IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE PORT HARCOURT JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT PORT HARCOURT.

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HONOURABLE JUSTICE Z. M. BASHIR.

 

Dated: 16^th day of July, 2025                  

SUIT NO:  NICN/PHC/151/2020

 

 

BETWEEN:

 

1. MR. IKECHUKWU IBEKWE 

2. MR. LINUS UMANAH

3. MR AUGUSTINE CHIEDU BENYE  

4. MRS AMAKA NJOKU

5. MR. KENNETH IWUOHA

6. MRS. OLUSEYE IGBAFE ----------------------------- CLAIMANTS

 

AND

 

CISCON NIGERIA LIMITED ----------------------------- DEFENDANT

 

 

Representations: 

A. Akinwole for the Claimant 

U.I. Nwokorie with J.C. Chinendo for the Defendant.

 

 

Judgement.

This suit was commenced via a General Form of Complaint dated and filed on the 26th of November, 2020, accompanied by the requisite frontloaded processes including a statement of facts, list of witnesses, witness depositions on oath, list of documents, and the documents to be relied upon at trial.

 

The matter was initially assigned to Hon. Justice P. I. Hamman and later reassigned to this Court in May 2024. Before the reassignment, the Claimants had, by an Amended Statement of Facts filed on 14th January 2021, sought the following reliefs against the Defendant:

1. Declaration that the Claimants are entitled to their benefits as specified in the Staff Manual issued by the Defendants in November 2009, their Pension Contributions, NHF Refunds and One Month Salary In lieu of Notice.  
2. An Order that the Defendant pay to the Claimants the sum of N56, 566, 561 as their Terminal benefits to the following Order: 

i. Ikechukwu Ibekwe; N3, 244, 749.10

ii. Linus Umanah: N21, 409, 795.96

iii. Augustine Benye: N1, 851, 709.60

iv. Amaka Njoku: N13, 323, 356.39

v. Kenneth Iwuoha: N13, 358, 147.07

vi. Oluseye Igbafe: N3, 378, 802.84 

i. Ikechukwu Ibekwe (Pension Alliance Ltd Account); N941, 006.37

ii. Linus Umanah (Pension Alliance Ltd Account): N2, 487, 046.03

iii. Augustine Benye (Crusader Sterling Pensions Ltd): 

N1, 255, 903.50 

iv. Amaka Njoku: (Crusader Sterling Pensions Ltd): N1, 890, 072.95 

v. Kenneth Iwuoha (Pension Alliance Ltd Account): N1, 718, 297.57 

vi. Oluseye Igbafe (Pension Alliance Ltd Account): N1, 718, 297.57 

 

i. Ikechukwu Ibekwe; N113, 196.74

ii. Linus Umanah: N304, 424.16

iii. Augustine Benye: N153, 410.14

iv. Amaka Njoku: N218, 652.16

v. Kenneth Iwuoha: N216, 063.32

vi. Oluseye Igbafe: N216, 063.31

i. Ikechukwu Ibekwe; N195, 180.55

ii. Linus Umanah: N524, 312.09

iii. Augustine Benye: N258, 366.07

iv. Amaka Njoku: N409,949.43

v. Kenneth Iwuoha: N348, 898.61

vi. Oluseye Igbafe: N348, 898.61

In response to the claim, the Defendant filed a Statement of Defence on the 11th of August, 2021, accompanied by a list of witnesses, their respective witness statements on oath, a list of documents, and copies of documents intended to be relied upon at trial. The said Statement of Defence was subsequently amended on the 24th of February, 2025.

Upon being served with the initial Statement of Defence, the Claimants filed a Reply to the Statement of Defence on the 1st of November, 2021.

It is imperative to observe at this stage that while this matter was pending before His Lordship, Hon. Justice P.I. Hamman, the Claimants brought a Motion on Notice seeking, in substance, an order for part-judgment to be entered against the Defendant based on an alleged admission contained in paragraph 3(viii) of the Defendant’s Statement of Defence. Upon consideration of the said motion, His Lordship, in a considered Ruling delivered on the 4th of April, 2022, entered part-judgment in favour of the Claimants to the effect that the sum of ?22,503,092.11 (Twenty-Two Million, Five Hundred and Three Thousand, Ninety-Two Naira, Eleven Kobo) be paid by the Defendant to the Claimants, the said sum having been admitted.

Furthermore, the record of proceedings transferred to this Court reveals that His Lordship also delivered another Ruling on the 20th of June, 2022, in respect of a motion to set aside garnishee proceedings instituted to enforce the aforementioned part-judgment. The basis of that Ruling was the pendency of an appeal, lodged by the Defendant, against the part-judgment—specifically, Appeal No. CA/PH/160M/2022. By the said Ruling, His Lordship granted a stay of execution of the part-judgment delivered on 4th April, 2022, pending the determination of the said appeal.

In view of the foregoing, the subsistence of the said part-judgment and the pendency of the related appeal shall be duly considered in the resolution of the present judgment, so as to avoid any procedural or legal incongruities.

Trial before this Court commenced on the 21st of November, 2024, with the Claimants opening their case by calling one witness, Mrs. Oluseye Igbafe, who testified as CW1. CW1 adopted her witness statement on oath dated 14th January, 2021, which was marked as C1. Through her testimony, the Claimants tendered sixteen (16) documents in evidence, which were admitted and marked as Exhibits C2 to C17, respectively.

Arising from the Statement of Facts and the evidence adduced through the witness statement on oath, the case of the Claimants is that they were employed by the Defendant at various times and remained in its employment until the 30th day of June, 2016, when their contracts of employment were terminated by letters dated the same day. The Claimants asserted that their employment relationship with the Defendant was governed by the Staff Manual issued by the Defendant in November 2009, which they all acknowledged by appending their signatures on page 45 of the said manual.

The Claimants further averred that while their salaries were last fully paid in February 2016, the arrears were subsequently settled in piecemeal. However, the Defendant allegedly failed to remit statutory pension deductions to the respective Pension Fund Administrators of the Claimants, and similarly failed to remit outstanding contributions to the National Housing Fund (NHF) on behalf of the Claimants. It was also alleged that the Defendant terminated the employment of the Claimants without prior notice, and failed to pay one-month salary in lieu of notice, thereby breaching the terms of their engagement.

Under cross-examination, CW1, Mrs. Oluseye Igbafe, testified that computation of financial reports and salaries formed part of her official responsibilities. She admitted to being a senior staff member during her employment and acknowledged that company decisions were made by management. Although she was aware of a management meeting held between the 15th and 17th of March 2016, she was not in attendance at the said meeting.

CW1 insisted that her entitlement, as well as those of the other Claimants, should be computed in accordance with the provisions of the 2009 Staff Manual, and not the Communiqué purportedly issued at the said management meeting. She further admitted that the Claimants initially approached the Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN) for intervention. However, in the absence of a resolution, the Claimants withdrew and opted to pursue the matter independently. She concluded by stating that she was unaware of any payments made to other former staff or of the terms contained in the Communiqué relied upon by the Defendant.

Upon the close of the Claimants’ case, the Defendant opened its defence and called presented one witness, Mr. Briggs Wali, who testified as DW1. He adopted his witness statement on oath, which was marked as D1. Through DW1, seven (7) documents were tendered and admitted in evidence under protest, and marked as Exhibits D2 to D8.

From the Amended Statement of Defence and DW1’s evidence, the case of the Defendant is that the employment of the Claimants was not governed by the Staff Manual of November 2009, as alleged. Rather, the Defendant maintained that the said manual had been reviewed and revised pursuant to a management meeting held between the 15th and 17th of March, 2016, following which a Communiqué was issued. According to the Defendant, it is this Communiqué that regulates the terminal benefits of staff, including the Claimants. The Communiqué allegedly provides for the payment of 50% of one month’s basic salary for each completed year of service as terminal benefit.

The Defendant further contended that prior to the March 2016 meeting, a townhall meeting was held on the 27th of May, 2014, which was attended by over 110 members of staff. During the meeting, the issue of terminal benefits was deliberated and it was resolved that management would thereafter develop a formal framework for the computation of terminal benefits.

The Defendant averred that it had, in accordance with the Communiqué, computed the terminal benefits of the Claimants and had made arrangements for payment. However, the Claimants allegedly refused to accept the said payments, which led to the involvement of PENGASSAN as their representative. The Defendant denied liability for any further sums beyond the amount computed in accordance with the Communiqué and maintained that the Claimants are not entitled to the sums now claimed before this court.

Under cross-examination, DW1, Mr. Briggs Wali, admitted that none of the Claimants were part of the Defendant’s management team. He further acknowledged that the Defendant was owing salaries to staff for several months, which were only eventually paid in arrears. DW1 also confirmed that the Claimants did not append their signatures to any of the documents tendered by the Defendant as evidence of consensus regarding the Communiqué.

Upon the discharge of DW1, the Defendant closed its case. The matter was thereafter adjourned for the adoption of Final Written Addresses by the parties.

On the 25th day of March, 2025, the Defendant filed its Final Written Address. In the said address, learned counsel for the Defendant, U.I. Nwokorie Esq., distilled two issues for determination as follows:

1. WHETHER THE COMMUNIQUE ARISING FROM THE UPPER MANAGEMENT MEETING HELD FROM MARCH 15TH -17TH, 2016, GOVERNING THE MODALITIES OF PAYMENT OF TERMINAL BENEFITS IS BINDING ON THE CLAIMANTS?

2. WHETHER, IN THE ENTIRE CIRCUMSTANCE OF THIS CASE, THE CLAIMANTS HAVE PROVED THEIR CASE TO BE ENTITLED TO THEIR CLAIMS?

In arguing issue one, counsel posited that in view of the fact that the crux of the dispute between parties being whether the terminal benefit is under the obsolete staff Manual of 2009 or under the Communique, the law is trite that where there are several editions of standard terms in a contract of employment, the applicable terms of contract are to be the most recent edition existing at the time the contract was made. Counsel cited the case of TEXACO (NIG.) PLC V. KEHINDE (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt. 708) 224, 240, (E). Counsel added that corporate entities are entitled to review employment policies in line with prevailing economic circumstances and the Defendant, exercising its corporate discretion, revised the computation of terminal benefits via an upper management resolution in 2016, culminating in a binding communique. Counsel in this regard cited section 87 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 2020.

Counsel argued that the decisions of management bind employees, once properly communicated because a company is an abstraction, it acts are through living persons. Counsel cited the cases of NIGERIAN NATIONAL SUPPLY COMPANY LTD V . ALHAJ HAMAJOD SABANA AND COMPANY LIMITED & 2 ORS. (1988) 2 NWLR (PT 74) 23, 58 (H) and ORJI V. ANYASO (2023) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1904) 1, 19, (E-G) and also referred the court to the answers provided by CW1 during cross examination. 

Counsel argued that CW1 is attempting to mislead this court by positing in one breathe that she is not aware of the Communique but aware of the meeting that birthed the communique. Counsel argued that the law is settled that a witness who has two materially inconsistent pieces of evidence on oath by him on the same point of facts does not deserve to be believed or given the honour of credibility. He also does not deserve to be described as truthful. Counsel cited the case of ALHAJI GARBA DAN SAKARE V. ALHAJI SALAWU BELLO (2 013) 17 NWLR (PT. 848) 154, 170-171 (G-A).

In arguing issue two, counsel posited that there is a fundamental procedural requirement that when facts are joined by parties in their pleadings, evidence is required to prove such facts as averred. And it is the person upon whom the burden of establishing the facts rests that must adduce satisfactory evidence in proof thereof. Counsel also argued that it is settled law that an averment in the pleadings, in respect of which no evidence is called in proof, is deemed to have been abandoned. Counsel cited the cases of REPTICOS.A.GENEVA V. AFRIBANK NIGERIA PLC (2013) 14 NWLR (PT. 1373) 172, 207 (H); SUARA YUSUF V. OLADEPO OYETUNDE & ORS (1998) 12 NWLR (PT. 579) 483, 498 (B-C); RILWAN&PARTNERS V. SKYEBANK PLC(2015) 1NWLR (Pt. 1441) 437,461 (F-G) and JOLABON INVESTMENT (NIG.) LTD. AND 2 ORS  V. OYUS INTERNATIONAL COMPANY (NIG.) LTD. (2015) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1490) 30,42-43, (G-A).

Counsel maintained that the Defendant do not owe any salaries to the Claimants and that the Claimants are not entitled to any of the sums claimed and that there is no proof before this court that the Defendant was transferring assets to one Shawsand Estate Limited. 

Counsel also argued that it is a well-established principle of law that before any party resorts to judicial intervention, he is required to exhaust all internal remedies provided by the relevant body or institution and where a statute provides for resort to an administrative remedy, the court cannot competently adjudicate on any suit arising therefrom unless the administrative remedy has been exhausted. Counsel cited SECTION 7(1)(A), NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT ACT 2006, SECTION 169 OF THE EVIDENCE ACT, 2011 and the cases of ADIGUN V. OSAKA (2003) 5 NWLR (Pt. 812) 95, 130 - 131 (H-A) and ARIBISALA V. OGUNYEMI (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt. 921) 212 while positing that by withdrawing from PENGASSAN's dispute resolution process midway, the Claimants have circumvented the prescribed procedure, thereby bypassing a lawful and fair resolution mechanism.

Counsel argued further that the principle of regularity is a fundamental doctrine in corporate and administrative law, which presumes that decisions taken by duly constituted corporate bodies or public authorities are lawful, proper, and in accordance with established procedures until proven otherwise. He added that there is the presumption that where there is no evidence to the contrary, things are presumed to have been rightly and properly done.

Counsel posited that it is pertinent to note that the Defendant is not in denial of its indebtedness towards the Claimants, but is contending the quantum of and the modalities for the payment of the debts owed while it is unfair to demand such outrageous sums from a company going through downturn and has been doing everything to pay the agreed sums. Counsel added that justice should prevail, and the law should be given a human face as the Defendant, willing to honour its financial obligation in accordance with 2016 Communique that was lawfully established and duly communicated, cannot suddenly be compelled to bear an additional, unwarranted financial burden simply because the Claimants, in the twilight of their employment, have developed a new-found sense of grievance.

Counsel concluded by urging the court to refuse to grant the reliefs herein sought by the Claimants having failed to discharge the burden of proof placed on them. 

In response to the Defendant’s final address, Claimants filed their final address on the 2^nd of May, 2025 wherein counsel to the Claimants A. Akinwole Esq., formulated three issues for determination to wit:

1. Whether the Claimants are entitled to the various sums claimed for Salary in Lieu of Notice, NHF Contributions, Outstanding Pension Contribution (these claims not being disputed by the Defendant)? 

2. Whether The Communique arising from the Upper Management Meeting Held from March 15-16 2016 (or any other communique) is binding on the Claimants in the calculation of their terminal benefits 

3. Whether the Claimants have proved their case to be entitled to Judgment in their favor

In arguing issue one, counsel started by drawing the Court’s attention to the fact that the Defendant did not in any way deny that the Claimants were not paid one Month Salary in Lieu of Notice while the employment  was terminated with immediate effect on June 30 2016 by letters dated and issued same day; that the Defendant did not deny that Pension fund contribution was paid late, and that others were outstanding as claimed, while there is no mention at all of NHF Payment in the Statement of Defence, and in the evidence of DW1 he admitted at Paragraph 22 that NHF Contributions were owed. 

Counsel added that the crux of the Defence was that the Defendant only disputed the basis of the TERMINAL BENFITS part of the claim, and did not address the other heads of claim. Counsel contended on what is general and specific traverse and in this regard, cited the cases of NEW HORIZON HOTELS LTD. & ORS. vs. OKOYE(2018)LPELR-45328(CA); CBN V. Dinneh [2010] LPELR- 8983 (CA); First Bank of Nig. PLC V. TSA Industries Ltd. [2007] All FWLR (pt. 352) 1719 at 1734; MESSRS LEWIS & PEAT (N.R.I.) LTD. v A.E. AKHIMIEN (SC. 115/1975).

Counsel argued further that notwithstanding the avoidance of the defendant to react to the issue, the Claimants proceeded to lead evidence as to the state of the Pension Fund and tendered their Pension Fund accounts as Exhibits C5A-C5F, for 1^st – 6^th Claimants respectively, while for NHF Contributions, the Claimants tendered Exhibits C17 showing the Contributions by the defendant and when they stopped.

With regards to salary in lieu of notice, counsel cited section 11 of the Labour Act and the cases of CHUKWUMAH v SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY OF NIGERIA LTD (SC 122/1988) [1993] NGSC 6; IFETA VS. SPDCN LIMITED (2006) 8 NWLR (Pt. 983) 585, while referring to the termination letters admitted as Exhibits C3A – C3F. 

 In arguing issue two, counsel succinctly posited that the Communique arising from the Upper Management Meeting Held from March 15-16 2016 is of no legal effect and cannot affect the already earned emoluments and benefits of the Claimants as the Claimants never agreed to the change of their salaries and benefits, and no document was ever given to them to sign to bind them to a change in their earned benefits.

Counsel added that the arguments of the Defendant in arguing its issues 1 and 2 are contradictory and inconsistent, because the Communique arising from the Upper Management Meeting Held from March 15-16 2016 was issued before PENGASSAN became involved in the issue of Terminal benefits. 

 

Counsel argued further that in order for Exhibit D5 to constitute evidence, the Court would have to speculate as to who was present at that meeting because the Defendant did not discharge the burden of proving that the Claimants were on notice as to the meeting, attended, or are aware of the outcome and evinced agreement to be bound by that outcome.

With regards to Exhibit D2, counsel contended that the Communique is not dated, and no evidence was led to show that it was circulated to the Staff of the Company, or specifically to the Claimants, hence, the burden on the Defendant of fixing an effective date on exhibit D2 was not discharged. Counsel added that this is particularly relevant because in paragraph 3 of the Reply to Statement of Defence, the Claimants denied being part of such a meeting or receiving such communique after the meeting or agreeing to write off 50% of their already earned Terminal Benefits.

Counsel further submitted that the contractual obligation of the Defendant to pay Terminal Benefits cannot in law be unilaterally amended to prejudice already earned benefits due and accruing to the Claimants as the Defendant seeks to do and the effect of Exhibit D2 under question is to halve the Terminal Benefits already earned and accrued to claimants, at the whim and caprice of the Defendant, which is contrary to the spirit and intent of Section 7 Labor Act. Counsel in this regard cited the unreported cases of Suit NUMBER NICN/LA/588/2017: EKEOMA AJAH v. FIDELITY BANK and A.G, NASARAWA STATE V. A.G, PLATEAU STATE [2012]10 NWLR (PT.1309) SC419 @ 449, PARAS.E-F, 450, PARA.C. NWOBOSI V ACB (1995) 6 NWLR (PT 404) 658: CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA V AGNES IGWILLO (2007) 2 All N.L.R. 211; KWUNIFE WAYNE WEST AFRICA LTD. (1989) 12 SC 92; ASHAKA CEMENT PLC VS. ASHARTUL MUBASHURUN INVESTMENT LTD. (2016) LPELR-40196 (CA).

Counsel urged the court to find at law that the Defendant’s actions in issuing unilateral communiques (Exhibit D2) fall short of what is required at law to amend the Staff Handbook and the Terms in regards Terminal benefits.

With regards to the opting out of mediation led by PENGASSAN, counsel argued that the law is that Mediation is a Voluntary Process, and any party may opt out of the process at any time before a settlement agreement is signed and that there is no interpretation of the law of Estoppel that can compel a party to be bound by a Mediatory process that he opted out of.

In arguing issue three, counsel posited that the Claimants have proved their case to be entitled to Judgment in their favor, taking cognizance of the partial Judgment of this Court under the hand of Justice Hamman on the 4^th day of April 2022 based on the admission of the Defendant in their Statement of Defence is to the effect that the admitted sum of N22,503,092.11 (Twenty-Two Million, Five Hundred and Three Thousand, Ninety Two Naira and 11 Kobo only) was awarded to the claimants, and the entitlement to the balance set down for trial.

 

Counsel presented tabulated computations for owed terminal benefits, NHF contribution, pension contribution and salary in lieu for the claimants. Counsel also took into account the part judgment entered on the 4^th of April, 2022 and contended that bearing the lesser amounts computed in the address, it is trite law that a Court may award less than what was claimed, as the mathematical justification results in less than what was claimed in no way affects the jurisdiction of the Court to enter judgment in favor of the Claimants. Counsel cited in this regard the cases of CHIEF SUNDAY OGUNYADE V. SOLOMON OLUYEMI OSHUNKEYE & ANOR (2007) LPELR- 2355 (SC); EMEKA ENEMCHUKWU vs. CHIMAROKE OKOYE (2016) LPELR (40027) 1.

 

With regards to claim for general damages, counsel urged the Court to remedy the injustice suffered by the Claimants by awarding very generous damages in favor of the Claimant’s, and such other orders as the court may deem fit to make in the circumstances, under Section 19 of the National Industrial Court Act.

Counsel concluded by urging the Honorable Court to grant the Reliefs as contended in the Claimants’ address, and discountenance the assertions of the Defendants.

 

By way of reply on point of law filed on the 19^th of May, 2025, counsel to the Defendant posited to the effect that the admission in paragraph 22 of the witness statement on oath of Briggs Wali over the NHF contribution being owed was a clerical error to be blamed on the lawyer. 

With regards to the non-remittance of the NHF and Pension contributions, counsel respectively cited section 20 of the National Housing Fund Act and section 11(3) (b) of the Pension Reforms Act, 2014 to content that assuming there were shortfalls in the contributions, the Claimants are not the regulators for the enforcement.

The argument with regards to the Staff Manual of 2009 against the Communique, and with regards to the mediation by PENGASSAN were a rehash of contentions already made in the Final address of the Defendant.  

Upon a careful review of all the processes filed by the respective parties in this suit, I have diligently evaluated the pleadings, considered the oral and documentary evidence adduced at trial, and watched the demeanour of the witnesses who testified before this Court. I have equally scrutinised the documentary evidence tendered and admitted as exhibits.

Furthermore, I have taken due account of the reliefs sought by the Claimants vis-à-vis the arguments canvassed by learned Counsel on both sides in their respective Final Written Addresses and Reply on Points of Law.

Having considered the totality of the facts, the legal arguments, and the evidence placed before the Court, I find that the issue germane for determination in this suit is succinctly captured as follows:

Whether, in view of the facts, circumstances of this case and the evidence before the Court, the Claimants are entitled to the reliefs sought.

Before proceeding to address the lone issue formulated, I find it necessary to first resolve the objection raised regarding the admissibility of Exhibits D2 – D8, which were admitted under protest during trial.

When the said documents were tendered by the Defendant through DW1, learned Counsel for the Claimants objected to their admissibility on the ground that they are photocopies and not Certified True Copies (CTCs), without further elaboration. In response, learned Counsel for the Defendant contended that proper foundation had been laid for the tendering of the said documents.

The Court directed that parties advance arguments on the admissibility of these documents in their respective Final Written Addresses. However, both Counsel failed to address this issue in their addresses. Consequently, the only arguments before this Court remain those raised orally at the point of tendering.

Having examined the documents in question, I note that they are indeed photocopies. During trial, DW1 explained that the original copies of the documents were lodged in another court. The documents tendered bear the logo and official markings of the Defendant company.

It is trite that only public documents require certification as true copies for admissibility under Section 104 of the Evidence Act. In the instant case, the documents in contention are internal company documents emanating from a private corporate entity and do not fall within the contemplation of public documents. As such, the requirement for certification does not apply.

I find that DW1 laid sufficient foundation for the tendering of secondary evidence in respect of the said documents. Therefore, the objection to their admissibility lacks merit and is hereby overruled.

Accordingly, Exhibits D2 – D8 are properly admitted in evidence and shall be accorded their due probative value in the resolution of this suit.

Returning to the lone issue for determination, I must foremost reiterate that in view of the nature of the declaratory reliefs sought by the Claimants, the law is well settled that a party seeking declaratory reliefs must succeed on the strength of his own case, and not on the weakness or even absence of a defence.

In this regard, the Supreme Court in MATANMI & ORS v. DADA & ANOR (2013) LPELR-19929(SC) emphatically held:

“I agree with the learned counsel that the plaintiffs must establish their claim on the strength of their case. They cannot place any reliance on the weakness of the defence; if any. The burden of proof on the plaintiffs in establishing their declaratory relief to the satisfaction of the court is quite heavy in the sense that such a declaratory relief is not granted even on admission by the defendant where the plaintiffs fail to establish their entitlement to the declaration sought by their own evidence.”

Per FABIYI, J.S.C

See also: Nwokidu v. Okaru (2010) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1181) 362; Dantata v. Mohammed (2002) 7 NWLR (Pt. 664) 176; Dumiez Nig. Ltd. v. Nwakhoba (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt.1119) 361 at 373.

The Court of Appeal in P.D.P v. Abubakar (2007) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1022) 515 at 546 - 547 paras. D - A echoed the same principle thus:

“In civil cases, before a court can grant a declaratory relief sought by a plaintiff, he must plead and lead evidence to entitle him to the declaration sought. An admission by the defendant will in no way relieve the plaintiff from the onus placed on him of proving his claim. The plaintiff has the bounding duty to satisfy the court by evidence, and not through admission in the pleading of the defendant, that he is entitled to the declaration sought. The court has a discretion to grant a declaration or refuse same. The outcome will depend on how cogent and strong the claimant’s case is. In other words, courts do not make a declaration of right on admissions.”

See also the authorities of: Bello v. Eweka (1981) SC 101; Motunwase v. Sorungbe (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt. 92) 90; Dabup v. Kolo (1993) 9 NWLR (Pt. 317) 254; Nkwocha v. Ofurum (2002) 5 NWLR (Pt. 761) 506.

It must be further noted that while civil cases are indeed determined on the balance of probabilities or preponderance of evidence, the burden of proof lies squarely on the party who asserts, in line with the evidential principle encapsulated in section 131(1) of the Evidence Act 2011.

The Supreme Court in Ajuwon v. Akanni (1993) NWLR (Pt. 316) 182 held that:

“Where a material fact is pleaded and is either denied or disputed by the other side, the onus of proof clearly rests on he who asserts such a fact to establish the same by evidence. An averment in pleadings is not and does not amount to evidence and must therefore be established by satisfactory evidence unless the same is expressly admitted.”

Per IGUH, JSC.

Having firmly stated the applicable principles of law, and bearing in mind the facts and evidentiary circumstances earlier set out in this judgment, I shall now proceed to consider, one after the other, the specific reliefs sought by the Claimants in this suit, and evaluate the extent to which they have been established by credible evidence to warrant a grant by this Court.

Relief (a) as sought by the Claimants reads thus:

“A Declaration that the Claimants are entitled to their benefits as specified in the Staff Manual issued by the Defendants in November 2009, their Pension Contributions, NHF Refunds and One Month Salary In lieu of Notice.”

The crux of contention between the parties in relation to the foregoing relief lies in the applicable framework for the computation of the Claimants’ terminal benefits. While the Claimants assert that their entitlements ought to be calculated based on the provisions of the Staff Manual issued by the Defendant in November 2009—which they claim to have signed—the Defendant contends that the said Staff Manual had become obsolete following subsequent reviews culminating in a Communiqué issued after meetings held on 27th May 2014 and more significantly, between 15th and 17th March 2016.

It is noteworthy that the Defendant was silent in its defence regarding the claims for pension contributions, National Housing Fund (NHF) refunds, and salary in lieu of notice. This silence, in the face of specific claims, may well amount to an admission, but I will address each aspect of the relief based on the evidence before the Court.

To begin with, there is no dispute as to the fact that the Claimants were employed by the Defendant and that their employments were terminated. The Claimants tendered their respective letters of appointment and letters of termination as Exhibits C2(a)–(f) and C3(a)–(f). Although the Claimants were employed at various times, their employment was terminated simultaneously with immediate effect on the 30th of June, 2016.

Notably, paragraph three of the termination letters states:

“We are making arrangements to pay your entitlements.”

This statement is an express acknowledgment of an outstanding obligation to the Claimants and further affirms that they were not given advance notice of termination. It implies that, at the very least, they are entitled to one month’s salary in lieu of notice, which the Defendant has not shown to have been paid.

With respect to the applicable terms of service, the Claimants tendered two versions of the Defendant’s Staff Manual of November 2009—marked Exhibit C6 and Exhibit C7 (certified true copy). They also tendered Exhibits C5(a)–(f) to support their claim for unpaid pension contributions and Exhibits C16(a)–(f) in relation to NHF refunds.

Clause 13.1 of the Staff Manual (Exhibits C6/C7) clearly provides as follows:

“Where an employee’s appointment is terminated without notice, the company shall pay a one month’s basic salary in lieu of notice.”

Clause 13.7 further outlines the gratuity benefits structure as follows:

• 0 – 5 years: 75% of Monthly Gross Salary for every completed year
• 6 – 10 years: 100% of Monthly Gross Salary for every completed year
• 11 – 15 years: 150% of Monthly Gross Salary for every completed year
• 16 – 20 years: 200% of Monthly Gross Salary for every completed year
• Above 21 years: 250% of Monthly Gross Salary for every completed year

The Claimants’ contention is that their terminal benefits must be computed on the basis of the above provisions. In rebuttal, the Defendant tendered several documents intended to demonstrate that the applicable framework had changed. These documents include:

• Exhibit D2: Communiqué arising from 1st Quarter Upper Management Meeting held 15th–17th March 2016;
• Exhibit D3: Letter to Fidelity Bank dated 24th January 2017;
• Exhibit D4: Communiqué from a meeting between CISCON and PENGASSAN held between 13th–15th November 2017;
• Exhibit D5: Minutes of Town Hall Meeting held on 27th May 2014;
• Exhibits D6 – D8: Additional Communiqués from internal meetings with PENGASSAN dated 18th November 2016, 23rd May 2016, and 18th July 2016 respectively.

While the Defendant relies on these communiqués to argue that the Staff Manual had been revised, it is pertinent to observe that none of these communiqués bear the signatures or acknowledgments of the Claimants as consenting parties. It was further admitted under cross-examination by DW1 that none of the Claimants were part of the Defendant’s management team and did not participate in the meetings referenced in the exhibits.

At this stage, the Court must assess whether the Defendant has discharged the evidential burden of showing that the 2009 Staff Manual was validly and contractually superseded by the subsequent Communiqués. The question of whether the Claimants were bound by the revised terms allegedly adopted through management or union negotiations—absent evidence of their consent or signature—will be crucial to the determination of this relief.

I shall now proceed to address the individual heads of entitlements listed under this relief, including the validity and enforceability of the 2009 Staff Manual vis-à-vis the Communiqué, and the Defendant’s obligations under the Pension Reform Act and the NHF Act, in due course.

Upon a careful perusal of the Communiqués tendered by the Defendant, particularly Exhibits D2, D4, and D5, in contrast with the Staff Manual of November 2009 tendered as Exhibits C6/C7, I find it imperative to state from the outset that the law is well-settled on how expropriatory or restrictive provisions ought to be construed. It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that any provision or instrument which seeks to derogate from accrued rights or reduce the entitlements of an individual must be interpreted strictly against the authority making such imposition and liberally in favour of the party whose rights are to be curtailed.

This principle was restated by the Supreme Court in Okotie-Eboh v. Manager (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt.905) 242, where the Court held:

“It is also a recognised principle of interpretation of statutes that statutes which encroach on the rights of the subject whether as regard person or property are construed as penal laws fortissime contra proferentes, that is, strictly in favour of the subject.”

Applying this principle to the present case, I find that the Communiqués tendered by the Defendant in an attempt to negate the Staff Manual of 2009—particularly Exhibit D2 (March 2016), Exhibit D4 (November 2017), and Exhibit D5 (May 2014)—fall short of establishing a clear and final supersession of the said Staff Manual in relation to terminal benefits.

Starting with Exhibit D2, titled “Communiqué arising from 1st Quarter Upper Management Meeting held on 15th–17th March 2016”, it is pertinent to highlight that the document does not show any evidence of being ratified by the affected employees or communicated individually to the Claimants. The second paragraph of the Communiqué, under the subheading “Staff Manual”, reads as follows:

“The revised Staff Manual has been approved by the Upper Management and will be published as soon as practicable.

 

(a) With effect from 1st January 2013, computation of the new Terminal Benefits shall be based on 50% of monthly basic salary for each service year and this shall be in effect until 31st December 2018, after which time the computation shall be reviewed, subject to the prevailing circumstances.

 

(b) The newly approved computation factor of 50% of monthly basic salary stated above, shall be incorporated into the existing Staff Manual and shall supersede the existing computation factor(s).”

Notably, the opening paragraph of the Communiqué contemplates that a revised Staff Manual would be published at a later date. However, the Defendant has not placed before this Court any evidence of the existence or publication of such a revised Staff Manual. The absence of this material document undermines the finality and operational force of the purported revision.

Moreover, while Exhibit D2 proposes that terminal benefit computation shall be based on 50% of monthly basic salary, Exhibit D4 (the Communiqué issued in November 2017 after a meeting between CISCON and PENGASSAN) reflects an entirely different computation formula, thereby introducing inconsistency. It states:

“Terminal Benefits for all disengaged staff up to December 31st, 2012 shall be paid based on 80% of monthly gross salary for every year served, while for the period 1st January 2013 to 14th November 2017, it shall be based on 70% monthly gross salary for every year served. The terminal benefit for the period beyond 14th November 2017 shall be based on 60% of monthly basic salary for every year served.”

The inconsistency between the computation models in Exhibit D2 and Exhibit D4 further supports the finding that the Communiqués did not represent a settled or binding revision of the Staff Manual of 2009. Rather, they reveal a state of flux and negotiation—one that was apparently still evolving even after the Claimants’ disengagement on 30th June 2016.

Instructively, none of the Communiqués bear the signatures of the Claimants or any proof that they were parties to the negotiations or that they consented to the altered benefit regime. The law is clear that a variation of contract terms must be by mutual consent. Therefore, any unilateral reduction of terminal entitlements without express or implied acceptance by the Claimants is legally ineffective.

In light of the foregoing, and particularly having regard to the strict approach required when construing instruments that seek to derogate from accrued benefits, I find that the Communiqués tendered by the Defendant—being inconsistent, unsigned by the Claimants, and unaccompanied by any published revised Staff Manual—are insufficient to displace the valid and binding provisions of the November 2009 Staff Manual governing the Claimants’ terms of disengagement.

What the foregoing analysis establishes is that the issue of terminal benefit revision between the Claimants and the Defendant was not conclusively settled during the management meeting held between the 15th and 17th of March 2016. As at that time, the Claimants’ employment had not only been terminated—with effect from 30th June 2016—but there was still ongoing negotiation concerning the terminal benefits, as evidenced in the later Communiqué issued between 13th and 15th November 2017 (Exhibit D4). This sequence of events renders it manifest that the Claimants’ entitlements had already accrued under the terms of the Staff Manual of November 2009 at the time of their disengagement.

By implication, those accrued entitlements became a debt upon termination. The Defendant’s subsequent negotiations or proposals for downward variation—irrespective of whether they were economic measures or policy adjustments—do not extinguish the Claimants’ pre-existing contractual rights. Most crucially, the law does not permit the unilateral imposition of a revised terminal benefit structure upon employees whose employment had already ended, especially where no mutual agreement to such variation was reached.

I am not unmindful of the emphasis placed by learned Counsel to the Defendant on the alleged withdrawal of the Claimants from PENGASSAN and the implication that they thereby opted out of ongoing collective negotiations. However, this argument overlooks the constitutional guarantees enshrined in Sections 36(6)(c) and 40 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), which confer on every citizen the right to freedom of association, choice of representation, and access to the courts for the enforcement of legal rights.

Accordingly, the Claimants, having ceased to be in the employment of the Defendant as of 30th June 2016, also ceased to be members of PENGASSAN from that date and retained the right to pursue their entitlements individually. In further support of this position, the Claimants’ resignation from PENGASSAN was formally documented by letters dated 4th October 2016, admitted in evidence as Exhibits C4(a) – (f). Notably, the latest Communiqué on terminal benefits tendered by the Defendant (Exhibit D4) is dated 15th November 2017—over a year after the Claimants had withdrawn from the union. The implication is that PENGASSAN was no longer acting on their behalf during the negotiations that produced Exhibit D4.

The cumulative effect of the evidence is that while the Defendant contemplated reviewing its terminal benefit policy from as early as 2014 (see Exhibit D5), it neither successfully revised the Staff Manual of November 2009 prior to the disengagement of the Claimants nor obtained their consent to any variation thereafter. Consequently, the provisions of the 2009 Staff Manual—being extant and binding at the material time—remain the governing instrument for the computation of the Claimants’ terminal entitlements and I so hold.

With respect to pension contributions, I observe that the Defendant made no specific denial or explanation regarding the non-remittance of pension deductions, save for the submission of learned counsel that the Claimants lack locus standi to claim same, as they are not regulatory agencies. This submission is with respect, misconceived. Employees have the right to enforce their statutory entitlements, including pension remittances, particularly where deductions were made from their salaries but not credited into their Retirement Savings Accounts (RSAs).

Upon evaluating Exhibits C5(a) – (f), which consist of Pension Fund statements, I find that the Defendant is clearly identified as the employer in all but one of the statements. Specifically, Exhibit C5(d) (in respect of the 3rd Claimant) curiously reflects “Income Electirx Nigeria Limited” as the employer. No explanation was offered for this discrepancy, and in the absence of further clarity, this Court is unable to make a positive finding in favour of the 3rd Claimant on this leg of the claim.

As for the remaining Claimants, I find that their last pension contributions, as reflected in their respective statements, were made between January and March 2014, despite their employment continuing until June 2016. This evidences a clear default in statutory remittance, and entitles the affected Claimants to a declaration and order that their pension deductions from March 2014 (or earlier, where applicable) to June 2016 be paid into their respective RSAs.

Turning to the National Housing Fund (NHF), the Defendant equally failed to proffer any evidence in rebuttal of the Claimants’ assertions. The only argument presented was similar in tone to that of the pension claims, namely that the Claimants lack the legal standing to seek enforcement. Again, this is untenable in law. I have examined Exhibits C16(a) – (f), which are employee ledger cards issued by the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (FMBN), and each reflects the Defendant as employer. The records therein show that the last NHF contribution for each of the Claimants was in January 2014, after which contributions ceased despite continued employment.

It follows, therefore, that the Defendant remains liable to remit the NHF contributions deducted from the Claimants’ salaries from the point of last remittance until their respective employments were terminated in June 2016.

In summary, and upon a comprehensive consideration of the relevant evidence and submissions, I find that the Claimants have established entitlement to the relief sought in Relief (a). This Court, therefore, declines to accept the Defendant’s contention that the Staff Manual of November 2009 was superseded by any of the Communiqués tendered.

Relief (b) seeks An Order that the Defendant pay to the Claimants the sum of ?56,566,561.00 as their terminal benefits in the following order:

(i) Ikechukwu Ibekwe – ?3,244,749.10

(ii) Linus Umanah – ?21,409,795.96

(iii) Augustine Benye – ?1,851,709.60

(iv) Amaka Njoku – ?13,323,356.39

(v) Kenneth Iwuoha – ?13,358,147.07

(vi) Oluseye Igbafe – ?3,378,802.84

In considering this relief, I have taken into account Clause 13.7 of the Defendant’s Staff Manual of November 2009, which sets out the formula for computing gratuity benefits based on years of service and applicable percentage of gross monthly salary.

The Claimants placed before the Court the relevant Staff Manual (Exhibit C6/C7) and their respective letters of employment and termination (Exhibits C2(a)–(f) and C3(a)–(f)), from which the number of completed years of service can be determined. However, no direct documentary evidence of the Claimants’ final salaries was provided.

The only reference to salary is in paragraph 16 of the Statement of Facts, which contains a table listing the terminal benefit claims and one-month salary in lieu of notice. Notably, this assertion was not specifically challenged or controverted by the Defendant. Given the absence of a direct and material challenge, and in line with the settled principle that unchallenged evidence may be relied upon, I accept the salary figures stated therein as plausible for purposes of computation.Based on the employment and termination dates, the completed years of service for each Claimant are as follows:

• 1st Claimant (Ikechukwu Ibekwe) – 11 years
• 2nd Claimant (Linus Umanah) – 20 years
• 3rd Claimant (Augustine Benye) – 7 years
• 4th Claimant (Amaka Njoku) – 16 years
• 5th Claimant (Kenneth Iwuoha) – 19 years
• 6th Claimant (Oluseye Igbafe) – 9 years

The applicable percentages from Clause 13.7 are:

• 6–10 years: 100% of monthly gross salary
• 11–15 years: 150%
• 16–20 years: 200%
• Above 21 years – 250% of monthly gross salary for every completed year.

Using the unchallenged gross salary figures and applying the clause to each Claimant:

1. Ikechukwu Ibekwe – 150% × ?292,770.82 × 11 = ?3,220,479.07
2. Linus Umanah – 200% × ?1,048,624.18 × 20 = ?20,972,483.60
3. Augustine Benye – 100% × ?258,366.07 × 7 = ?1,808,562.49
4. Amaka Njoku – 200% × ?819,898.86 × 16 = ?13,118,381.76
5. Kenneth Iwuoha – 200% × ?697,797.22 × 19 = ?13,258,147.18
6. Oluseye Igbafe – 100% × ?348,898.61 × 9 = ?3,140,087.49

The cumulative sum from the above computations amounts to ?55,518,159.59.

This Court takes judicial notice of the Part Judgment entered on 4th April 2022 by my learned brother, Hon. Justice P.I. Hamman, awarding the sum of ?22,503,092.11 to the Claimants in respect of admitted terminal benefits.

Accordingly, deducting the admitted sum from the computed entitlement yields a balance of ?33,013,067.48, representing the contested portion of the Claimants’ terminal benefits now established before this Court.

Although the Claimants originally claimed the sum of ?56,566,561.00, it is trite law that a court is entitled to grant less than what is claimed, but not more than what is pleaded and proved. This principle was restated by the Court of Appeal in UKO v. THE LIQUIDATOR, UTUK CONSTRUCTION & MARKETING CO. LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) & ORS (2011) LPELR-9120(CA), where AKAAHS, J.C.A., held:

“There is nothing wrong in law for a court to grant to a party less than what he claimed but definitely not more than what he is entitled to and what is proved at the trial.”

In light of the foregoing, Relief (b) is granted to the effect that this court makes an order directing the Defendant to pay to the Claimants the total sum of ?33,013,067.48 being the unpaid and contested balance of terminal benefits due to the Claimants under the extant provisions of the Staff Manual of November 2009.

The Claimants, by Reliefs (c) and (d), seek specific monetary orders directing the Defendant to remit unremitted pension contributions and National Housing Fund (NHF) refunds into their respective statutory accounts.

Relief (c) seeks “An Order that the Defendant pay the following sums (totaling ?10,010,624.00) into the Claimants’ individual pension fund accounts:

• Ikechukwu Ibekwe (Pension Alliance Ltd): ?941,006.37
• Linus Umanah (Pension Alliance Ltd): ?2,487,046.03
• Augustine Benye (Crusader Sterling Pensions Ltd): ?1,255,903.50
• Amaka Njoku (Crusader Sterling Pensions Ltd): ?1,890,072.95
• Kenneth Iwuoha (Pension Alliance Ltd): ?1,718,297.57
• Oluseye Igbafe (Pension Alliance Ltd): ?1,718,297.57

Upon review of the evidence, the Court finds merit in the substance of the relief, as the Claimants tendered their pension statements as Exhibits C5(a)–(f), showing stoppage in contributions. However, it is observed that the pension statement for the 3rd Claimant (Exhibit C5(d)) does not reflect the Defendant as the employer. Consequently, there is no probative link between the Defendant and the alleged obligation in respect of the 3rd Claimant.

For the remaining Claimants, based on the documents in evidence, the number of months for which contributions were not remitted—from February 2014 to June 2016—ranges from 27 to 29 months depending on the last recorded payment.

Accordingly, using the last contribution figures for each Claimant and applying the unpaid months:

• 1st Claimant: ?20,999.00 × 29 months = ?608,971.00
• 2nd Claimant: ?57,945.76 × 29 months = ?1,608,420.08
• 4th Claimant: ?45,642.20 × 27 months = ?1,232,339.40
• 5th Claimant: ?34,457.38 × 29 months = ?999,264.02
• 6th Claimant: ?34,457.38 × 29 months = ?999,264.02

This amounts to a total unremitted pension sum of ?5,448,256.52.

Accordingly, Relief (c) succeeds in part and it is hereby ordered that the Defendant shall remit the total sum of ?5,448,256.52 into the pension accounts of the underlisted Claimants as follows:

• ?608,971.00 for Ikechukwu Ibekwe
• ?1,608,420.08 for Linus Umanah
• ?1,232,339.40 for Amaka Njoku
• ?999,264.02 for Kenneth Iwuoha
• ?999,264.02 for Oluseye Igbafe

No order is made in favour of the 3rd Claimant in this regard due to insufficient proof of the Defendant’s responsibility for contributions to his pension account.

Relief (d) seeks “An Order that the Defendant pay the total sum of ?1,221,809.83 to the National Housing Fund as refunds for the Claimants in the following amounts:

• Ikechukwu Ibekwe: ?113,196.74
• Linus Umanah: ?304,424.16
• Augustine Benye: ?153,410.14
• Amaka Njoku: ?218,652.16
• Kenneth Iwuoha: ?216,063.32
• Oluseye Igbafe: ?216,063.31

The Claimants tendered Exhibits C16(a)–(f), which are their individual ledger cards issued by the Federal Mortgage Bank, naming the Defendant as the employer and capturing monthly NHF contributions.

The last contributions made by the Defendant were for January 2014, and the evidence establishes a 29-month gap (February 2014 to June 2016) during which no remittances were made. Applying this to the last monthly contribution yields the following:

• 1st Claimant: ?2,887.55 × 29 = ?83,738.95
• 2nd Claimant: ?8,500.05 × 29 = ?246,501.45
• 3rd Claimant: ?4,137.55 × 29 = ?119,988.95
• 4th Claimant: ?6,637.55 × 29 = ?192,488.95
• 5th Claimant: ?5,012.55 × 29 = ?145,363.95
• 6th Claimant: ?5,012.55 × 29 = ?145,363.95

The total outstanding NHF contributions amount to ?933,446.20, which, though less than the sum claimed, is established by evidence and uncontroverted by the Defendant.

Accordingly, Relief (d) is granted to the extent that this court hereby orders that the Defendant shall remit the total sum of ?933,446.20 into the respective NHF accounts of the Claimants as follows:

• ?83,738.95 for Ikechukwu Ibekwe
• ?246,501.45 for Linus Umanah
• ?119,988.95 for Augustine Benye
• ?192,488.95 for Amaka Njoku
• ?145,363.95 for Kenneth Iwuoha
• ?145,363.95 for Oluseye Igbafe

Relief (e) seeks “An Order that the Defendant pay the sum of ?2,085,605.36 to the Claimants as one month salary in lieu of notice as stated below:

• Ikechukwu Ibekwe: ?195,180.55
• Linus Umanah: ?524,312.09
• Augustine Benye: ?258,366.07
• Amaka Njoku: ?409,949.43
• Kenneth Iwuoha: ?348,898.61
• Oluseye Igbafe: ?348,898.61

There is no dispute on record that the Defendant failed to pay the Claimants salary in lieu of notice following the termination of their employment. The Court, therefore, finds that the Claimants are entitled to this head of relief.

However, I must observe that Clause 13 of the Staff Manual of November 2009—which was extant at the time of termination—specifically refers to “one month basic salary” in lieu of notice. The Claimants, though providing a tabulated sum in paragraph 16 of the Statement of Facts, failed to disaggregate the components of their salaries to clearly establish what portion constitutes the basic salary. In the absence of such breakdown, the Court is unable to confirm that the amounts stated in paragraph 16 truly represent their “basic salary” as required under the applicable contract.

Accordingly, Relief (e) is granted only to the extent that the Defendant shall pay to each Claimant their respective one-month basic salary as salary in lieu of notice, in line with Clause 13 of the Staff Manual of November 2009.

Relief (f) seeks “An Order awarding general damages of ?24,000,000.00 (i.e., ?4,000,000.00 each) against the Defendant in favour of the Claimants.

The principles governing the award of general damages are well settled. As held in SEVEN-UP BOTTLING COMPANY PLC v. NKANGA & ORS. (2008) LPELR-8462(CA):

“General damages are those which the law presumes to arise naturally and directly from the wrong complained of and in respect of which the Court will award a fair and reasonable compensation, even where the Claimant does not adduce specific evidence in proof.”

Having reviewed the facts and circumstances of this case—including the Defendant’s prolonged failure to remit terminal entitlements, pension contributions, and housing fund remittances—the Court is satisfied that the Claimants suffered avoidable economic hardship arising from the Defendant’s omissions.

While the Defendant cited economic downturn and financial constraints during the relevant period, such explanation, though noted, cannot extinguish the responsibility to honour accrued employee entitlements. The Defendant’s conduct constitutes a breach of the Claimants’ right to timely receipt of their lawful earnings.

In line with Section 19(d) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, and guided by equity and judicial discretion, the Court finds that an award of ?1,000,000.00 per Claimant is appropriate in the circumstances.

Accordingly, Relief (f) is granted in part, and it is hereby ordered that the Defendant shall pay the sum of ?1,000,000.00 each to the six Claimants, amounting to a total of ?6,000,000.00 as general damages.

The sole issue formulated for determination is resolved substantially in favour of the Claimants. Upon a holistic appraisal of the pleadings, evidence, and applicable law, the Court finds that the Claimants have proved their entitlement to the extent granted in this judgment.

Accordingly, judgment is entered in favour of the Claimants in part as follows:

The Claimants are entitled to terminal benefits, pension contributions, NHF refunds, and one-month basic salary in lieu of notice under the Staff Manual of November 2009.

The Defendant shall pay to the Claimants the sum of ?33,013,067.48 as the outstanding portion of terminal benefits, having deducted the amount already paid pursuant to part-judgment.

The Defendant shall remit the sum of ?5,448,256.52 into the pension accounts of the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Claimants as specified.

The Defendant shall remit the sum of ?933,446.20 into the respective NHF accounts of all six Claimants.

The Defendant shall pay to each Claimant their one-month basic salary as salary in lieu of notice, in accordance with Clause 13 of the 2009 Staff Manual.

The Defendant shall pay general damages in the sum of ?6,000,000.00 (i.e., ?1,000,000.00 to each Claimant) for breach of obligation and hardship suffered.

Judgment is accordingly entered.

No order is made as to cost.

 

…………………………………………………………….

HON. JUSTICE Z. M. BASHIR, PhD.

JUDGE