IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
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Suit No: NIC/LA/46/2010
Petitioner: Mr. Emmanuel Femi Gbenga Ajayi
And
Respondent: Ofem Onun, for the claimant. P. Okonji, for the defendant
Date Delivered: 2012-01-25
Judge(s): Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip - Presiding Judge Hon. Justice O. A
Judgment Delivered
RULING
The claimant on 24th December 2010 filed a complaint against the defendant claiming the following reliefs:
i. A declaration that the activities of the defendant against the claimant leading to the purported suspension and or
dismissal of the 11th day of April 2005 amounts to discrimination against his person as a Nigerian citizen contrary to the
clear provisions of the Nigerian Constitution on account of his union and or association activities and that the suspension
and or dismissal is wrongful, null, void and of no effect whatsoever.
ii. A declaration that the activities of the defendant against the claimant leading to the purported suspension and or
dismissal of the 11th day of April 2005 amounts to discrimination against his person as a Nigerian citizen contrary to the
clear provisions of the Nigerian Constitution on the basis of unfounded allegation of receiving bribe which was not
subjected to trial in a competent court, thus denying the claimant fair hearing and that the said suspension and or
dismissal is wrongful, null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
iii. An order setting aside the said purported suspension and or dismissal of the claimant because the allegation of crime
leveled against the claimant by the defendant was not tried and proved in a court of competent jurisdiction; as such, the
claimant is presumed innocent.
iv. A declaration that the employment of expatriates by the defendant without technical expertise or competence into
positions which should be filled by Nigerians is discriminatory, unlawful and illegal.
v. An order of mandatory injunction restraining the defendant from further employment of expatriates without technical
expertise or competence into positions which should be filled by Nigerians.
vi. A declaration that the employment of Nigerians as 'Casual Workers' by the defendant is discriminatory,
dehumanizing, unlawful and illegal.
vii. An order of mandatory injunction restraining the defendant from further employment of Nigerians as 'Casual
Workers'.
viii. A declaration that the employment of Nigerians without the defendant issuing a letter of employment to the said
Nigerians, an intentional and willful act by the defendant which makes the concerned employees jittery and unsure of
their standing on one hand, and on the other hand, makes it very easy for the defendant to dispense with the services of
the employees with impunity and ignominy, is unlawful and illegal.
ix. An order of mandatory injunction restraining the defendant from further employment of Nigerians without issuing
letters of employment to them.
x. The declaration that discriminatory policy adopted by the defendant in its remuneration package between Nigerians
and expatriates is demoralizing, dehumanizing, unlawful and illegal.
xi. An order of mandatory injunction restraining the defendant from further implementation of discriminatory policy in its
remuneration package between Nigerians and expatriates.
xii. An order directing the defendant to pay the sum of N60,000,000 being salaries receivable by the claimant between
1st April 2005 to date, upward increases in salaries within the same period, medical allowance for claimant and family,
transportation benefit/allowance (official car + driver + fuel + repairs and services). Subscription and annual due
payment/levies for membership of Club 1938, expenses on telephone (land line and mobile), housing allowance, utility
allowance, entertainment allowance, lunch allowance, end of the year bonus (13th month pay) and end of the year gifts
by virtue of claimant's position as Head, Commercial (Import & Export).
xiii. An order directing the defendant to pay the sum of N7,600,000 as severance package, AIICO staff retirement benefit
scheme, contributions to NSITF, contributions to pension fund and outstanding leave.
xiv. An order directing the defendant to pay the sum of N70,000,000 (Seventy Million Naira Only) as special damages for
illegal breach of contract and unlawful deprivation of work life which truncated the legitimate career of the claimant.
xv. An order directing the defendant to pay the sum of N10,000,000 for the unlawful seizure and missing certificates in
the claimant's brief case seized on the 8th day of April, 2005.
xvi. An order directing the defendant to pay the sum of N100,000,000.00 (One Hundred Million Naira Only) for the
character assassination of the claimant and that of his family as well as the resulting trauma.
xvii. An order directing the defendant to pay the sum of N160,000,000 for the illegal seizure and continuing detention of
the claimant's goods, valuables and personal effects which includes but not limited to drafts of seven (7) books meant
for publication, from where the claimant would have made good money from immediate sales and thereafter receive
royalties as well as fame and the deprivation of the attainment of self actualization, letter of employment which contains
the terms of the contract of employment between claimant and defendant, letters of promotion, salary increment and
upward review of other perquisites, wrist watches, gold bracelets, gold cuff-links, etc.
xviii. An order directing the defendant to pay the sum of N2,500,000 being cost of feeding, transportation, telephone
calls and other incidental expenses while reporting at State Criminal Investigation Bureau, Panti for over six months.
Grand Total - N410,100,000
xix. An order directing that the accrued interest component of all the entitlements be computed up to and including the
date of the final determination of this suit by the Honourable court.
xx. The defendant/respondent may pay the above sum of N410,100,000 to the claimant's Legal Practitioner within the
time allowed for appearance and upon such payment, the proceeding shall terminate.
In reaction, the defendant entered a conditional appearance on the 19th January 2011 and subsequently filed a
preliminary objection on the 28th February 2011. The preliminary objection is brought pursuant to section 7 of the NIC
Act 2006, Order 15 of the NIC Rules 2007, section 46 of the 1999 Constitution and the inherent jurisdiction of the court
praying for the following:
1. An order striking out this suit in its entirety for want of jurisdiction; or in the alternative;
2. An order striking out reliefs iv, v, vi, vii, viii, ix, x, xi, xv, xvi and xviii as they disclose no reasonable or justiciable cause
of action cognizable within jurisdiction of this court.
3. An order that the entire suit as constituted discloses no reasonable cause of action against the defendant herein.
The grounds upon which the application is brought are as follows:
1. Maersk Nigeria Limited and Safemarine Nigeria Limited which have been muddled together as a single legal entity
and as a single defendant in this suit are two distinct legal entities and the contractual liability of one cannot attach to the
other in law;
2. The suit is not properly constituted as the named defendant is not a proper party to this suit.
3. The claimant's claims are outside the civil causes and matters which this Honourable court can adjudicate upon; and
4. The claimant has no locus to seek the reliefs contained in paragraphs iv, v, vi, vii, viii, ix, x, xi, xv, xvi and xviii of his
statement of facts.
5. This court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain this suit as presently constituted.
Accompanying the preliminary objection is the written address in support. In reaction, the claimant filed an
11-paragraphed counter-affidavit sworn to by Ofem Onun, a legal practitioner, on the 28th April 2011 and his written
address opposing the objection. The defendant on the 15th July 2011 filed a 7-paragraphed reply affidavit sworn to by
Paul Okonji, a legal practitioner, together with another written address in support of the reply counter-affidavit.
In adopting the written address of the defendant, learned counsel informed the court that he would abandon his
arguments on the jurisdiction of this court in the light of the Third Alteration to the 1999 Constitution which came into
force during the pendency of this objection. Two issues for determination were raised by the defendant as follows:
(i) Whether or not the claims of the claimant as presently constituted is such as can be validly adjudicated upon by this
Honourable Court in terms of the exercise of its jurisdiction.
(ii) Having regard to the fact that Maersk Nigeria Ltd and Safmarine Nigeria Limited are separate and distinct legal
entities, whether the lumping together of the two companies as a single defendant is not fatal to the competence of this
suit.
He began by submitting that where a court seeks to determine if it has jurisdiction to entertain any matter before it, it is
only the claimant's claim the court considers, citing Tukur v. Govt of Gongola State [1989] 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517, and
Western Steel Works v. Iron & Steel Workers [1987] NWLR (Pt. 49) 284 (incomplete citation). He also submitted that
where pleadings are filed in a suit, the issue of jurisdiction ought to be determined from the claimant's pleadings, citing
AG Kwara State v. Olawale [1993] 1 NWLR (Pt. 272) 645 at 675. He submitted further that a court can only exercise
jurisdiction when it is properly constituted, the subject matter is within its jurisdiction and the case has been initiated by
due process of law and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of its jurisdiction, citing Madukolu v.
Nkemdilim [1962] 2 SCNLR 341, and Alhaji Usman Magaji v. Maidorowara Matari [2000] 8 NWLR (Pt. 670) 722 at 735,
736.
Learned counsel submitted that a court can only exercise its jurisdiction where the proper parties are before it otherwise
the exercise of such jurisdiction will be a nullity. He referred to paragraphs 1 and 2 of the statement of facts and stated
that the facts averred is that the claimant was hitherto employed by Safmarine Nigeria Ltd described as a subsidiary of
the Maersk Nigeria Ltd and that the former allegedly terminated his employment in a manner that is tantamount to a
breach of his fundamental human rights. It was his contention that the claimant seeks to establish the liability of Maersk
Nigeria Ltd on the ground that it is an agent of Safmarine. He argued that the facts as alleged by the claimant discloses
no reasonable cause of action cognisable against Maersk Nigeria Ltd at the instance of the claimant.
He submitted that Maersk Nigeria Ltd is not a party to the employment contract and there is no privity of contract
between the claimant and Maersk Nigeria Ltd. It was also his submission that Maersk Nigeria Ltd and Safmarine Nigeria
Ltd are at law separate and distinct persons and the contractual liability of one cannot be attached to another. He argued
that the basis for which the claimant seeks to attach Maersk Nigeria Ltd with liability is on the grounds of an un-pleaded
and imaginary agency relationship. He further argued that the facts averred in the pleadings does not disclose an
agency relationship and the claimant has failed to establish any nexus whatsoever between himself and Maersk Nigeria
Ltd.
He then submitted that Maersk Nigeria Ltd is not a proper party to this suit, that the suit does not disclose any
reasonable cause of action against it and that there is no legal basis or nexus between Maersk Nigeria Ltd and the
claimant. He further submitted that from the processes before the court the basis for which the claimant seeks to
establish the liability of the defendant as a holding company of Safmarine Nigeria Ltd is unknown to law and offends the
principles of corporate personality as enunciated in Salomon v. Salomon (1897) AC 22. He submitted that a holding
company is at law a separate and distinct person from its subsidiary, citing Akinkugbe v. E.H.N. Limited [2008] 12 NWLR
(Pt. 1098) 223 at 438.
He argued that assuming but not conceding that the defendant herein is indeed an agent of Safmarine Nigeria Ltd, the
law is settled on the procedure for enforcing a claim where the principal is disclosed. That the proper party in a case of a
disclosed principal is the principal as opposed to the agent, citing Osigwe v. PSPLS Management Consortium Ltd [2009]
3 NWLR 379 at 399 ' 400 (incomplete citation). That there is no privity of contract with the defendant and, therefore, the
claimant has no right of action either in law or equity against the defendant for a breach of contract of employment or
wrongful termination.
The defendant's counsel submitted that only a person in whom an enforceable right is vested as his personal right is
entitled to sue to enforce such rights. That a person will be said to have locus standi where the reliefs claimed would
confer some benefits on such party. He cited Ndionyenmah Nwankwor v. Mrs. Ononeze [2009] 1 NWLR 671 at 698 and
AG Anambra State v. A.G. Federation [2007] 12 NWLR 4 at 93 ' 94 (incomplete citation in both cases). He argued that
the claimant left the employment of Safmarine since 2005. That this action is brought in his personal capacity hence he
has no interest whatsoever in the affairs of the company. It was counsel's submission that the reliefs sought in
paragraphs iv, v, vi, vii, viii, ix, x, xi, xv, xvi and xviii do not in any way disclose any right enforceable, exercisable or
directly attaching to the claimant.
He argued that the claimant cannot seek to enforce alleged or purported rights of employees of Safmarine as he is a
complete stranger to the affairs and running of Safmarine Nigeria Ltd and, therefore, lacks the requisite locus standi,
citing Fawehinmi v. President Federal Republic of Nigeria [2007] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1054) 275. It was his submission also
that where a party does not have locus standi, the court cannot validly exercise its jurisdiction, citing Adesanya v.
President, Federal Republic of Nigeria [1981] 2 NCLR 236. He then urged the court to decline jurisdiction and strike out
the suit.
Replying, the claimant framed two issues for determination as follows:
(a) Whether the Honourable Court is competent to exercise jurisdiction and as such proceed to hear and determine this
suit as constituted by the claimant.
(b) Whether the defendant, Maersk Nigeria Limited (Principal and Agent) of Safmarine is the proper party sued as
defendant of this suit.
Learned counsel to the claimant began by submitting that a court must have jurisdiction before it can entertain a matter.
That a court must be competent to entertain the matter as any defect in competence renders the proceedings null and
void, citing Oloba v. Akereja [1988] 3 NWLR (Pt. 84) 508 and Madukolu v. Nkemdilim [1962] 1 ANLR 587.
He reproduced section 7 of the NIC Act 2006 and submitted that by virtue of the provision of section 7(a)(i), labour
means a contract of service where an employee offers his/her services to an employer for remuneration which could be
either a wage or salary. He submitted that a contract of service could only be brought to an end through laid down
procedure and that an employer has a right of hire and fire and may fire an employee without stating any reason. That
had the defendant exercised the right of firing the claimant for an alleged misconduct without malice, there would have
been no need to institute this suit.
He then went on to state the manner in which the claimant was fired, how he was under surveillance by the Police for
three month as a result of a letter written to the police by the defendant and how he was denied fair hearing on the
allegation of receiving a bribe by the defendant. On the issue of fair hearing, he cited in support Olatunbosun v. NISER
[1988] NWLR (Pt. 80) 25, FCSC v. Laoye [1989] 2 NWLR (Pt. 106) 652, Sokefun v. Akinyemi (no citation given), and R
v. Chancellor of the University of Cambridge (1723) 1 S 557 where Fortescue J said 'that even God himself did not pass
sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defence.'
He referred to section 7(a)(ii) of the NIC Act 2006 and submitted that the words 'and matters incidental thereto' used in
that provision refers to issues related to labour and that this covers all matters however arising which have direct and
remote connections with an employment contract and in the instant case, between the defendant and claimant. That all
the claimant's prayers have arisen as a result of the events that occurred in the course of employment of the claimant
as a servant of the defendant, so also are other attendant issues which arose after the unlawful termination of his
employment which he itemized as unlawful seizure of his brief case, character assassination, unlawful seizure of his
personal effects and other valuables. He submitted that these are all within the jurisdiction of this court and urged the
court to 'proceed to hear and determine all the claimant's claims hitherto expunged suo moto by the court on the 19th
January 2011'.
The claimant's counsel submitted that the court is under an obligation to take into cognizance international best practice
and that the question that readily comes to mind is as follows: 'bearing in mind the 79-paragraphed statement of facts as
deposed by the claimant, the record of which is before the Honourable Court, did the defendant in this case conduct its
relationship with the claimant in a manner that is good and in consonance with international best practice' Our humble
answer is in the negative NO'. He then reproduced the entire provisions of section 254C and 254D of the 1999
Constitution, as amended, and urged the court to assume jurisdiction as the claimant has come before the court so that
the legality or otherwise of the defendant's actions can be determined.
On the second issue, counsel contended that the defendant has strenuously labored in vain trying to re-write history and
has thereby engaged in a futile exercise of distinguishing between six and half a dozen. He then proceeded to give his
own historical version of Safmarine Nigeria Ltd and Maersk Nigeria Ltd. He concluded this historical excursion by stating
that:
The underlining rationale for buying Safmarine had to do with the fact that the said Safmarine was a profitable venture
with goodwill dating back to decades. Safmarine remains one of the 'cash cows' of the defendant in this suit, the
defendant takes all the benefits of acquiring Safmarine, then the question which a discerning mind would pose is why
should a suit arise against Safmarine and the defendant would aver before the Honourbale court that it is not a party to
the suit' With respect, our answer is otherwise; we submit before the Honourable court that Maersk Nigeria Ltd is the
proper party sued as defendant in this suit.
He stated that the complaint written to the Police was on the letter head of the defendant and it was signed by its
Managing Director Toni Knutsen. That this letter has led to litigation and the defendant cannot now turn round and aver
that it is not a party. He contended that the law would not allow anyone be it a person or body corporate to approbate
and reprobate simultaneously. He also submitted that when the name Maersk Nigeria Ltd is searched for on the internet
using Google search machine, the defendant proudly announces to the whole world that one of its brand names is
Safmarine and a further search for the name Safmarine reveals that it is a brand in the portfolio of Maersk situate, lying
and carrying on business within Maersk Nigeria Ltd premises at 2 ' 4 Ede Street, Apapa. That the necessary inference
that could be drawn from the relationship of Maersk Nigeria Ltd and Safmarine is that they belong to the same group of
companies A-P Moller Maersk group. He then submitted that if Safmarine cannot be sued as a corporate body, the
proper party to sue is Maersk Nigeria Ltd.
He finally submitted that the court has jurisdiction to entertain this matter and prayed the court to strike out the
preliminary objection as it is brought to waste time, it is totally unprofessional, reckless and a flagrant abuse of the court
process. He urged the court to award costs in the sum of N5 million against the defendant.
Replying on points of law, counsel to the defendant submitted that the claimant has not shown that there is an
employment relationship between him and the defendant neither has be shown any valid and legal basis for instituting
this action against the defendant. He submitted that notwithstanding the claimant's inability to appreciate and
comprehend legal issues, this is a court of law and not a history class. He submitted that the position of the law
regarding corporate personality has long since been established in the locus classicus case of Salomon v. Salomon
(1897) AC 22.
Regarding the claimant's deposition in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the counter-affidavit that the defendant was sued because
Safmarine was struck off the register of companies, the defendant counsel submitted that once the legal personality of a
corporate entity is in issue, the best proof is the certificate of incorporation or any other document from the Corporate
Affairs Commission, citing ACB v. Emostrade Ltd [2002] 8 NWLR (Pt. 770) 501, Bank of Baroda v. Iyalabani [2002] 13
NWLR (Pt. 785) 551 and Umar v. NGG Nig Ltd [2007] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1032) 117. He submitted that the claimant has not
produced any evidence to show that Safmarine was struck off the Registrar of companies. Therefore, the claimant has
failed to discharge the onus of proof on him, citing 'section 135(1) of the Evidence Act Cap. E14 LFN 2004'. He
submitted that he who asserts must prove, citing Njoku v. Eme [1973] 5 SC 293, Kate Enterprises Ltd v. Daewoo Nigeria
Ltd [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt. 5) 116, Okagbue v. Romaine [1982] 13 NSCC 30 and West African Chemical Company Ltd v.
Caroline Poultry Farm [2000] 2 NWLR (Pt. 644) 197 at 206.
He submitted that a trade name, brand name or trade mark is at law totally different from the legal personality of the
company operating or trading under the said trade or brand name. That the claimant's submission that the Safmarine
brand name is a very important business portfolio of the defendant and thus any suit against Safmarine can be validly
maintained against the defendant as the principal and agent of Safmarine is misconceived and devoid of legal
understanding.
The defendant submitted that the three exhibits exhibited in the counter-affidavit marked A, B and C are not admissible
before the court on the ground that they are irrelevant to the proceedings. He submitted that Exhibit A does not establish
or show a nexus between the claimant and defendant and Exhibits B and C are websites extracts which are not only
irrelevant but also inadmissible being electronically generated documents. It was also his contention that paragraphs
3.2.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.5, 3.3.7 and 3.4 are totally unfounded and irrelevant for the purposes of determining this
objection. He urged the court to strike out the suit with a cost of N5 million.
We have carefully considered the processes filed, submissions made and authorities referred to. The main issues to be
resolved are:
(i) whether this suit as presently constituted is competent or put in another form whether the proper parties are before
this court;
(ii) whether the claimant has the locus standi to sue in respect of issues that do not disclose any right or entitlement on
his part.
It is not in dispute by both parties that one of the conditions under which a court can exercise jurisdiction is when the
subject matter is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case that prevents the court from exercising its
jurisdiction. See Madukolu v. Nkemdilim [1962] 1 ANLR 587. In trying to ascertain this, the court only needs to consider
the statement of facts and not the merits of the claimant's case. We will, therefore, reproduce below paragraphs 1, 2 and
3 of the statement of facts as follows :
1. That I am the claimant in this suit and who until 8th April 2005 was the Head, Commercial (Import & Export) of
Safmarine, hitherto known and addressed as Safmarine Nigeria Ltd now a subsidiary company to the defendant.
2. That the defendant (agent of Safmarine) in this suit is incorporated in Nigeria under the laws of Nigeria, a shipping
company, carrying on the business of import and export of goods in and out of Nigeria with its head offices at 2/4 Ede
Street, Apapa, Lagos.
3. The claimant was in the employment of the defendant until 8th April 2005, when three armed policemen were invited
to the offices of the Managing Director of the defendant from the State Criminal Investigation Bureau, Panti to arrest the
claimant. (The letter of employment containing the terms and conditions of the contract of service between the claimant
and defendant was illegally seized by the defendant on the said 8th April 2005 and so are many other valuables
belonging to the claimant all of which are still in the custody of the defendant).
It is the defendant's position that Maersk Nigeria Limited is not a party to the employment contract and, therefore, there
is no privity of contract between it and the claimant. The claimant in paragraph 1 of his statement of facts averred that he
was the Head, Commercial (Import & Export) of Safmarine Nigeria Ltd, now a subsidiary company to the defendant. The
question that arises is if Safmarine is a subsidiary of the defendant, how comes that in the parties to the suit, the
defendant is described as an agent of Safmarine' In fact in the submissions of counsel, the defendant was described as
both principal and agent of Safmarine. Now, if Safmarine is a separate legal entity, given the principle in Salomon v.
Salomon, can an employee of one company be imputed to another' In Joy Maskew & ors v. Tidex Nig. Ltd Suit No.
NIC/1M/98 delivered on November 25, 2008, this Court held as follows '
We agree with the respondent that a subsidiary company is separate and distinct with the parent company and so must
be held accountable for its acts. The respondent has not been shown to have merged with Zapata Nigeria and so cannot
be said to be a party to the collective agreement in issue; and because it is not a party to the collective agreement, it
cannot be sued under the interpretation jurisdiction of the court as provided for under section 15 of the TDA.
In this case this Court treated a parent company as separate from a subsidiary for the purposes of the application of a
collective agreement. The same principle is applicable here given that the claimant averred in his statement of facts that
he was in the employment of Safmarine; yet it is Maersk that he is suing.
The law is that it is the statement of claims of the claimant that determines jurisdiction. The claimant claimed 20 reliefs
from the defendant. Of these, 12 are outside the purview of the jurisdiction of this Court given that the claimant did not
disclose what interest, right, entitlement or locus that he has to warrant him suing on the issues. On the issue of locus
standi, the claimant must show that he has either a personal interest which will be or has been adversely affected by the
action complained of or that he has suffered or sustained or is in immediate danger of injury to himself. See Esuruoso &
ors v. Alhaji Ogidi [2002] FWLR (Pt. 112) 85 and Thomas & ors v. Olufosoye [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt. 102) 669. In respect of
claims iv, v, vi, vii, viii, ix, x, xi, the claimant has not shown how the alleged actions of the defendant has adversely
affected his rights. It is our considered view that the claimant does not have the locus standi to include these claims in
this suit and thereby seek to remedy these alleged wrongs against the employees of the defendant. He is not a trade
union who would be in better stead to do this and, therefore, have the locus standi to bring such an action on behalf of
its members. It would appear that the claimant is a mere busybody and an intruder in the affairs and management of the
defendant company. We, therefore, strike out these claims.
Claim xv is for an order directing payment for illegal seizure and missing certificates, an issue outside the jurisdiction of
this court. Claim xvi is a claim for libel which is clearly not within the jurisdiction of this court while claims xvii and xviii are
claims for detinue, also outside the jurisdiction of this court. We also strike out these claims.
The remainder of the reliefs were made out by the claimant to look as if they were claims in respect of wrongful
termination of employment. The claimant alleges in paragraph 3 of the statement of facts that these documents were
seized by the defendant on the 8th April 2005. We have carefully looked at the statement of facts and the documents
frontloaded. The claimant's letter of employment is not pleaded or frontloaded neither is the letter of dismissal. However,
there is a letter marked Exhibit 06 pleaded in paragraph 58 of the statement of facts written to the claimant by the
defendant's Solicitors dated 11th November 2009. It is the same firm of Solicitors who are representing the defendant in
this instant matter. They wrote:
We are solicitors to Maersk Nigeria Limited (Our 'client')'We are aware of the circumstances of your dismissal as well as
the fact that your notice of dismissal was duly communicated to you'In the premises, we have advised our client that you
were duly dismissed'Our client is therefore not prepared to pay you any salary or other entitlements following your said
dismissal.
In spite of this letter, a look at the 79 paragraphs of the statement of facts will reveal that there are no averments related
to the issue of wrongful dismissal or termination except as to the reliefs sought. This means that the main claims of the
claimant necessitating coming to court are not claims relating to termination or dismissal. This being the case, we are of
the opinion that the claims of the claimant are not properly before this court. Consequently, we rule that this Court has
no jurisdiction over the present case. The reliefs as to declaring that the suspension and purported dismissal of the
claimant were couched simply to be able to bring them within the ambit of the jurisdiction of this Court.
For all the reasons given above we hold that the present suit is incompetent for want of proper party, locus and cause of
action. The suit, as presently constituted, is accordingly dismissed.
Ruling is entered accordingly. We make no order as to costs.
''.''''''''''.
Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip
Presiding Judge
........'.'''''''''''. '''''''''''.'''
Hon. Justice O. A. Obaseki-Osaghae Hon. Justice J. T. Agbadu-Fishim
Judge Judge
