has proved the salary contained therein being N403480.87. Relief b hereby succeeds.

94. Reliefs c and d are for housing and furniture allowances. Exhibit C6 clearly provides for these allowances and the claimant in paragraphs 33 and 34 of Exhibit C2avers that these allowances are usually paid early in the year. This Court has consistently held that in respect of accrued allowances, being allowances where an employer advances a facility in any manner or form aimed at the enhancement of the status and or productivity of the employee such that the facility is tied to the employee’s employment. In situations where the Claimant has received such allowance for the year paid in advance or is entitled to such a payment before he is terminated, this court holds that where already paid such allowance is not refundable and where the employee is terminated after the date the allowances accruesbut was not paid such an employee is entitled to the said allowance. This is known as the doctrine on non-recovery of enhancement allowances or facilities.I find that the Claimant has proceed entitlement to these allowances to the effect thatReliefs c and d are hereby granted.

95. Relief e is for 2013 leave allowance which the Claimant maintains is payable each February, in the matter of leave the claimant also averred that he was not allowed to go on leave throughout the duration he worked for the defendant, he was always paid his leave allowance. Exhibit C5, providesfor thegrant of the Claimants to Annual leave and goes along to stipulate such an allowance at N350,799.00 and the mode of payment as ‘At Annual Vacation’. Having stated that the Claimant is required to prove entitlement to the right for a declaratory relief. I am satisfied that the Claimant is entitled to the relief sought. The Claimant had averred that the Defendant hadnot allowed him to go on leave throughout the duration he worked for the defendant, he was always paid his leave allowance. the defendants had in paragraph 43 d)denied that leave allowances were paid in February but were paid before the commencement of Annual leave. Continuing to state that the claimant was not entitled to any leave allowance.The law of Traverse is that a traverse that is a mere denial does not amount to a denial for the purpose of raising an issue for trial.SUIT NO. NICN/LA/651/2013 MR. JEZREEL ELO MAYOR VS. ECO EXIM ALLIED LIMITED & ANORdated October 29, 2014. See LEWIS & PEAT (NRI) LTD V. AKHIMIEN [1976] 1 ALL NLR (PT. 1) 460, UBA LTD V. EDET [1993] 4 NWLR (PT. 287) 188, OHIARI V. AKABEZE [1992] 2 NWLR (PT. 221) 1 AND LSDPC V. BANIRE [1992] 5 NWLR (PT. 243) 620. Furthermore, a general traverse to the effect that the defendant denies certain paragraphs of the statement of claim without making specific response to those paragraphs does not constitute sufficient denial and have been held to amount to admission. See DIKWA V. MODU [1993] 3 NWLR (PT. 280) 170 AND SANUSI V. MAKINDE [1994] 5 NWLR (PT. 343) 214. Further still, an averment in a statement of defence that the defendant puts the plaintiff to proof or does not admit the correctness of a particular allegation in the statement of claim without more has been held to be insufficient denial. See EKWEALOR V. OBASI [1990] 2 NWLR (PT. 131) 231 AND IDAAYOR V TIGIDAM [1995] 7 NWLR (PT. 377) 359. Given these authorities, I find and hold that there is no specific denial on the part of the 1^st defendant that the claimant’s leave allowance is not the sum he is claiming. I also find and hold that the claimant has proved his claim for relief e accordingly

96. The claimant had averred that he had not been allowed to embark on his annual leave although he was duly paid his leave allowance, the defendants were non-committal with regard to the actual going on leave; -. This court had in the case of Suit No. NIC/377/2008 AKINFEMIWA AKINYINKA & ANOR V. MORE TIME C02 GAS PLANT LIMITED & ANORdelivered on 14^th April 2011, held that the denial of annual leave entitlement to the claimants was a deprivation of the right to annual leave under section 18 of the Labour Act. This is, therefore, an unfair labour practice which this court cannot close its eyes to.: See SUIT NO. NIC/LA/10/2011 ADEMULEGUN ADEREMI & 15 ORS VS. WEMA BANK PLC delivered on July 16, 2014.That the defendant’s refusal to grant the claimant annual leave, is unacceptable and amounts to unfair labour practiceand that the Court must intervene to protect this right. See OBEYA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL V. AG, FEDERATION [1987] 3 NWLR (PT. 60) 325. I find that the which the claimant is entitled to recompense under Section 14 NICA 2006 for this deprivation /unfair labour practice.

97. Having said that Section 14 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 enjoins the court to consider all the rights and entitlements to which parties before the court are legally entitled and Section 14 provides; thus,-

“the court shall in the exercise of the jurisdiction vested in it by or under this Act, in every cause or matter have power to grant either absolutely or on such terms and conditions as the court thinks just, remedies whatsoever as any of the parties thereto may appear to be entitled to in respect of any legal or equitable claim properly brought forward by the court so that, as far as possible, all matters in dispute between the parties may be completely and finally determined and a multiplicity of legal proceedings concerning any of those matter be avoided”.

98. The claimant is therefore entitled to two year’s salary as compensation for the denial of the enjoyment of his annual leave throughout his employment with the Defendant. I find and hold.

99. In relief f. the Claimant is seeking a refund of his contribution to the staff cooperative, the Defendants have stated that the Claimant had not applied for his contribution from the cooperative. This Court has always held that Cooperative Societies are part of the Employers Institution and the acts of the union impart on the Employer in this case the Defendant. It is not in doubt that the claimant made thesecontributions and so I find that having been terminated from the Defendants employ the Claimant is entitled to this relief accordingly. This relief is hereby granted.

100. In relief g), the claimant is seeking what he dubs his productivity allowance by Exhibit C6 the claimant’s salary is supposed to comprise of 75% guaranteed and 25% performance but the Defendant never considered and therefore did not pay the Claimant for his production which ought to form the 25% performance for his 2012 and first quarter of 2013 The Claimant went on to list the areas to which he claims entitlement. The Claimant listed eleven (11) separate business transactions for which he is seeking the production bonusesbearing in mind that the Claimants is seeking a declaratory relief and the law requires that the Court be shown evidence of the right and the Claimant, entitlement tothis right. The claimant hadpleaded in paragraph 8 and 9 that he was very productive bringing business to the defendants and went on to list 11 establishments to whom the Defendants were appointed lead or co insurer and raise a notice to the Defendants to produce the original letter appoint the Defendants as Insurers.

101. It is pertinent to observe at this time that the import of a that ‘notice to produce’ only entitles the party serving the notice to tender a secondary copy in his possession if the original is not produced: See CHUKWURA V. NDUKA & ANOR. [2008] LPELR – 3985 [CA] P. 29 – 30, PARAS. B – A:

a. …The position of law is very well amplified in BUHARI V. OBASANJO [2005] 13 NWLR [PT. 941] 1at 198 where the Supreme Court said as follows –

b. “A party on whom Notice to produce is served is not under any obligation to produce the document. The service of the Notice to produce only entitles the party serving the Notice to adduce secondary evidence of the document in question by virtue of section 98 of the Evidence Act…

102. See also IN KOSSEN [NIG.] LTD V. SAVANAH BANK [NIG.] LTD. [1995] LPELR – 1706 [SC] PP. 20.

103. The claimant tendered Exhibit C7 being a bundle of letters that appointed the Defendants as lead insurer to the National Assembly Central Bank, Federal Road Safety Corp, Nigerian Television Authority as well as other letters appointing the defendant as part of the Insurance Consortium to Nigerian Meteorological Agency, National Health Insurance Scheme, and Federal MortgageBank. These exhibits only state the appointment of the defendant as a lead or co insurer. The Claimant also tendered Exhibit C8titled Approved processes for the preparation and payment of Commission and Business Acquisition Cost, which mainly for Underwriters to prepare payment in line with the existing format. it is this existing format that this Court requires to view in order to determine this head of claim and it is not before the /court. none of the claimants exhibits elude to the payment of commission for business the claimant or any other employee brings in, nor is their any evidence of the amount due to the Claimant and how it is to be determined. even Exhibits C that states that 25% of the Claimants salary shall be made up from his productivity but there is nothing before the court to state how this productivity is to be determined and extrapolated over the months in a quarter /year.

104. The defendants on their part describe the Claimant as non-productive and continue that the Claims being that all be cannot be attributed to the 1^st quarter of either 2012 or 2013, and that the Claimant cannot claim to have brought to the Defendant all business that came in simply because he is the Managing Director, the defendants went on to argue that they maintain a team of Marketers and that they concept of Productivity bonus is unknown to the defendants , that the defendants do not pay the their employee any such productivity bonus

105. Be that as it may my find is that this head of claim has not be substantiated to the satisfaction of this court and as such this head of claims fails as does the corresponding executory part of Reliefg in Exhibit land cannot be granted.

106. As I had observed above, Relief h -k relate to the claimants claims and alternative claims to a Toyota corolla vehicle with the registration number RC 175 AAA. These reliefs also relate to the Defendant’s Counterclaim. The case of the claimant is that as the Head of a Regional Branch, he was entitled to a brand new official car but because the defendant could not afford a brand new car he was offered a rickety Toyota Corolla Saloon car with Registration number RC 175 AAA and the former Managing Director, Mr. Yinka Bolarinwa personally changed the vehicles particulars to the Claimants name. The Claimant relies on Exhibit C13 a bundle of documents containing inter alia the proof of ownership of the vehicle and other particulars of the Vehicle; - Motor Licences for the years 2011 and 2012.

107. The Claimant continues to avert further that the said Toyota car was rickety (Exhibit C14), the gear was malfunctioning, this the Claimant informed the defendant. And that he wrote several correspondences to the defendant for the repairs/total overhauling of the said car as the vehicle no longer befit the status of the Claimant as the Head of the Regional Branch of the defendant company.

108. The Claimant maintains that he was left with the repair of the said vehicle despite repeated request for to the defendants. The Claimant was then compelled to commit his money into repairing the vehicle. He obtained quotations from a mechanic trading under the name and style of Philoy Motors Ent, fora bill of170, 500, 000.00 (One Hundred and Seventy Thousand and Five Hundred Naira only) for the body work and the Claimant bought spare parts for the said vehicleto the tune of (N189,400:00k) One Hundred and Eighty Nine Thousand Four Hundred Naira only). The Claimant also relies on Exhibits C15 and C16and Exhibit D21;- for these receipts.

109. The case of the Defendant is that the Toyota Corolla car with registration No. RC 175 AAA was purchased by the Defendant from Elizade Nigeria Limited for the sum of =N=3,400,000.0O [Three Million, Four Hundred Thousand Naira] See Exhibit D14, D15 and D17, andthat at all material times, (See Exhibits ;; ExhibitD18 – Exhibit D20) the Defendant is the owner of the Toyota Corolla car with registration No. RC 175 AAA The defendants continue that the Claimant has since refused to return and/or surrender the Toyota Corolla car despite their repeated demands; - Exhibit D23. To the Defendant’s, the Claimant had fraudulently and secretly without the knowledge and consent of the Defendant unilaterally transferred the ownership of the said vehicle to himself in order represent himself as the owner of the said vehicle.

110. The Defendant maintains that the stated Toyota Corolla car was assigned to the Claimant by the Defendant solely for official purposes and was in a perfect and excellent working condition with all the fixtures and fittings intactand that the said car is still in the Claimant’s exclusive possession. Arguing further that continued daily use of vehicle by the Claimant after his summary dismissal and his refusal to surrender same to the Defendant has had a material adverse effect on the Defendant’s business operations and logistics in Abuja. The Defendant contends that upon his summary dismissal the Claimant was obligated immediately return forthwith all the Defendant’s properties in his custody, which he has not done. The defendants also filed a counter claim in respect ofthis vehicle. I shall address with the counter-claimof the Defendants in due course.

111. Looking at all the exhibits just mentioned above what is clear to this court is that he Toyota Corolla under consideration here, was purchased by the Defendants. The Claimant in support of his position that is was ceded to him for his private and personal use including official duties are the Proof of Ownership, Change of Ownership that is Exhibit C13, the latter unfortunately is undated and merely lists the new owner as the Claimant with the defendants office as the his address. The Proof of ownership itself is dated 23^rd April 2004.The Claimant maintains that the then Managing Director Personally changed the vehicle to the Claimants name and issued an internal memo wherein the then Managing Director assured him that he would receive his brand new car as a replacement of the fairly used Toyota he was presently using (now your belonging) with a brand new Toyota Avensis. Exhibit C24. My take on this exhibit especially with the use of the word ‘replace’ does not indicate an intention to convey ownership at best the memo is ameans to encourage the Claimant. This document I hold does not represent a conveyance of title or ownership of the vehicle under consideration. Now, apart from the claimant’s averments and Exhibit C13 the Claimant did not adduce any evidence to support the act of the Managing Director, the Claimant has not presented this Court with any receipt of purchase, such as a receipt of boarded vehicle, showing the consideration he paid for the said vehicle even if that consideration were non-monetary (due to the company’s inability to purchase a brand new car.). or better still if the Claimant had supplied this court with any document under which the Managing Director was empowered to dispose of the company property in such a matter, or authorization of the board. As it stands the claimant has not satisfied this court of the legal proprieties of the transfer of ownership to himself. It is also necessary to state that he actual change of ownership document tendered by the Claimant was not dated and as such I am unable to attach any weight to that document, “Being undated it is difficult for the court to ascertain when it was actually made” See EMA BANK PLC. & ANOR v. ALARAN FROZEN FOODS AGENCY NIG. LTD. & ANOR (2015) LPELR-25980(CA).The Court is unable to uphold the alleged transfer of the ownership of the vehicle to the Claimant. I find that the Claimant has not proved ownership afortorai remaining the owner of the said vehicle. Relief h) and the corresponding part of Relief L fail and cannot be granted and thereby fails.

112. As mentioned above the Claimant frontloaded and tendered a Certificate of Proof of Ownership and a Change of Ownership wherein the purpose of the said vehicle was put as “Private”. the Claimant continued that after the change of ownership the Claimant continued to use this vehicle in the serviceof the defendant and presented Exhibits C15 and 16 for refund by this Court as an alternative relief j to Relief k wherein the claimant seeks a pronouncement that the vehicle is rightly his because he had expended money (Exhibit 15 and 16) on the said vehicle.

113. In the case of CHIKA AMINU v. GODWIN NWANKWO(2017) LPELR-42502(CA)the Court of Appeal held that; - The position of the law is that alternative claims can only be made where a Plaintiff sets up two or more inconsistent sets of material facts and claims reliefs on each of them in the alternative. Usually, the law regarding claims made in the alternative is that where the Principal claim of a party succeeds and is granted by the Court, there will be no need to consider any alternative claim thereto as only one of two or more alternative reliefs will be granted. See M.V. CAROLINE MAERSK vs. NOKOY INVESTMENT LTD (2002) 6 SCNJ 203 at 224 . But where the Plaintiff as in the instant case and on a set of the same facts and not two or more asks for a relief and probably a second relief made in the alternative, then an alternative claim cannot in the strict sense of the word be said to have been made especially when alternative cases have not been alleged as in the instant case. This is even more so when the facts relating to these claims have not been separately stated in order to show on what specific facts each alternative head of relief is claimed. See the cases ofMETAL CONSTRUCTION (W.A) LTD vs. ABODERIN (1998) LPELR-1868 (SC); UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR vs. UKOHA OBAJI OJI (2011) LPELR-5069." Per OHO, J.C.A. (Pp. 31-32, Paras. F-F)

114. Notwithstanding that in the instant case the claimant has set up an entitlement to the Toyota Corolla based on the change of ownership, then asked for an order that because of repairs he undertook himself the court should declare him the owner of the said vehicle or the court to award him the refund of the cost of repairs, I shall treat the latter two as separate claims in alternative of the main claim for purposes of substantial justice.

115. Firstly,in respect of relief i), the Claimant has not shown the Court the under which law or agreement his spending N390, 000.00. on the vehicle could be translated to or be tantamount to an entitlement to the vehicle. There is no evidence from the claimant as to the value of the vehicle, neither has the Claimant adduced any independent evidence as to the value of the vehicle to enable the Court make a determination as to whether the mere payment of the said sum after inform the defendant as to the state of the vehicle could ground an entitlement to the said vehicle. I think not. this claim also fails.

116. Now with respect to the claimant’s alternative claims for monies expended by the claimant on the said vehicle particularly Exhibits C15 and 16, barring evidence that the claimant was authorized to make these expenditure or that the said expenses were duly approved by the Defendants this Court is unable to accord any credence to these claims. Reliefs j also fails.

117. Relief K is in respect to N3, 932, 498.53k the claimant is seeking as his terminal benefits on his retirement; - on approval of his retirement. Nowhere in the pleading has the claimant raised any plea the basis on which this court can consider this relief, no pleading and no evidence, and as such this relief is taken as abandoned.

118. The Claimant in Relief l) is seeking executory ordersin respect to the declarative claims stated above, this by law must be evaluated considering all the evidence before the court, with regards to relief h) I have already considered the Claimants case above, the defendants in their defence maintained that the Toyota Corolla Vehicle was purchased by them. The Defendants have denied the change of ownership and present their own evidence of purchase stated below, the Defendants also stated that they had at all times been responsible for the licensing and insurance of the said vehicle and presented apart from the already referred to purchase documents from Elizade Exhibits D14 and 15, the defendant also relied on their Proof of ownership dated 3^rd March 2009 Exhibit D16 , the Allocation of Registration no. Exhibit D16, the 2009 Cover note of 4^th March 2009 Exhibit D21 and Three (3) separate Certificates of Insurance form Staco Insurance Plc for the years 2011, 2012 and 2013 being Exhibits D18, D19 and D20 consequently. I had already evaluated the Claimants Exhibit C13.

119. Looking at both sets of documents especially at face value, like I had noted, it appears that both parties performed acts of ownership over this vehicle but the question is; which one of the two is legally authorized to act as owner, or to whom does the said vehicle rightly belong. The defendants purchased the vehicle in March 2009 and the Claimant maintains that the then Managing Director Personally changed the vehicle to the Claimants name. Now apart from the claimant’s averment and Exhibit C13 the Claimant did not adduce any evidence to support the act of the Managing Director, the Claimant has not presented this Court with any receipt of purchase such as a receipt of boarded vehicle, showing the consideration he paid for the said vehicle even if that consideration were non-monetary (due to the company’s inability to purchase a brand new car.). or better still if the Claimant had supplied this court with any document under which the Managing Director was empowered to dispose of the company property in such a matter, or authorization of the board. As it stands the claimant has not satisfied this court of the legal proprieties of the transfer of ownership to himself. It is also necessary to state that he actual change of ownership document tendered by the Claimant was not dated and as such I am unable to attach any weight tothat document, “Being undated it is difficult for the court to ascertain when it was actually made” See EMA BANK PLC. & ANOR v. ALARAN FROZEN FOODS AGENCY NIG. LTD. & ANOR (2015) LPELR-25980(CA).The Court is unable to uphold the alleged transfer of the ownership of the vehicle to the Claimant. I find that the Claimant has not proved ownership afortoi remaining the owner of the said vehicle. Relief h) and l) cannot be granted and thereby fail.

120. Now to consider the claimant executory order in relief l) in relation to reliefs i) and j) particularly against the above as backdrop, I find that the only plausible rationale for the Defendants Exhibit D22; - a memo from the Regional Manager, is that the Claimant had written to the Regional Manager for approval to purchase tyres and pay the annual mobile permit. The endorsement contained therein further buttress this finding; This means that the Claimant was still beholden to the Defendant for authorization and approval before spending money and that the defendants were responsible for the maintenance of the said vehicle albeit with due and upon approval. This I find, is the usual procedure between employee and employer unless where specifically stated otherwise and in this instant the norm rules the day. This relief (Relief l) as it pertains to i) and j), also fails.

121. Relief m and n relate to interest and cost. I shall return to these reliefs lateron in this judgement.

122. Having somewhat, concluded with theclaimants case I shall now address the Defendants Counterclaim.

123. WHEREOF the Defendant claims against the Claimant as follows:

(A). A DECLARATION that the Claimant’s summary dismissal by the Defendant was in order.

(B). A DECLARATION that the Defendant is the owner of the Toyota Corolla car with registration No. RC 175 AAA.

[C]. A DECLARATION that the Claimant’s refusal to surrender the Toyota Corolla car with registration No. RC 175 AAA to the Defendant after his summarily dismissal is wrongful and actionable per se.

[D]. AN ORDER of perpetual injunction restraining the Claimant either by himself, his agents, privies, assigns, personal representatives or any person however called acting for him or through him and/or holding in trust for him from either using, selling, disposing off and or exercising any act of possession and/or ownership over the Toyota Corolla car with registration No. RC 175 AAA pending the final determination of this suit.

[E). AN ORDER directing the Claimant to return forthwith to the Defendant the Toyota Corolla car with registration No. RC 175 AAA in the same excellent and perfect working condition in which it was as at 27th March, 2013 when the Claimant was summarily dismissed with all fixtures and fittings intact.

[F]. AN ORDER directing the Claimant to pay the Defendant the sum of =N=4,500.000.00 [Four Million Five Hundred Thousand Naira] being the cost of the Toyota Corolla car with Registration No. RC 175 AAA.

[G]. AN ORDER directing the Claimant to pay the Defendant the sum of =N=5,000,000.00 [Five Million Naira] as damages for the wrongful seizure, conversion and unauthorised use of the Defendant’s Toyota Corolla car with registration No. RC 175 AAA by the Claimant after his summary dismissal on 27th March, 2013.

[H]. AN ORDER directing the Claimant to pay the Defendant interest on the combined judgement sum at the rate of 21% per annum from the date of judgement until the entire judgment sum is fully liquidated.

[I]. AN ORDER directing the Claimant to pay the Defendant the Cost incurred by the Defendant in this action information contained in all the emails are derived from information supplied.

124. The Defendants in their Counterclaim A) are seeking a declaration that theClaimant’s summary dismissal by the Defendant was in order. The positionof the law as regards summary dismissal is as was stated EZE v. SPRING BANK PLC. (2011) LPELR-2892(SC)"To warrant a summary dismissal, it suffices that the conduct of the employee, as in the present case, is of such grave and weighty character as to undermine the relationship of confidence which should exist between the employer and employee as found by the trial court and affirmed by the court below. See TELIAT SULE V. NIGERIAN COTTON OARD (1985) 2 N.W.L.R. (PT. 5) 17."Per Mohammed, J.S.C. (Pp.20-21, Paras.G-B).In the instant case the Defendants have not shown this court how the Claimant’s actions committed under a previous management could be considered as undermining the defendant’s in this suit especially as the Court was not shown how the defendants sanctioned the previous regime in anyway what so ever. The defendants made allusions to the act of the claimant in that he received monetary gain and secret profit from the Commission paid by the Defendant to the Facilitator in respect of the NIGCOMSAT insurance transaction which to the defendants argue was a breach of the Claimant’s fiduciary duty. The Defendant tendered their ExhibitsD23 the Defendants Handbook, despite the evidence of CW1 and CW2 to the effect that the Exhibit was unknown to them and not part of their contract, referring to their employment letters the defendants did not tie any part of this document to their claim. The law is that there has to be the necessary nexus between documentary evidence tendered and the particular purpose or aspect of the case of the party tendering same. See ACN V. NYAKO [2013] ALL FWLR (PT. 686) 424 SC, BUHARI V. INEC [2008] 12 SC 1and HON. SEGUN ADELE & ANOR V. HON. SOLOMON OLAMILEKAN ADEOLA & ORS [2015] LPELR-25972(CA). This requirement of nexus is extended under the law to mean that a party who produces an exhibit so that the Court could utilize it in the process of adjudication must not dump it on the Court but must tie it to the relevant aspects of his case. See VIENAGBOR V. BAZUAYE [1999] 9 NWLR (PT. 620) 552; [1999] 6 SCNJ 235 AT 243, OWE V. OSHINBANJO [1965] 1 ALL NLR 72 AT 15, BORNU HOLDING CO. LTD V. ALHAJI HASSAN BOGOCO [1971] 1 ALL NLR 324 AT 333, ALHAJI ONIBUDO & ORS V. ALHAJI AKIBU & ORS [1982] 7 SC 60 AT 62, NWAGA V. REGISTERED TRUSTEES RECREATION CLUB [2004] FWLR (PT. 190) 1360 AT 1380 – 1381, JALINGO V. NYANE [1992] 3 NWLR (PT. 231) 538, UGOCHUKWU V. CO-OPERATIVE BANK [1996] 7 SCNJ 22, OBASI BROTHERS LTD V. MBA SECURITIES LTD [2005] 2 SC (PT. 1) 51 AT 68, EZE V. OKOLAGU [2010] 3 NWLR (PT. 1180) 183 AT 211, ANPP V. INEC [2010] 13 BELGORE V. AHMED [2013] 8 NWLR (PT. 1355) 60 AT 99 – 100, OMISORE V. AREGBESOLA [2015] 15 NWLR (PT. 1482) 202 AT 323 AND 324, MR. MOHAMMED DUNGUS & ORS V. ENL CONSORTIUM LTD [2015] 60 NLLR (PT. 208) 39and ADEMOLA BOLARINDE V. APM TERMINALS APAPA LIMITED UNREPORTED SUIT NO. NICN/LA/268/2012the judgment of which was delivered on 25th February 2016.

125. As it is, with the defendants inability to refute the claimants position that the Management authorized the manner of distribution of the 30% fee, and the testimony of the witnesses of the parties to the fact of an arrival of a new management, I find that the issue of payment of 30% and all the incidental events resonate as, sharp practices of a previous Management which cannot be solely attributed to the Claimant and hence cannot found summary dismissal, the Summary dismissal is not in order and is hereby converted to Termination. I hereby hold. Counterclaim A accordingly fails

126. In relief B, the defendants are seeking a declaration as to their title to the B-J b grantedToyota Corolla car with registration No. RC 175 AAA. looking at the Defendants documents evaluated above I am satisfied that looking at Exhibits D14-Exhibit D22, juxtaposed to the documents of the Claimant’s Exhibits C13-Exhibit C16, that the Defendants purchased the said vehicle on the 2nd March 3009 and maintained its ownership till date exercising and performing all acts of ownership at all material times. Relief B succeeds.

127. In relief C) the Defendant are seeking a legal pronouncement as to the non -surrender of the said vehicle following the summary dismissal. Considering this court’s holding that the Summary dismissal was not inorder any relief hinged on the said summary dismissal cannot be granted. Furthermore, the defendants have argued in support their contention that they had the Defendant made several demands that the claimant to return the said vehicle. and referred the court to Exhibit D23,a letter purportedly addressed to the Claimant on the 12^th of April 2013 formally demanding that the said vehicle be returned to them. However, a close perusal of this exhibit reveals that it is bereft of any indication of being sent by someone or received by anyone else. The law has been well established that in order to prove that a letter was actually delivered to the addressee there must be proof of receipt and this can be established by (a) dispatch book indicating the receipt, or (b) evidence of dispatch by registered post or evidence of witnesses, credible enough that the person was served with the document. NLEWEDIM Vs. UDUMA [1995] 6 NWLR 309 at p394 para B. followed in AGBAJE Vs. FASHOLA [2008] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1082)1.

In the unreported case of SUIT NO: NICN/CA/17/2014MR. OBONA AKPAN OFEM Vs. LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE COMMISSION & 3ORS delivered on the 31^st May 2017, this court held in respect of documents lacking evidence of delivery or dispatch that “the said exhibit..... I find were not served on the claimant and as such are only evidence of documents prepared by the defendant and have no nexus with the claimant despite, they bear the claimant’s name. Due to the absence of demand and the reasons above given Reliefs C) and G) cannot be granted.

128. Relief D). is for a perpetual injunction restraining Claimant heirse.t.c. from interfering with the said vehiclepending the final determination of this suit. Now seeking that this suit is now being determined this relief is therefore overtaking and fails,

129. In relief E) the Defendant is seeking an order releasing the vehicle to the defendant, with the granting of relief B) the first part of this relief flows therefrom. The Defendant had not adduced any evidence as to the condition of the state of the vehicle and as such this court cannot make any pronouncement on the state and condition of the said vehicle, I find and hold, that by order of this court the Claimant is hereby ordered to return forthwith to the Defendant the Toyota Corolla car with registration No. RC 175 AAA

130. Having granted Relief E). there is no basis for the order directing the Claimant to pay the Defendant the cost of the Toyota Corolla car this relief F). is therefore rejected and denied.

131. Reliefs G) and H) fail for not being substantiated.

132. Relief H). fails as this Defendants successful reliefs do not pertain to monetaryclaims upon which interest can be attached.

133. Relief I) is for an order for costs.

134. The Defendant’s case succeeds but only as far as reliefs B, and E in part. Only

135. Reliefs a), b), c), d), e) and f). Relief l) in respect to reliefs b)- f), and relief a m and n

136. For ease of reference the claimant case succeeds but only thus far:- this is the court’s judgment

1. IT IS HEREBY DECLARED that the summary dismissal of the Claimant on on the 27th March, 2013 is wrongful.

2. BY ORDER OF THIS COURT the Summary Dismissal served on the Claimant on 27^th March 2013 is hereby converted to Termination.

3. IT IS HEREBY DECLARED that the Claimant is entitled the sum of N1,210, 442.61k (One Million Two Hundred and Ten Thousand, Four Hundred and Forty- Two Naira Sixty One Kobo being his three months’ salary in lieu of notice which the Claimant is entitled to.

4. IT IS HEREBY that the Claimant is entitled to the sum of N1,050,000.00 (One Million and Fifty Thousand Naira) only being the housing allowance for the year 2013 paid to the workers in the cadre of the Claimant and which the Defendant usually pay in the month of January every year to workers in the cadre of the Claimant.

5. IT IS HEREBY DECLARED that the Claimant is entitled to the sum of N150,000.00k (One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira) only for the 1st quarter of 2013 being the furniture allowance paid to the workers in the cadre of the Claimant every quarter.

6. IT IS HEREBY DECLARED that the Claimant is entitled to the sum of N263,099.82 (Two Hundred and Sixty Three Thousand and Ninety Nine Naira Eighty- Two Kobo) only for the year 2013 being the leave allowance paid by the defendant to the workers in the cadre of the Claimant and usually paid in February of every year.

7. IT IS HEREBY DECLARED that by not allowing the claimant to proceed on annual leave, the Defendants are guilty of an unfair labour practice for which the Defendant shall pay the Claimant the sum of N9, 683, 540.88 (Nine Million Six hundred and Eighty-three thousand, Five Hundred and Forty Naira Eighty-eight Kobo) by (403 480 . 87 & 24)

8. IT IS HEREBY DECLARED that the Claimant is entitled to the sum of N420,000.00k (Four Hundred and Twenty Thousand Naira) only being the amount of money which was deducted from the salary of the Claimant from November, 2009 till March, 2013 as contribution to the Law Union & Rock Insurance Staff Cooperatives, thrift savings account of the Claimant excluding accruing interest.

9. BY ORDER OF THIS COURT of this court the Defendant shall pay to pay the Claimant the sum stated in PRAYERS (b) to (k),

10. Cost of this suit is put at N100,000.00k (One Hundred Thousand Naira) only

137. All sums payable within 30 days, thereafter 20% interest shall attach.

138. And with regards to the Defendants Counterclaim; -

I. It is hereby declared that the Defendant is the owner of the Toyota Corolla car with registration No. RC 175 AAA.

II. BY ORDER OF THIS COURT the Claimant is hereby ordered to return to the Defendant the Toyota Corolla car with registration No. RC 175 AAA.

139. This is the Court’s Judgement and it is hereby entered accordingly.

………………………………………

HON. JUSTICE E. N. AGBAKOBA

Presiding Judge, Abuja Division